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Tech Talks With Kinsoft

Tech Talks With Kinsoft artwork

Gelatissimo Data Breach – DragonForce and the 352GB Heist

Jun 2, 202621 minAudio

Got something to say to this podcast? Send a voicemail, and you might hear yourself on the next episode! In April 2026, the DragonForce ransomware group claimed it breached Gelatissimo, the Australian artisanal gelato franchise, and listed the company on its dark web leak site. In this episode of Tech Talks with Kinsoft, we cover what the group alleges it took - around 352GB of data, with sample screenshots showing employee payroll details, partial tax file numbers, and a visa application containing a passport number - the extortion threat to publish the data, and Gelatissimo's response, including engaging cyber security experts and notifying the OAIC and the Australian Cyber Security Centre. We flag throughout where claims are alleged rather than confirmed. Worried about ransomware and the safety of your staff and customer data? Visit www.kinsoft.com.au to talk through your security and IT needs. Sources: Cyber Daily; ACS Information Age.

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Welcome to Tech Talks with Kinsoft. It's great to be here. So when you think of gelatissimo, you probably think of like sunny Australian afternoons, right? Yeah, exactly. Artisanal gelato, happy memories. Right. It's this very innocent, everyday image. But today we are dragging that bright, sunny brand into the darkest corners of the internet. Which is quite the tonal shift. It really is. Because today we are unpacking a massive 352 gigabyte Data heist. And it's one that brings

the abstract world of cybersecurity right to the doorstep of everyday retail workers. Yeah, it's a very striking juxtaposition. And, you know, it perfectly illustrates the reality of the modern threat landscape. Definitely. Because we are dealing with this incredibly sophisticated ecosystem of extortion. And honestly, they do not care if you sell software, manufacture cars or, you know, scoop gelato. They really don't. So our mission for this exploration is to basically cut through the dense technical. jargon surrounding this recent ransomware attack. Right, because there's a lot of it. Exactly. We have a stack

of incredibly detailed recent reporting here, primarily from Information Age and Cyber Daily. Excellent sources. Yeah. And we want to use those to uncover what this actually means for the human beings whose data is caught in the crossfire. Because there's a real human cost here. Right. We are looking beyond the flashy headlines to understand, like, the mechanics of the attack, the horrifying permanence of the data that is allegedly at risk, and, of course, the agonizing reality of a corporate extortion countdown. It's a lot to cover. It is. OK, let's unpack this.

I think the best place to start is just with the scale of the target. And the sheer audacity of the claims being made by the four actors. Yeah, because Gelatissimo is not some small mom and pop operation. No, not at all. I mean, this is a massive franchise. They started right here in Sydney back in 2002. And they have grown to over 60 stores across Australia, plus around 22 international locations. Which means they hold a massive amount of operational and employee data. A staggering amount. And according to the reporting, a ransomware group known as Dragonforce

posted a listing for Gelatissimo on their dark web leak site. Right. And they claim to have stolen roughly 352 gigabytes of data from the company's systems. Which is just huge. It is. To put that in perspective for you listening, 352 gigabytes of purely corporate and text -based data is... Like an absolute ocean of information. Yeah, we're talking about millions upon millions of pages of documents, spreadsheets, communications. Endless files. Exactly. And exfiltrating that

amount of data is not an instant process. Right. It's not a quick copy and paste job you do in five minutes. No. Moving 352 gigabytes out of a corporate network without tripping alarms, that often implies that the attackers had persistent undetected access to the systems. Like for a significant period of time? Usually. Slowly, yeah. Slowly siphoning the data out before they ever even made their presence known. Wow. But to prove they actually have this massive warehouse -sized filing cabinet of data, they didn't just dump it all at once on the dark web. No. That's

not how the extortion works. Right. Imagine someone stealing that massive filing cabinet. But to prove they have the leverage, they only slide six terrifying folders under your door. That's a great analogy. They released a very tiny, highly curated sample. Yeah. But I want to push back on the core premise here, though. OK, go ahead. Why target a gelato company? I mean, are we looking at some highly coordinated cinematic digital heist specifically plotting against gelatissimo? Or is this just like automated opportunism? It's

the latter. And the Cyber Daily source provides a very clear profile of the attackers that answers that question entirely. OK, so who are they? So Dragon Force is not a team of rogue hackers huddled in a basement nursing some weird grudge against a gelato chain. Right. No vendetta against ice cream. Exactly. They operate a highly industrialized model. It's known as ransomware as a service or RAS. Ransomware as a service. Wow. Yeah. They essentially function as a malicious software vendor. So they build the infrastructure, but they don't necessarily execute the break in themselves.

Spot on. They develop the malicious software. They maintain the dark web leak sites, you know, where the countdown timers are hosted. And they manage the negotiation portals used to extort the victims. So it's basically a platform. That is the core of the Reyes model. Dragon Force relies on what they call affiliates. Affiliates, like marketers. Like independent contractors of the cybercrime world. Oh, wow. Yeah. These affiliates, they scour the internet for literally any vulnerability. An unpatched server, a compromised

password, a successful phishing email. Just knocking on digital doors until one opens. Exactly. And once they find a way in, they rent the Dragonforce platform to execute the actual ransomware deployment and the extortion. So how does the money work? Well, when a ransom is paid, Dragonforce takes a 20 % cut for providing the software and the platform. Okay. And the affiliate who actually executed the breach keeps the remaining 80%. That is literally a franchising model for cybercrime. It really is. I mean, the irony is incredibly bitter there, considering Gelatissimo relies

on a franchise model for its own legitimate business. yeah the attackers are using the exact same scalable business structures to inflict the damage that is wild and it is a ruthless highly organized business like dragon force actively advertises its platform on russian language hacking forums to recruit skilled affiliates so they are recruiting openly yes they are also believed to have operational links to the notorious lock bit ransomware cartel oh lock bit they're huge very huge but the most

important mechanism to understand here is their use of the double extortion tactic. Right, because the old model of ransomware was just about locking you out, wasn't it? Exactly. Hackers would encrypt your files and demand a ransom for the decryption key. It was basically a business interruption problem. Yeah, and if you had good backups, you could simply wipe your systems, restore the data, and ignore the hackers completely. But double extortion changes that. It does. It was invented specifically to bypass the defense of having good backups. Okay, so how does it work? So the

affiliate doesn't just encrypt the data anymore. They steal it first. They take it out of the network. Right. They silently exfiltrate that 352 gigabytes to their own servers. Then they deploy the encryption to lock the victim's systems, causing that immediate panic and business outage. So the company scrambles, they go to check their backups, right? Yes. And that's when the hackers reveal the second layer of extortion. They say, even if you can restore your systems, we have all your sensitive data and we will publish it to the dark web if you don't pay. It transforms

a vandalism problem into a full -blown hostage situation. What's fascinating here is just how prolific this indiscriminate targeting has become. Dragon Force has claimed 505 victims to date. 505? Yeah, and that number more than doubled in just a few months following last September. That's terrifying. In the exact same week, they listed Gelatissimo. They also listed a printing specialist, a landscaping company, an engineering firm, and a U .S. medical equipment supplier. So it really is totally random. Completely. They do not care what industry you are in. They only

care that you have a database of human identities that they can monetize. Right. And to understand the. the severe credibility of their extortion threats, we really have to look at their track record. Definitely. Last year, Dragon Force claimed an attack on a Queensland -based organization, the Toowoomba Friendly Society Dispensary. A medical dispensary. Yes. They claim to have stolen nearly 36 gigabytes of data. And a medical dispensary hold a completely different classification of data. than a gelato shop. Radically different.

I mean, you were moving from corporate operations into deeply private health information. Exactly. And when the dispensary presumably refused to pay the ransom, Dragon Force followed through on their threat. They leaked it all. They leaked the data. The information that became freely available on the dark net included medical documents with names, addresses, and even photographs of patients. Oh my God. It detailed highly sensitive specific medical treatments. Everything from methadone treatment to... prescriptions for emergency contraceptives. That is just beyond cruel. They

also leaked staff pay details and high resolution scans of employees' Medicare cards and driver's licenses. Wow. So if Dragon Force is willing to weaponize the private medical history of a dispensary patient, just to prove a point. Yeah. The terrifying reality is that Gelatissimo's employees are facing that exact same ruthlessness. Absolutely. So what specific leverage did the hackers expose this time? What is actually in those six sample screenshots they used as proof of the breach? So the reporting from Information

Age details the contents of those six screenshots. Right. And we must explicitly note here that these are the alleged contents of the breach. Very important distinction. This is what the hackers claim to hold used to intimidate the company into pay. Right. So looking at the list, the hackers clearly curated this sample to inflict maximum psychological and operational pressure. Oh, without a doubt. You can basically divide the evidence into two categories, I think, corporate leverage and personal ammunition. Let's look at the corporate leverage first. OK, so on the corporate side, the fourth and fifth screenshots

were a bank transfer receipt and a detailed corporate bank statement. Right. Proving they had access to deep financial operations. And then the sixth screenshot amplifies that corporate leverage. significantly. It really does. It was a list of direct contact details. So emails and mobile numbers for corporate staff located in the Philippines, various franchising and operations teams in Australia, and crucially, the direct contacts for the chief executive officer and the chief financial officer. Wow. The CEO and CFO. That brings us to the personal

ammunition, which is almost scarier. Yeah, the employee data. The first screenshot was an alleged spreadsheet listing employee first and last names, their gross earnings, their paid leave, overtime bonuses, and withheld taxes. Extremely granular payroll data. Extremely. And most alarmingly, that same spreadsheet. appeared to list the last four digits of the employee's tax file numbers, their TFNs. Which is highly sensitive. And then a second sample was just wild to me. It was an alleged visa application. Right. Containing a

passport number, a phone number, a professional email address, and the person's actual home address. Just a complete identity kit right there. Yes. And the third sample was an incident report from a 2025 workplace accident. Yeah, which provides deeply personal, potentially sensitive medical or human resources context. So the threat model changes entirely depending on whose data we are looking at in that sample. Exactly. And the Information Age article actually includes... some critical insights from Nalin Arakulaj. The associate professor.

Yes, an associate professor in cybersecurity at RMIT University. And he breaks down exactly how this data is weaponized. Okay, how does he explain it? Well, for the senior executives, the danger really lies in sophisticated corporate fraud. Like using those leaked contact details of the CEO or CFO. Exactly. Those are incredibly valuable because they enable what the industry calls whaling. Whaling. Like phishing, but for the big fish. Precisely. Highly targeted scams and impersonation attacks. Because, I mean, if threat actors have the CEO's exact mobile number,

their internal email format, and the context of recent corporate bank transfers. They have everything they need. They can craft an incredibly convincing message. Like they can text a junior accountant at 4 .0 p .m. on a Friday claiming to be the CEO in an urgent meeting. I need you to authorize this massive wire transfer to a new vendor right now. Exactly. And they don't even need to hack the bank at that point. They just hack the human trust within the company. Right. The senior executives are the keys to the corporate vault. Yeah. But Professor Oroklige

points out that the danger for junior staff is arguably much worse on a personal level. How so? Because the sensitive data exposed in those other screenshots, the tax file number details, granular earnings information, visa documents, and passport numbers that forms a complete identity profile. And this data isn't just used once, right? No, not at all. In the dark web economy, a profile containing a passport number, a home address and partial TFNs is bundled up and sold to identity brokers. Identity brokers. Yeah. Criminals use automated tools to exploit this

information at scale. They use it to open fraudulent lines of credit, apply for loans or file fake tax returns. And the brutal reality here is that junior staff. The people making the gelato or handling the franchise administration, they generally have far fewer financial and legal resources to recover from having their identity stolen. Compared to a corporate executive. Absolutely. Here's where it gets really interesting. Professor Araklage provided a quote in the reporting that I think perfectly captures the terror of this

situation. What did he say? He said, once this kind of data is out, you can't change it like a password. It can follow people for years. That is chilling. And it's so true. It is. Because, like, you can cancel a compromised credit card in 10 minutes, right? Avially. You can force a company -wide reset of every single login credential. Yeah, well. But you cannot easily change your tax file number. No, you can't. You cannot alter the history of a workplace injury. Changing a passport number involves significant bureaucratic hurdles. And your home address is your physical

reality. This data is permanent. It is permanent. And that permanence is the engine of the extortion. Right. The attackers know that Gelatissimo knows this data cannot be taken back once it is published to the broader internet. Once it's out, it's out. Exactly. If a junior employee's visa application and passport details are leaked, they might not feel the impact tomorrow. Or even next month. Right. But three, four, five years down the line, they could go to apply for a mortgage. only to discover a string of defaulted loans taken out in their name. By someone who bought their identity

profile for pennies on some Russian forum. Exactly. The psychological toll of that invisible threat hanging over the workforce is immense. Which brings us to the agonizing reality of the countdown timer. The ticking clock. Yeah. According to the reporting, at the time the articles were published, Dragon Force had set a timer on their dark web leak site. Right. They gave Gelatissimo less than five days. About four days and 12 hours to be exact. Barely any time at all. To respond before they threaten to publish the entire 352

gigabyte data set. It is a completely artificial deadline. It's designed purely to force panic. Just to pressure them. Yeah. They want the corporate leadership to make a rushed emotional decision to pay the ransom before they even have time to fully understand the scope of the breach. So how does a company actually operate? when that clock starts ticking. Yeah. I mean, the public usually only sees a brief public relations statement, but behind the scenes, the pressure must be staggering. Oh, it's a war room environment.

To understand the response, we really have to separate the hackers' psychological warfare from what Gelatissimo has actually confirmed to the press. Yes, let's stick to the facts. Based strictly on the official statements provided to Information Age and Cyber Daily, the company initiated a very specific sequence of events. First, Gelatissimo confirmed that they did detect unauthorized access to a part of their systems. Okay. They publicly acknowledged that a cyber incident is actively being investigated. Right. Second, immediately upon discovering the incident, they engaged external

cybersecurity experts to contain the breach and run the forensics. So they called in the cavalry. And they also stated they are working urgently. To verify the third party's claims, which is crucial, they're trying to understand the exact nature and extent of the impacted information. And finally, they formally notify the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, the OAIC, and the Australian Cybersecurity Center, the ACSC. If we connect this to the bigger picture. Yeah, you can see the incredible regulatory and

operational tightrope the company is walking during those five days. By notifying the OAIC and the ACSC, they are triggering a massive legal and regulatory mechanism. They aren't just dealing with hackers anymore. No, they are no longer just fighting. the hackers. They are on the clock with the federal government. Right. The incident response team is facing this immense forensic bottleneck. Absolutely. They have external analysts desperately combing through network logs, just trying to reconstruct the attacker's path. Because they have to figure out if Dragonforce actually

exfiltrated 352 gigabytes of data, or if they only managed to grab those six folders and are just bluffing about the rest. Right. Verifying the scale of the theft takes time. but the artificial countdown timer on the dark web. It doesn't care about forensic timelines. Not at all. And while the technical team is dealing with that forensic bottleneck, the leadership team is managing the legal reporting requirements. Because personal data is involved. Exactly. They have to navigate the notifiable data breaches scheme, assessing

the risk of serious harm to individuals, and preparing to formally notify the affected employees and franchisees. And simultaneously, they are managing the human crisis. The staff. Yes. The company spokesperson explicitly stated they're apologizing for the concern the incident caused and that they take the protection of entrusted information very seriously. It's a very tough conversation to have. Imagine trying to communicate with a workforce that is... undoubtedly terrified about the exposure of their passports and tax files. While likely not having all the concrete

answers yet because the forensic investigation is still underway. Exactly. You are dealing with an active extortion threat, regulatory demands, panicking employees, and media scrutiny all at the exact same moment. It's a nightmare scenario. So what does this all mean for you? For the listener. Right. When we synthesize the mechanics of the Dragon Force Reyes model, the curation of that sample data, and the impossible corporate tightrope of the response, what is the ultimate takeaway?

It becomes very clear that this is not just a story about a gelato chain having a bad week. Not at all. It is a masterclass in understanding how invisible supply chains and everyday networks are the true targets of modern cybercrime. We often default to thinking that cyber warfare only targets massive financial institutions or defense contractors. Right, like the movies. But the reality is that franchising networks, retail chains, and the everyday mundane administrative data they hold. Like payroll processing, visa applications, incident reports. That is the high

volume currency of the dark web economy. The threat actors don't care about the product being sold. They don't care about the gelato. They care about the database of human identities required to run the business. It really reframes how we must. Think about the information we hand over to our employers or the businesses we frequent. Definitely. We are trusting these organizations, not just with our labor or our transactions, but with our digital permanence. And that trust is being systematically tested by industrialized extortion operations that view literally every

unpatched server as an opportunity to monetize human privacy. It's a sobering reality. It is. If today's discussion has you thinking about your own digital footprint, your business's vulnerabilities, or how to navigate this increasingly complex landscape, we strongly encourage you to visit www .kinsoft .com .au to discuss your own security and IT needs. Because you do not want to wait until an artificial countdown timer appears on a dark web forum to start taking your digital perimeter seriously. Preparation and proactive

defense are the only ways to survive in this environment. To wrap up our analysis today, there is a broader societal implication here that builds on everything we have discussed. Something we all need to sit with as these attacks become more frequent. We spent a lot of time discussing Professor Arkaz's insight about how this data is indelible. Right. You can't just change it. If our most sensitive foundational information... Our passport numbers, our tax files, our medical histories cannot simply be reset like a compromised

password. Are we rapidly approaching a future where we have to assume our personal history is permanently public? Wow. And if we accept that our data will eventually be breached, how does that fundamentally change the way we live, the way we establish trust, and the way we work online? That is an incredibly unsettling but entirely necessary thought to leave on. Thank you for exploring the mechanics and the human cost of this incident with me.

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