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Talk Cocktail

Talk Cocktail artwork

What Comes Next For Iran On The Brink.

Feb 11, 202640 minAudio
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The numbers coming out of Iran stop you cold: 12,000 to 20,000 dead in 48 hours. Not across months of civil war or years of grinding conflict, but concentrated into two January nights of systematic slaughter. My guest on this recent WhoWhatWhy podcast, Shay Khatiri, insists we’re focusing on the wrong horror. The real question isn’t what happened on January 8 and 9 - it’s what comes next. Because this wasn’t an economic protest that got out of hand. This was the maximum force Iranian civil society can muster on its own. And it wasn’t enough. According to Khatiri - a leading Iran scholar at the Yorktown Institute focusing on US foreign policy toward Iran and Russia - every previous uprising (2009, 2019, 2022) left a residue of unfulfilled promise and mounting rage. This time, the pattern breaks. What Khatiri heard from every source inside Iran, from overworked surgeons to furious shopkeepers, was the same plea: We’ll do everything we can, but we need help from outside. Get full access to Talk Cocktail Podcast at jeffschechtman.substack.com/subscribe

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Transcript

From the show. Tap a time to play from there.

SPEAKER_00Welcome to the Who, What, Why podcast. I'm your host, Jeff Sheckman. The images filtering out of Iran through the digital blackout tells a story almost too horrific to process. Body bags stacked in makeshift morgues, surgeons working through the night on young people whose organs were literally blown from their bodies. Desperate pleas for help spray-painted on walls in English. Between 12 and 20,000 dead in just two nights, if the reports are accurate. A massacre that would dwarf Tiananmen Square when adjusted for

population and

SPEAKER_00compressed into 48 hours of systemic slaughter. But numbers, even numbers this staggering, can numb us to the human reality underneath. The voices my guest has heard again and again from inside Iran were willing to do everything, but they needed help from the outside. This is the moment we've been warned about for years, the intersection of moral imperative and strategic necessity that makes us profoundly uncomfortable. Because intervention in the Middle East has become a dirty

word, a trauma we carry from Iraq.

SPEAKER_00Yet non-intervention in Syria created its own catastrophe. Hundreds of thousands dead, millions displaced, extremism metastasized, and Russian resurgence. Now Iran presents us with the same impossible choice, only with higher stakes, a nuclear threshold democracy that has spent 47 years exporting revolution, funding terror, and brutalizing its own people. My guest today, Shea Qatari, has been arguing that we're asking the wrong question.

SPEAKER_00It's not whether to intervene. Events are intervening on us whether we act or not. The real question is what kind of Iran emerges from this crisis and whether we'll have any influence over that outcome. Because what comes after the Islamic Republic may be even more dangerous than the regime itself. The tragedy is that we've been here before. 2009, 2019, 2022. Watching Iranians rise up. Watching them get crushed. watching the window close.

SPEAKER_00This time feels different, though, both in scale and in willingness of protesters to explicitly ask for foreign help. But different doesn't mean we know what to do. So we're left with the essential question. What do we owe people fighting for their freedom against a regime we've opposed for nearly half a century? What are our actual interests in Iran's future? And can we execute the kind of precision, intelligence-driven intervention that Sheikh Qatari describes without it spiraling

SPEAKER_00into something worse? Sheikh Qatari is vice president of development at a senior fellow at the Yorktown Institute, focusing on U.S. foreign policy, specifically Iran and Russia. As an Iranian political analyst and foreign policy analyst, he writes on topics for the Russian-Iran file and has been featured in numerous publications. It is my pleasure to welcome Shea Qatari back here to the Who, What, Why podcast. Shea, thanks so much for joining us.

SPEAKER_01Hi, Jeff. Thanks for having me. I want to go back to January 8th and 9th and the events that took place in Iran. And I don't think that there is a sense in this country at this moment as to how

SPEAKER_00dramatic that was, how dramatic the massacre was. And really, it compares to almost nothing else, given how condensed and concentrated it was. Talk about that.

SPEAKER_01So let's actually go back a little farther. Events started in late December when in the bazaar, cell phone shop owners began chanting against the regime because it was triggered by the collapse of currency in Iran. But that was not... the reason that it became what it became. It began spreading from there. Revolutions don't happen because of economic problems.

Otherwise, we would have had a revolution during the Great Depression in the United States. Revolutions happen because of a sense of injustice and a lack of agency that people feel.

SPEAKER_01Americans didn't have a revolution in the 1920s and 30s because we have a democratic system that people can express their grievances through. That's not the case in Iran. So I am emphasizing this because there's a lot of talk about how this is caused by economic conditions in Iran, whereas it's not. It's triggered by it. And It is magnified by it, but it is not caused by it.

SPEAKER_01Inherently, this is a political revolution. It's not out of simply economic problems. Same as people made the same mistake in 2022 when they said it was about social issues and the hijab, whereas it was triggered by that, but it was not about that. So in December 2025, chance happened, they spread across the country and they're growing. In early first week of January,

SPEAKER_01the son of the former Shah, the exiled crown prince, Reza Pallavi, issues a call for nationwide protests at night on Thursday and Friday, January 8th and January 9th. And people responded to that call. Everybody went to the streets to protest. And it became, for the regime, it immediately got out of hand. The crowds were simply too large to control.

SPEAKER_01And they immediately began attacking governments, buildings, and properties, as well as religious communities. buildings and properties such as seminaries and mosques. which were several of them were attacked and burned down because of their association with the government. We still do not know the extent of the casualties. We know of the atrocities. We have received reports from inside Iran that people were shot

with military-grade

SPEAKER_01weapons, were shot with military-grade weapons, that there were foreign proxies of Iran, likely the Hashd al-Shaabi, the popular mobilization forces came from Iraq to shoot at Iranians, at the people, likely because many of Iran's own security forces were not willing to go that far to attack Iranians, possibly because they sympathize with their grievances.

I've talked to medical professionals in Iran and the stories they say is just horrifying.

SPEAKER_01One surgeon told me that people who were brought in, this is a literal description, not an exaggeration, had their internal organs like their wounds, stomachs, intestines hanging out of their bodies. So that's part of it. People were being shot at with automatic rifles. Another person told me that in one scene, they attacked a government building. And in a blink of an eye,

he saw seven or eight people shot dead in front of him.

SPEAKER_01Yeah. These stories are coming out. We know that about 5,000, 6,000 are confirmed dead. These are human rights organizations in the United States that are going one by one confirming the name of each deceased person. estimates that we are getting from leaked government sources in Iran go as high as 40,000 give or take and more are in detention like almost

certainly gonna be executed it is the worst civilian massacre in modern history of the world and

SPEAKER_01if these numbers are accurate. It's the worst massacre in Iranian history since the invasion of the Mongols. And the last thing is, you talk about intervention, and it has become quite obvious that Iranians cannot do anything without foreign help at this point. So the question becomes whether we accept the current regime in its current form or help Iranians.

at this point to say that we wish that Iranians free themselves but we should not do anything is intellectually quite honestly at best stupid at worst disingenuous because it suggests that there is a path for Iranians to do it on their own now

SPEAKER_01It is a legitimate political argument to make that this regime, Iranians cannot overthrow the regime and it's none of our business to do it for them or help them do it. That is a valid point. I don't agree with it. But to say that we hope that Iranians do it on their own implies that there is such a chance. Everybody who argues against intervention must acknowledge that regime change in Iran, democracy in Iran, freedom in Iran is not attainable without foreign help.

In the past where there have been uprisings, has there been a desire for foreign help?

SPEAKER_00Is there something different about this time?

SPEAKER_01Yes, there has always been. Going back to 2009, people chanted Obama either with them or with us, meaning the regime. And they turned against Obama because they believed that Obama chose the regime. And I think that's correct. In fact, President Obama himself has nearly admitted as much. He said that he made a mistake not to help the Iranians. So yes, there has always been the extent of... How much foreign support they would like to receive and whom to

receive it from has

SPEAKER_01been changing. It used to be diplomatic and covert and things like that from the Americans and Europeans. Yeah. In 2009, most people wanted help. They didn't even know what kind of help, but they would assume that most of them would have opposed military intervention. Today, 17 years later, 16 and a half years later, everybody is in favor of military intervention.

SPEAKER_01And even more interestingly, everybody will take it from anyone else. And not including, especially from the Israelis, because they think that they're the most reliable partner they have against the regime. Something that I don't believe anybody would have signed up to in 2009. And this shift has been gradual, obviously. Throughout the past 16 years, a desire for foreign intervention and military intervention has

gradually grown and

SPEAKER_01has reached its pinnacle today.

SPEAKER_00And what role does Pallavi play in this right now, the extent to which his calling for this demonstration and his rise in profile has played a role in this? How does that impact the potential for intervention, in your view?

SPEAKER_01I don't think that it changes the potential for intervention in any way. But the role he has has been mostly among Iranians in the diaspora where he's extremely popular and inside Iran where he's also quite popular. Yeah. Not as popular as he'd like to be, but on the other hand, you saw he gave the call for people to come out and millions went out. People who had never gone to protest went out for the first time to answer his call.

SPEAKER_01He's by far the most popular figure in Iran. Outside, I guess, maybe a soccer player might be more popular, but certainly the most popular political figure. We have one survey from 2021, so it is dated and a lot has changed. At the time, it showed that he had 35% popularity, but 35% was about 20 points larger than anybody else.

He was still the most popular, and I think he has become even more popular since.

SPEAKER_01Having said this, the role that he played... in these protests might have been a mistake for him personally, because he has made the impression that he has a plan. He has been meeting with foreign officials for the past couple of years, publicizing those, and he is become very close with the Israelis, publicizing that.

SPEAKER_01He has been boasting that he opened a channel in June 26th, announced that he has opened this channel for regime insiders to become defectors. And a month later, he announced that he had received 50,000 applications. He's recently said that it's actually 100,000 applications, but they need to be verified. And he has talked about, he and people around him have been boasting that they have

cells inside Iran,

SPEAKER_01that they, among people, things like this. So a lot of people were under the assumption that he has a plan when he issued the call to protest. And it's absolutely obvious that he had no plan. When the dust settles and if there's no intervention by the United States, it might prove that he had one shot and he missed it because people will turn against him that 40,000 of us died because we trusted you and that was a mistake. That remains to be seen.

SPEAKER_01might not happen. Trump might intervene. So we don't know what's going to happen, but that is certainly a possibility. He was very popular by the time that he issued the call. Whether he will be popular at all or be relegated to a fringe leader whom everybody hates and blames for the massacre a year, two years from now is an open question.

SPEAKER_00In your view, what does U.S. intervention look like? You need to appreciate that what necessarily is helpful to Iranians logistically is

SPEAKER_01not encouraging politically. By which I mean, one of the most useful things we can do is cyber attacks and electronic warfare to disrupt Iran's command communication and control systems. So they cannot coordinate to crack down on the protests. The issue with that is that it's covert and it's not visible.

So Iranians have good reasons not to trust foreign help since they have never received it. If we say that we have created a hospitable environment for you guys to return to

SPEAKER_01the streets and protest, because there's nothing verifiable by the eye... they probably will not come to the streets. So the alternative becomes to, in addition to doing cyber attacks, to have some kinetic activity just to show them that we are actually supporting you. And as I like to say,

things need to go boom for Iranians to be convinced.

SPEAKER_01Now, that is itself helpful because there are key figures in the leadership that we should eliminate. People who are part of the command and control system. apparatus especially people close to the supreme leader ali khamenei take ali larijani for instance who has been with khamenei since the 1990s and is possibly right now the second most powerful man in iran was coordinating

uh the recent crackdown was in charge of coordinating the recent crackdown and gave the order for

SPEAKER_01opening fire so Killing him is very useful because on the one hand, Khamenei loses a very trusted lieutenant and he doesn't have many of them. On the other hand, a capable individual, a competent individual is eliminated. Another such figure is Khamenei's son, Mushtaba Khamenei. And I mentioned him because he's not a family member, though that he is. He is essentially the deputy supreme leader of Iran.

SPEAKER_01And he's been the architect of crackdowns since 2009. So he is a political actor. There are others like Shamkhani, also close to Khamenei. Gulpayee Ghani, who is the chief of staff to Khamenei, the chief justice, Mohseni Ejai, certain hanging judges that are in Iran, prosecutor general, people like that. who are the commanders,

SPEAKER_01both of the crackdowns that happen, as well as prosecuting arrested protesters and giving them death sentences, as has become custom in recent years. So eliminating people like that would be extremely helpful, as well as obviously police and military commanders. In fact, my colleagues at the National Union for Democracy in Iran, have a comprehensive list of people who have been commanding

crackdowns since 2017,

SPEAKER_012019, and 2022. We could just go through the list and eliminate such figures. And also, this is now a bit trickier because a lot of these military bases are in urban areas, and we have to be sensitive about that. But just generally, you don't want to create an environment that, like the June... war with Israel, the 12-day war, Iran's skies are filled with fighter jets and every residential area might be

getting hit so people are scared and leave the city instead of coming to protest.

SPEAKER_01We don't want to create that environment but Having these in mind, you could hit a few military bases just to make armed forces scared of going to the base to pick up their weapons to go and do crackdown. And last, we need to figure out something about the Arab proxies. That probably requires working with Iraqi governments and the Syrian government, potentially, to

to prevent these forces from leaving Iraq and Syria and closing the border to them.

SPEAKER_01Those are things that we could be doing. But at the end, we really need to, in addition to make it easier for Iranians to protest, we need to give them some assurance that we are going to support them.

SPEAKER_00If these decapitations were to take place, if the regime by some miracle could fall, what does Iran look like post-regime?

SPEAKER_01So before we go there, I forgot to mention, since you mentioned decapitation, actually the one person I don't want to eliminate is Khamenei himself, precisely because of the question you asked. It is a long shot, but the best case scenario is if Khamenei is cornered so much so that he has to surrender power. Again, it's a long shot, probably not going to happen, but the best case scenario is for us to force him to give up power to an individual

SPEAKER_01like Pallavi or whoever. I don't even care who's going to take over. Could be you, Jeff, as long as it's... As long as there's someone. But ideally, we want Khamenei to be alive... So he has to surrender power and legitimize his successor. As for how the regime will or how Iran will look like after the Islamic Republic falls, your guess is as good as mine, I would say. But I mentioned that it's a long shot,

but we want to legitimize the successor by forcing Khamenei to give up power.

SPEAKER_01That's probably not going to happen. Keep in mind that Iran's military is not a traditional kind of secular army that is going to just defend the homeland and get on with it. It is ideological. And on top of being ideological, it's quite sizable. Contrast what happened in Russia after the fall of the Soviet Union with in Poland. Poland did not have a huge military. Its security was largely provided by the Soviet military.

SPEAKER_01So they're not guys with guns, you have to mind after the fall of the Soviet Union in Poland. Poland because of democracy. It's one of the most prosperous and strongest liberal democracies in the world right now. Now, contrast that with Russia, which did have a huge military and you had to worry about the guys with guns. And what happens? One of those guys with guns is the dictator of Russia today.

SPEAKER_01So you have that issue. One outcome is one of the guys with guns would be in charge of the country and, you know, they understand the politics of the military and they're going to keep it together. It will be a military dictatorship, a security dictatorship. Somewhat different than the Islamic Republic, but not different enough for us to like it and hostile to us. Another one is, which I think is much likely, is disintegration of the country entirely into chaos and civil war.

SPEAKER_01You get something like Iraq or Syria. Now, that is an issue we're going to run into anyway. whether we intervene today or wait until Khamenei dies and there's a food fight within the regime and there are going to be protests again and some of the security forces are going to side with the protesters and there's no Khamenei to call the shots and the regime turns against itself and you get the civil war anyway. So it's not a risk we're running into with intervention. It's a risk.

SPEAKER_01It's a near certainty that we're going to run into that situation whether we intervene or not, intervention might prevent it. But that is probably something we're going to run into anyway at some point in Iran. A third option is that you manage to negotiate something with the security forces for them to either disarm or be co-opted into Iran's larger military, and you get somewhat a smooth transition into an acceptable regime,

SPEAKER_01be it an American-style liberal democracy or a, well, not today's Turkey, but a yesteryear's Turkey flawed democracy. And somewhat a free country that is... Not good by our standards, but is very good by Middle Eastern standards. That could be an outcome too. But that would require us to us, meaning both the U.S. government, as well as the opposition,

SPEAKER_01to work something with the IRGC, with the Islamic Revolution's Guardian's Corps. What?

SPEAKER_00What kind of window are we talking about in terms of intervention? How long before intervention can actually have some impact following on the heels of the demonstration?

SPEAKER_01I don't think that we're ever going to run out of that window. Whenever we intervene, if we do it right and we tell people that, okay, we're ready, come out, we're going to support you, people are going to come out.

SPEAKER_00And do you think that there's a reason why, the reason for the U.S. or Israel to act more quickly at this point? Or is there time to wait?

SPEAKER_01Well, I think that we've lost the momentum anyway. So there's time to wait from the... We've lost the momentum in Iran, I should say. So we've lost the time in Iran. But that's not really the issue here. The actual problem is that we have a window in Washington, D.C. You cannot one day wake up in Washington. You're familiar with our politics here. You cannot one day wake up and say, OK, we're ready to go and intervene in Iran.

SPEAKER_01Well, Mr. President, nothing has happened in Iran for six months. Why are you doing that? We have our, I don't know, we have midterms coming up and we have bigger fish to fry. We have a political momentum in Washington right now that we're kind of both missed, but the president is keeping alive by the force of his personality. So that window is there. And as long as the talks are ongoing... As long as Iran is in the headlines, we still have that window.

The third option is that the talks don't get anywhere and we forget everything and

SPEAKER_01Israel decides to attack Iran's ballistic missile program, which is a serious threat to Israel, and the window reopens. But I think the window is more about our politics than about Iran. People will come out. Talk a little bit about the degree to which Iranians would like to see U.S.

SPEAKER_00intervention at this point. To what extent will that be seen as a positive development right now?

SPEAKER_01For my own intellectual curiosity, I spent the past two weeks, especially the past month, but especially the past two weeks that Internet has reopened, trying to find someone who's against it, and I have failed. I have been asking people, like, okay, so you're for intervention. Do you have a friend who's against it? Nope. I don't have friends against intervention. Like, are you sure? Like, there's nobody in your circle who's against it? Nope. Nope. Everybody's for intervention. Arash Azizi,

SPEAKER_01my friend, had a very interesting piece in The Atlantic where he talked to people about intervention. It's a very interesting piece. There are some voices against intervention, right? But most people are in favor of it. But two things to consider here. People he's talking to are all outside Iran and are all left-wing activists in the diaspora. A lot of them leading socialist groups. And imagine when you're talking to Bernie Sanders to Leon Trotsky,

SPEAKER_01that's the span of people he's talking to, right? And from Bernie Sanders to Leon Trotsky level of lefties, most people in the diaspora... are in favor of intervention. Go figure the rest of the country who have been shot and wounded, who are not ideologically anti-American. And also, generally speaking, Iranians have become very right wing and generally are right wingers. I would be shocked if other than 15% of regime supporters

setting those aside for

SPEAKER_01against intervention, obviously, I'd be shocked if there is more than 10 to 15% of Iranians against it. If that many, if that many. I talked to someone who's told me that they have construction going on in their neighborhood. So a lot of loud noises. And she said, every time I hear a big noise, everybody in the house jumps and like, oh my God, finally they're hitting it. And disappointment that, oh no, it's just a construction.

SPEAKER_01And still the next time that it happens, they still get excited. She said, we're never going to give up the hope for an intervention. Well, not never, but for the foreseeable future. We're not going to give up the hope. As many times as we've been disappointed that, no, it's just the construction, we're still getting as excited as the last time. Talk about the broader regional reverberations from a potential involvement on the

SPEAKER_00part of the U.S. What happens with respect to Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Syria, etc. ?

SPEAKER_01So we have seen that there are Arab states. This is public reporting. Arab states and regional actors, including Turkey, are lobbying the president against intervention. I know that this excludes the Emiratis. I believe that Emiratis are in favor of intervention. And the Saudis... It's interesting about the Saudis because it appears that the Saudis are against intervention on the one hand, but we also saw a report that the Saudi Minister of Defense was

in Washington

SPEAKER_01arguing in favor of it. But... They're sending mixed messages. It might also be that that public reporting was just a PR thing to do image control. Turks are against it for good reasons, I would say. The Turks were really hit by the Syrian civil war. They cannot afford another refugee crisis, and Iran is three times the size Syria was at the time of the civil war. Or even larger than three times.

they're worried about possible refugee crisis and how people would go to Turkey

SPEAKER_01trying to go to Europe, and Europeans are not going to let them in, so they're going to be stuck in Turkey. We just solved our Syrian refugee problem. What are we going to do with the Iranian refugees? So they have that issue, understandable. For both the Arabs and the Turks also, they like a weak Islamic Republic for a few reasons. One is that Iran's foreign policy after the Islamic Republic falls,

SPEAKER_01assuming it doesn't go to some IRGC general, is going to be about its borders and its territorial integrity and very nationalistic in not necessarily a good way. And that would cause conflicts with its neighbors probably so that's an issue they don't have right now and they would not want to have that's just an international relations problem the second issue is imagine if it all goes well and

iran becomes the liberal democracy and uh look at poland again i mentioned poland poland's a

SPEAKER_01on the course to take over Britain, British GDP per capita, and is not too far from taking over its GDP altogether. This is in large part because of the foolish decisions the Brits have made and the Poles have not economically. But Things in Poland, 30 years, 30-something years after the fall of communism, look really good. And we're talking about the United Kingdom. We're not talking about Turkey,

which... We're talking about the United Kingdom...

SPEAKER_01after Thatcher left, which was in a really good economic condition. It will probably, in an ideal scenario for Iran, it will take a much shorter time to surpass the Saudis and the Turks. and their neighbors economically. If you establish free enterprise, and keep in mind that Iran has a large, very large, young population with technical expertise, a lot of engineers, a lot of engineers, and a lot of people who have somehow made it work as

entrepreneurs under this

SPEAKER_01regime. So imagine how it will look like in a free market and a free politics. So Iran could easily surpass its neighbors, And then it will cause a domestic crisis for its autocratic neighbors that Iran was decades behind us just 20 years ago. Or we thought that it was decades behind us. But just in 20 years, it has become something we're just jealous of.

SPEAKER_01You know what? We want the same change. We also want a liberal democracy. And then the Al Saud family is going to... start having to respond to its own population why their political model works better than liberal democracy. And that's not a question they would like to answer. So that's an interest they have against regime change. The Last thing is,

I mentioned that Saudis like a weak Iran, so do the Turks.

SPEAKER_01Saudis are turning on Israel again. And the Turks have just gone wild against Israel. The Qataris have always been against Israel. A free Iran will, at the worst, be indifferent toward Israel. Much likelier, Iran will be quite close with Israel. Especially in Iran that returns to the monarchy of the Palabies. So if you're trying to rebuild your legitimacy as...

SPEAKER_01Saudi Arabia or as Turkey, in objection to Israel, do you prefer a weak Iran who's going to supply you without being a threat to you? Or do you want a strong Iran that is going to be partners with Israel and supply Israel capably? The answer is that you want a weak Islamic Republic. In any way, A weak autocracy is in the interest of Iran's autocratic neighbors if the

SPEAKER_01alternative is a flourishing liberal democracy. It is also in... I mean, actually, I cannot think of an alternative in which a... wickedocracy is not preferred to. Civil war, wickedocracy is better. Liberal democracy flourishing, wickedocracy is better. A strong Islamic republic, a weak Islamic republic is better. This is the ideal situation for most of Iran's neighbors.

SPEAKER_00Given where we are now, to what extent do you think this is a different moment than 2009 or 2019 or 2022?

SPEAKER_01It's different than 2009 in kind. In 2009, people came to protest for the regime to stick to its own contract with them. Which is to say, you have restricted elections. We agreed to that. We chose our guy within your parameters of politics, and you still cheated. So can we go back to...

SPEAKER_01the original contract we had. Restricted elections, but we get to have our say in this dynamic. That's 2009. In 2010, the same green movement, but toward the end of it, or I guess late 2009, I should say. Sorry, the Persian calendar is different than the American calendar, so I'm confused when it's the new year and when it's not. It becomes quite obvious that that's not going to be the case.

SPEAKER_01So Iranians move on from chanting on the street, where is my vote? And demanding a recount to saying death to the dictator. Then you have... The Green Movement begins as pro-reform and closes as we have a system problem. 2017, when there are small protests and riots, that's anti-regime. So that's a difference of kind.

that we are talking about since 2017 and 2019 and 2022 and 2026 they have been different in as a matter of degree not of kind you have an increase in the size of the protests in the willingness to engage in violence against the regime you have

SPEAKER_01had uh different demographics joining the protests, but they've all been anti-regime. This is different as a matter of degree, which is it's probably as large and as violent as you're ever going to get. I cannot imagine how it could be any more radical and any larger than it already is in the future, because I think that this was the maximum strength of the Iranian people without

SPEAKER_01foreign help. But again, it's a difference of degree this time not of kind than in the past uh but it's a difference of kind than 2009 that's my answer

SPEAKER_00Shea Qatari, I thank you so very much for spending time with us today. My pleasure. Thanks for having me, Jeff. Thank you. And thank you for listening and joining us here on the Who, What, Why podcast. I hope you join us next week for another Who, What, Why podcast. I'm Jeff Sheckman. If you like this podcast, please feel free to share and help others find it by rating and reviewing it on iTunes. You can also support this podcast and all the work we do by going to whowhatwhy.org forward slash donate.

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