Jeff Schechtman 03/06/26 Iran didn’t ask for regime change. It asked for bread. How a protest movement got hijacked - and turned into a war nobody planned for. And the man who saw all of this coming has been saying so, loudly and at personal cost, for 20 years. My guest on this very recent WhoWhatWhy podcast is Hooman Majd, the grandson of an ayatollah, the son of a diplomat who served the shah, a contributor to NBC News and The New Yorker, and the author of four books on modern Iran - most recently the memoir Minister Without Portfolio. He has spent his career as the voice in the room insisting that Iran is always more complicated than Washington wants to believe. He has never been more right, and the moment has never been more dangerous. Get full access to Talk Cocktail Podcast at jeffschechtman.substack.com/subscribe
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SPEAKER_01Welcome to the Who, What, Why podcast. I'm your host, Jeff Sheckman. There is a particular kind of expertise that can only be inherited, not learned in a classroom or acquired through years of think tank fellowship, but carried in the blood, absorbed at dinner tables where the conversation was conducted in Farsi, in diplomatic residences where the old world and the new were always in uneasy tension. in the silence that follows a revolution that erases the only home you ever knew.
SPEAKER_01Human Majd has been living inside that silence for nearly half a century. The grandson of an ayatollah, the son of a diplomat who served the Shah, a man who translated for Ahmadinejad at the United Nations and then wrote about the experience with the cool precision of someone who understood exactly what was being lost on purpose. For 20 years, he has been the voice in the room saying it's more complicated than that. More complicated than the narrative coming out of Washington.
SPEAKER_01More complicated than the story Israel wants told. More complicated than the diaspora opposition cheering on bombs falling on the country they fled. But now, in the span of several weeks, almost everything he warned about has come to pass. The strikes have landed. Khomeini is dead. The nuclear program is rubble. And the president of the United States has admitted to a journalist that he has no idea what comes next. What Majd has understood, and what the architects of this moment never seem to grasp,
is that the Iranian people on the street were not sending the message that
SPEAKER_01Washington received. They were not asking for this. They were asking for bread. They were asking for a currency that held its value. They were asking, as they have been asking since 1906, for something that has always been just out of reach, simply at last, to live in a democracy. What they got instead was a lesson in how great powers hear only what they want to hear. My guest, Human Maj, was born in Tehran, raised in diplomatic postings from San Francisco to London to New Delhi,
and stayed in the United States after the revolution of 1979 that took everything
SPEAKER_01his family had built. He's a contributor to NBC News. He's written for The New Yorker, The New York Times, and Foreign Affairs. And he's the author of four books, including The Ayatollah Begs to Differ and his most recent memoir, Minister Without Portfolio. It is my pleasure to welcome Human Maj here to talk about what is perhaps the most consequential moment of a long career as Iran's most essential interpreter. Human Maj, thanks for joining us here on the Who, What, Why podcast. Oh, thank you so much for having me.
SPEAKER_01Well, it is a delight to have you here. Thank you so much for joining us. You grew up, as I mentioned in the introduction, you grew up in pre-revolutionary Iran. You were raised in the upper echelons of that world, a world that really ceased to exist in 1979. As you watch events unfolding today, talk a little bit about the context of that. and how you look back at the country and how you see it today. Yeah. I mean,
SPEAKER_00you know, growing up, I didn't grow up inside Iran as much as around the world, but as a son of an Iranian diplomat, very aware of Iran. my Iranian-ness, if you will. And back in those days, Iran was considered this kind of mysterious but kind of cool country by people outside of Iran. Wherever I went to school, American schools in Tunis or in New Delhi or even San Francisco and London, You know, there was always a curiosity about Iran,
SPEAKER_00and I was very proud to be Iranian, only because I thought I came from an amazing culture. It's what, you know, every Iranian learns as a child. Come from, you know, 2,000, 2,500 years of a great culture, Cyrus the Great, you know, all those things that they teach us as children, as Iranian children. And so I was proud of that. I was proud of... And then there was this... a shock not just because of what my family lost in the revolution not just because of losing you know um
property or whatever it is one loses when there's a revolution and a drastic change
SPEAKER_00in the regime. Not even so much losing your country, but there was this kind of sense of loss of self, of my own identity. It's like, well, I can't identify with the people who are now in charge of this new regime in Iran because they really bear no relation to anything that I've ever experienced in my life. And I'm not American either, even though I live here and I've grown up around Americans. My best friends are American. I went to school with Americans and Brits.
So there was this sense of, you know, identity loss in a way, not just a loss of a homeland.
SPEAKER_00So that's the immediate context of, you know, a pre and post revolution. I didn't really judge the revolutionaries, though, despite that, because even though I didn't know them, I didn't understand that culture very well, despite the fact that my own family were quite religious, but not in the way, not politically religious, or religiously political, if you will. And so despite that, I didn't judge them. I knew that the Shah was...
SPEAKER_00Not great for Iran politically. I knew that from an international perspective, he was great. From internal politics, by the time I was 15 and 16, I really understood what Sadak was, the secret police that was trained by the CIA, trained by the Mossad, that did torture people, did throw people in jail if people expressed an opinion that was against what the Shah believed. Now, the Shah denied that always, that there was torture and stuff like that, but we knew it did exist. We now know that it was probably less than was promoted by the
revolutionaries at
SPEAKER_00the time of the revolution. So, you know, one had mixed feelings. It's like, I'm not going to blame people for bringing on a revolution. I don't even live there right now. I'm not a part of that society, even though my father is very much a part of that world because he was our ambassador, Iran's ambassador to Japan at the time of the revolution. But I didn't want to judge revolution. I was against an Islamic republic on a personal level because I just didn't believe that Iran should be an Islamic republic.
SPEAKER_00I was fine with it being a republic. And so, yeah, to make a long story short, that sense that I have had, excuse me, of not wanting to judge and not wanting to be anti-Islamic Republic, necessarily anti-Islamic Republic, Led me to a career that had nothing to do with Iran for a while in America, first being an illegal alien because I'd been a student. And then with the hostage crisis,
visas were canceled under President Jimmy Carter.
SPEAKER_00Finally getting political asylum, becoming legal, getting into the entertainment business, music business, and then into the film business a little bit. with major corporations was all wonderful life. I have no regrets about any of that. During that time, staying in touch with Iran as much as I could, being aware of what's going on in Iran politically. And then when the music business collapsed and a film company that I was Working with, we ran out of money, so I then ventured into journalism,
SPEAKER_00and that led to finally getting my passport back, my Iranian passport back, and being able to travel to Iran and then write about Iran, as you mentioned, these four books.
SPEAKER_01One of the things that you did, and this relates to the writing that you did, it relates to the work you spent many, many years doing as an interpreter, that you were constantly explaining Iran, and you were mostly explaining it to people that were taught to fear the country and really had no clear idea of what was going on there. You were an interpreter on so many different levels.
SPEAKER_00Yeah, absolutely. I mean, you know, in the early days of the revolution, it was, and with the hostage crisis, the embassy hostage, U.S. embassy hostage crisis in Iran, it was very difficult to be Iranian, I will say. I had the good fortune I suppose, of not sounding like an Iranian, like sounding like the people that they were seeing on television, you know, the bearded guys yelling down with their death to America and so on and so forth. And with a name that didn't obviously sound... Muslim or Iranian people.
SPEAKER_00My name doesn't resonate as being like, oh, there's a guy from... It's foreign, definitely a foreign name, but they can't really specifically label. So I was lucky in that sense. But you couldn't really explain Iran at that point other than if you were asked and if the subject came up when people were wearing yellow ribbons and tying yellow ribbons around trees and saying how awful the Ayatollah is. explain that, you know, that's not everybody. You know, there's a reason why so many people are, that's not all Iranians. There's a reason why so many Iranians are leaving Iran and
seeking refuge outside
SPEAKER_00of Iran is because they disagree with what's going on with Iran, including disagreeing with taking off hostages and death to America and this kind of break in relations with the West. So, yeah, that was the initial day. Later on, as things got, became different, the sort of entente, Bill Clinton tried to, you know, get a better relationship going with Iran. Iran was unable to... Even though Khatani,
SPEAKER_00who was the reform president at the time, wanted to build a relationship with the West, a different relationship and tried very hard and was successful with Europe, but less so with the United States, mainly because he was stopped by the powers that be, which means the supreme leader in his office. Then later on, you know, Obama obviously not only tried, but was successful with the nuclear deal. And throughout this time, you know, trying to explain what Iran is so that it would allow Americans
to be supportive
SPEAKER_00of, for example, Obama in a nuclear deal. And I think most Americans were. I mean, obviously, I don't want to discount the objection by the extreme right in America and certainly certain congressmen and senators who didn't want any deal with Iran, even if it meant virtual capitulation at the time. And we know that Israel didn't want a deal. We know that Benjamin Netanyahu came here to argue against the deal, joint session of Congress. But I think Or at least I should say I don't think.
I hope that my books at that point, having written two books, maybe could help Americans.
SPEAKER_00I would hope that it could help Americans, including people in government, including people who had in think tanks, who had some influence to think differently about Iran, Iranian society, and what Iran wants to be and where it wants to stand in the world order. That may be presumptuous of me, but I think I got enough attention from at least my first book and my appearances on television, my work with NBC News, that I like to think that it didn't hurt,
SPEAKER_00but it certainly helped with an understanding of Iran. which could help people go, oh, yeah, well, yeah, it makes sense for us to try to make this happen. It makes sense for us to put away this nuclear issue and not worry about Iran building a bomb. It makes sense for us to support that. And one of the themes that run throughout this is in your explanation and your
SPEAKER_01interpretation of Iran – It's always this idea of telling people and having to explain to people that it's more complicated than they think. I mean, that runs right up through today.
SPEAKER_00Yeah, no, absolutely. It's always way more complicated than people think. And I think, you know, the proof is in the pudding, as they say, with Trump thinking he's going to pull a Venezuela on Iran. And, you know, we're in the fifth day of a war that's seen Americans killed, you know, Many, up to 1,000 Iranians killed, fighter jets falling out of the sky, and airports throughout the region closed, and drones hitting buildings in other countries in the Middle
East from Iran,
SPEAKER_00launched from Iran. So yeah, that's a fundamental misunderstanding. by our government by the u.s government of what iran wanted to do what it could do um and just you know sort of you know starting a war willy-nilly sort of like almost like you know shoot from the hip and hope hope it works um so yeah the misunderstanding of the iranians here and i think A lot of people probably agree with me and some will disagree with me that Iran,
SPEAKER_00in this particular case, seeing what the military buildup was on its doorstep, understanding the cost associated with that military buildup, was very, very keen, very eager to show real flexibility in this last round of negotiations with Steve Woodcoff and Jared Kushner. And, you know, Rafael Grossi from the IAEA, the UN nuclear agency, which oversees nuclear programs, peaceful programs, was there in the meeting.
SPEAKER_00The Omani foreign minister was there in the meetings. And I think they really thought that they could avert this war, but somehow Donald Trump decided, no, it was going to be war. In hindsight, it was probably wrong for the United States to send two people to negotiate with Iranians who knew absolutely nothing about Iran, and worse, knew absolutely nothing about the nuclear program. So, you know, big difference from the Obama days. And again, I'm not trying to be pro-Obama and anti-Trump here.
SPEAKER_00I'm just trying to set the scene for where we're at today. And obviously, I approved of the nuclear deal because I thought, you know, it's good for America and it's good for Iran. I mean, if you ever had a win-win situation, that was it. And one usually hopes for win-win situations. One of the things that seems to have precipitated the current situation is the
SPEAKER_01perception that America had, that a lot of Americans had, that Iranians somehow wanted this help, that they had taken to the streets a month or so ago in huge numbers and taken incredible risks to their own lives. Many were killed in the process, and that that was somehow a go-ahead to this. Explain that.
SPEAKER_00Well, there's no question there are people in Iran— who were so, I guess, so upset, angry with the regime, if you want to call it that, with the system that had brought them to the point where they couldn't afford eggs and couldn't afford chicken and couldn't, you know, with the economic situation and their money, their assets, their savings were being depleted by this, you know, unbelievable inflation. that anything,
SPEAKER_00any change would have been welcome, including for some, I would say, you know, a military attack to change things, whether it's a complete regime change or, as I think, like to call it, regime adjustment, an adjustment in the regime that benefits them as well as the United States and allies of the United States so that, you know, there's this relief from this horrible situation they find themselves in.
SPEAKER_00So the protest started for economic reasons. It became a protest against the regime because the regime didn't have an answer. There was no answer for the people who were protesting. that we're going to solve your economic problems and this is how we're going to solve it. Obviously, the Iranian nuclear negotiators believed that by negotiating with Trump and to Trump's team that they would get sanctions relief and this was going to take a while. But obviously that crackdown that happened where thousands were
killed made people
SPEAKER_00even more angry at the regime. So there's no question that people have welcomed a change in Iran. There's also no question, and it would be silly to deny it, that people have been calling for some. Again, the numbers are impossible to pinpoint. Calling in these demonstrations that happened in January for the Shah's son to return in this sort of nostalgic idea that the Shah's time was so much better than now, so the Shah's son's time will be better than now.
SPEAKER_00There's no question about that. And there's no question that some people are probably okay with this war, thinking if this war continues, the regime will fall and we will have a better future because under this regime, we no longer trust it. And then, of course, there's a whole other group of people who are, well, we really like some change, but we definitely don't like being mobbed. um and and people are dying and we you know there's panic to some degree on the streets of tehran a lot of people trying to leave tehran
they're leaving in in quite big numbers um many streets i've seen videos that i can verify um other people have verified uh have you know some streets look like gaza obviously not the whole capital iran is much much bigger it's as you know big as western europe so
SPEAKER_00it's not gaza's a tiny little strip. And Iran has 93 million people. Gaza had a couple of million residents. So I'm not trying to equate the two, but there are streets that look like Gaza. And certainly there are many, many Iranians who don't want that.
SPEAKER_01And talk a little bit about the fact that that demonstration initially, and you alluded to this a moment ago, was really based on economics more than politics initially.
SPEAKER_00Yeah, no, no question. I mean, you know, a lot of people in Iran, what happened in the demonstrations, it was actually some of the most diehard loyalists of the Islamic Republic, the most religious people. the bazaris, the merchant class, who started the protests. And they were protesting that the government really didn't have an answer for the inflation, didn't have an answer. I mean, I'll give you a perfect example. It actually started by cell phone tradesmen in the bazaar. And The cell phone people,
SPEAKER_00sellers, and they sell cell phones from Samsung and iPhones and so on and so on. These are all imported, right? So they have to pay in dollars to get these phones. And they were saying, we can't do business anymore because I can't sell an iPhone today for $1,000 when it's going to cost me $1,100 to replace it tomorrow. So I'm out of business. What are you going to do about this? That was how the protest started. And it then spread from the cell phone. You know, the electronic sellers in the bazaar to other merchants were
saying basically the
SPEAKER_00same thing. We can't afford to do business because anything that I sell today at a price, I have to replace. And replacing it cost me more than what I could get for it today. Yeah. So the only alternative would be to sell in dollars or sell in gold, but that's not really practical in a country like Iran. People use the local currency, use local banks. So that's how it started. But then once the government was unable to really answered the people's demands uh it turned into a much
stronger cause call for change but even just but before that there were people who were already anti-regime anyway who joined in in the protests and they were the loudest the most vocal you know death to the dictator death to khamenei death to this and that and
SPEAKER_00we want regime change and then among some of those People also calls for the Shah's son to return and take over. So there was a desperation, and desperation was understandable.
SPEAKER_01And talk about the Shah's son, Riza Pahlavi, and his attempted leadership coming out of these demonstrations and claiming that he had 50,000 members of the Iranian security forces ready to defect and that he was the guy to follow. Yeah.
SPEAKER_00Well, he started making that claim. I mean, he'd been relatively quiet for some 40 years or so, more than 40 years since he was 18 years old when the revolution happened here, and he was living here at the time. He raised a family, was always like an opposition figure against the regime, but never not really very active. And then the Masa Amini protests happened, the hijab protests in 2022,
and he saw an opportunity or his advisor saw an opportunity to become this leader.
SPEAKER_00And that's when he really became you know, very public and making speeches and having rallies and so on and so forth about, you know, this regime has to go. Look, they killed this young woman because her hijab wasn't proper. And so he gained some popularity then. For many, many years, nobody really was speaking about Pahlavi. Certainly when I used to be able to go to Iran, nobody in Iran ever mentioned his name. It wasn't even on anybody's lips. He had some measure of support in the West, but he wasn't actively doing anything.
SPEAKER_00He wasn't building a government in exile. He wasn't, you know, unlike the MEK, for example, he was not organized, building a support base inside Iran, a sort of, you know, base of support that could potentially take over even if they're, you know, meeting in secret or whatever. So there was no, but then he started in 2022. And then when these most recent protests happened, yeah, he was like, okay, you know, go out on January 8th, you know, call my name, take over the government.
SPEAKER_00And we saw what happened. The Iranians responded with force on January 8th. This is after about 10 days of protest that had already been happening, which were peaceful. And then it became violent. And there was some violence by some of the protestors, Molotov cocktails, so on and so forth. Anyway, the crackdown was horrific. And we know that the Iranian government says 3,117 had been killed. and listed their names and social security numbers. Other people say it's, you know, up to 30,000.
But, you know, the human rights organization saying 7,000, 8,000 with possibly more. The president of the United States says 32,000 without saying where that number came from.
SPEAKER_00But Pahlavi has used that number, and he now argues that he is the only choice for regime change. He did talk about back in the summer about in the first 12-day war that Israel and the United States did in June of 2025, that he had registered some 50,000 security forces and military forces to defect at the right time. Well, certainly the right time would have been like a month ago, and they didn't. And if there was going to be any defection now would certainly
be the right time as well.
SPEAKER_00And there isn't defection. So that seems to have been bogus, a boast that's not true. And obviously, you know, a lot of people who may have supported him or may support him do, you know, feel like he's been not really very helpful or useful here. He's told people to go out in the street. They've gotten murdered. He's sitting in Washington or Paris, comfortable, away from all the action. So, yeah, his popularity exists.
There are people who are going to want a change who will be satisfied with him
SPEAKER_00because he represents this... you know, very western, westernized kind of regime. And that's what some people want. His alliance with Israel, some people want that as well, because they feel like there won't be any more threats from Israel once he's in power, if he's in power. But the truth of the matter is, it's a real long shot to imagine that he can bring about change. He really doesn't have an organization inside Iran Doesn't have the widespread support that some people believe he
has inside Iran.
SPEAKER_00He does have support in the diaspora, no question about it. One of the things that I think gets lost a lot in the telling of Iran's story in
SPEAKER_01America is a sense of nationalism, the idea that the Iranian people can despise the government and despise the military, but their feelings towards foreign powers coming in are even worse in many cases, that there is this sense of nationalism that is still very much there.
SPEAKER_00Yeah, no question. No question. And one thing I'm saying in the last few days is what people have always said, senators and people like that, the Iranian population is the most pro-American in the Middle East, is the most pro-Israel in the Middle East. Well, that may have been true to maybe even more pro-Israel, not pro-Israel, but pro-American than Turks, for example. But that said, once you start getting bombed and having Iranians killed by Israel,
SPEAKER_00killed by the United States, I think you automatically are going to see people not being so pro-American or so pro-Israeli. And when you start seeing a foreign country trying to impose on you, on your people, a form of government, a form of leadership, you know, you become suspicious immediately as an Iranian because of the history of Iran, because of the history going back a couple of centuries. I'm talking about the British and the Russians,
SPEAKER_00imperial Russians controlling Iran, and you're talking about the 1953 coup, the United States and the UK. So yeah, there's always going to be people who are hesitant to accept that. And just today, just today, Axios was reporting that the Axios reporter, Barack Ravid, who spoke to Trump, said that he will not accept a leader in Iran that he doesn't approve. He has to approve the leadership in Iran. Well, I mean, it's bizarre.
SPEAKER_00The president of the United States has to appoint the leader I mean,
SPEAKER_01people forget, I suppose, that it was out of this kind of foreign interference and foreign powers that really gave birth to the current Islamic Republic.
SPEAKER_00Exactly. Exactly. I mean, that was one of the—people have forgotten that. Absolutely. I mean, you know— Eisenhower didn't want to do 53, you know. He was pushed into it because of the anti-communist sentiment in America at the time. And he was being told, well, you know, the communists will take over if we don't do this. But there was a hesitancy.
SPEAKER_00Truman had rejected it. a coup completely before Eisenhower. And then Eisenhower initially rejected it. According to the history books, I'm not a historian, but the books that I've read in the history books. So does Trump want to be, you know, the guy behind the next coup? I mean, it's bizarre. I don't understand it. And clearly that's something That's something that, you know, Iranians will reject. I mean, if you wanted the Iranians on your side as you're bombing them,
SPEAKER_00the last thing you do is tell them, oh, I'm choosing your next leader. I'm bombing you and I'm choosing your next leader.
SPEAKER_01Certainly, you've written and you agree that the current military intervention is folly at best. Is there a version of this, given where we are today, five days into this war, is there a version that doesn't end in catastrophe?
SPEAKER_00I think it's already a catastrophe. I don't see how it's not a catastrophe. I don't know. I mean, the ending could be a worse catastrophe, but it's already a catastrophe. I mean, look at the entire region. I don't want to exaggerate and say it's in flames. There's no air traffic in the region, virtually none. Emirates Airlines, one of the biggest airlines in the world, canceled virtually almost all of its flights. A Russian airline is flying from Bahrain to Moscow, but basically there's no air
SPEAKER_00travel in the Middle East right now. We're talking about Dubai being bombed, Bahrain being bombed, Qatar being bombed, Saudi Arabia being bombed by drones and or missiles. Today, Azerbaijan airport, an airport in Azerbaijan being hit We're talking about, you know, the Kurds now being potentially armed and wanting to start a separatist movement in Iran and perhaps attacking Revolutionary Guards and the Iranian military.
So, yeah, it's already, I mean, I don't know how much more of a catastrophe.
SPEAKER_00I mean, think about, for example, the Emirates and Dubai specifically. which is viewed as sort of the monaco of the middle east where you can you know it's a safe haven you can build a hotel you can build the golf courts you can invest your money you can buy a multi-million dollar house um a villa you can um banks can come there and do business and it's being bombed i mean or being attacked I mean, how many people are going to consider Dubai a safe haven
anymore after this is all
SPEAKER_00said and done? The whole region has changed. And even if the regime changes in Iran and becomes pro-Western for a while or whatever it becomes, which is unlikely, by the way, at least unless there's a ground invasion that Trump hasn't actually ruled out, a la Iraq. And we go in and impose a new regime on Iran. Then what? Do we have a situation like Iraq where there will be pockets of resistance?
I mean, I've always maintained you can hate this regime and Iranians can hate this regime.
SPEAKER_00But let's face it, there is by any estimate, including intelligence agencies, anywhere between 10 and 20% popularity of the regime, including the supreme leader who was assassinated. And that amounts to a few million people. Will they just sit back and, you know, we saw what happened in Iraq. Will they just sit back and let the U.S. and or Israel or the two countries combine to impose themselves, their will on Iran?
SPEAKER_00I doubt it. I think that would be the ultimate catastrophe, I would argue, a ground invasion, because it would involve a lot of American deaths as well. And you make the point that the analogy with Iraq only holds up to a point,
SPEAKER_01that it really is a very different situation.
SPEAKER_00Absolutely. Very different situation, yes. Iraq had, as we know, there was the whole majority Shia, minority Sunni, minority Kurds, but split between these three groups. Uh, Iran has, uh, is multi ethnic and does have minority, uh, Sunni, uh, minority Kurds and minority Arabs and Baluchis, but it's, it's much more united as a country against invaders than Iraq, which was an artificial country to begin with that only existed
as a nation since
SPEAKER_00world, well, I guess, end of world war one. So Iran, there's a pride among Iranians that their country has existed both geographically where it is and politically as a nation state for close to 3,000 years at this point. So that's a different situation than some of the Arab countries in the region, which were carved out of various tribal
uh entities and and um and colonial entities so yeah it's a it's a it's a different dynamic who knows i mean i don't know what will happen if there's an iraq style invasion but i just i mean we know that's not imminent because we don't have our
SPEAKER_00troops there ready to you know to land and start an invasion um but if The idea was that with the air war alone, just by the air, that we could bring about a regime change. That's probably folly, certainly in Iran. I mean, we weren't able to do that in Vietnam. an air war. We had absolute, I mean, Pete Hex was talking about, oh, we have complete air superiority. Well, we know you do. We know you and Israel, United States and Israel have complete air superiority and they
control the skies
SPEAKER_00over, you know, the U.S. controlled the skies over Hanoi and over North Vietnam. How did that work out for us? I mean, we got some pilots shot down, but we did control the skies over pretty much all of Southeast Asia at the time. And that doesn't bring about a revolution, doesn't change a regime. And we even had troops, but not in North Vietnam necessarily, but we had troops fighting the Vietnamese and we weren't able to defeat them with a far superior military. So, yeah, I mean, I think the experience of Afghanistan,
the experience of Iraq, should have theoretically told us that this is probably not the wisest move.
SPEAKER_00And we should have tried to do something more diplomatic. But listen, I come from a diplomatic background. I believe in diplomacy, you know, until there's no other choice. But I think there's always the choice of diplomacy, always.
SPEAKER_01We've talked about this nationalism. One of the things that we see here that I'm sure encourages Washington, some in Washington, is this excitement on the part of a lot of the Iranian diaspora about the bombs falling there right now.
SPEAKER_00Yeah. I mean, I honestly don't know what to say. You know, it's hard to imagine that. You know, I've been able to talk to, indirectly talk to, I mean, through voice messages when the internet comes back on in Iran briefly for whatever reason. Sometimes it's in the middle of the night here in New York. I get a message. I mean, it's really bad in Tehran. And that's where I have contacts in Tehran. It's really bad.
And the idea that people are cheering it is just... I don't know what to say.
SPEAKER_00I don't know how anybody can cheer the bombing of another country. Even worse, how anybody can cheer the bombing of their own country that they may not live in. But it's... It's bizarre to me. It's beyond my comprehension of how anybody can feel like that's okay. When you see the images of dead people and injured people and the streets that you know so well that you've driven down many times on the road to
the airport,
SPEAKER_00you know, when you see that and you see the horrific scenes, I don't know how you can say, oh, yeah, this is great.
SPEAKER_01What does Iran look like six months from now, do you think?
SPEAKER_00Well, predicting Iran has always been impossible, hasn't it? Everybody who's ever predicted what happens with Iran has been proven wrong, including myself. So I'll include that. I used to be on NBC occasionally, and I still am occasionally, and they'll say, oh, Iran expert. I say, please don't call me an expert. An expert means that I know what I'm saying. But no, or I can predict. I can't predict it. I think it really does depend so much. on what the united states does because i believe israel will
follow what the united states decides i think if trump decides he absolutely wants to stop this war israel will stop he will israel will stop as well i don't think they're just going to defy trump and continue bombing iran so it really it just completely depends on on on
SPEAKER_00where the united states wants to take it i think iran will hold out and not agree to an immediate ceasefire because I think, based on what I've talked, people I've talked to, that the last time they did that, which was in June, in the 12-day war, they felt they got fooled. They just allowed the U.S. to bomb them again by agreeing to a ceasefire, that they should cause pain, that they should cause pain for the United States, that they should cause pain for the regional countries who will
then put pressure
SPEAKER_00on the United States not to you know, mow the grass as it is every six months, come and bomb the country trying to get their will imposed on Iran. So, you know, if you say six months from now, well, I don't think the war could last six months. I really don't. I don't think anybody will allow that to happen. I think there will be a ceasefire at some point. And again, going back to the ground troops and ground invasion, if that doesn't happen,
SPEAKER_00then I would see Iran being a weakened country, but with a regime intact and looking to rebuild. And rebuild infrastructure, rebuild its military, rebuild its ballistic missile capability, because that's their defense. That's what they have, their drones and their missiles, which is why they have always refused to give those up. So six months from now, if you were to ask me odds,
SPEAKER_00if I was a betting man, I would say the regime is intact, relatively intact, having lost quite a few top leaders, and there will be some sort of ceasefire agreement and... That's what I would bet on. I mean, let's face it, you know, Hamas is still there after two years of Israel bombing it right next door. And so to get rid of a regime is not the easiest thing in the
world, as we've seen. I mean, we got rid of the regime in Afghanistan, but they came back 20 years later.
SPEAKER_00They came back. We got rid of the regime in Iraq, but with incredible pain for the Iraqi people and for the American people and the American military. So we don't want to repeat that. So I don't think that's going to happen. Hard to imagine rebuilding given the sanctions that are in place and the economic
SPEAKER_01condition of the country.
SPEAKER_00Correct. And I think the way that that would happen is in any ceasefire, I think there would also have to be some kind of deal where sanctions are lifted. Otherwise, Iran won't agree to a ceasefire. And I think at some point, they might feel that they have the upper hand because they're causing pain and Trump wants the ceasefire. And if that's the case, then in order to give Trump the ceasefire, they're going to want some sanctions relief. And that may or may not happen. I can't tell you if Trump will agree,
but we know that Trump likes to declare victory and his base usually just,
SPEAKER_00you know, believes him. And whatever deal happens for sanctions relief will by definition be better than the JCPOA and Obama's deal. And he will be able to, you know, tout that as his accomplishment. I got a better deal. That will happen because... The JCPOA is not going to happen again. Iran is not going to have, you know, thousands of centrifuges spinning. It's not going to happen. And Iran had already agreed that that wasn't going to happen. Why Trump didn't declare victory then and say,
I made a deal, I don't know. But there was pressure we know from Israel and Netanyahu to also deal with the
SPEAKER_00ballistic missile situation. So that was another factor, I believe. But, yeah, I mean, it's... I think also if there's a ceasefire and if there's some kind of arrangement in a ceasefire, there'd have to be some kind of arrangement for what's going to be in the future. And I think China and Russia will play a role here as well. for Iran, I mean, on Iran's behalf, in terms of rebuilding and being able to facilitate that. The other interesting thing with all this is,
SPEAKER_00and the trip hasn't been canceled yet, at the end of this month, Trump is going to China and meeting with Xi, who has been Iran's biggest buyer of its oil.
SPEAKER_01We'll see how it all plays out. Hooman Maj, I thank you so very much for spending time with us today.
SPEAKER_00My pleasure. My absolute pleasure. Thank you. And thank you for listening and joining us here on the Who, What, Why podcast.
SPEAKER_01I hope you join us next week for another Who, What, Why podcast. I'm Jeff Sheckman. If you like this podcast, please feel free to share and help others find it by rating and reviewing it on iTunes. You can also support this podcast and all the work we do by going to whowhatwhy.org forward slash donate.
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