In this episode, we start out with an RSI featuring resident Brian Upton. After that, we talk to Dr. Maggie Mechlin about her experience as chief patient safety officer, and her thoughts on root cause analysis as a tool to fix problems. Got something to say to this podcast? Send a voicemail, and you might hear yourself on the next episode!
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Transcript
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Hello anesthesia enthusiasts and welcome to another episode of Style Points. Joining me today is Dr. Maggie Mecklin, who will share her wisdom about root cause analysis. Before that, I'll turn it over to my co-host, prior chief resident and now junior faculty here at UC, Dr. Nate Moore, to introduce our RSI. Hi Sean. I'm here to introduce double doctor Brian Upton, who got a PhD in molecular and
developmental biology in addition to his MD before joining our program, where he is about to start his CA1 year. Brian is going to teach us about basic medical statistics, and I'm excited to hear from him. No glamorous introduction for this topic here, we're going to be talking about those pesky statistics topics that have been showing up ever since the MCAT. Instead of going over definitions and formulas, because I doubt that listening is going to be the best way to learn them, I instead want to discuss more conceptually why these principles are important and why they keep showing up.
First let's go over sensitivity, specificity, positive predictive value, and negative predictive value. I'll refer you to those handy tables with formulas for the exact calculation of them. The first question I want to pose is why not just have one number for accuracy, as these are all in some way trying to gauge a test's accuracy. I'm sure we've all seen ads for something like a pregnancy test that claims to be over 99% accurate. What is the problem with that? To demonstrate why this may not be the best way to evaluate a test,
let's make up a new pregnancy test. If I were to flip a coin, heads or tails means not pregnant, and landing on the edge of the coin means positive for pregnancy, how accurate would that be? So I'll take my test to our local college football team and give it a try. Lo and behold, it accurately identified all the players' pregnancy status. 100% accurate, none of them were pregnant. Now you may think it's rigged, which it is, so we'll try it out in the OB clinic. For argument's sake, let's say half of the women are truly pregnant.
What is the accuracy of our test now? Say about 50%, it correctly identified women that were not pregnant. How about testing our pregnancy test in the general population? Well, with about 12 births per 1,000 people in the US annually, and a typical gestation of about a quarter of a year, about 0.9% of people are pregnant at any given time. The accuracy of our test in this scenario would be 99.1%, or greater than 99% accurate, similar to that ad we may have
seen. I hope this helps to demonstrate why one number for accuracy is insufficient. What we care more about is what percentage of people that are pregnant have a positive result, or the sensitivity, and what percentage of the people who are not pregnant have a negative result, or the specificity. And then in the clinic, when we get a positive test, what percentage of those are actually pregnant, and when we get a negative result, what percentage of those are not pregnant, which are the positive and negative predictive values. I do want
to emphasize that those last two numbers, the PPV and NPV, are still influenced by the prevalence of the population. In contrast, the sensitivity and specificity do not change as the prevalence changes. Therefore, when evaluating a test, sensitivity and specificity are ideal measures of the test performance, while the positive and negative predictive values are more useful when applying to the test based on your result, as you do not necessarily know if the person in front of you is a true positive or a false positive, true negative, or false negative, just that their test was either positive or negative.
Now, stepping away from that example, oftentimes sensitivity and specificity are in opposition of one another. That is, to increase the sensitivity of a test, you often have to sacrifice specificity and vice versa. For many tests, this can be done by shifting your cutoff point for what a positive test would be. To really improve both metrics, a change needs to be made to the test itself. An example of this would be using ALKFAS as a marker for liver injury. While you could shift your cutoff for an elevated ALKFAS to change the sensitivity and specificity,
you will continue to have false positive liver injury results due to bony etiologies. That is, the test has poor sensitivity as it stands. To improve the specificity, while not losing out on our sensitivity, you could incorporate a test like GGT into the test to improve both metrics. I hope these examples help you better conceptualize some of the statistics concepts that come up on our tests, and I hope this improves the accuracy on your test multiple choice questions. Or was that sensitivity? Oh well,
good luck. Thanks, Brian. I'll do my best to keep the podcast as sensitive and specific as possible. Joining us today is Maggie Mecklin. She's an associate professor of anesthesiology at the University of Cincinnati. After completing a fellowship in critical care anesthesiology, she became interested in patient safety. She was the chair of the procedural sedation committee, which she actually handed off to me for a while, and eventually became the chief patient safety officer here at UC. As part of that
position, she became an expert on root cause analysis, or how to un, we'll say fumble, a problem. Maggie, thanks for joining us. Thank you. I'm excited to talk about this. Well, before we get started, I still want to ask you my favorite get to know you question, the, who would you invite to dinner question. So if you could invite anybody to dinner, even somebody from history or the past, who's it going to be? I'm generally very bad at answering questions like this. The best thing I came up with was Taylor Swift, one of my daughters, and I really
enjoy her music and different levels, obviously. My other daughter insists that she hates Taylor Swift, she is not a Swifty. Why do we have to listen to this in the car, mom? And then she quietly sings along to it and eventually privately confessed to me that she's now half of a Swifty, but that I'm not to tell her sister that. So what would you, I would think it would probably be difficult with her schedule to get her out to a dinner, but if you did get her, if you did get her out for what is likely
to be a very expensive dinner, what are you, I'm sure what would you ask her about? What are you going to talk to her about? I'm curious about how she goes from thoughts that she has or life experiences and translates them into songs or, you know, almost poetry. I actually have a cousin who's got a master's in poetry. Oh, wow. And said that. Right. And one of the things she was recently talking with me about, about how talking about reading Taylor Swift's process
and actually looking at her lyrics is the closest she's seen recently to a lot of the process that a lot of famous poets have talked about and write about for their own writing. And I found that full line of thinking intriguing. Excellent. Well, the next thing we have to talk about, I know a lot of people maybe wrinkle their nose out or aren't huge fans of, but you potentially say actively grown in a way, but you know, we can call it whatever. Well, what do you like to call this topic?
I think there are a lot of things that could go into it, but when I'm talking to family or friends, I refer to it as problem solving, obviously, specifically, we're going to talk a little bit, I think about root cause analysis, which is one type of cause analysis. I won't go too long down that specific rabbit hole because there are plenty others to go down. But it really is. And I'm going to use one of my beliefs here. It really is understanding a problem then figuring out how to unf**k it so it doesn't exist forever. And I like
that a lot, cognitively, as well as from thinking through how we can help people both on the patient side, on the associate side. It can be more creative than it might initially seem that I just love truly a million parts of it. So you became patient safety officer or chief patient safety officer. How does that happen? How do you get invited to that position? Nobody has ever asked me to do that.
I'm giggling because I am not someone, much like the question of who would you want to have dinner with is something I struggle to answer. I'm not a long term planner. And I've been really fortunate in my life to do what I think of her call falling forward, where I just keep doing things and then, oh, look at this opportunity. Oh, look at that opportunity. Well, I guess I'll try that now. For myself, it kind of started a couple of years after
I was attending. The person who had been the medical director of the same day surgery in PACU here at our main hospital, UCMC, they retired from that role. I took that over. I found myself trying to do some quality improvement work around length of stay in the PACU. And that was a real life adventure. From there, I fell into chairing the sedation committee, as you know, because you got to fall into that for a while, your own self or maybe intentional.
I'm not trying to put that paradigm on you. It was fun while it lasted. And then I ended up working on a very specific project that had to do with sedative medications in MRR and patients who had had some safety events. And I ended up personally developing a relationship with a person who was the chief safety officer at that point, who then asked me to come in underneath her and do some similar work and then time and organizational changes
and kept working through improvement work and solving problems. And then I got asked to do it. So what is root cause analysis? Tell us more about definitionally or what it means to you or give me some background. Yeah. You know, I think all of us, and especially probably in all industries, but I only really have healthcare. We know the things that go wrong on a day to day basis. We know why we think they go wrong on a day to day basis. Some of them people have tried to solve in
the past. Some of them people have mostly given up on and accepted. And the goal of root cause analysis is, is that when you see a problem, trying to figure out exactly where it's starting so that you can put into place a solution that will truly prevent recurrence. So for example, a while back we had an event where a patient, the initial thought was that
the root cause of this was that a patient wasn't properly identified. You know, we always talk about, make sure you check their bracelet, look at the name, date of birth. And we all get sick of that. The patients get sick of it. No one wants to talk anymore about their name or when they were born. And the initial pass at looking at this was, well, so and so just didn't do the patient identification correctly. And why didn't they do it? We just need to tell them that they need to do the right thing and they know it. And then, you know, if they do it again, they probably end up with consequence. And no one goes into
probably any job, but certainly healthcare with the goal of creating a ruckus all day, every day. Pretty much everyone goes to work with the intention of doing the best they can to help not only their patients, but also their colleagues and to move things along in a positive direction. And so really, when you think about it, anyone who doesn't properly identify a patient probably isn't doing it because they're a jerk or that they forgot that that's part of their job or whatever else. There's always something underneath of it. And really the root cause analysis is aiming to find out, okay, well, what's
underneath that and how do we actually solve it? For my own self, I have a couple very prominent memories of times where I came to work trying to do the right thing and did the wrong thing. Once as a CA1, I had two syringes in my pocket. We often have syringes in our pockets, or at least back in that day we did. And they were labeled, but I was focused on this. This is my first case. I got against the OR. All the steps, especially as an early
CA1 between meeting the patient and getting into the OR, I was thinking about all of that. And so I grabbed the syringe that had the pepsin in the right lane in it and I gave it, but it didn't have the pepsin in the right lane. It had an opiate in it. And fortunately, the room was ready for us. We went back, we induced the patient shortly thereafter. Everything went fine. No one was hurt. The patient felt great. But I still remember that. It's got
to be at least 15 years later. And I don't remember it positively. And I had something conceptually like that as a fellow too that really stood out where I was trying to do the right thing, but my head was in a bunch of other places and thought I was giving someone their home medication back, that it turns out they hadn't taken a long time. And then their hospital course was longer because of all the fallout from that. So we all are coming here to try to do the right thing, but the system's not always set up to allow that.
And there's so many workarounds when things don't work that it becomes the whole system itself. And I realize this is a very long answer to a short question, but I really, the whole point of cause analysis of any type is finding out the true problem and then fixing the true problem in a way that will work. So those are the only two mistakes that you have made in your career. That's my understanding. Yes. And zero as a parent and zero as a staff. So those are just the only two. Excellent. Well, I'm glad that we have approximately
the same record. Right, right, right. That's great. So how do you know when you need to do a root cause analysis? What does that look like? That's a great question. And I think there are some individual isms, both as an organization and in general in broad, broad strokes, probably almost every healthcare organization would do root cause analysis for some time when a patient was hurt and we know that there was a defect in our system.
And defect can mean either that we don't have a process to address a certain issue. So that's a defect. We don't have a process that we need where we do have a process, but it's either antiquated or not updated or never followed. And we do these workarounds or where we've got a process and for whatever reason, we just completely didn't follow it. So defect
plus harm here at UC health is we almost always do root cause analysis for those. So there are a couple other flavors of cause analysis that we may do in some instances. So for instance, people who fall and get injuries there, it's usually the same root causes for that. And sometimes we group those together, which is called common cause analysis. But so deviation and harm. We also do it for instances where maybe there's a deviation or defect or an
absent process and no one was hurt, but you can tell that, holy, we're really lucky no one was hurt with this. We need to solve this before it's a problem for the next person. So near misses. Yes. We partnered with Press Ganey back in 2019 and kind of adopted their system of that categorization and cause analysis where they call, they actually call, they
have three categories, serious safety events, which are the ones with serious harm and deviation. Precursor safety events, which are the ones with either minimal harm or no harm and deviations. And then near misses in this definition actually means their deviations, but they never even got to the patient. So that would be like, I got the wrong drug from pharmacy and it never even made it into the patient's room. I send it back. Whereas they got the wrong drug up from the pharmacy and I gave it to the patient, but they didn't have any harm
would be a precursor in that language. Okay. Same principle. So can you give me an example of something that would obviously be something that you would want to do a full root cause analysis on so we can use it as an example. What if it was maybe you took the wrong patient back to the O R. Yeah. Yes. And it's interesting you bring that up because presumably you would identify that certainly before an operation began, hopefully before they even went to
sleep. And it's interesting because particularly if we talk about the events where no one's hurt, it's a real sometimes adventure to get all the right stakeholders and experts on board to doing a cause analysis because we're all of an outcome focused and caring. Well, if no one got hurt, then what's the deal? But yes, things like that would be big or
in the past we had a number of events perioperatively where we were having a movie either creating smoke other than as intended by the device or small fires or we've had certainly one of the things that comes up a lot that's relevant to periop would be a wrong site procedure would be a big one. Okay. Let's say they've chopped off the left knee instead of the right
and the patient's very upset and now it's your job to do the root cause analysis. Where do we go from here? You get the email in your inbox that they've gone after the wrong leg. Yeah. Now what? So actually oftentimes the hardest part of that process is getting to the email phase. Oh, really? Yeah. People as a whole are really hesitant to submit instant reports, at least in our health system. It appears to be varying degrees of a problem
nationwide, but especially with our physicians, learners and providers, there's a lot of mistrust of the system and a lot of frustration by some of the incident reporting actual software that people just don't put stuff in and then they just walk around and complain. So there's no harm in putting in incident reports and it'd be great if people did it more. For things like wrong site, someone will usually do that, but that is often one of the biggest hurdles
is actually getting it reported so it can then go through the funnel. Okay. So it gets through the funnel. It does end up in your inbox. Now what? Yep. The next thing is it goes to, we've got a multi-professional group that meets weekly that includes members of the safety team that I'm part of. It includes our partners with accreditation, risk management, experience and relations. We've got a pharmacist that sits on this group, a couple other people who meet every week to go through applying these definitions about were there deviations
in the system, were there harm, or so how much. And that's our main filter for deciding, okay, we've got this incident reporting, does it meet the criteria to then go for their investigation? And if this group talks through the event and says, yes, this meets our criteria, then it goes on and members of our safety team will dig further into the patient's chart. They kind of identify who are the people who were involved in the event and set up time
to interview them and talk with them to better understand not only what happened in terms of what I can observe in the chart, but also what else was going on in the end of the time? What were you thinking about? What was competing for your attention? What were you potentially, what were you thinking was the main problem this patient was having, particularly if it was like an inaccurate or misdiagnosis? And trying to do our best to understand everyone's headset at the time, because we know that hindsight bias is huge, particularly with
safety events. And so it's really critical to do our best to figure out, okay, at the moment, where were we and what was going on? And that the team takes that information, puts it together and comes up with a timeline for the event. After that, we get a group of people together who are experts in essentially the type of care that was provided. So for instance, something happens in the operating room, we're going to have someone from an
A to C team, we're probably going to have someone from a surgical team, probably a circulating nurse, maybe a scrub tech. It would obviously depend on what the event was. One of the new changes that our organization in the last couple of years is that when we bring together this root cause analysis team to go through the timeline and see where we have opportunities is we, with very rare exception, do not use the people who were part of the incident. And that's a kind of a national best practice, maybe international. And the thought is that
by bringing in people who have similar expertise, but not the exact same person who was there, you provide more psychological safety for the person who was a part of the event by not then perceiving that they have to come in front of a room and talk about why they did what they did. And that hopefully that's not the reality of what the RCA would feel like anyway, but people still worry about that. And then additionally, and this part is more anecdotally and internally, when we've had people who were parts of the event at
the cause analysis, the meeting takes a lot longer and we may or may not actually get to good causes because again, whether or not it's the vibe that's set in the room, people internally feel like they have to justify what they did. So they often talk extensively about what they were thinking at the time and why they did what they did, sometimes in a defensive manner. And I can't imagine why somebody would be defensive about a mistake
that they made. And see that exactly. And that's one of the cool things about if we actually get to more effective system thinking and cause analysis is again, it's back to that whole idea of no one comes to work to cause a shenanigan. The dominoes are not set up correctly around you if they fall so easily. And trying to move the thought process from I did this wrong, I caused this problem or they did this wrong, they caused this problem
to why didn't we have the infrastructure for this to go right is really the goal of what our team and what anyone doing this work is trying to do all the time. But it's a real shift in mindset, particularly in my opinion with people who provide health care directly because it's our hands, right? It was my hands on that syringe. I drew up the net, I labeled it, I did all that stuff. And so we always feel at least some amount of personal responsibility.
And so most human beings translate that to their colleagues as well when something goes wrong. So for all of those reasons, we try not to have the people who are involved in that actual incident itself during the analysis. When the team comes together, we go through the timeline and figure out, okay, in a perfect world, where would things have gone different? And usually there are one or two places where there would have been an opportunity to make a different decision. And then the gang together, which again includes the clinical subject
matter experts and includes the members of safety team that I'm part of, who are facilitating and leading the cause analysis. There are always risk management attorneys around accreditation people and patient experience team is often a big part of it as well. And once we decide, okay, this is the real step where everything went awry, or this is the real process that failed, then we dig into, okay, well, why did it fail? Well, I didn't, I didn't look
at my syringe correctly because I drew it up. So I assumed I knew which one it was. I didn't, I was task focused at the time. And so I wasn't thinking about, oh, I have two syringes that have the same, that are the same size in my pocket. I was thinking about, okay, they don't have a hat on yet, but I'm supposed to be in the room and the surgeons in there tapping their foot. I need to get, I need to find their hat. They need to give their family member hugs and kisses. I can tell that this is a patient and their
loved one who are going to struggle to part for a few minutes, but, but I'm already behind this, you know, all this other stuff. So it's really, we're really trying to move the analysis from, okay, what happened to why did it happen? What's the process that failed? Not that there's a person that failed. So as the group all agrees on why this failed and what the process was, and we worked to come up with, I don't know, what kind of solutions would work. Our
UC health RCA process has been continuously iterating and improving for some time. One of the things we're working on now is historically we've tried to identify, okay, well, this failed, so we're going to do this. Well, this happens, we're going to do this. We're going to do this. But we know that the first idea is not always the best idea. And we also know that other organizations struggle with similar problems. And so we're trying to move action items to things that we can maybe either test out or research more and not get super granular
in the meeting. That's actually new and we haven't gotten to testing that yet, but that's one of our next steps. So after we identify the correct cause, which is again, a really critical piece because when you have the wrong cause, you solve the wrong problem. And it may still be a problem. It may still be a cause. It may still be a problem. But if it's not the cause and the problem, you don't prevent that same thing from happening again. So we identify the cause, we talk with action items, and then we send out the people who are the
clinical leads in that area. So for again, an OR event, it would probably be like a manager or a physician medical director to engage their teams to figure out the best ways to execute and solve the problems. One of the big issues that we recurrently see with determining action items is everyone wants to update the policy or educate or remind. And to be clear, those are all important steps. They are absolutely critical. However, you can't end there because
we know that doing all of those, those are at best an 80% success rate. And then the farther away you get, your reminders fade from people's mind, I guess the education fades. And so we need to do things not only that include all that and setting the groundwork in the future, but we need to do things that are better stop gaps than just reminders. I've been talking for a real long time. So where should we go next? Everything that you've been talking about makes me think of one of my favorite things
to tell medical students and residents about systems level solutions, which I think one of the best examples is the pin index safety system, or the diameter safety system. Yes. So, and I always tell residents, by the way, that the anesthesia machine is very important and knowing about it and checking it is all very important. I am not the guy who's going to tell more things in the anesthesia machine and how they work. But yes, that is exactly perfect that our nitrous is one color or oxygen is another, our air is another, and that you
can't physically attach a nitrous tank to your oxygen backup tank. It's not physically possible. They're shaped differently, they're sized differently. I don't remember the specifics, but it's not physically possible. So that is a solution that has a high level of reliability. And there's a whole reliability science that actually then maths and tells you what the failure is. That's probably at least a level three reliability. It probably is higher, except in healthcare, we don't really find higher than level three. So most of the discussion pops out there. But there's less than a 1% chance of that family, whereas our education
is a level one. But yes, if you can find the analogous solution as the pin index and the back of your machine for your backup tanks for all of this stuff, oh my God, it'd be amazing. But that doesn't exist for. I would be remiss here if I didn't include my favorite inappropriate mnemonic for the cylinder, which you can remember, which is you piss in a cylinder. So pin index safety system is the one that goes with cylinder. I love that. Well, that's
how I got through residency. It's a bunch of stupid mnemonics like that. But it's perfect. That's perfect. I'm glad that I was able to share that with everyone. That's fantastic. Okay. So we've done the RCA. We have figured out the problem. We have attempted to address the root cause. Now what? How do we know that that worked? Yeah. So our current process is that the gang all comes back together at 30, 60, 90 days and potentially if it's not
done by then every 30 days until it is to say, okay, did we actually get to implement the actions we expected? If so, how did it work? And is it still working? And sometimes that's sometimes it's coming back to say, oh, you know what? We thought we could do this. We actually can't. Sometimes it's this didn't work. Sometimes it's no, we just haven't gotten to that yet. Being able to put in a new solution like the pin index takes a long time. I mean, we've got some that we're a year out of continuing to do to follow the
block. One of the hard things is that the actual function of how we divide up our work at UC health, it's not a hard thing, but it's just it's challenging is our system safety team that leads the RCAs and helps with follow up and making sure we have reliable solutions and our clinical teams that do the work are basically different human beings, which is great because now we've got two groups with different sets of expertise. But sometimes
that can cause conflicting timelines and priorities. And, you know, sometimes even back to when you're saying, OK, well, what do we do next or what happens next? We find out sometimes we end up having what we call deja vu events and meaning that it's essentially the same thing again. And usually when that happens, we find that I mean, it could be that our solution was quote unquote wrong, but most commonly is that we actually didn't have the
correct cost as a failure. There's one of the tools we use a lot. It's called the five whys. And the principle is that if you ask why five times, it's pretty much always get you root cause. But if you say, hey, Mandy, why did you get the wrong drug? Oh, because I was trying to. Why are you distracted? Because I'm really out of time and my case is really great. Well, why are you out of time? Well, we can't actually address that here. Why are you running late? All of that. And so if you keep when someone when you get back and answer
and you keep asking why. When you can't ask why anymore, that's usually your root cause. And if we zoom back out to the example of the patient identification failure, you know, well, the person didn't do it. They knew they should do it. Well, you can still ask why after that. That's not a cause. And if you if you address that problem that we didn't identify the patient correctly as this individual didn't do their job and either I need to give them some sort of a disciplinary action or a warning or or I need to remind them or whatever
it is. And that's your solution. Well, you haven't actually solved the problem. You have to keep if you will guarantee have repeat events. So part of the follow up is did it happen again? Did it turn out that that we were incorrect in what we thought the problem was? As tempting as it is to ask you why for the next five questions, I'm I'm not going to do that. Instead, I was just thinking about all the different complex personalities and
agendas that must come to the table when you bring these big multidisciplinary teams together. How do you manage that? That just seems like a miasma of different people. You said in real life, that's amazing. Well, you're welcome. Thank you. Thank you. I it's actually funny that you asked that literally earlier this morning. I was texting with one of our colleagues and I said that I actually think that a third of what I've learned in my job is facilitation and redirection in in big group meetings. I think there's a couple
of things. Number one, it comes back to in my mind, trying to understand another person's perspective and their lens and their view of the world and where they're coming from. Because again, if we keep coming back to we're all here to try to do the right thing and to try to help people. There's something that from their perspective, helping people looks looks one certain way, maybe they're thinking of different people or different types of help. And you know, it's probably not that no one comes to this to try to derail the
work and and redirect and sometimes they do come with an agenda to talk about a tangentially related problem that they can't stand. And I think this is their own audience. That's the case. Generally is addressed with some amount of validating that I'm sure that is a problem. And we can talk about that one next or separately. But let's keep focused on this so we can get this done. When when there's more work, conflict. There's there's
a lot of at least in my brain, it's nuanced between like gentle redirection to the other end of the spectrum is mom voice, we're not doing that right now. I need to stop. I don't do that one a lot. It's pretty effective at getting stoppage. I imagine so. What happens next is pretty variable too. But the staff is pretty reliable after that. But but it's
usually some version of verbally reminding everybody we're here with the same big goal and that sometimes we need to either pause and hear someone else out who's thinking about it differently or share why we're thinking about it the way we are or mom voice, we're not doing that. So there's a lot of different outcomes I imagine that take place and you talked about sometimes you don't get what you want and the problem recurs, or sometimes you do get what you want and there is a meaningful change. Can you talk in a non identified kind
of way about what those successes and failures feel like and what lessons you learn from either one of those? Yeah. Um, you know, one of the issues that this is more towards the failure side that I think everyone's facing now is we know that most of our hospitals are pretty full and we know that patients boarding and the emergency departments is a big problem. And when patients are boarding, when a lot of boarding because this may not
be a big part of everyday anesthesia life, but boring usually means that the patient came into the ED they can be admitted to the hospital, but there's no space for them to go to. So they hang out in the ED for an extra 412 24 48 hours as an inpatient. And, and the downstream, one of the downstream effects is that then, okay, there are more people in the lobby, there are more people who leave without being seen. And if I'm in the lobby for 14 hours for the ED, well, that's a long time that if I'm still there, I'm probably quite sick and probably need help. And there's a chance that something could happen to me
while I'm there. And really one of the, one of the root causes, so I guess that's another important point is not everything has just one root cause, but one of the root causes of all of that is that to get patients out of the hospital, they have to have a place to go. And sometimes they need to go to a nursing home, pre-hub facility and insurance requires prior often can take and then you can see how all this goes downstream. And in terms of a failure, none of us can fix the healthcare health insurance industry.
And that is a pervasive failure that, that we can't ever deal with an organizational level. And so sometimes we have to, okay, well, I can't do that. I need to jump over something else. There are kind of buckets of recurring events, like we talked about where sometimes it's a quote unquote simple process, like patient identification, and it fails in 50 different ways. And so it's like whack-a-mole, okay, well, I dealt with
this patient identification issue that had to do with how the bracelets print. Damn, it just happened again. Now, now it turns out this patient identification issue is actually because of distraction. Okay. Okay. Whack-a-mole, that distraction problem. No, now this is actually the same one that happened with the printers. We thought we fixed all of them, but these are actually in a different part of the building and those weren't able, we didn't keep up with the maintenance on those or they're overdue for their maintenance.
And so, so sometimes it's whack-a-mole for the same problem. Some of the things that are really cool though, are when we see that the clinical teams get really excited and engaged and keep solving their, you know, kind of use the tools that we use in our meetings, take them forward to solve problems on their own. We had surgeon reach out to our team recently to say, Hey, in this subset of our healthcare organization, I think we could
improve how we get patients from the operating room to the ICUs in a way that we have the right people at the right place at the right time. And one portion of our organization actually has a wonderful process for that and another portion doesn't. And so one of the cool successes is as we keep moving forward and working with different groups, we can keep connecting people together to partner and solve their problems better. I'm not sure if that's quite what you were asking them.
No, that's perfect. I appreciate that. So let's talk about what you see in terms of the future of root cause analysis and patient safety. Are there any innovations that you see coming to the forefront or what do you think is next? One of the things that is now kind of like a hot topic that people are talking about and that no one's gets solved is how do you deal with the issue of not just physical harm, but emotional harm? So, so yeah, you locked off the incorrect knee. Sure. You know what,
actually that knee was bad. I was going to need it on anyway. I don't mind, but you know, I'm really upset about it. It's not a great example, but right. But I'm really upset about it. Or at all, the people at the hospital spoke to me with such disrespect that I can't come back here. What do you do with that? There, there are a couple of scales for severity and we're trying, we're starting to bring that into our, when I referred to the meeting where we classify things and decide what needs an RCA, we're starting to bring that in. We
still, again, don't have a great solution for it. We haven't come across cases where we've had no physical harm, but very, very severe emotional harm that we've then sent to a root cause analysis. And to be clear, I don't think that's because it hasn't happened. I think it's because we don't know about it. But we've talked about maybe we would do that. And one of them is that the other, the other big area is equity. That implicit bias is
unequivocally part of some of our safety events and how you identify it and then how you actually embed it into your analysis to be able to identify it effectively and then how you fix it. I mean, good God, everyone's trying to fix implicit bias, but figuring out how to solve it is obviously going to be challenging. But the first step is obviously identification. And one of the things that I know that I struggle with, and I suspect a lot of other physicians,
clinicians, and providers do is we just want to fix it. We just want to solve it. And I can't fix it. But the first step is to bring it up. And so it's starting when, when something happens, if we, ideally this would become our standard and it is not yet, but ideally we would identify was there a difference in not only race or ethnicity, which I think we think of most obviously in healthcare as part of our social disparities, but also religious
background, sexual orientation or gender identity. I mean, just go through the whole list and, and we most commonly think about those things coming up where I, a healthcare worker is taking care of a patient who's a different of a different group than I am. And I don't give them as much attention, but it, but it does additionally go in attention is not the right word, but hopefully you guys can run with me on that. It goes the other way as well that I, a patient have a healthcare worker who's part of a different group and maybe I'm a real jerk to them. And then, and that could escalate to the level of workplace violence.
And one of the things that we, I think don't appreciate a lot in healthcare is that when we talk about workplace violence, that's not just someone goes into a post-hub, so they've gone, that's my patient kicked me in the chest. Not a demented patient, but my patient was pissed, kicked me in the chest. Happened on a night shift. I was working recently. I didn't get kicked. Someone else got kicked. It's the splurring string of profanities that my patient yells at me. That also happened to me recently for actually, for the first time in my life.
I walked out of a patient room when I was trying to pre-op a patient. The second time that I tried to pre-op them as they continued to curl their frustrations at me. And I was trying to get a couple of information about their history. They were very upset. They've been waiting. And I offered several times to continue discussing it with them. They were, after they've been able to take a few deep breaths and much like my children respond
to the deep breaths, that really only escalated the situation. My kids are very vocal about hating deep breaths and they're not doing that. But again, in the work that I do, also what we look at when we think about equity is if there's an inequity between the healthcare provider and the patient, but also just to call out that inequities also relate to workplace violence and verbal abuse is workplace violence. So those are kind of the things that people
are thinking for. Okay, how do we embed this effectively and do it better? Because we know that healthcare is not just, did I cut out the thing that was bad and so it closed good. It's also, did you feel valued as a human being? Did you feel understood? Were you able to ask your questions? It's all those things that we think of, I think in medicine, or at least I think of them as mushy or softer. But those are really those human factors that I think we need to figure out how to do better. So let's go back to when you were a medical
student or a resident who is really interested in solving those big problems but didn't know how yet. What advice would you go back and give yourself as someone who was interested but didn't know what they were doing ostensibly? Sure did not. I think in my mind, the most important things are to approach everything you possibly can with curiosity because I think that's the biggest way you learn. Sometimes it's hard to figure out where the people are with different types of work that you can try to glom onto because that's been one of
my other techniques of life is just glom off and don't go away. It just if you can't get rid of me then you'll have to eventually teach me something or have me do something for you to try to figure that out. But it's the cool thing in my mind about cause analysis and this kind of problem solving is that you can apply it not only to how you take care of patients or how you solve problems at work. But I actually use a lot of this type of thinking at home. And again, my kids and husband don't always love it. But why? You can always ask
yourself questions and part of it is even training yourself to ask the questions and the more you can even practice independently. Oh, why do I do that? Why are we doing that? Why is this attending doing it this way? But that attending does it that way. And it's, you can find out so much cool stuff. So I think being curious takes you so far in life, but that's a broad life lesson in my mind. I wish I could say, Hey kids, if you want to do what I do, you should do X, Y, Z. But, but I honestly fell into this and I don't
know what people who do it on purpose, what their trees look like. Well, I appreciate you falling forward into this podcast. I'm really excited. Lastly, any, well, that was an excellent style point. I wonder if you have any other style points or points of personal preference that have brought you success in or out of the operating room. Yeah. In addition to the curiosity, the other one, it sounds fairly hokey is, is a version of that, which is in soon assume positive intent. And again, realizing that very few
people are trying to be a pain in the ass, not, but if you can figure out a way forward to get to that, you can usually solve whatever it is. And I think that applies pervasively throughout life and work. I've got a million opinions on how we should do all kinds of minutiae both in the OR and the ICU. But I don't think we have enough time to get into it. Well, thank you so much for joining us. I am really happy that you decided to come on.
Me too. Thanks, John. Thanks again for joining us today. If you enjoyed this month's podcast, please feel free to drop me a line at stylepointspodcast.gmail.com. Leave a review or feel free to share it with your friends. Take a deep breath. Open your eyes. We're all done.
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