The world’s largest bank by assets is also a powerful instrument of Chinese statecraft. An investigation by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, based on 4.8 million confidential records, reveals how the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) aligned lending decisions with Beijing’s strategic priorities, sometimes overriding internal compliance concerns to secure natural resources, support Chinese companies, and strengthen political alliances.The findings highlight the tensions between commercial banking, geopolitical influence, and financial oversight. From lending to Russian companies despite sanctions-related concerns to financing infrastructure and resource deals abroad, the records expose how strategic imperatives can shape banking decisions. Limited transparency, meanwhile, leaves borrowing countries and regulators with significant questions about accountability and risk.Scilla Alecci, lead reporter and partnership coordinator for ICIJ’s China Capital Investigation, joins Eric to talk about ICBC’s overseas lending, Beijing’s influence over bank decisions, and the implications for financial regulation, resource access, and borrowing countries.Show Notes: * International Consortium of Investigative Journalists - How the world’s largest bank advances Beijing’s political priorities and global ambitions. https://www.icij.org/investigations/c... 📌 Topics Covered in This Episode * How ICBC Advances Beijing’s Global Strategic Interests * China’s State Banks and Geopolitical Power Projection * Sanctions Compliance and High-Risk Overseas Lending Decisions * Chinese Lending, Resource Access, and Political Alliances * Zambia’s Debt Repayments and China’s Lending Practices * Transparency, Financial Oversight, and Borrower Accountability Join the Discussion:X: @ChinaGSProject | @eric_olander | @scilla_alecciFacebook: www.facebook.com/ChinaAfricaProjectNow on Bluesky! Follow CGSP at @chinagsproject.bsky.socialFollow CGSP in French and Spanish: French: www.projetafriquechine.com | @AfrikChineSpanish: www.chinalasamericas.com | @ChinaAmericas This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.sinicapodcast.com/subscribe
Audio and video play straight from the show's own hosting. PodSubs stores and serves no media.
Transcript
From the show. Tap a time to play from there.
[music]
SPEAKER_02Hello and welcome to another edition of the China Global South podcast, a proud member of the Sinica Podcast Network. I'm Eric Olander. Today, we're going to look behind the scenes at the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, which is the world's biggest bank and one of China's least understood instruments of global power. A new investigation by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists draws on 4.8 million confidential records that reveal how ICBC advances Beijing's interests. Now, if you're not familiar with ICBC, you really should be.
SPEAKER_02It's one of China's most powerful financial institutions with around $7.5 trillion in assets. With those kinds of resources, it also has a lot of power. Now let's look at the report very quickly. Three major financial institutions. Now, this shouldn't come as a huge surprise for a lot of people. This is something that we've known, but we got details on how Bankers explicitly cited a, quote,
SPEAKER_02China rationale for some of the deals, explaining how financing would secure natural resources, strengthen political alliances or support Chinese companies overseas. And in some cases, headquarters even pushed transactions forward despite internal compliance concerns. Then number two, ICBC maintained relationships with what a lot of people would describe as high risk clients, despite, again, some of their own internal warnings. Now, those included Russian companies connected to sanctioned business owners and
SPEAKER_02a bank owned by the daughters of Azerbaijan's president. Those records show how strategic considerations help justify exceptions to the bank's own safeguards. And third, the financing extended well beyond Chinese companies and developing countries. Now, that's where a lot of the perceptions are. But reporters at ICIJ uncovered loans to Australian mining companies described as marginal or even loss-making, but valuable for securing long-term relationships. And even in Europe,
SPEAKER_02financing supported interests in critical infrastructure and access to technology. ICBC did not respond to repeated requests for comment on the report, including questions delivered personally to its London offices. The Chinese government rejected the investigation's characterization of what they said was opaque lending, saying its overseas financing follows international norms and does not seek political interest. The Chinese Foreign Ministry denounced the report and dismissed it, but we do not have any other comments from the Chinese side on it.
SPEAKER_02But we're going to get more today from Sheila, welcome to the show. Thank you so much for taking the time to join us. Thank you for inviting me. So I think a lot of us who follow the China space and have been following ICBC over the years I'm just curious, what did these internal records reveal that we didn't already know that we couldn't already prove?
SPEAKER_00Sure. Yes, as you said, it shouldn't come as a surprise that a state-owned bank wants to advance China's policies. However, what we see is the reasoning behind the lending and financial decisions that they made, and how even in a very regulated environment, such as London, the city of London, where These UK units were based. You can see how they were able to bypass conventional banking standards
SPEAKER_00on sanctions evasion or anti-money laundering policies when Beijing's interests were at stake. I think that was the most interesting finding for us. The records come from the London branch and the UK subsidiary of ICBC. So we only have A very small portion of their lending decisions. We cannot say that this happens throughout every branch and subsidiary around the world.
SPEAKER_00However, we have a very interesting glimpse into what's going on behind the scenes in this very influential bank. That many people know about, but very few people know in detail, you know, like ICBC, obviously it's the world's largest bank by asset size, but they're not transparent. You know, even when they act as a policy bank, there is very little information about what they do, how they How they, you know, the terms behind some of the loans that they provide.
SPEAKER_00So I think we, in a way, this investigation kind of showed the receipts for what many people suspected until then.
SPEAKER_02Yeah, and I guess the question that I had when I was reading the report, and it's very worthwhile reading, How exceptional is this? I mean, if ICIJ did a look into Deutsche Bank, or if they looked into a state bank from any number of countries, would they find similar conclusions where state banks were operating at the behest of How much of what you found is just when you lift up the rock the financial services industry, you don't always like what you see underneath, but it's really not that exceptional.
SPEAKER_02Or did you find things that were truly outside the norms, even by the standards of the financial service industry, which is not very transparent to begin with?
SPEAKER_00Absolutely. So ICIJ in the past did a lot of investigations into banks like Deutsche Bank, HSBC. We had an investigation called FinCEN files that looked at how they filed or actually failed to file SARS or act on suspicious activity reports. Yes, I mean, banks have been fined for wrongdoing in many countries. So in that way, ICBC is not an exception. What I think is interesting in this case is that it presents itself as a commercial bank.
SPEAKER_00However, when they take risky decisions, when they decide to onboard a risky client, knowing that they are risky, they do it for a political reason. And that's something that makes it different from Sets it apart, let's say, from other peers. So, you know, we never saw in the past, at least. And of course, we cannot pretend to know everything about every bank. We haven't seen a case where, you know...
SPEAKER_00Bankers would decide to bypass their own sanctions policies, as in the case of the Russian company Norris Nikol, for example, because China wanted Nikol for its industrial upgrade. That is something that you wouldn't see for a commercial bank. They would maybe do something wrong or bypass internal controls for the sake of profits and that's it. And here you say mostly decisions of the kind being taken for political reasons.
SPEAKER_00So I think the geopolitical nature of these decisions is something that we haven't seen before. ICBC is the largest Commercial bank has its sides, but JP Morgan is bigger for other terms. And, you know, another interesting thing that makes them different is that JP Morgan has, you know, dozens of media relations people and ICBC has basically none. When you try to contact them, you cannot find a person to talk to. So even just that tells you,
SPEAKER_00you know, you are dealing with a company, with a bank that does not want to be transparent and held accountable in any way.
SPEAKER_02That's certainly one way of looking at it if you're measuring it against, say, Western banking standards. But at the same time, this bank doesn't perform the same role that J.P. Morgan does. It works at the behest of the state. Is it just maybe a different expression of power that, again, is not our standards of power, but this is an extension of the Chinese state power that we are struggling to understand in terms of what their logic of power is and how they consolidate their financial – You know, companies with their state-owned mining companies, with their state-owned, any number of state-owned entities.
SPEAKER_02And it's just, it's a very different way of articulating power in the 21st century, which is different than what we have done. I mean, I'm not trying to rationalize or excuse it, but if we measure everything against transparency from the Western standard, is that a fair standard in the 21st century?
SPEAKER_00Absolutely, this is a different beast, let's say. This is what other experts have told me. It is a Chinese state-owned company. It's not just a state-owned company. Of course, you have to take into consideration that some of the bankers were members of the Communist Party. You know, when they had performance reviews, it wasn't just about, you know, how many deals they made, but also like whether they were able to advance his policies. And this is something you wouldn't see, I think, in other banks, like Western banks.
SPEAKER_00However, it is an international bank that operates in international markets. You know, like in this case, it was London and obviously they have to abide by the same rules as other peers. And, you know, so if they present themselves as an international player, then some of the rules that other banks are, you know, abiding by should apply to them as well. And one of them should be Transparency or,
SPEAKER_00you know, of course, we know that financial services are not the most transparent players out there, but at least, you know, a perception that they can communicate or at least respond to questions when they are asked by the public or journalists or the government, for example.
SPEAKER_02Was it concluded that they violated British banking laws through your investigation and that British authorities have now are taking action? Is that part of this story?
SPEAKER_00No, I don't think we can. Well, I don't know what the British authorities are doing, to be honest. But you haven't heard anything
SPEAKER_02about that, right?
SPEAKER_00No.
SPEAKER_02Okay.
SPEAKER_00They don't comment on these things, so we haven't heard. Well, I think we haven't found... Instances of criminal behavior, let's say. What we found is the very high risk behavior or like maybe internal misconduct or incidents that their own compliance officers flagged as very problematic. For example, one of these was the $1.3 billion transfer for Huawei.
SPEAKER_00That was very controversial internally to the bank because it went against some of their own checks, as well as the idea of breaching sanctions policies, the bank's internal sanctions policies, to keep lending money to Russian entities and others. We haven't seen instances of criminal, yeah.
SPEAKER_02Okay, that's very interesting. The report is based on 4.8 million records. I'm not going to ask where you got the records from, obviously that's sensitive, but how did you authenticate them so that you knew that what you were looking at was legitimate?
SPEAKER_00This is something that we do all the time. ICIJ has done several investigations based on leaked records, millions of records. One thing that we do before we even involve partners in our investigations is that we validate the documents. Many of these documents also include records that you would find in the public space. For example,
SPEAKER_00some contracts, even some loan terms or other documents. There is a mix of going and checking what's available outside the trove and see if you can match some of that information. And at the end of the day, you also ask for comment. You go to the companies that you're going to write about and request comments, very specific, very detailed comments on our findings and none of them ever questioned those.
SPEAKER_02Yeah. And so I guess one of the key questions that has come up in light of your investigation of how much is of what happened, of what you documented is merely the London office, because that's where you had the documents. How much of this is worldwide? And how much of this was orchestrated by Beijing specifically? So my colleague, Giro Nima, who's the Africa editor at CGSP, had spent a lot of time with the report, had wanted to join us today, but unfortunately had a last minute, you know, scheduling conflict.
SPEAKER_02So I asked him to record a few questions for us to join the conversation. So let's take a listen now to what Giro has to say about this question of where did the organization of all this come from?
SPEAKER_01Still looking into the issue that you've mentioned, when we had Beijing intervening in the case where the headquarters in Beijing intervening to give ICBC London the go ahead, what was the level of interaction? I'm asking the question because throughout the reports in the case, for example, for Huawei and in the case of Sierra Leone, we see there was kind of internal fighting between different departments.
SPEAKER_01So when we read the report and then we see that we can ask, so at what level the hierarchy of ICBC was involved and how this issue was resolved at the end and what... There are a lot of things to unpack there. Yeah, it's a big question.
SPEAKER_00Yeah, so the records come from, as I said, the London branch and the UK subsidiary. This difference is quite interesting because the branch is basically under the direct supervision of Beijing, while the UK subsidiaries It's a legal entity, you know, and they deal with retail customers mostly. So the branch is in London, but basically, you know, the main decisions are taken in Beijing. And of course, you know, in the branch too, you have a CEO, you have,
SPEAKER_00you know, head of departments, infrastructure, finance department, you know, so many. However, we see that in the key decisions, like in the Huawei case or in a Zambia, for example, loan case, the managers of London units would refer, would Refer to decisions taken by their superiors in Beijing. So we are not talking about the president,
SPEAKER_00of course, or the chairperson, you know, but these are the most senior officers in that specific unit and they stay in Beijing. And every case is different. In the case of Huawei, for example, they don't mention I remember the investigation records that talk about what went wrong or what happened during the transfer. They don't talk about specifically who decided what.
SPEAKER_00They just refer to Beijing, to the head office. That's the term they use always, head office in the documents. In the case of Sierra Leone, what happened also in that case was that The bank decided to give it together with another bank, Exim Bank, I think it was more than 600 million loan to this small company that was in charge of a port expansion. And without having all the documents,
SPEAKER_00the documents in place, that I don't remember now, I would have to look at the documents. But in that case, you know, they also say the head office want us to Commit to this loan, even if we don't have everything on the record. And then months later, they realized that some of the borrowers, the receivers of this loan, there were allegations of corruption against them. And so they decided to not disburse the loan.
SPEAKER_00But instead of telling this company, we are not giving you the loan, they just Stay quiet because they don't want to upset the government of Sierra Leone.
SPEAKER_02Yeah, it's politics.
SPEAKER_00You know, like in that sense, these documents have been interesting because you really see, you know, people who, you know, you see the interactions between these officers in the emails. You kind of have a feeling of how they were interacting between each other. The compliance officers were tense in some situations because they knew that these were, you know, some of these behaviors was against what they We're there for, you know, that that was their job, you know,
SPEAKER_00like a money laundering reporting officer, you know, he studied, he had a career in that, you know, and then maybe he wants to advance and become, you know, and so they don't want that on their CV. But at the same time, they understand that when head office wants something that they obtain it.
SPEAKER_02I guess what I'm struggling with a little bit here is... Since, as you mentioned, there was no demonstration of illegality here. So what seems to be happening here, what you seem to be documenting is that this is a bank that is going against its own internal compliance and regulations and guidelines for oftentimes political reasons. And now it's a state bank. Is there anything, and I don't know if your report, I didn't hear in this, but is there anything wrong with that necessarily?
SPEAKER_02If China wants to use its taxpayer money to take risks that are excessive or not effectively evaluated, well, that's China's decision to be able to do that, and they're going to be ultimately accountable to their own taxpayers because this is public money. Is there anything wrong with what they've done outside of that?
SPEAKER_00Well, I think... The problem is that in this case, for example, we look, this is, yes, it's a Chinese bank, but these are the UK units of a Chinese bank, okay? But again, we've concluded
SPEAKER_02that there's no illegality, though, or at least as far as you can tell. I mean, or at least the British government hasn't taken action yet against them.
SPEAKER_00Yeah. So that's still to be seen. I mean, ICBC has been fined for similar flaws in other countries, in Canada and the US, you know? I don't know, maybe if the UK government wanted to take a deeper look into this, they may find something that, you know, warrant some warnings. I don't know. But I think that even if it didn't cross, or at least we didn't find something like proof that they were acting illegally,
SPEAKER_00you know, some of the The bank's own officers found misconduct issues. Some of them resigned because they didn't want to be involved. So definitely it is an institution that if it operates outside China, foreign governments should at least be aware of how it operates and maybe take a closer look. And considering also Geopolitical interests,
SPEAKER_00one of the things that governments should take into consideration when they examine banks' activities or modus operandi.
SPEAKER_02Yeah, okay. Let's go back to Giraud and for another question from Mauritius.
SPEAKER_01Talking about ICBC muscular approach in the lending process in case of Zambia, for instance, what ICBC has done in that case in 2011 that was different to what other banks Westenberg would have done in case of Zambia that would kind of present ICBC approach to Zambia to be much more either muscular or being more, some would say, unfriendly towards Zambia.
SPEAKER_01As what ICBC has done in Zambia or elsewhere, the way to approach it was quite different, was totally different than what other financial institutions would have done in the case of Zambia. Thank you.
SPEAKER_02And maybe before you answer that question, you can give us a little bit of background on what you reported in Zambia.
SPEAKER_00So this story is coming up soon, so I can just give you maybe a teaser because a colleague of mine, Mike Arelli, is working on that. But just in a nutshell, what we found was that, you know, in 2018, so years after the bank had given, I think it was more than 200 million loan to Zesco, the Zambia's electricity utility,
SPEAKER_00Seven years after they had provided this loan, they started to, you know, wanted the money back, basically. And the company was in financial distress. They had already other loans with ICBC and other Chinese banks, and they were not really in a position to repay some of this, the first installment. What is interesting there is that at that point, ICBC itself had Basically, in London, they had opened an account for Zesco just to repay the loan.
SPEAKER_00So in that case, in 2018, even if Zesco appeared not to be in a financial position to repay the loan, they already had put some money in their account. And ICBC Beijing ordered, basically, ICBC London to just give them the loan. It's not even a green light. They basically were able to grab this $20 million for the first installment and transfer it back to Beijing. And this happened even though there were some issues within ICBC London
SPEAKER_00because they, again, they had some due diligence issues. They had not done all what was required by banking protocols at the time. So there were some tensions there between Compliance officers in London and the head office. The head office wanted their money back and the compliance still needed some time to figure out compliance issues, but the money was transferred. So I don't know that I can compare this with other banks, Chinese banks, specifically or Western banks. We haven't, you know, this is what we see here.
SPEAKER_00As I said in the beginning, it's just a little window into how this bank operates. But when we talk to experts, They said it was very interesting, for example, to know that ICBC was the lender. At the same time, it also had the account where the money was deposited. So they didn't need anyone's permission to get the money for them. So this is something that allowed them to get their money back in a way that maybe
SPEAKER_00a policy bank would have not done. So... I mean, this was just an example, I think.
SPEAKER_02Yeah, and it highlights how Chinese state banks in the China Development Bank and the China Ex-Im Bank in many ways are operating in very different ways than, say, traditional policy banks have operated. So, for example, it's thrown off a lot of people that the China Development Bank is issuing commercial-based loans, which is not usually something that happens from a state lender. Normally, they're concessional lendings. And I mean, there are some exceptions. I think the German state bank also offers commercial rate loans as well.
SPEAKER_02But again, the logic of power here is different and the articulation of that logic of power. And I just I wonder if the burden is certainly on the Chinese, as you say, to be transparent in some cases, but also on the borrower. To know what they're getting into and who they're getting into. And one of the things that we've found over the years is that particularly in places like Africa and Latin America, where the borrowers just kind of assumed that the Chinese banks would operate much like the other traditional state banks have operated in Europe,
SPEAKER_02in the United States and elsewhere. And they haven't. And I wonder how much of that responsibility is on the Chinese side for using different ways of doing things, sometimes shady, sometimes not, and on the borrowers who went in a little bit naive.
SPEAKER_00Well, I mean, so the thing is also that Chinese banks went in places where some Western banks wouldn't go, you know, like lending to countries where Western banks Governments and Western banks didn't want to be involved in because of some, you know, many issues.
SPEAKER_02Because of the risk, there's a lot of risk.
SPEAKER_00Absolutely. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And so, and at the same time, China wants their money back.
SPEAKER_02Which is not unreasonable, right? I mean, no one can blame them for that.
SPEAKER_00But that means that they use what experts call ring fencing, you know, like so very specific and kind of harsh terms on the borrowers so that the money is paid back. The problem is that these borrowers, sure, I mean, I don't know if there was naive or some case it wasn't naive, it was more like an interest or in some other cases, maybe some political decisions to get this money. But in the end, you see that some of these countries are indebted.
SPEAKER_02Well, they borrowed money, so of course they're indebted. I mean, that's not rocket science there.
SPEAKER_00But yeah, indebted with banks that don't, maybe they are not part of the Paris Club. They're not going to give you, know, other terms that maybe other banks would have. But as you pointed out,
SPEAKER_02there was no choice, though, because the other banks weren't giving them that option.
SPEAKER_00Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, absolutely. I mean... So I don't know what to conclude there, but I guess the problem is that, I think one of the problems is that, you know, the aid data, for example, the, you know, the William and Mary Research Lab, they are some of the, you know, the researchers who have been done more work on this and Even they struggle to find information on the lending practices of these banks.
SPEAKER_00And the problem is that because of the lack of transparency, you cannot, you know, here we are speculating on this, right? I mean, yes, we're talking about some of the contracts that we have seen, but these are just, you know, very few compared to The amount of money that's been disbursed to these companies, entities in Africa and other places. So the problem there is that when you have so much lack of transparency, so much opaqueness, then it's all about spirituality. And that's where, you know, that's the problem, I guess.
SPEAKER_02And to be fair on that opacity issue, that's not only the Chinese side there. Again, there is nothing stopping the Zambian government and there was nothing stopping the Kenyan government. Which, by the way, the Kenyan government has in its constitution that it must publish all major procurement contracts. But they agree to the same opacity terms and the nondisclosure agreements. They can tell the Chinese, listen, we have to declare this to our publics. As part of our laws, and they don't do that.
SPEAKER_02So the lack of transparency swings both on the borrower and the creditor. It's not just on the creditor. So I think that's just an important, you know.
SPEAKER_00But on this question of the lack of... Yeah, but you had a power dynamics there, you know.
SPEAKER_02Yeah, but the borrower still has some power to be able to say, listen, we have laws. And Kenya still ostensibly is a democracy. So if you're not, you know, but at the end of the day, if a borrower is asking for terms that are too onerous, then they don't have to borrow that money, right? I mean, there's no one putting a gun to their head to borrow that money.
SPEAKER_00Yeah, but it's like, yeah, okay.
SPEAKER_02No, go ahead. I'd be interested to hear your take on that.
SPEAKER_00Yeah, you know, it's like... The problem is a bit like high money lending, you know, when you have someone who needs the money because they need to build a hydropower, they need electricity and no one else is showing up, then they go to the lender that provides the money. The problem is that The consequences are so big in the end, you know, maybe a few years down the line. So, yeah, it's complex.
SPEAKER_02And that is the nature of, I mean, in the United States, for example, we have payday lenders where poor people borrow money at much higher interest rates and with much more onerous terms than wealthy people do. Wealthy people get all the benefits of high credit, low interest loans, long repayment terms, extra credit when they start repaying. Poor people don't. And I guess the same is true in the global context as well, that poorer countries oftentimes are penalized for their poverty
SPEAKER_02because they are perceived to be a higher risk, even though in many African countries we've seen over and over again that they have actually managed their debts properly. Quite effectively. So those higher rates are unfair. I don't blame the Chinese necessarily for wanting to make sure the ring fencing you're talking about getting their money back. I mean, why else would they lend money if they don't want to get it back? I guess just on this question of the opacity thing is, again, we're guessing on a lot of things. And your report was very clear on saying you just didn't know a lot
SPEAKER_02because you didn't have access to things. But on this question of some of the decisions being made for strategic reasons, saying securing resources, selling Huawei, or trying to secure political influence, did you find any evidence that they actually achieved those objectives? Or were these aspirational, that they were hoping to? Did you get any sense from that, from those ambitions?
SPEAKER_00Well, I mean, so we know that, you know, when they wanted to, when they gave money to companies to obtain resources and then saw that in exchange also Chinese contractors would have, you know, We have opportunity. Then in those countries, yes, we found evidence of that. For example, I don't know, Angola is the most evident case in 2010. ICBC gave,
SPEAKER_00I think it was a very large loan, $2 billion or so, to Sonangol, the state of company. And in these documents, they say quite explicitly that that was so that CITIC, one of the Chinese companies could get a contract for housing, you know, a project there and it happened. So, you know, then that's also when you go into your question about how do you validate this,
SPEAKER_00when you see in reality, this is what happens, you know, like, or for example, they go into, they give money to companies in Chile to, you know, To get copper. And that's specifically, you know, the reason why they do that is because they need copper in China for their own industries and so forth. And in other situations, they talk about giving money to companies because the government stayed on companies because the governments are part of the BRI.
SPEAKER_00So this happens again in Angola. It happened in Azerbaijan. So, yes, absolutely. And we see that some of these countries now, they are allies, political allies of China.
SPEAKER_02What was the reaction that you got? So the Chinese didn't say anything, even though they were asked repeatedly. The Chinese Foreign Ministry denounced it, but ICBC did not respond. What other reactions did you get to the report?
SPEAKER_00Well, I must say, from the Chinese side, you mean?
SPEAKER_02Well, no, worldwide. I mean, I was surprised by that it didn't get more traction in the international media. I was expecting a little bit more, but I'm just curious what reaction you got from it from any sites. Obviously, the Chinese did not respond to it, but others. Yeah.
SPEAKER_00Well, I think that people like you who are interested in these topics were very interested in the report. Also, for example, I got interest from people in the financial crime or anti-financial crime space, let's say, because of this idea of having a Chinese bank operating overseas but under Special rules, let's say. I think some people were interested in that sense.
SPEAKER_00In the UK, there was a debate One of the Lords questioned the security implications of some of the investments or the financial decisions that ICBC did, which involved utilities, for example, water utilities and other key infrastructures. So that was the political reaction we had. Yeah, I think it was a bit subdued.
SPEAKER_00I mean, to be honest with you, I think it wasn't a gigantic reaction. For those who are looking at this, who are interested in how China operates, especially now, then maybe it wasn't. These days, there are so many issues.
SPEAKER_02It's hard to keep up with everything. And it's hard to shock anybody anymore. But I will say, the report is absolutely indispensable to understanding at least how a part of ICBC works. Thank you very much.
SPEAKER_00As I said, one of my colleagues is working on a story about Zambia, so I hope we will have that soon. I'm also interested in looking at ICBC's role in the wind industry in Europe. As you know, there is a European Commission investigation into some Chinese companies. For unfair subsidies and competition. So that's something I'm looking into. And then we will see. I mean, honestly, we have done, we have tried to go through all the documents, but that is impossible.
SPEAKER_00So I don't know, maybe more will come up. I don't know. It's a big report.
SPEAKER_02Well, we'll put links to – there's a lot of different things as part of the China Capital Investigation. We'll put a selection of the links in the show notes and then a link back to the ICIJ website so everybody can take a look at the great work that you've done. Sheila Lecce is the lead reporter at ICIJ on the China Capital Investigation and the partnership coordinator as well for the project. Sheila, thank you so much for taking the time to join us. We really appreciate it.
SPEAKER_00Thank you. This was fun.
SPEAKER_02And we'll be back again next week with another episode of the China Global South podcast. And of course, if you want to support the independent journalism that we are doing here at CGSP, the best way to support us is to go to ChinaGlobalSouth.com slash subscribe. And don't forget, if you're a student or a teacher, half off, just use your email from your university or your school to sign up. So that'll do it. So for the entire CGSP team around the world, for Jiro, Kobus, Lucy, Brianna, everybody, thank you so much for listening and for watching. [music]
This week on Sinica, I speak with Joe Studwell, whose 2013 book How Asia Works gave a generation of readers a usable account of how East Asia got rich. His new book, How Africa Works: Success and Failure on the World’s...
This week on Sinica, something special: a keynote from my friend Evan Feigenbaum, vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, delivered on October 5 in Ottawa at the Asia Pacific...
Something different this week. Since I moved back to Beijing, the question I get most often has nothing to do with trade or tech or the 15th Five Year Plan. People want to know what my life here is actually like. So I...
This week on Sinica, I sit down in Beijing with Tim Clissold. If you read one book about doing business in China in the 2000s, there’s a fair chance it was his Mr. China, the self-aware, admirably self-deprecating...
India and China are cautiously rebuilding ties after years of confrontation, but normalization remains fragile. Recent high-level meetings have restored diplomatic momentum, yet unresolved territorial claims, persistent...