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RevOps FM

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Legends of GTM: Eloqua's Founder Talks Category Creation - Mark Organ

Feb 6, 202446 minAudio
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Many entrepreneurs dream of creating categories. But few have actually done it - much less built a category worth billions of dollars. Mark Organ is one of those rare few. As founding CEO of Eloqua, he pioneered marketing automation in the early 2000s, paving the way for other players and selling to Oracle for nearly $900 million. Mark and I chat through how he co-founded Eloqua, the pivots and experiments needed to achieve product-market fit, and how category creators may be wired a bit differently. Thanks to Our Sponsor Many thanks to the sponsor of this episode - Knak. If you don't know them (you should), Knak is an amazing email and landing page builder that integrates directly with your marketing automation platform. You set the brand guidelines and then give your users a building experience that’s slick, modern and beautiful. When they’re done, everything goes to your MAP at the push of a button. What's more, it supports global teams, approval workflows, and it’s got your integrations. Click the link below to get a special offer just for my listeners. Try Knak About Today's Guest Mark Organ is the founding CEO of Eloqua (the first successful marketing automation platform) and Influitive. His greatest professional passions include creating new billion-dollar categories in technology and developing new leaders. Today he helps CEOs achieve their full potential in their businesses and their lives as the CEO of Categorynauts. https://www.linkedin.com/in/markorgan/ Key Topics [00:00] - Introduction [01:05] - Founding Eloqua and marketing automation [07:47] - Origin of the lead generation playbook [10:39] - Getting to product-market fit [16:03] - Genesis of lead scoring [19:08] - Toolkit software vs. opinionated software [24:25] - Pivots and brushes with death are the norm [27:09] - When is it right to build a category? [30:14] - Building a category around an under-served hero [33:51] - Creating a category for the second time [36:42] - Challenges with churn at Influitive [41:05] - Alternatives to VC funding in SaaS Resource Links Categorynauts - Categorynauts is the leading global community of category creating leaders, helping CEOs looking to discover, develop and dominate their category. Learn More Visit the RevOps FM Substack for our weekly newsletter: Newsletter

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Transcript

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Justin Norris: You're listening to RevOps FM with Justin Norris. Welcome to RebOps FM. And today we chat with Mark Organ, the founding CEO of not just one, but two category creating companies. Mark is a real legend in the space of GTM. First, he helped usher in the era of marketing automation at Eloqua. Which later sold to Oracle, and he then founded the Advocacy and Customer Engagement Platform in Fluidiv. So this is someone who knows a thing or two about creating categories.

Today, Mark is the CEO and Head Coach at Category Knots, where he offers coaching to CEOs on category design and company building. And Mark and I are going to chat about what was it like building the category of marketing automation back in the early days, and then just dive deep into his playbook for category creation more generally. What does this mean? When should we do it? How is it done? Mark, I am so excited to have you on the show today. I'm excited Mark Organ: too. Let's get Justin Norris: going. Alright. I mean, let's start at the beginning. Some inside perspective on the days at Eloquo.

What was it like? What was your idea in the beginning founding that company? And how did it evolve into what we came to know as, I think, the first marketing automation platform, if I'm not mistaken. Mark Organ: Yeah, I mean, the first one to get any attention, the interesting thing is that there's nothing really new under the sun and there actually was before Eloqua, there's at least one company that I do recall, I can't remember the name of them, that built an Eloqua like thing, but this was before the idea of multi tenant cloud databases.

So this was on premise, They had to sell their product for at least a quarter million dollars up front. So there's something to be said for just having good timing. Often there's an enabling technology that allows a disruptive technology to work. Like a good example is in the automobile, which was actually around for a good 15 years before it really started to take off. And it wasn't until the key ignition, people had to stand outside and crank the car, if you might have seen old videos of that. And that wasn't a very good experience for a driver, but the combination of

the key ignition pneumatic tires made a big difference for the quality of drive. So sometimes you need that enabling technology to work. And I think in the case of Eloqua and other technologies like it, I mean, you can make a case for CRM as well, really only taking off after the cloud. I had a bunch of other technologies, but yes, I mean, the first one to really get to commercial scale, uh, and it was a very interesting story. Eleco was a bootstrap company. I was the oldest person in the company at the time at 25 when I founded the company and really, we were just trying to survive.

We raised 166, 000 and managed to get profitable on that really was not thinking about creating a category at all. We're just trying to. Figure out a market is really what we're trying to do. We're trying to figure out a market and trying to do something that was different from what else was out there. The reason why we founded the company had nothing to do with marketing at all. Interestingly, when we started it, and this is something that not a lot of people know, but the idea really came from the experiences that I and my partner, Steve Woods had when we were at Bain companies, management consultants.

I was doing work in the sales effectiveness space and seeing how sales reps were really not being very effective. The advent of modern technology allowed buyers to screen out sellers a lot more effectively. As it turned out, there was the rise of the internet, and that's where a lot of new prospects were spending time, either on websites or in email, this would be in the late 90s. At the same time, my partner Steve, Who became the CTO of Eloqua. He was struggling to buy all his Christmas presents online. He wanted to buy his Christmas presents online.

That was the challenge he gave himself in 1998 99. And couldn't really do it and found it really needed advice and service in order to make it work. So he kind of put these ideas together and said, What if we could use the internet to connect buyers and sellers together on websites? That would be cool. And so what we actually created was something that you now see in like intercom was like a chat. It was a chat product. And literally it was an embodiment of this idea where we connected buyers and sellers using chat on the Internet.

Our very first customer was our commercial real estate agent. Um, it just turned out to be completely lucky today. They would be known as Cushman and Wakefield. It was like the number one commercial real estate brokers. And I guess they took pity on us and became our customer. After the tech rec in 2000. And so that was our first customer that we launched this chat product. Justin Norris: Just to clarify, it sounds like a very early version of drift. Yeah. So drift Mark Organ: or Olark or intercom. Yeah. I mean, if you were to look at the screenshot, it really looks very similar.

To those products. But what was interesting is our very first customer was a B2B company. So everyone else in the space at the time. So the big player in the space, which is still around, what we call live person was focused on the consumer market like everyone else. And as it turned out, our first customer was B2B and that was lucky. And so as it turns out, commercial real estate sales reps that make hundreds of thousands of dollars a year don't really want to chat with random prospects on the internet. But what they were interested in doing was in following up with people when they were

ready to talk about a particular property. So we actually built the email engine because we thought, well, we're not getting a consistent enough flow of chatters. So let's build an email so that we can get more consistent flow. And then that actually ended up becoming the MVP was really, it was an accident. And so it was a sort of combination of email marketing and what actually was website tracking, putting those two together and allowing sales reps to follow up with prospects in order. That became the MVP. It was an absolute accident.

But what was interesting, though, is that the foundational mission of the company, which is to connect sellers and buyers over the internet, that was true. But the technology that we used ended up being different. Like, we ended up jettisoning the chat product after a while. And then even the email marketing and website analytics, like, even though those two components Were a key part of the technology that wasn't the category like the category was focused around nurturing prospects until they were ready.

To buy, so the fact that we were an email marketing or website analytics, like those are not the markets that we played in. We actually created a new market and it was pretty interesting because nobody would fund us. Right? So the VCs all turned us down, the analyst firms refused to cover us and it's because they thought we were confused. So they thought we're like, are you a web analytics player? We're like, well, no, I mean, we have that technology, but that's not the market we play in. We're happy to have. Web trends at the time, website story, which became omniture have that part of the market.

Email marketing became a huge market unto itself. Again, not really the market that we wanted to play in selling emails at a quarter of a cent per piece. The emails we sent were 20 times more expensive. The reason why is it's not about email. The reason why it was about this other sort of function that we created. And that really became the genesis of what was a new category. Not just the way that the technology was used, but probably most importantly, and probably get into it, the people who used it, which are not really necessarily

the sales reps, but these would be like the early marketing automation people, marketing operations people that were in charge of having a more efficient and productive marketing organization. You Justin Norris: alluded a bit to the essence of what that motion was. Basically, the idea that people might come to you doesn't necessarily mean that they're ready to buy, but if we can continue to engage with them over a period of time, send them relevant content, build that relationship, then

when they are ready to buy, we can be ready to hand them over to sales. Like, kind of very simplistic, but broadly speaking, And actually also spoke to john miller from marketo about the genesis of this and from his point of view it kind of emerged sort of almost organically like hubspot was talking about something similar within by marketing marketo was talking about something you were doing this thing was it just sort of this organic thing that was in the air or do you remember the origin of this idea of going to market in this way. Mark Organ: Yeah, no, I do remember the idea. Yeah, and it's interesting because we were founded more than six

years before Marketo and HubSpot. I think to some degree, both of those companies were a reaction to Eloqua. In fact, I saw the early VC deck that Phil Fernandez and John Miller produced. And it had Eloqua in there, but the challenge with Eloqua, which they correctly identified was that the user experience was not great. And they improved on that. HubSpot also was a reaction to Eloqua to some degree because it was to them all about interrupting buyers and not actually providing the best buyer

experience, which I'll get to in a bit. So I think buyer experience is really important here and probably one of the big insights that I had, there's sort of two foundational ideas that built up Eloqua. One was my insight on sellers, but the other one was Steve Woods insight on buyers, that he wasn't able to have the experience he wanted as a buyer. And I think there's a lot of. Insight in that that great marketing helps buyers get the feelings that they want to get the experience that they wanted. So this idea was really quite central when we founded the company again.

Number 1 was that the Internet could be, which includes email and the web could be a powerful tool for sellers to connect to prospects when they're ready to buy. So that was an insight that we had even when we started the company. And the second one is the experience of buying is not great. And if we can improve it, then you probably have a market there somewhere, even though the technology that we built first was wrong, like it was not what the market wanted. We still had an insight that came from our own experiences.

And also in my case, I mean, interviewing hundreds of sales reps as part of my consulting work so that our brains were kind of primed for this. We knew the type of problem we wanted to solve. Solve. We had an understanding of the data that we would expect if we were solving it properly so that when our technology was wrong and not just our technology was wrong, so is our target market. So we're based in Toronto and Toronto is a big financial center in North America. And so our initial target was finance insurance and real estate because that's

what you have here in downtown Toronto. And it turns out that market was wrong too. That's banks and insurance companies. They don't really care that much about lead generation and demand gen because they have really tons and tons of people that they could sell to. But most of them are not appropriate. They don't have the right kind of credit score and whatnot. So that was off too. But again, I think because we had a strong initial hypothesis as to what data we would expect to see if things were going well, we changed the technology and we changed the market so that we ended up tacking

to a target market that actually was desperate for High quality opportunities. In fact, that was the biggest problem that they had. And maybe one of the ways that we got this insight was that it turns out there's a part of the real estate market that actually ended up being affected for us. So Cushman Wakefield was not actually a great customer for us, and eventually they ended up churning. But we did end up getting pretty lucky in that we had some customers in the vacation real estate space. It turns out we had a partner in Toronto that was really

big into vacation real estate. And that became a hit. So understanding, well, why did that work and other real estate companies, for example, not work? And it turns out that vacation real estate is different in that their real estate is more perishable. Like when they build something, they have to sell it pretty quickly. Being able to sell out properties allows them to raise more money on Wall Street and go and do the next project. And that's kind of more software like.

So if you think about when you build a piece of software, it is perishable. You need to sell like hell. And if you don't, there's going to be competitors that are going to catch up to you. So that's when the light bulb kind of went off and said, Oh, I get it. We need to sell to companies that need qualified leads like their life depends on it. And those are the best opportunities. And then an even bigger lightbulb came up. Another random thing. As I said, I'm an ex scientist. Before I got in the business, I was actually literally at the lab bench for eight years. I was going to get my PhD in neuroscience, literally doing lab bench work, right?

And if you look at the history of discoveries, I mean, often they are accidents, but there's a prepared mind, like a prepared mind We'll see the accident and see that. Oh, this thing could make a good post it note. For example, like someone discovered a glue that wasn't a very good glue, right? And said, Oh, this crappy glue would actually be really good. And that's where the post it notes came from. And so I think like a good entrepreneur, their mind is always. They're in the market. They're talking to prospects and customers and they're feeling it. And they're actually looking potentially for adverse data.

The adverse data may actually be what you want. And so we got another interesting customer called J boss, which at the time was one of the biggest open source software companies in the world. It was our first open source software customer. So this would be like 2004. So other companies at the time would be like my sequel. You might remember them red hat. And I have a funny story about Red Hat, which shows you what product market fit really looks like. But Jboss was a massive success for us. We generated 10 times better return for them than we did for any of our

other customers that we had before. So what went on there and why was it so effective? Well, it turns out that open source software companies are different from regular software companies in that they already have all the leads that they could ever want. They're drowning in leads. They're using the damn thing for free. What you need to do is figure out who's the best fit. And prioritize those for sales reps in order to follow up with being able to do that. Absolutely transformed J Boston's economics, and they ended up selling for a huge multiple.

And so at that point, we got that every other open source software company in the world actually became our customer, including Red Hat. This is really funny because we went down in North Carolina to go to go in and launch at Red Hat. And these poor people had to go and buy like Windows terminals. To use our product because we're like in a cathedral of open source with our Microsoft based product. It's like going to Mecca and offering a pork sandwich. I mean, it's hilarious. That's what product market fit really looks like.

When someone has to buy a whole bunch of computers just to use your product, you know you're doing something right. But then we really got it. Like we really got it. This is okay. What we're really good at is this lead qualification thing and prioritization thing. That's what we absolutely nailed. And so from that point on, like our growth went nuts because we knew exactly what we were. Why we did what we did, who the best possible fits are for us, who the best partners are for us, what are the best next products for us to build,

because we really understood ourselves. And that's really because of our interaction with the market and the data that we had coming back. And to me, this is what building a software company or any company really is all about. It's about, there's a scientific method. You develop hypothesis as to what you think is the right target market, the right offering for that market, the right way to position it and market it. And then you go and get data coming back and that tells you kind of where you should go and point your company at that Justin Norris: point. When you talk about the lead prioritization use case, are we

really talking about lead scoring? Like, was that the genesis of what we call lead scoring today? It is. Mark Organ: That's exactly it. It was the genesis of lead scoring because you needed to have a score in order to prioritize who to follow up with. And that really did come from our foundational research that I did into Seller. So what I discovered when I was Learning all about sellers is, number one, seller time is super valuable. It's way more valuable than most companies really give it credit for. The second thing I learned is seller longevity or tenure is super important.

So salespeople really start to pay off big in their third or fourth year with a company. That's some of the research that I had done. So when a company is losing their sales reps after two years, it's an absolute tragedy. And why do sales reps leave companies? Well, the other thing I found out is they leave because they're not getting the leads that they require. It's not about their education. It's not about their management. A lot of really. And this was a kind of a blinding insight, not just for me, but for my client at the time that lead quality was so important.

So sales reps are wasting time on poor quality leads. It is devastating. It feels like absolute crap because they're not only are they not being successful, they're wasting a lot of their time. So optimizing sales rep time and efficiency was a huge focus for us at Eloqua. Which you think about it, is super weird for a company that's in the marketing space. Like why is a marketing company obsessed about sales rep productivity? It's because of where we came from. It's because of our origins.

And I do think it's one of the reasons why Eloquest succeeded. I think we succeeded because we were focused on the right metrics and metrics that were completely different from everybody else in the space because of who we were, that we were the marketing company that was obsessed with sales success. In fact, a number of our customers, we were told many times, this is the first time in two years where we've got together with the sales organization again, like we'd have these meetings that had marketing and sales together on the same. Table in order to discuss what is a qualified lead. How do we score these properly?

We would be the driver of that conversation, especially in the earlier days. I mean, the later days at Eloqua, sure, everyone started talking about this. You had serious decisions that was bringing this to market. Really, we were the first company to ever partner with serious decisions. This is another interesting story in itself, in terms of why we partnered with them. But yeah, I think that one of the ways to do well in the software industry, which has got tons of noise, lots and lots of players in it, Is to build processes that have never been built before. And those are most commonly found when you bridge over

departments, you bridge function. So Eloqua really was a bridge between the sales function and the marketing function. And Fluidiv, which came later, was a bridge between the marketing function and the customer success function. So when you bridge across two functions, which are often are your fault lines in companies where you have departments that don't talk very well together, building processes that bridge those very well and using technology to do that. It's a great way to build a company that Justin Norris: works. What extent do you feel that the platforms that you've built are

agnostic in the sense that they're toolkits that can be used in a variety of ways versus platforms that have a kind of opinionated perspective on go to market built into them? So if we take the example of Eloqua, The motion that sort of evolved around that and I think evolved around the category of marketing automation generally is the one that we've kind of alluded to use content to collect leads you nurture you score you hand over to sales that was like the basic scaffolding of that motion and do you feel that is sort of centrally embedded.

In the platform and if that motion changes is I think that there's questions and that is evolving today. Do those platforms need to evolve as well? Or do you feel that they're more just like, these are toolkits that we can use in any way to market, however we Mark Organ: want. Yeah, that's a great question. I think a great piece of technology really does both. If you're just a platform that can do anything, users don't really know what to do with all the power in the product. If you don't have an opinionated way, at least for some of the critical things.

If there's not an, what you call opinionated, which I just think is intellectual property that's embedded in a piece of software. If you don't have that, then I think you're probably not going to hit your potential. I think we have both, where at least for some key functions, there is a best practice way to do things. But there's also something for power users that have innovated, like there needs to be a way for innovators to use your product as a canvas to do what it is that they want. And oftentimes those, I mean, I've found it many times, both with Eloqua

and Includiv, that our customers knew better than us what to do. They would tell us, well, here's our vision. I remember DocuSign with their 150 different nurture streams, which they could do in Aliqua, you couldn't do it anywhere else. We never conceived of anything like that. That was something that they said that they wanted to do. And so we were able to push the product into that direction. I think what product managers have to really think through, and this is really difficult. This is why product management, when you get a good one, a good product manager, a good CTO, they're worth their weight in gold is you've got to figure out in

which directions do we need to scale. You can't scale at every dimension. At Eloqua, what we decided is we want to be able to scale in the direction of Basically allowing for the most sophisticated marketing campaigns ever to be created. We want it to be for people who want an ultimate power to be able to do that. But there are a lot of dimensions that we didn't scale. You couldn't have an unlimited number of sales reps, whatever. You couldn't have a ton of users on the product. I think it would break. You couldn't have. 5 million simultaneous visitors on a website.

So if you wanted to go super high scale B2C, it would break. And we knew that we're not going to try to go after those spaces. I think the limit of where we went to, which ended up being also an accident, was a number of sports teams used the product because we started in sort of selling seasons tickets and then move from there onto the B2C side. But that was really straining the product quite a lot. So there's like B2C, we're not going to go there. Lots and lots of users. We're not going to go there, but if you have in mind a killer campaign that you want to do, that has a huge amount of sophistication to it, if

this happens, then just do this. If this happens and do that, we want to be able to nail that and it'd be the best in the world at that. And I think that was a good decision that we went into. Those are things, for example, that Marketo or HubSpot could never do, even today, could not do them. They could do a lot of other things, and maybe even including things that Eloqua can't do. Like, I think Marketo again made a smart decision and said, We are going to compete on ease of use. And so there are going to be a lot of Eloqua's potential customers that are not going to need all that power. And they're going to want to make it more of a joy to use.

And I think they did a great job. I give a lot of credit to John and Phil for what they did there. And then at HubSpot, I mean, they weren't even really in the marketing automation space in the beginning. They were really inbound marketing. Somehow they made marketing automation inbound y. I'm amazed at their ability to do that. Because for years, Darmesh said, we're not getting into that space. We don't like it. And then they did. And somehow it worked, I guess, as testaments to great marketing. If you want to make it big in the marketing software business, you need to have platform potential.

You need to have the ability for people to do things that you did not conceive of. But you need to think about, well, what direction is that going to go in and can we own that? And at the same time, you absolutely need to be opinionated on some critical things. Like you have to understand the best way to do things. And drive those best practices for, for companies. And to your question, I mean, things are changing. I do think that product led growth is the future. I just can't imagine that any company is going to be purely sales driven in the future. If you're not using your product to do more of the other functions, the sales,

the marketing, the customer success functions, even the product functions. If you're not doing that, then you're going to lose to someone who is going to do that well. And I think the current marketing automation tools today are actually not that good at that. They're really not evolved for getting those deep product signals that are in there. And I think we're yet to see who's going to win in that space. I don't think it's going to be Justin Norris: the existing players. About how you had to pivot multiple times start over the wrong market wrong technology wrong product it's funny because i am listening to audio book by

ben horowitz hard thing about hard things and he talks about his experiences and very similar they were selling servers they were failing the pivoted to selling. Software they almost died so many times and then they had a big exit and same for you selling to oracle for almost 900 million dollars and so do you feel that these pivots and these sort of brushes with death so to speak maybe that's a bit too dramatic but just approaching failure and then needing to reassess. Is this just inherent in the journey of entrepreneurship or are there

some people that just get it lucky and they're like, yep, here we go. And it's a smooth path to kind of fame and fortune from there. Mark Organ: You're not being overly dramatic about brushes with death. I mean, we came within four days of kicking the bucket. I mean, there's some crazy stories of how we kept ourselves alive. which included, which running was great about that is that our employees owned a lot of the company a lot more than what was typical because we had a number of brushes with death and we ended up selling stock to the family members of our employees and they ended up doing well.

So yeah, no, it was definitely a hairy experience. I think it's possible that there's some people who just get lucky, but I work with a lot of entrepreneurs and a number of them have had to do. Multiple like what you're talking about really is the pivoting from servers into software or whatnot. I mean, that's a big pivot or so. Maybe more of these mini pivots where their target market is wrong, their pricing model and offering is off. That's a big one, right? So that was a big one at included. We went from a freemium model to a paid pilot model, and that was

actually really big for getting our growth going in the right direction. So, yeah, business model target market messaging. Yeah. That's why I advocate this sort of scientific Agile approach where as a CEO, you're constantly testing ideas. You're constantly saying, what about this? I wonder what would happen if we charge this way? What would happen if we try this target market? And you're doing it really as a way to get closer to the answer. And the answer being, this is our target market with this offering, with this

pricing model, with this messaging, that is going to be the answer for winning a multi billion dollar market. And so, being open to other ideas that maybe your initial hypothesis wasn't right. In fact, it's almost sure to be wrong. Your initial hypothesis is sure to be wrong. But, but then once you're starting to learn, having increasing conviction in how you're going to market over time. Justin Norris: And then maybe that's a good transition into the topic of category building generally, because you've made that the focus of your

current career with category knots, which is a super interesting idea. Maybe just as a first question, should everybody try to build a category? Is there times where like actually don't build a category, do something within an existing category? How should people think about this? Mark Organ: Building a category is not for everybody. It's funny. I mean, the last time, uh, when I wanted to start in fluid in my significant other, why don't you just go and do it? Marketo did. Why build something completely new? Cause that's why I'm wired. It's just what I'm excited about doing. I'm actually not a technologist.

I mean, a long time ago, but God bless Eric Yuan and zoom. They built a, an amazing product to. Capture an existing category, but he'll be the first to tell you they had no interest in building a category. You wanted to build a better mousetrap. For the existing one and I think that could be a fine way to go. I think the people who are excited about building categories. It's just because that's the way they are. They're pioneers. It's the way that they're wired. The 1 thing that I do really love about building categories

is that while it takes longer. I think if you follow a good step by step process, you actually can build something great. It may not be a multi billion dollar category, but I think if you do it right, and you're the owner of even a smaller category that's, it's a 30 million category, but you have 50 percent share in that. I mean, you still have a business that's doing 15 million in sales, and it's probably profitable. I actually have a friend of mine who did just that. He was a top sales rep at LinkedIn and he was burnt out and his wife was a permanent makeup artist.

Like they basically tattoo makeup on women's faces. I'm burnt out. I'm going to help build their business for a little while while I figure out what's next. And at the time I talked to him about my playbook around how to build a category, which he thought was really interesting. And he's like, we'll try some of your ideas. And so at the time there was like a few hundred permanent makeup artists in North America and his wife was one of them. So they started by just making kits. These are like permanent makeup kits. They just assembled a bunch of stuff and ship them. That's how they started. They ended up building their own products.

So they source their own products. They did training. They did certification. They ended up doing a award ceremony. A lot of the things that I've done in terms of category building. Today it's actually a pretty interesting business. It's in the double digit millions. They own a hundred percent of it. They're probably doing a lot better than many people in the software industry. They could probably sell their business to a private equity firm for like a lot. And so it's not a huge category, but they own it and that's not bad. Yeah, it's taken them 10 years and typically is how long it

takes to really build a category. But the step by step process. Actually makes it to me a little bit less risky compared to trying to catch lightning in a bottle, building a new piece of technology for an existing category to me actually feels riskier and maybe it's just because of my skill set around categories. So let me tell you a little bit about what that step by step process is. It starts with having what I call the underserved hero, which at

Eloqua was the demand gen marketer. So we found these really interesting people when we went out to go and visit prospects, and these were these marketers that often did not even have a background in marketing. A lot of them came out of engineering. In fact, some of them came out of sales, but basically what happened is you had these companies where the CEO. And other senior people figured out that the Internet was the way to go for marketing, like, and making something more process

oriented was kind of the way to go. And they often didn't have people even in their own department that were good at this. They had to go and find other people that were a little more quantitative and process oriented. And these were people that were attracted to us, to our product. And I mentioned serious decisions. They're also very attracted to serious decisions. And their research at the time when we partnered with them, they were four people and a dog over top of a rented storefront in Danbury, Connecticut. They were absolutely tiny, but these demand gen people really loved research because they were the ones that were doing research in this

area in terms of demand generation. And the reason why we call ourselves demand gen automation was because these people call themselves demand generators. They literally didn't even call themselves marketers. So we generate demand for a living. Like we are the people that in a demand poor environment, make it happen. And so all we did at Aleppo was we built a company around these people. So we didn't just give them product. We gave them services. We gave them an ecosystem. We gave them a conference, content, a book, a platform to build on top of.

And we just surfed that wave. And that's the same way that Lucatina Davies served for their permanent makeup company. Who did they serve? They serve these underserved heroes of permanent makeup artists, which swelled from 500 people to 5, 000 people. Kind of surfed that wave. At Influitive, there were customer marketers at the time when we started customer marketing was this really, it was not really much of a thing. Okay. These are the people that were in charge of getting references. To help close deals. And maybe they would do a referral campaign now and again.

And what we saw was that this is going to be huge because, well, because we're driving everyone crazy with these emails all the time, the buyers were getting frustrated with that. They wanted to hear from their peers. They wanted to hear from real customers. And as it turns out, getting customers to talk to advocate was not that easy. And so what we did is say, okay, well, as opposed to having separate processes for referrals and references and case studies and five star reviews online and all that, well, shouldn't you have one person in charge of all customer evidence?

And let's go serve those people. And that's all we did. And we did the same playbook, which is we gave them product, service, ecosystem, community, award ceremony, book and other content and platform. And honestly, if you've chosen well, if you've chosen people that are on the way up, that's all you have to do, is you just serve those people, and eventually you'll actually have something decent, and because you were the first. You're going to get your share of the winnings of that category.

And even if you don't choose well, that's my whole point, like, let's say the category doesn't end up becoming that big as you thought. You still might end up with 30 40 percent of something, and 30 or 40 percent of anything is actually still Justin Norris: decent. Did you find it? Easier the second time around like coming in doing in fluid if I really remember all that vividly because I kind of remember the first days of influence of and then marketo had purple select and I knew your team because I was also in Toronto so I kind of was like on the periphery of that a little bit watching it was it easier or was it still just as hard and require pivots and all that sort of thing.

It was Mark Organ: easier. So at Eloqua, I was completely rammed. We had no idea what we were doing. We made a lot more mistakes than the second time. And it was actually, I'm really grateful. My credent at Salesforce, who asked me to give a talk about category creation in the early days of Influitive. So that forced me to think about what did we actually do at Eloqua? And why did it work? And then what are we doing now at Influitive? And that actually codified a number of my ideas. When I gave a talk at Dreamforce, and so yes, there were less pivots. I also raised more money, which is both a blessing and a curse.

So Ellico was a bootstrap. And in hindsight, there's a lot of value in that. At Influitive, I already had a name for myself. So I raised A lot, 30 plus million dollars. And to be honest, not all that money was invested wisely. Once you raise that money, you have to go and put it to work, but it did probably make it easier to get to product market fit, but the pivots were less severe. We understood the target market. While we sold to the same target that we sold to at Eloqua, which were sort of complex software companies.

So we understood that. We did change the business model. We did change the pricing models. I mean, those things changed the messaging, the messaging did go through pivots, but we didn't go through such like a huge product pivot, probably what we did learn some of my big insight that I had coming into Influitive came from my experience where I was on the board of a social gaming company and seeing how interesting gaming companies are compared to software companies. You don't have to train people on how to use a game. They use it on their own and how it really drives a lot of user.

Addiction. And so one of the things that we did learn is that the more fun and game like we made the product, the better we did. So we did go through a number of interesting pivots to make it more and more like a game. But still the same process. Like that was a hypothesis that we had and then we went and tested it. Let's predict what'll happen. Let's see the data come out. The data coming out says, hey, this is really positive. Let's go and double and triple down on this idea. Justin Norris: I'll give just an homage like from an outside perspective at that time your marketing team was really top shelf.

Jim williams was your marketing leader and alex shiplo who i know pretty well was leading demand and just seemed like you guys were on fire like it was the hot place to be people were closing you had really. innovative ideas. So it really did feel like at that moment in time you had latched on to something special and it was just moving along at a really fast clip. I don't know if it felt that way internally as well, but it certainly appeared that way. Mark Organ: That was a really fun time. We were at the time growing very quickly. So that was the time we started Advocamp, the Advocamp event, which

ended up being a big hit as well with Jim Williams running that. We hit a significant rough patch after that. And the churn started to really go up. So while we were winning a lot of customers and there was a lot of excitement around the idea and still is a lot of excitement around the idea. The churn started to really go up. One of the challenges was that so for people who don't know on your show, it was basically gamified community and the purpose of the gamification is to drive advocacy, so to get more customers to invest their time and

energy and reputation into companies that they really love with referrals, references, case studies, videos. Tweets and all those sorts of things. So that's what the product was all about. The insight for when to the product, I mentioned a little bit about making things fun and game like, but it's pretty not a blinding insight, which is if you make the process of advocating more pleasurable, people will do more of it. So make it more valuable, make the experience better, which is really what Influent is about. So that was the first ever community approach for doing advocacy.

The challenge was that this is a community that lives separately from the product. It wasn't that easy to get advocates to do their thing like you really have to build a good relationship with them. So what we found is that there was there a player customer marketers out there and they got tremendous return on investment for the product. And then you had B and C grade customer marketers, which are 70 percent of the market, or 80 percent are B and C players. And sometimes one of these people would go on mat leave, or they'd leave their job or whatnot, and they'd get replaced with someone.

So even a community that was going really well. Would sometimes start to crest a little bit. And so the churn started to go up and then the reputation for churn got out into the market, which was not great. So the company started to flatline a little bit in terms of growth. We had got ahead of our skis in terms of our burn rate. So I had to do a couple of rounds of layoffs in order to get things right sized. Eventually I did end up leaving the company to actually homeschool my son, which was, that was sort of nine years in, he was getting a little bit tired.

And then I think the company never really, with the new management team, didn't really hit its full potential. So I still think it's a very interesting category, and it will be a multi billion dollar category. The key is going to be solving that churn problem. And maybe AI is going to be an important part of that. I mean, that's generative AI was not something that was part of the experience before that's something that could make a big difference. I think that making the community a more organic part of the experience of using a product, I think could make a big difference the same way

that in a Tesla, you have the referral machine is built right into the car. You don't have to think like, Oh, you're happy with your experience. Go refer a friend and we'll give you something for that. I like our conversation before about enabling technology, the right enabling technology, I believe will make this a multi billion dollar category because for sure the companies that get their customers doing more of the work for them, if your customers are doing more of your selling, your marketing, your product work, your customer success work, you're going to win. You have people who are better than your people and they don't cost anything.

And so there's just no way that this can't be a multi billion dollar category. And I think we'll see that in the next few years, someone is going to go and build the category killer Justin Norris: here. It's funny that you mentioned gen AI, because I think again, as an outside server, one of the challenges I perceived. In running an influential community, the person labor required to like keep it going, like new questions and quizzes and challenges and things, there was a constant stream of that. It was relatively labor intensive and AI could certainly relieve a lot of

that burden on the customer marketer. Mark Organ: That's my hypothesis. Yeah. I think that generative AI may turn those B players, custom marketers into A players. Maybe we're also getting things like optimized scoring systems. I think there's a lot of amazing things that we could do with AI. That could be the version of the key ignition for this market space. So for any entrepreneurs that are listening, I think that there's a very bright opportunity in the space. Justin Norris: I want to ask one more question about the sass market in general

and particularly the funding model and this theme has emerged organically and a lot of your responses about bootstrapping Eloqua raised a lot of money within fluid of your friends with the permanent makeup business and how they did it and I think over the last year or so what we've seen with capital markets drying up lots of layoffs. A lot of companies that with these insane valuations that will probably never recover their initial value. So even though they may have raised hundreds of millions of dollars, those, that equity is not very valuable. All that is to say, do you think that we're about to see different

models emerge that the traditional VC model of like raise a whole bunch of rounds, keep raising, keep burning? Is that changing and is bootstrapping going to become cooler or other funding models become more popular? Mark Organ: I think the answer is yes. I think things are going to change. I think the SAS, the industry is maturing and there's still lots of opportunity in a maturing space. It's just, you're just not going to see as much innovation around sort of new functions to automate. I think almost every function in a company is now got some automation around it.

So that gold rush is over, but then there are. Opportunities and things that are maturing. There's a ways to put different functions together that haven't been done before. There are suites of software that you can put together and you can integrate them in ways that haven't been done before that I think are going to be interesting. I think there's more opportunity now in bootstrapping than erasing. Today. So if I were to build another software company today, well, first of all, this, the cost has gone down so much. I mean, if you could scrape together a hundred thousand dollars today, you

can build a pretty decent product, get it to market, test it with thousands of different potential customers. That would have taken 5 million when I started Eloqua now, and now it would cost a hundred thousand dollars. And that's with a lot of inflation at the same time. I think that there's. An opportunity really to raise now when like we did it out. I mean, the reason why I raised money, I mean, really for two reasons. One was we had a bunch of idiots on our board that we have to get rid of these angel investors that were actually pretty terrible.

Um, they had to buy them out, but the other one was we actually knew what we were doing, right? So we like, holy cow, we have a market that's accelerating. We can put revenue generating units together at a profit in five months. Two sales reps, a lead generator and a half a sales engineer, and we can make them profitable in five months. Why wouldn't we raise all the money? We can't in hindsight, like that's really the right thing to do. Because we could tell the investors, like, you put your money, here's the box, and here's what we're going to do with it, and where are you going

to get return on the way back out? Whereas at Influitive, honestly, they were taking more risk, which they were willing to do, because they're like, well, Mark will figure it out, because he's done it before. And we were also taking a lot more risk. And in hindsight, I'm like, I'm not sure that was a really good idea. Again, maybe one of the advantages of being a category creator is you actually do have more time. We didn't have all competitors breathing down our neck. We had no competitors at all. So I think we actually had more time. Maybe in my case, I was just like, well, they're throwing money at me

and the valuation is really high and I'm kind of sick of writing checks. And so sure, why not? Let's take some money and make life a little easier. I can afford a vacation this year and some other things like that. If you can keep 100 percent or maybe 80 percent of your company, because you give more, give more equity to your people. Keep 80%, keep 70 percent of the equity for yourself, give more out to your people. And then once you figure things out, well, then you really do need, I mean, the scale of go to market, you really do need money. Now, especially if you actually have competitors, you may lose the market.

That's the other reason why we had to raise Elk at the time was that I started to sense new competitors were coming. I was right, right? Marquetta was founded a year later after we raised 10 HubSpot and these companies in Silicon Valley would, that's what they're good at doing. They're good at raising money and putting it to work. Like I thought they were bananas at Marquetta. I'm like, I can't believe they're doing this. Why are they overpaying so much? Well, actually they were right. It was the right thing to do. So yeah, no, I do think we'll see a different model. I think we'll see more bootstrapping. I think we'll see more intelligent use of debt.

As a way to get companies to a level to where it makes sense to raise more money at a higher valuation and invest in nailing the go to market motion. So Justin Norris: interesting, Mark. I really appreciate you chatting with me, hearing this all. It's just interesting to put into perspective a lot of things that like I saw this much of and your point of view. Living through that. Thanks, and I really hope to chat with you again. Thank you, Mark Organ: appreciate it. Have a great day. Justin Norris: Hey everyone, I want to invite you over to the RebOpsFM Substack

community, where you can sign up to get rough transcripts, show notes, longer form articles, and other bonus content. Just head over to rebops. fm slash subscribe to get free access. I'd also love to know what you thought of the episode, and to hear suggestions for topics you want to learn about. Feel free to leave a comment on Substack. Or send me an email at justinatrevops. fm. Thanks for listening.

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