Skip to content
PodSubs
ShowsPeopleGuestsJobsNewsEvents
More
BlogPodCred
Menu
ShowsPeopleGuestsJobsNewsEventsBlogPodCredNetworksSign in
Join nowSign in
  • Shows
  • People
  • Jobs
  • News
  • More
    • Guests
    • Events
    • Blog
    • PodCred
    • Networks
    Join nowSign in

Matters

Matters artwork

Industrial Policy --Again

Nov 12, 202632 minAudio
ShareXLinkedInFacebookWhatsAppEmail

Leela Lebowski interviews Professor Ben Selwyn at the University of Sussex about his book co-authored with Christin Bernhold, Capitalist Value Chains, which was recently awarded the 2026 International Political Economy Working Group (IPEG) award. The book critiques mainstream global value chain approaches for depoliticizing capitalism and obscuring labor exploitation, environmental destruction, and geopolitical tensions. Ben revisits Alice Amsden’s account of South Korea’s industrial policy - subsidies, distorted prices, bank control, R&D, and discipling firms - alongside critiques that emphasize international factors like the Vietnam War. He discusses “internationalizing industrial policy” through state efforts to solve cross-border bottlenecks, especially securing critical minerals for electric vehicles, citing work on China’s overseas investments (e.g., DRC) and US geopolitical moves to secure resources. The conversation argues that industrial policy never disappeared, has resurged post-2008 amid intensified geopolitics, and often reinforces exploitation; they call for a more democratic, pro-labor industrial policy and criticize the shift from green programs to militarization. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit mattersthepodcastforourtimes.substack.com

Audio and video play straight from the show's own hosting. PodSubs stores and serves no media.

Transcript

From the show. Tap a time to play from there.

SPEAKER_01Welcome to the Podcast Matters, Ben. It's delightful to have you back with us. For our listeners, Ben and I were speaking on global value chains and we are back talking about a topic that's very close to our hearts, industrial policy. Ben, tell our viewers a little bit about yourself and what you're doing these days.

SPEAKER_00Thanks, Leila. Great to be here. Yeah, so we had a chat last year, actually. I think it was around in November, December last year, or maybe January. So I've written this book called Capitalist Value Chains with my co-author, Kristin Bernholt. And the subtitle tells you everything you need to know about the book. Subtitle is Labour Exploitation, Nature Destruction, Geopolitics, and it represents a critique of mainstream capitalism. GVC, value chain, supply chain approaches which simply think of these things

SPEAKER_00as extensions of the gains from trade, from specialization going right back to Smith and celebrate them and really worry every time there's any disruption to them and is obsessed about expanding them and is obsessed about digitalizing them and so this book just says That coal approach is wrong and it's leading to labor exploitation and massive environmental destruction and also a lot of geopolitical imperialist tensions that you can link to these global value chains

SPEAKER_00or capitalist value chains as we call them Because one thing that the mainstream does not do is speak about these chains as capitalist. They're speaking very apolitical, depoliticised terms, very kind of techno-centric terms, economic-centric terms, and really miss out a big social relational element of these systems of production, which we conceive of as extensions and parts of international class relations where one class exists. The billionaire class in Silicon Valley, for example,

SPEAKER_00can grow up huge amounts of surplus value from workers in other parts of the world, such as China. But then, of course, we're interested in issues of catch-up development and the statecraft and the imperialist chain and how states are operating within it, but also try and resist it and try and move their way up.

SPEAKER_01Fantastic. Today, we're going to talk about industrial policy. Tell me a little bit about the internationalization of industrial policy.

SPEAKER_00Yeah, so I'll speak about that in a second. If it's all right, I'll just recap. I know that you and your listeners are probably extremely familiar with Alice Amsterdam's work on industrial policy, but it's worth recapping here because that gives us the full value of the idea of the internationalization. So, Amazon's book, Asia's Net Giant, and her amazing You Left Review article about industrial policy in South Korea, spelt out a whole range of policies. These included things like getting prices wrong, deliberately distorting prices,

SPEAKER_00so for example, making inputs cheaper than market rates in order to facilitate competitiveness, providing subsidies, coercing firms, providing controlling banks, Investing heavily in R&D and targeting firms, picky winners. And all of these things, all of these policies were outlined by Amsterdam in the late 1980s, early 1990s, at the time when neoliberal ideology, the kind of get the prices right ideology was dominant.

SPEAKER_00And she really just exploded. She said, look, you neoliberals, you claim that South Korea has developed because of kind of appearance to market signals.

SPEAKER_01That is...

SPEAKER_00Wrong, to put it politely, and this is the reality. And she gave this stunningly brilliant analysis of industrial policy. And other people have done that too. People like Robert Wade, Charles Johnson, early on, came up with this idea of development estate and many others. And they go back in the inspiration to Friedrich List, and ultimately, Elizabeth Hamilton. Over 100 years ago, in terms of Hamilton, over 200 years ago, speaking about the realm of the state in facilitating catch-up development, what we understand as catch-up development today.

SPEAKER_00So, that was Amstyn's really important contribution. Now, she was criticised for that contribution by people like Jim Glassman, who wrote a fantastic book on East Asian development, and people like Glassman said, Okay, all of these policies that I'm just talking about are there. That's the big part of the story, but it's not the whole story, he argued. Because the story of South Korean's development is also linked to external events,

SPEAKER_00militarization, the Vietnam War in particular, and the way that the South Korean state was able to benefit from the Vietnam War, supplying the US military and other actors in the region in that context. So this raises the question that how do we understand industrial policy? Is it purely through a kind of methodological nationalist lens looking at the state itself? Or do we have to think about industrial policy in an international context? And if so, how? Now, in the book Capitalist Value Chains, Christine and I,

SPEAKER_00we talk about the notion of the imperialist chain. And we derived that from Trotsky and other Marxists. And we said, look, if you look at the history of capitalism, especially since the Second World War, you have the United States making global capitalism. That's the title of Panitch and Gindu's amazing book on the subject. The US really formed capitalism. Global capitalism for the first time following the Second World War, and it played the role of first amongst equals in terms of facilitating free trade,

SPEAKER_00but making sure at the same time that its companies were the dominant companies in that context. And so within this context of the imperialist chain, you start to see how industrial policy has got more than just a domestic element. Obviously, industrial policy is about international competitiveness. And there's examples of the United States funding a whole range of agencies such as NASA and so on to facilitate industrial development, technological cutting edge development. But when we look at industrial policy today, we can take these points and say, look,

SPEAKER_00global value chains or capitalist value chains are a process of production fragmented across borders, The lead firms, the big corporations that preside over this production, don't rely on free markets. They govern their chains in the GBC parlance, or they manage their chains, or they drive their chains. They control the chains. They control what is produced, how it's produced, where the resources come from. And they are backed up by other states, the United States especially.

SPEAKER_00But of course now we hear a lot about China over the last 20 years. It has really risen, achieved catch-up development to a very large degree. And it's a very interesting article published by... Well, this is an article by Daniel Driscoll, Max Caffell and Matthias Larsson, and it's called Internationalizing Industrial Policy, column, how China and the United States use state capacity to secure critical minerals

SPEAKER_00for electric vehicles. And their point is that... In the context of this fragmentation of production across borders governed by lead firms, states need to play an increasingly important role in securing the basic inputs for the products that are being produced. And so they look at electronic vehicles and they show how China especially has engaged over the last 20 years in all

SPEAKER_00of the stuff that Amazon talked about. Big investments, big subsidies, controlling firms and so on, which we'll be all about in a moment. But it's also engaged in really expanding its international network of infrastructure and logistical infrastructure and political relations and investment in mines and other activities in countries like the DRC to ensure that China and its firms get access to these crucial minerals and These critical minerals, such as lithium and cobalt, for electronic vehicles.

SPEAKER_00And so what these authors show is that the developmental state, as in the sense of Chalmers, Johnson, Ellis Amsden, Robert Wade, and others, was conceived of really solving national bottlenecks, ensuring investment, ensuring upgrading, and making sure that process was internationally compressive. What they are talking about now in this context of global value chains or capitalist value chains is that The states play a role in solving international bottlenecks, and that is ensuring that the critical materials are imported and supplied to China,

SPEAKER_00to Chinese firms, for a number of reasons. One of them is simply they need to have these Raw materials, these critical materials, because they are heavily concentrated in few countries, as I mentioned, like Australia, Chile for lithium, DRC for cobalt, but also because part of the big insight of the global value chain approach is that the lead farms benefit a lot from processing minerals, from processing the production process, from Controlling these high value added elements of production.

SPEAKER_00And so this is basically what they are talking about in this scenario.

SPEAKER_01Fascinating, which just reminds me of why we've been hearing so much about Greenland and securing those mineral rights there.

SPEAKER_00Yes, and the flip side of the coin is that whilst China has been doing this, and whilst China has been condemned in the Western media for not playing fair and these kinds of not adhering to market signals, which people like Alice Hamzen would laugh off. She'd say, look, of course, this is a developing country. This is a catch-up economy. They get prices wrong on purpose. They distort markets. That is how they developed. People like Hadrian Chang. They've said, that's how the US developed. That's how the UK developed under sort of mercantilist trade practices

SPEAKER_00before the Industrial Revolution. So in that sense, we can understand what China's doing perfectly well. But at the same time that the US is talking about China's unfair trade practices, the US itself is engaged in a very open, under Trump, attempt to Facilitate and control crystal minerals across the world. Obviously the war in Iran is one element. Trying to limit Iranian capacity to control its oil.

SPEAKER_00Part of that would be about limiting oil exports to China. Similarly with the seizure of Nicola Maduro in Venezuela earlier this year. But also the attempt to control or buy or Take ownership of Greenland and incorporate into the US. Basically it's about incorporating its mineral resources into US supply chains. So these are examples, and of course also in Ukraine. Earlier in the conflict, once Trump came into office, Again,

SPEAKER_00he was keen to make deals with Ukraine in order to get hold of the minerals that it possessed in order to facilitate accumulation in the United States. So in all these cases, the US is playing an obvious role of geopolitical moving to secure the minerals for its companies. And of course, it's backed up by the biggest military in the world, the biggest militaries the world has ever seen, far bigger than all of its competitors combined. And so the US military acts as a huge source

SPEAKER_00of demand and investments in technological upgrading in the military -industrial complex, For example, Elon Musk's Starlink and things like that. These are all linked together. And so the US has got in threadblocks was a hidden development state right there. The thing is now it's not so hidden. It's quite obvious what the US is doing. It's very geopolitically motivated and it's about securing and maintaining advantage for its firms in the face of a very effective Chinese state.

SPEAKER_01So I want to pull back a little bit, Ben, and talk about industrial policy because industrial policy has always been the poor half-cousin of economics. And we are seeing an ascension of industrial policy, although, as you've rightly stated, the developed countries have practiced plenty of industrial policy. Perhaps more than China or any other country when you look at it, you know, over time. Are we seeing industrial policy ascending or descending?

SPEAKER_00So, industrial policy is backed in a number of ways. A, it never went away. Okay, so like I mentioned, people have talked about hidden developmental state in the United States. People like Hadrian Chang have talked about the long history of industrial policy for all late developing countries and even early developing countries like the United Kingdom. So what's happened is firstly industrial policy is back ideologically. So some Nobel laureate or other said at some point the best industrial policy is no industrial policy.

SPEAKER_00And this was a kind of ideological statement that many economics Nobel laureates were rewarded for making, which basically elevated ideology over historical accuracy and political-economic sophistication. That's gone. That kind of monitoring is just, you can see it for what it is. It's rubbish. It's never been the case. So at the moment, industrial policy is very much back, ideologically. Historically, if we look at the last 20 years or so, there was a huge increase in industrial policy post-2008 with the economic crisis,

SPEAKER_00big investments to attempt to save the banks, huge quantitative easing, new ways of thinking about money, new industrial policies in terms of greening of the economy, which again is one of those ideological phrases that doesn't really capture what's going on. And with the increasingly obvious geopoliticization of the world economy, we see industrial policy linked to geopolitics and imperialism as well. Industrial policy is here, but it's worth noting now, and this is slightly ironic,

SPEAKER_00that many of us who have been saying for a very long time, criticizing neoliberalism, saying, look, neoliberals, they're lying to us, they're lying to everyone about this myth of the free market. It's never existed. It cannot exist. We need some kind of industrial policy. Okay, so we've got it, but what is it now? It's not grave at all. It's like from the foreign plane to the fire. Of course, industrial policy can be more run, less democratic, more pro-labor rather than anti-labor.

SPEAKER_00But as Amstead said, the success of late developing countries is labor repression and high levels of exploitation. So there is a basis in industrial policy of quite reactionary, Conservative in the sense of the capital legal relations. So this is something that we need to look out for. But industrial policy is back. Yeah, so it's back. And one way of seeing this is there's a very good article in Jacobin by Alexandra Gerasim-Chiricoda.

SPEAKER_00Excuse me if I've pronounced her name not very well. And so this is in a recent issue of Jacobin and it's about EU fears China. And it really shows how China's been pursuing an industrial policy, which really puts the EU to shame. She gives a number of examples. So talking about state-owned enterprises. So China accounts for, well, Chinese SOEs constitute 62% of total SOE assets worldwide. European SOEs file with just around 14%.

SPEAKER_00So you can really see the difference. And if you read The Economist and other mainstream liberal magazines, they just say, oh, SOEs are inefficient, which reveals, again, the level of historical myopia. So what this article shows is that you have SOEs, they have very high levels of control by the Chinese Communist Party, and it should be said, this is a very interesting point, the Chinese Communist Party just had its 15th five-year plan earlier this year, It has low range planning. It doesn't believe in this myth of the free market.

SPEAKER_00It doesn't even pretend to adhere to it. And it's able to engage in long-range planning. And one of the consequences of this long-range planning is a rapid emergence of the green economy. So photovoltaics, electric vehicles, and so on. And a rapid upgrading in technology so that companies like Huawei, for example, are very powerful. And car manufacturers like BYD, which... A decade ago, most people in the West would not have heard of, is now one of the biggest car companies in the world and one of the biggest sellers

SPEAKER_00of electric vehicles. So this gives you an example of how China has developed. And so this goes back to Amsterdam. She makes this point that industrial policy, one element of it is distorting prices. In order to provide cheap inputs to potentially internationally compared to exporters and producers. And this is exactly what the Chinese state has done. It's got this China State Grid Corporation. It's one of the world's largest companies by revenue.

SPEAKER_00And it has facilitated very high electrification rate across China. And what is really important is that European industrial electricity prices are around twice as high as those in the US and 50% higher than in China. So what is that saying? China has managed to produce this firm that produces a key industrial input, which is able now to provide it to its industrial capitalist class very cheaply,

SPEAKER_00much more cheaply than the European entity has. And further, the EU makes all this noise about this Green Deal. When you read Green Deal literature, it sounds great. But it's cutting back on it, and it's absolutely failed to generate this kind of level of international competitiveness and coherence in terms of national industrial coherence that China has done. And again, this is explainable by intersectoral analysis and what Alice Amsden was talking about a while ago.

SPEAKER_00So this is a great example. Another example that she mentions is that And this would probably give most capitalists in the UK, in the United States and in the EU a heart attack. But she points out that many private firms have got Chinese Communist Party units within them. Why is that happening? If you look at Western companies like Volkswagen, for example, or many US firms, you see a very high level of payments or income to shareholders.

SPEAKER_00This explains the In part, the large levels of inequality in these countries, but also the relative lack of dynamism of these firms in terms of becoming world leaders in EVs, becoming industrial operators and so on. Part of the reason for these Chinese communist units within private firms is to control them, to discipline them, to discipline capital. That's exactly what Amsterdam spoke about, and it works. In terms, if you want to promote capitalism, look at China. I should say, if I don't want to provide capitalism,

SPEAKER_00if you do want to provide capitalism, get rid of your silly ideology of free markets and look at how economies actually work. And you need to look at institutional political economy and Marxist political economy if you're going to understand this. Other things that she mentions in this article is that the... Expansion of BYD, for example, is part of a huge investment in the Greater Bay Area, around Shenzhen, for example, and big investments in suppliers,

SPEAKER_00quality suppliers to these emerging firms. She also mentions how the state-owned industries are a font, a source of For training and for then the dissemination of skilled industrial engineers. Now, you cannot have industrial strategy without a trained force of engineers who understands the demands of competitive upgrading and technological transformation. And this is exactly what the Chinese state has been doing for quite a long time now.

SPEAKER_00So there are many other examples in this article here, in the Jekyllian article, and I'll direct your readers to have a look at that.

SPEAKER_01I'm going to link it for our listeners, Ben. I will link it into that. I wanted to bring up, I just wanted to elaborate on a point you made, which is about the ascension of industrial policy. As we write in, it's never gone away. In fact, the World Bank recently released a report. World Bank has been extremely critical of industrial policy and was in the East Asian Miracle report allocated any successes of industrial policy in Japan and Korea and Taiwan. To free market.

SPEAKER_01They've come around and they've said, whether you like it or not, every country is experimenting with it. Every country is doing it. And one of, Hajin Chan had this great lecture at the Apoori Day series in 2025. I'm going to link the lecture to this. And he talks about how now that the mainstream orthodox economics has come around to industrial policy again, they can come and go, They cherry pick certain aspects of it that fit into their methods

SPEAKER_01and their analogies and leave out certain things like this example you're giving of the embeddedness within the firms. I think this sort of embedded autonomy in a way, if we look at Peter Evans' work on that, I see an extension of that idea that you're embedding yourself, you're leaving the firms autonomous, but there's also a certain amount of control. And he makes this great point, and I don't know if you've come across that, which is that when people, when sort of mainstream economists or the IMF

SPEAKER_01or banks start to tinker with industrial policy, they only take certain pieces of it. That suits them. And does it really work if you leave all the other bits and pieces out, which is state control, essentially. You look at the state control over banks, over credit, over lending, over the manipulation of prices. If you leave all of that out and then you just tinker with industrial policy, is it going to work? I'm not saying we have the answer to that, but I'm just posing that as a question.

SPEAKER_00Yeah, I think that's a very good point. Basically, they're watering it down and they're trying to adapt to industrial policy to preserve the neoliberal approach, which raises the question, what was and what is neoliberalism? I think your points, Lido, are Neoliberalism was never about getting the state out of the market. The state played a major role in enforcing neoliberalism through restructuring the labor market, through disabling trade unions, through facilitating so -called creation destruction in neoliberalism.

SPEAKER_00So what is neoliberalism? Adolf Reid has got this phrase, neoliberalism is capitalism So the state has played a major role in neoliberalism. So what is neoliberalisme? Adolf Reid has got this phrase, Neoliberalism is capitalism without a working class opposition. So this is a class relational construction Consruction of neoliberalism, it's not states versus markets, which the whole phrase states versus markets is in a sense nonsensical. Markets cannot exist without states. Karl Plann, you said the emergence of the free market was predicated on that.

SPEAKER_00Huge increase in centralized state intervention. And this is a basic point that all the developmental statists absolutely recognize and use very well to show the role of states in establishing markets, in making markets dynamic, in making capitalism dynamic. What neoliberalism was is the attempt to make workers work harder for less and to facilitate a massive shift upwards of income And this is what we're seeing. If you're looking at Elon Musk and if you're looking at the other billionaire class,

SPEAKER_00he's a trillionaire. If you look at the other billionaire class, this is the outcome of 40 years of neoliberalism. Well, American workers have seen their wages stagnate, and European workers have seen their wages stagnate. Chinese workers are subject to extremely high rates of exploitation, so much so that they have to do very high rates of overtime to make a living. Then talking about workers in places like Foxconn and Petit Trump, for example, whereas at the same time you have the emergence of this billionaire class, especially in the United States and Silicon Valley,

SPEAKER_00but also in places like Taiwan with Terry Gale, the former CEO of Foxconn. So that is neoliberalism and that is still with us. And so the big institutions like the World Bank, they are 100% neoliberal. They're 100% anti-labor, 100% pro certain types of capital. And they want to maintain that whilst incorporating some of the insights about industrial policy, which for them is designed to It's not designed,

SPEAKER_00which a socially responsible or a left version of industrial policy would be, it's not designed to actually ameliorate the conditions of workers. Through a kind of strategy that would create meaningful, well-paid jobs, de-qualify social life, shift the balance of class power away from capital towards labour. That would be the industrial policy that we need. And I think that is one of the big challenges for us progressives, especially now that Trump is on the ropes and that some of the right are

SPEAKER_00on the ropes, is how do we think about a progressive industrial policy that is not labour exploitative? That is the real challenge.

SPEAKER_01Ben, this has been an absolutely fascinating discussion. On a last note, I just wanted to squeeze in one more question, if you're okay with it. We are in a wartime industrial policy. I think that's the point you brought up in the beginning, that South Korea really got its boost for industrial manufacturing by supporting the war in Vietnam. And we're watching war between Russia and Ukraine, the war in Iran.

SPEAKER_01Obviously, there's a huge amount of weapons manufacturing that's going on. How can we link this to modern day industrial policy?

SPEAKER_00So this article on the Why the EU Face China makes the very useful point that the EU has got this Green Deal, which is purportedly about greening the EU and Potentially making workers last better and so on. But in the context of extra competition and from China especially, the EU is cutting investments into the Green Deal and increasing investments in the military. And you get people talking about investments in the military in even a kind

SPEAKER_00of positive It's based on the idea that if the state invests, growth follows. But one of the lessons of industrial policy, surely, is that we need to think about multiplier effects. Where do we invest where a small level or a certain level of investment will lead to big? Outcomes and where should we avoid investing in a situation where we invest and yet not much occurs as a consequence.

SPEAKER_00And I would say that the military investments or investments in the military is not a good deal if you want progressive multiplier effects from the rest of the economy. Military contractors are quite capital intensive, they're very limited in number, they're not very well integrated into the rest of the economy. If you compare that, for example, to investments in, say, social housing, schools, hospitals, education, etc., You see there's a massive difference. In the United Kingdom, there's been a survey about investments in higher education,

SPEAKER_00so universities, showing that for every £1 investment, around £14 of extra income is generated through a whole array of mechanisms. And that kind of multiplier does not exist in the military-industrial complex. And so I would say multiple tragedy that the huge amount of income spending is going towards the military, The plus side is that Trump being on the ropes means that, as Andy Burnham said, I can't believe I'm quoting a Labour politician positively here,

SPEAKER_00and he is a much better politician than Keir Starmer, but he said Trump's, he basically said, look, Trump's defeat means that we can start talking about proper investments, talking about climate change and how to address it, and talking about kind of social provisioning, taking the cost of living crisis. In a way, the sooner Trump and Trumpism is gone, the better in terms of thinking about coherent industrial policy. There's a long way to go. Like we've said in our conversation previously, I don't think Democrats by themselves will have a coherent industrial policy.

SPEAKER_00Although Joe Biden's approach was scuppered by two Democrat senators several years ago, now that the Democrats have won so decisively, a progressive Democrat president could perhaps generate a really progressive industrial policy, not just a Roosevelt moment, but a Roosevelt plus moment. Let's hope.

SPEAKER_01Absolutely. You're absolutely right. Joe Biden had some of the most far-reaching modern-day industrial policy that the United States has seen, the CHIPS Act. Thanks, Leena.

Open the transcript file

Hosts and Guests

Nobody is credited on this episode yet.

Credit the people on this episode

Be the first to rate this episode

More episodes

All episodes
  1. Cockroaches: Employment and Education

    Jul 28, 202636 minAudio

    Our guest today is Professor Santosh Mehrotra, who has recently co-authored a book with Jajati Parida on employment in India: India Out of Work: Rethinking India’s Growth Story. This podcast is part of a new series...

    Credit the people on this episode

  2. Tarrif's, Tarrif's, Tarrif's -- Episode 5

    Jan 1, 202652 minAudio

    Dr. Ajay Chhibber is a Distinguished Visiting Scholar, Institute for International Economic Policy (IIEP), George Washington University, Washington D.C., and a Distinguished Fellow, Isaac Center for Public Policy,...

    Credit the people on this episode

  3. GVCs, GVCs, GVCs -- 1st Episode

    Nov 3, 202530 minAudio

    Professor Benjamin Selwyn is Professor of International Relations and International Development at the University of Sussex, UK. He researches and writes about global value chains, poverty and inequality, and global...

    Credit the people on this episode

  4. A Long History of Mental Illness

    Jul 23, 202553 minAudio

    Andrew T. Scull (born 1947) is a British-born sociologist who researches the social history of medicine and the history of psychiatry. He is a distinguished professor of sociology and science studies at the University...

    Credit the people on this episode

  5. Tariffs, Tariffs, Tariffs -- Episode 3

    Jul 15, 202518 minAudio

    In this podcast episode, a follow-up from Episode 1, March 2025, and Episode 2 on June 12th, 2025, I have Dr. Ajay Chhibber on the show again to discuss the significant changes and impacts of tariffs introduced by the...

    Credit the people on this episode