Welcome to Episode 354 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes. This week we are continuing our series reviewing Cicero's "Academic Questions" from an Epicurean perspective, which gives us an overview of the issues that split Plato's Academy and helps us understand Epicurus' position on the same issues. This week will continue in Section 16 of Book Two. Our text will come from Cicero - Academic Questions - Yonge We'll likely stick with Yonge primarily, but we'll also refer to the Rackham translation here: Cicero On Nature Of Gods Academica Loeb Rackham: Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming: Internet Archive https://www.epicureanfriends.com/thread/5280-episode-354-eataq36-the-monstrous-absurdity-of-academic-skepticism/
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Speaker 1Welcome to episode 354 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius who wrote On the Nature of Things, the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at epicureanfriends.com, where we discuss
Speaker 1this and all of our podcast episodes. We're continuing in Book 2 of Cicero's Academic Questions, addressing the nature and possibility of knowledge and and how that factors into all of our day-to-day decision-making, addressing, setting from the very beginning whether happiness or pleasure is the correct goal and destination of your life, or whether you should be concerned about what happens after you die, whether you should be concerned about general issues of piety or rationality or abstract ideal forms,
Speaker 1just what the correct orientation in life generally is. And all of that is wrapped up in this question of whether knowledge is possible, because if you take the position like the academic skeptics take, that knowledge is not possible, then you're really not going to have a lot of credibility in arguing that any particular direction is the appropriate one. As we've been discussing, the Stoics reacted strongly against that because they are going to be defending virtue as the
Speaker 1goal of with even greater intensity than the academic skeptics are willing to do, to the extent that they're willing to advocate anything. And so the Stoics are taking the position, as Lusullus has been arguing here in the section that we've been reading, that knowledge is possible. And he's going through a number of important arguments that give us significant information about the Epicurean point of view. Last week, we ended up reading section 17. And though there are some
Speaker 1continuing issues that we are going to have to double back and cover as we go further, especially in terms of the meaning of the Stoic view of ascent and, of course, the continuing issues of what is meant by a cataleptic impression, we concluded last week in reading Section 17 where Lucella said to the academic skeptic argument, You guys can quote Democritus that there are countless identical worlds that cannot be distinguished from each other. And you can
Speaker 1use Democritus, if you like, to argue that nothing, therefore, can be known. But I'm not going to, first of all, grant you that Democritus knows what he's talking about in terms of his atomism. And I'm certainly not going to grant that Democritus is right in concluding that nothing is knowable. So Democritus was held in very high regard by Epicurus, but not necessarily in this aspect of his views of atomism, because Epicurus ended up taking some significantly different positions that
Speaker 1allowed him to conclude, in contrast to Democritus, that knowledge certainly is possible and not to take a position that it's at the bottom of a dark well and end up being as skeptical as Democritus apparently was. And of course, I always say apparently because our direct knowledge of Democritus is much less firm than we would like it to be, and we have to just go on what other people are quoting from Democritus. But right here in 17 and 18, we are seeing, even though Epicurus himself is not the featured target of the discussion, There is a physics in
Speaker 1relation to canonics argument going on that is absolutely overlapping with what the Epicureans were addressing. And so seeing what the skeptics and the Stoics were arguing about between each other is going to allow us to bring out exactly what the Epicurean position on this question was as well. So that's going to be my introduction for today. I'm now going to turn it over to Joshua to continue and then move us into 18. So Joshua, whenever you're ready.
Speaker 2Lucillus in 17 gave something of a response to what we're going to be talking about today when he said this, What do you seek to gain by talking about twins? For it is granted that they are alike, and you might be content with that, but you try to make them out to be actually the same, and not merely alike, and that is quite impossible. So broadly speaking, we're still talking about that same concept, and it's been applied to twins, to two eggs that can't be distinguished between, and then
Speaker 2we get to the ideas of Democritus, the innumerability of worlds, that there must be worlds which are identical to one another. There should be people, we would expect, in an infinite cosmos on those worlds, identical to each other. And this is Lusulus' response to that. First of all, I reply, he says, that you are bringing me to the arguments of Democritus, with whom I do not agree. And I will the more readily refute them on account of that doctrine, which is laid down very clearly by the more refined
Speaker 2natural philosophers, that everything has its own separate property. And let me interject to say that when he's talking about everything having its own separate property, this is a Stoic idea. For Grant, he continues, that those ancient Servillii, who were twins, were as much alike as they are said to have been. Do you think that that would have made them the same? They were not distinguished from one another out of doors, but they were at home. They were not distinguished from one another by strangers, but they were by their family.
Speaker 2Do we not see that this is frequently the case? That those people whom we should never have expected to be able to know from one another, we do, by practice, distinguish so easily that they do not appear to be even in the least alike? Here, however, you may struggle. I will not oppose you. Moreover, I will grant that that very wise man, the wise stoic man who is capable of true knowledge, who is the subject of all this discussion, when things like one another come under his notice,
Speaker 2in which he has not remarked any special character, he will withhold his assent and will never agree to any perception which is not of such a character as a false perception can never assume. But with respect to all other things, he has a certain art by which he can distinguish what is true from what is false. With respect to those similitudes, he must apply the test of experience. As a mother distinguishes between twins by the constant practice of her eyes, so you too will distinguish when you
Speaker 2have become accustomed to it. Do you not see that it has become a perfect proverb that one egg is like another? and yet we are told that at delos when it was a flourishing island there were many people who used to keep large numbers of hens for the sake of profit and that they when they had looked upon an egg could tell which hen had laid it nor does that fact make against our argument for it is sufficient for us to be able to distinguish between the eggs For it is impossible for one to assent
Speaker 2to the proposition that this thing is that thing, but even more like that thing than that thing is like that thing, than by admitting that there is actually no difference at all between the two. For I have laid it down as a rule to consider all perceptions true which are of such a character as those which are false cannot be. And from this I may not depart one finger's breadth, as they say, lest I should throw everything into confusion. for not only the knowledge of what
Speaker 2is true and false, but their whole nature, too, will be destroyed if there is no difference between one and the other. And that must be very absurd, which you sometimes are in the habit of saying, when perceptions are imprinted on the mind, that what you say is not that there is no difference between the impression, but only that there is none between certain appearances and forms which they assume. As if perceptions were not judged of by their appearance, which can deserve or obtain no credit if
Speaker 2the mark by which we are distinguished truth from falsehood be taken away. But that is a monstrous absurdity of yours when you say that you follow what is probable when you are not hindered by anything from doing so. In the first place, how can you avoid being hindered when what is false does not differ from what is true? Secondly, what judgment can be formed of what is true, when what is true is undistinguishable from what is false? From these facts there springs unavoidably epoche, that is to say,
Speaker 2a suspension of assent, for which Arcesilus is more consistent, if at least the opinions which some people entertain of Carniades are correct. For if nothing can be perceived, as they both agree in thinking, then all assent is taken away. For what is so childish as to talk of approving of what is not known? But even yesterday, we heard that Carneades was in the habit at times of descending to say that a wise man would be guided by opinion, that is to say, would do wrong. to me indeed
Speaker 2it is not so certain that there is anything which can be comprehended the question which i have now spent too much time in discussing as that a wise man is never guided by opinion that is to say never assents to anything which is either false or unknown there remains this other statement of theirs that for the sake of discovering the truth, one ought to speak against every side and in favor of every side. I wish then to see what they have discovered. We are not in the habit, says he, of showing that. What then is
Speaker 2the object of all this mystery? Why do you conceal your opinion as something discreditable? In order, says he, that those who hear us may be influenced by reason rather than led by authority. What if they are influenced by both? Would there be any harm in that? However, they do not conceal one of their theories, namely that there is nothing which can be conceived. Is authority no hindrance to entertaining this opinion? It seems to me to be a great one. For who would ever have embraced so openly
Speaker 2and undisguisedly such perverse and false principles, if there had not been such great richness of ideas and power of eloquence in Arcesilus and, in a still greater degree, in Carneades?
Speaker 1Okay, Joshua, thank you for reading section 18 for us there. There is a lot in this section that we're going to be spending some time on. And in reading the whole thing, I begin to be more interested in some of the latter comments than what we intended to start off with in terms of Democritus. But I think many of the points here are going to be worth going into. So let's go back to the beginning and talk a little further about this reference to Democritus versus the more refined natural philosophers. Because the point we're really honing in
Speaker 1on here is the issue of whether there are, in fact, things that are identical to each other. Because the Stoics are trying to make the argument that if there are things that are truly identical to each other, then there is no way to tell the difference between them. And if there's no way to tell the difference between them and know that whether something is identical to something else or not, then you're going to be left confused and unable to determine whether you're right or wrong in saying that this is one versus the other. This is the
Speaker 1example of the twins. the Servili twins who were famous in that time period for being very difficult to tell apart. So let's talk about that for a few minutes. I know you've got some good insights into it, and we've done a little bit of looking into the background of this. Rackham cites the reference to more refined natural philosophers as being a reference to the Stoics themselves, who considered themselves to be natural philosophers, obviously reaching a different conclusion than that of Epicurus about many different things. but considered themselves
Speaker 1to be materialist, considered themselves to be looking to nature as their standard, just as Epicurus was attempting to do. So just as we have similarities and differences between the Stoics and the Epicureans on the nature of knowledge, we have similarities and differences between the Stoics and the Epicureans on whether the universe itself is natural and material and so forth. And in order to not get confused between the two, but to see the very important implications of
Speaker 1these differences, we're going to have to spend a few minutes talking about this question of whether twins or leaves or diamonds or anything else in the world can truly be identical. And if, in fact, there are identical things, does that blast a hole in Epicurus's view of knowledge? that it is possible to know the truth about something? Or does the case of identical objects prove, as the skeptics would like to make it, that knowledge is impossible?
Speaker 1And we took a few minutes before we started today to look back at a particular letter from Seneca, which goes into some of these issues. And although it's a slight tangent to talk too much about Seneca and the Stoics, I think this is important enough that we don't want to just gloss over the implications of this question of identical things. So, Joshua, how would you like.
Speaker 2To tackle that? Well, Seneca's letter 113 begins very similarly to Epicurus' letter to Pythocles. What they both have in common is that a student has written to them asking for clarification on an important point. And they both clear their desks and set to the problem of writing a response which explains the school's position. Now, in the letter to Lucilius, the question is this, whether justice, courage, foresight,
Speaker 2and the other virtues are living things. And Seneca says, by such niceties as this, my beloved Lucilius, we have made people think that we sharpen our wits on useless objects. and waste our leisure time in discussing what will be unprofitable. I shall, however, do as you ask and set forth the subject as viewed by our school. And upon this point, he launches into a discussion about the souls of men and the relationship between the soul and virtue. The idea
Speaker 2that if virtue is a living thing, then virtue itself must possess virtue, as other living things do. And we get down to a particular claim in this letter, which is what has connected it with what we're talking about in Academic Questions. Because on the response that if virtue is a living thing, then virtue itself possesses virtue, Seneca brings up the reply, of course it possesses its own self. Just as the wise man does everything by reason of virtue, so virtue accomplishes everything by reason of itself. In that case,
Speaker 2say they, the imaginary interlocutors, all the arts also are just living things, and all are thoughts, and all that the mind comprehends. It therefore follows that many thousands of living things dwell in man's tiny heart, and that each individual among us consists of, or at least contains, many living beings. Of course, they didn't know about microorganisms, Cassius, but this adds an interesting layer on top of what they're talking about. That when I point to someone and say I'm talking about them, there's potentially millions of organisms, right,
Speaker 2that are walking around in their shoes. And then Seneca replies, he says, Are you graveled for an answer to this remark? Each of these will be a living thing, but they will not be many separate living things. And why? I shall explain if you will apply your subtlety and your concentration to my words. Each living thing must have a separate substance, but since all the living things mentioned above have a single soul, consequently, they can be separate living things but without plurality. I myself am a living thing
Speaker 2and a man, but you cannot say that there are two of me for that reason. And why? Because if that were so, they would have to be two separate existences. This is what I mean. One would have to be sundered from the other so as to produce two. But whenever you have that which is manifold in one whole, it falls into the category of a single nature and is therefore single. So being a living being and being a man and being a Stoic and having hair or whatever, these are all attributes of Seneca. But Seneca is still
Speaker 2just one thing.
Speaker 1Yes, I agree that that's the point here. And he's going to go further, and there's some additional aspects of this. But just to keep it wrapped into the major category, we're still talking about this question of whether knowledge is possible and whether the possibility of things being identical to each other would make knowledge impossible. Because something that's identical to something else, you would never be able to tell the difference between them. We're going to see how Seneca brings that into an almost theological argument before we finish here. But Joshua, continue where you are in this part of
Speaker 1the argument, because we haven't gotten into this part of it yet. But Seneca is going to begin to sort of apologize for talking about all this, that this is all just so impractical. We just need to talk about something else. But really, the question that we're discussing is important and does not deserve to be deflected. And so we're going to stick with that as best we can like a laser before we finish to bring it all back to this question of whether identical things are possible or not. And if they are possible, does that blast
Speaker 1the possibility of knowledge? And for that reason, Seneca is going to conclude that truly identical different things are impossible. We'll come back and talk about Epicurus' position. But Joshua, you continue.
Speaker 2And it will benefit us to go in some detail here. Seneca continues by saying my soul is a living thing and so am I, but we are not two separate persons. And why? Because the soul is part of myself. It will only be reckoned as a definite thing in itself when it shall exist by itself. but as long as it shall be part of another it cannot be regarded as different and why again i will tell you it is because that which is different must be personal and peculiar to itself a whole and complete within itself now
Speaker 2seneca disagrees with other stoics on this question and he does talk about that a little bit in the letter he says here i myself have gone on record as being of a different opinion For if one adopts this belief, not only the virtues will be living things, but so will their contrary vices, and the emotions like wrath, fear, grief, and suspicion. Nay, the argument will carry us still further. All opinions and all thoughts will be living things. This is by no means admissible, since anything that man does
Speaker 2is not necessarily the man himself. Seneca does go on here to talk about virtues, emotions, vices, and all of these things as being living beings. But again, it comes back to this question of, are they many countless things sojourning in this one soul? And he says, no, is the answer, because they are all eternal. attached to the one being parts and members of a single whole. And then he brings up the chimera, but being with multiple heads, is it multiple different things? The interesting stuff for us
Speaker 2comes slightly later here when he says this, Every living thing exists as it began, until death. A man, until he dies, is a man. A horse is a horse. A dog, a dog. They cannot change into anything else. Now let us grant that justice, which is defined as, quote, a soul in a certain attitude, end quote, is a living thing. let us suppose this to be so, then bravery also is alive, being a soul in a certain attitude.
Speaker 2And in 291, he establishes this rule. Again, no living thing is part of another living thing. The creator, he says, has set himself the task of making unlike and unequal things that are different. But all the virtues, as your argument stands, are equal. Therefore, they are not living things. He does continue to talk about virtues in this way throughout the rest of the letter. But Cassius, do you have any particular point you want to jump in here? Because remember, we're not talking about virtues over in academic questions.
Speaker 2We're talking about, is it possible for there to be two things which are truly and genuinely identical in a way that no person or combination of persons, no knowledge or instrument exists that would allow a person to distinguish between them?
Speaker 1Yeah, Joshua, let me emphasize what you were just reading beginning around section 291, marked as 15 as the weakest source that I'll link in the text today. He says, again, no living thing is part of another living thing, but justice is a part of the soul. Therefore, justice is not a living thing. Stop there for just a second. And I'm sure this is just going to display my lack of understanding. To me, when he says living thing, it sounds like what he's doing is talking about what Epicurus gets into in terms of whether justice is a
Speaker 1thing in itself, whether it has its own independent existence. Now, again, he's using the phrase living thing as it's translated here. So maybe there's some difference. But at least in what we've focused on in the past, the question has been whether justice is a thing in itself. And then that continues. It says, it looks as if I were wasting time over something that is an acknowledged fact. For one ought to decry such a topic rather than debate it. And no two living things are equal. Consider the bodies of
Speaker 1all beings. Every one has its particular color, shape, and size. And here's an important point I think that we always have to be concerned about where the Stoics are really going and what's really motivating them. Because listen to this next sentence, indicated as 16, quote, And among the other reasons for marveling at the genius of the divine creator is, I believe this, that amid all this abundance there is no repetition. Even seemingly similar things are on comparison unlike.
Speaker 1God has created all the great number of leaves that we behold. Each, however, is stamped with its special pattern. All the many animals, none resembles another in size, all weigh some difference. The Creator has set Himself the task of making unlike and unequal things that are different. But all the virtues, as your argument states, are equal, therefore they are not living things. Okay, that's the end of
Speaker 1the quote. I'm going to suggest that we need to be looking past this example of the virtues as living things and look at what I think is motivating and Seneca thinks is essential, which is that God as the creator has made everything unique and stamped it with its special pattern. And I have to think that the Stoics are going to be linking this cataleptic impression to to this idea that everything is unique. When he talks about
Speaker 1all the animals differing from others in size, you know, what's the example that we like to talk about today? That no snowflake is the same as any other. That they're all unique. Well, as I say this, I'm not sure where science comes down right now exactly on what they prove here. But I think that that type of argument is where Seneca is going. And I don't think that it is scientifically provable or proven that all snowflakes are identical and unique from each other. And Joshua, as
Speaker 1we go forward here and come back to where Epicurus' position is, The Stoics are nailing down this position that no two things are absolutely identical with each other. Democritus apparently took the position that there are an infinite number of universes that are exactly the same as ours. Well, the Stoics don't like that. They want everything to be unique and stamped with its special pattern. Stamping is something I think is a verb that we see in the
Speaker 1discussion on the nature of the gods where Valleus the Epicurean is criticizing the idea that the divine creator is as if it were manufacturing or stamping out of a dye everything that has a special pattern in it. And we'll be discussing this as we go further. But think Epicurus is saying that there's an infinite number of worlds like ours and unlike ours. And so Epicurus is going to differ from the Stoics and say that there are not only some, but an infinite number of universes or
Speaker 1men that are absolutely identical in atomic structure and composition with others. So Epicurus is not going to say, I can tell things are different because everything is stamped with its unique pattern. I think we're going to find Epicurus is not going to say that. He's going to say that we can distinguish things from each other using the sensations, anticipations, and feelings in our own experience. That does not necessarily mean that there are not, in fact, identical objects. And
Speaker 1the way we end up reconciling that, as I see it talking today on October the 4th of 2026, is that Epicurus is referring back to the idea that everything that appears to us is in fact real, that our reality is determined by us through the sensations, anticipations, and feelings. We are not, as Epicureans, taking the position that there is a central arbitrary creator who has stamped everything with a unique mark that we are going to be able
Speaker 1to use to say that this is different than that. We are going to have to rely on our sensations, anticipations, and feelings. But in our reality, from our perspective, in our level of existence, that method is going to be sufficient to distinguish one thing from another. And we are not going to be hindered by that fact from taking the position that knowledge is possible. The skeptics are trying to say, well, you've admitted that there are certain things that are identical. That means you cannot really tell one
Speaker 1thing from another. Therefore, it's always possible to have a conclusion that it's false. And the Stoics are wrestling with that. The Stoics are saying, before we came over to Seneca, the Stoics are saying, nothing is truer than that the wise man will never go by opinion and he'll never assent to anything which could possibly be false. Which leaves us, and we'll have to continue on into this point as we explore the details more directly. But the point is going to be that Epicurus is going to agree to an extent that if we don't have sufficient information, we
Speaker 1are not going to take a position. We're going to wait in the Epicurean terminology before we take a position that something is true or false. But we are not going to insist on the experience of the wise man who the Stoics admit are as rare as phoenixes. We're not going to admit that only the wise man is able to make a judgment and is able to say that they have knowledge of something. We're going to take the position that knowledge is based on a realistic perspective
Speaker 1brought to us by the sensations, anticipations, and feelings, and that those faculties can be used appropriately to take the position that some things are known and some things are not known and some things are true and some things are false. We're not going to go down the road that Stoics are attempting to go and say that, well, there's a divine creator and he stamped everything with its own unique mark. And it may be impossible for us to tell whether one diamond or one egg is exactly
Speaker 1the same as another. But in the case of eggs, there are people who spend their lives on farms dealing with chickens, and they get really good at telling what chicken a particular egg came from. And so therefore, that's an indication to us that God has stamped every egg with its own unique mark. And through experience and training, eventually we can become on the level of the phoenix and be the wise man and actually know what is true. Epicurus is not going to take that path. He's going to say that there's a realistic definition of knowledge, a
Speaker 1realistic definition of true and false, in which through the sensations, anticipations, and feelings, we can reliably take a position on what is true versus what is false.
Speaker 2You know, I can understand why this would be an attractive view of nature, that nature never produces exact copies of any right? You know what it reminds me of is this passage from Antony and Cleopatra, William Shakespeare's play. In reference to Cleopatra, age cannot wither her, nor customs stale her infinite variety. In an Epicurean cosmos, the universe is made of atoms, and there are an infinite number of atoms. and there are innumerable number of different kinds of atoms. And it seems to me that there should
Speaker 2be exact duplicates if we're talking about an innumerable number of different kinds, or else I'm curious about how you categorize a kind. It's true that Vecurus Lucretius do talk about important instances where things appear to be very similar to us and yet are not. Lucretius has this very moving passage in Book 2, around line 342, about the calf taken away to be slaughtered and sacrificed at the
Speaker 2smoking altars in dedication to the gods. And in the Cyril Bailey translation, it says, the mother cow of this calf, bereft, wanders over the green glades and seeks on the ground for the footprints marked by those cloven hoofs, scanning every spot with her eyes. if only she might anywhere catch sight of her lost young and stopping fills the leafy grove with her lament again and again she comes back to the stall stabbed to the heart with yearning for
Speaker 2her lost calf Nor can the tender willows and the grass refreshed with dew and the loved stream, gliding level with their banks, bring gladness to her mind and turn aside the sudden pang of care. Nor yet can the shapes of other calves among the glad pastures turn her mind to new thoughts or ease it of its care. So eagerly does she seek in vain for something she knows as her own.
Speaker 1Joshua, let me jump in on that example as you go forward with it. I don't know what I thought that was talking about in the past, but now it seems to me that this is directly aimed at what we're talking about right now. There are an innumerable and, in fact, infinite number of identical atoms. Now, that does not mean every atom is identical because I think it's clear Epicurus is saying that there's an innumerable number of different atoms. But let's hammer that point down and stand to be corrected next week and walk this back if
Speaker 1it turns out to be wrong. But I think we ought to hammer down the point that in Epicurean philosophy, there are atoms that are identical with each other. And if there are, in fact, atoms that are identical with each other, that leads to the conclusion that there are an infinite number of identical worlds. Because you've got identical atoms that you can work with. And so linking it to your story of the mother cow and her calf, we've got to understand both positions, that they're identical things
Speaker 1in the universe, but the mother calf is still, despite these identical atoms, able to tell her calves from another. And I would at this moment relate this to the position I was arguing a few minutes ago, that the sensations, anticipations, and feelings of that cow are sufficient to allow her to recognize her own calf. But at the same time, there are innumerable numbers of identical atoms. So in some other world, in some other galaxy, there can be another
Speaker 1identical calf. But that does not prevent this mother calf from knowing her own calf. She's not concerned about the skeptics saying that there's things out there that are identical and so therefore you may be mistaken. She's living her life knowing her own calves based on what nature has given her to understand her calves and distinguish them from another. So I'm sorry to interrupt there, but I've always thought this was a very nice passage that talked about the emotion involved in losing your calf to being sacrificed to
Speaker 1the gods. And I think that is an important part of what's being discussed here. But clearly there is a major issue here involved in whether there are identical things out there. And if there are identical things, then it's impossible for you to know, Mother Cow, whether that's your calf or not. Because there's an infinite number of calves out there that are identical to yours. That's what Democritus says. So how do you know, Mother Calf, anything? Why don't you just take the position, well, this calf seems to me to be mine, but it might not be mine. I might be mistaken. I think that's where all this
Speaker 1is going and why this is so important. And I'll express a little further irritation at Seneca here because Seneca kind of pooh-poohs this whole question and sort of apologizes that this is really a waste of time. Why are we talking about that? Let's just live prudently. Let's just live with justice because all I really want to know is what it means to be brave and how to be brave. That's all that really matters here. Well, he's skirting the issue that the skeptics have raised, and the skeptics have to be met and have to be addressed
Speaker 1so that their argument can be seen to be dissembling, as in fact, Lucullus has called it here, a monstrous absurdity.
Speaker 2Yeah, and it's important to recognize that there are still limits in nature. and that there are other rules, other perceived rules in Epicurean philosophy, Epicurean physics, that seem to bump up against this same idea, or at the very least, they're adjacent to it. The idea of isonomia, that nature never produces just one thing of a kind, that if you find one thing in nature, you're never just going to find one otter, for example. There has to be a group of otters, there has to be like a
Speaker 2breeding population of otters, and so on. And likewise, especially in Lucretius, we get the idea that there are clear distinctions between things, and that every living thing is traceable back to a particular source. That most obviously with fruit trees, for example, apples don't spring forth on the trees that normally produce oranges. Apples have to grow on trees that come from saplings or seeds or rootstock or whatever that produce apples. You can't cross that boundary in nature. Immediately
Speaker 2after talking about the mother cow searching for her calf, Lucretius says, take any kind of corn, you will not find that every grain is like its fellows, each in its several kind, but that there runs through all some difference between their forms. This would seem to be saying the exact opposite of what we're saying, Cassius, that there are things in nature that are atomically identical. In like manner, he says, we see the race of shells painting the lap of earth, wherewith its gentle waves the sea beats on the thirsty sand of the winding shore. Wherefore, again
Speaker 2and again, in the same way, it must needs be, since the first beginnings of things are made by nature and not fashioned by hand, to the fixed form of one pattern, that some of them fly about with shapes unlike one another. And then he talks about fire and he says that the atoms of light must be smaller than other atoms. So it's true that some atoms of a particular class are identical to each other, I would think. It's also true that you can tell the difference between the effects produced by atoms of different classes.
Speaker 1Yeah, Joshua, I think we're in agreement. And I think what we're saying ultimately is reconcilable here with Lucretius, because the ultimate point is that some atoms are identical with others. Some atoms are not identical with others. We don't ever see or touch atoms directly. So, okay, we have to keep that point in mind that atoms can be the same or they can be different. What we're most concerned about is living happily and living in this world and in our level of experience. And so in our world
Speaker 1of experience as well, there can be things that are identical, but in most cases, they're not identical. In most cases, there are significant differences because things are made of atoms. It takes billions of atoms to come together to produce anything at our level. So in most cases, things are not going to be identical. But why are they not identical and how do we tell the difference? We got a lot more that we need to say about this, but it's not because God stamped them out in a
Speaker 1particular pattern or that he marked them in a particular way that they are all unique. We've got to be able to navigate between the two possibilities that something is unique and something is identical. And the existence of things that are unique does not eliminate the possibility that there are things that are identical. I think you pulled a great example by referencing isonomia versus this idea that nature never makes only one thing of a kind. I think
Speaker 1that that's a perfect point in Lucretius there that illustrates that nature never makes only a single thing of a kind. It's going to lead us to deal with the fact that there are things that are very close to each other and there are things that are not at all close to each other. But there are also things at times that may be rare, but there are also things that are identical. And so we have to be able to navigate knowing that both possibilities exist, that we may be looking at something that is identical. We may be
Speaker 1looking at something that is unique, but God isn't going to tell us by stamping it for us that we can learn to read God's markings and see where something is the same or not. We're going to have to be able to, like the mother calf, distinguish our own calf from other calves. And a skeptic may look at that cow and say, don't worry, mother cow, there's another one out there that's exactly identical, and you're not sure that the one you lost was yours anyway. And I think Epicurus is saying that's not the way that cows think,
Speaker 1and it's not the way that we should think either, because nature has given us sensations, anticipations, and feelings. We, at our level of existence, have things that we identify as the same, and we can also have things that we identify as unique, and we're able to deal with this issue in a way that does not require us resorting to a God who stamps out things with a particular pattern. There are patterns, and there are things that are stamped. We create them ourselves. But the absence of
Speaker 1a divine creator stamping out marks does not mean that knowledge is impossible. Joshua, we're eventually going to have to bring today's episode to a conclusion, and we're probably in the middle of this discussion and are probably going to be able to refine it as we go forward. But I think we're hitting on some really important issues that need additional development and that I would not even recognize as existed in the past. But now I think it's clear when we see what Lucretius is talking about and overlay it with what Cicero is mentioning here. And of course,
Speaker 1Cicero is our source for information about Isonomia through Valleus. And we've got these comments from Lucretius that have never seemed to be very important, really standing on their own. But when you think about you've got to have a theory of knowledge, it becomes easier to see that they're essential. They're not something to be skipped over as just raw science that has no implications. They are something that we have to have a working ability to deal with, or else we get upended by the skeptics and led down
Speaker 1the path of thinking that no knowledge about anything is possible.
Speaker 2These are fascinating questions, Cassius, and no doubt we profit from exploring them, and especially from exploring them in light of things in Lucretius that become ever clearer the more we branch out into ancient philosophy to see what the conversations they were having centered around in the ancient world. We're going to keep all of this in mind about identical twins and whether two different things can be truly identical in nature. As we go forward, it looks like next week we're going to get into the second paragraph
Speaker 2in 18, focusing on the response to all of this of the archetypal stoic wise man, who with his ability to withhold his assent will never agree to any perception, which is not of such a character as a false perception can never assume. And I have to wonder, Cassius, if this idea of withholding assent which the Wikipedia page for catalepsis defines as adherence to the truth thus understood, if this amounts to anything more really than a toddler
Speaker 2sticking their fingers in their ears and shouting, la, la, la. I don't want to agree that I've seen or perceived what I've perceived. But all of that is coming up.
Speaker 1I think you're exactly right, Joshua. We're going to have to develop some additional analogies because all of us are familiar with being taught when we were younger in church about how every hair of your head is numbered and all of these things that God knows about how one sparrow differs from another and so forth. And it becomes increasingly clearer that the Stoics are attempting to say that somehow the wise man is never going to make a
Speaker 1mistake and confuse something that is true from something that is false. But you can't just stop there. and say somehow he's going to know this. And maybe if he spends a whole lifetime trying to climb the mountain of virtue, maybe he'll eventually get to the level of the phoenix and be the rare person who knows what the truth is. That is a ridiculous way of approaching things. And it deserves the abuse that the Stoics are applying here to the skeptics and saying that these are monstrous absurdities to
Speaker 1say that nothing can be known. Well, I think we could counter that by saying it's also a monstrous absurdity to say that knowledge of true and false has to depend on some supernatural creator having stamped everything with his own seal of approval that we need to come into contact with through meditation and prayer and so forth. Well, again, as you've indicated, these are deep issues that we're going to be diving further into as we proceed next week here in this section 18. So we'll stop there for today.
Speaker 1We invite everyone to drop by the Epicurean Friends Forum and let us know if you have any comments or questions on these or our other discussions about Epicurus. Thanks for your time today. We'll be back again soon. See you then.
Welcome to Episode 359 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient...
Welcome to Episode 359 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient...
Welcome to Episode 358 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient...
Welcome to Episode 357 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient...
Welcome to Episode 356 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient...