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John Mearsheimer - Offensive Realism

John Mearsheimer - Offensive Realism artwork

The Danger of a Nuclear Middle East | Ask the Professor

Nov 6, 202621 minAudio
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YouTube Channel member @Seniorquasimodo asks: if Iran builds a nuclear deterrent, will Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the UAE follow, creating a stable balance of nuclear powers in the region? Would Israel and the United States allow it, and what is the future of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East? In this Ask the Professor, I make three points. First, the 2025 12-day war and the ongoing war that began on February 28 have given Iran powerful incentives to go nuclear, and Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq and Turkey would likely follow. Second, the Saudis have incentives to acquire a deterrent even if Iran doesn’t, because the United States can no longer protect them. Third, a region where every state has a survivable deterrent would be stable, but the proliferation process itself is extremely dangerous, since Israel and the United States have enormous incentives to strike before the capability is complete, and small arsenals may be vulnerable.

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Transcript

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SPEAKER_00Hello, this is John Meersheimer, and I'm here today to answer a question from a channel member. The question comes from at Senior Kasimoto, who says, given the historical European example, do you think Iran's eventual leap toward building a nuclear deterrent will highly incentivize its regional rivals, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and UAE, to follow suit, creating a new status quo of balancing nuclear actors that will lead to an era of relative peace and stability in the region?

SPEAKER_00And if Iran gets away with it, do you think Israel and the United States will allow other regional states to follow its example? Or would this be detrimental to the Greater Israel Project and the Abraham Accords, which had a crucial security dimension embedded in them? Overall, how do you see the future of nuclear proliferation in the region? Let me start off by stating the obvious, which is that it's clear that both Israel and the United States are deeply opposed to nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, and in particular, they're both deeply opposed to Iran acquiring a nuclear deterrent of its own.

SPEAKER_00From an American point of view, and this is true from an Israeli point of view, the ideal situation would be to be the only country in the world that has nuclear weapons. If the United States could wave a magic wand and eliminate everybody else's nuclear weapons, and it was left as the only nuclear weapons state on the planet, that would be a good thing from a strategic point of view. And of course, the Israelis, who can't afford to be as ambitious as that, would nevertheless like to be the only nuclear power in the Middle East.

SPEAKER_00And I think that makes eminently good strategic sense for Israel. And as I said, I think it makes eminently good strategic sense for the United States to want to be the only nuclear weapon state in the world. Now, to talk a little bit more about Iran, the problem that both Israel and the United States face is that the war that they waged against Iran in 2025, and you want to remember there was a 12-day war in June 2025, in which the United States and Israel attacked Iran.

SPEAKER_00And then, of course, we have the ongoing war between Iran on one side and Israel and the United States on the other side, that started on February 28th of this year. Those two wars have greatly incentivized Iran to get nuclear weapons. As many people say, if Iran had a nuclear arsenal, the United States and Israel would not have attacked it. And that basic logic tells Iranians, I'm sure, it certainly tells me, that Iran has good reason to want to get nuclear weapons.

SPEAKER_00And to build on the question that I was asked, there is no question that if Iran gets nuclear weapons, that will incentivize other states in the region to get nuclear weapons of their own. The Saudis have already made it clear that if Iran goes down the nuclear weapons road, they will follow right behind. Saudi Arabia has made it clear that they will not accept a situation where Iran has a nuclear weapon and Saudi Arabia does not.

SPEAKER_00It also stands to reason that Saudi Arabia won't be the only country in the region that's interested in acquiring a nuclear weapon if Iran does. I would imagine that countries like Turkey, Iraq, and Egypt will not be far behind. It makes good strategic sense from their point of view. But of course, we always want to keep in mind here that what makes good strategic sense from Iran's point of view or from Saudi Arabia's point of view does not necessarily make good strategic sense from Israel's point of view or from the United States' point of view.

SPEAKER_00In fact, it doesn't make good strategic sense from Israel's point of view or from America's point of view for any of these other countries in the Middle East to acquire nuclear weapons. Now, the question also deals with the issue of whether these countries in the Middle East will be incentivized to get nuclear weapons even if Iran doesn't get nuclear weapons.

SPEAKER_00So let's focus on Saudi Arabia to get at this issue. Let's assume Iran does not acquire nuclear weapons, it does not go down the nuclear road. What about Saudi Arabia? Does that mean that Saudi Arabia gives up on the pursuit of nuclear weapons? I don't think so. I think what this war, the ongoing war between Iran and the United States, coupled with the war that has just broken out between the Houthis on one side and Saudi Arabia on the other side, has put Saudi Arabia in a situation where it is strategically exposed to a number of serious threats and has no great power that can provide security for it.

SPEAKER_00Before this war broke out on February 28th, it looked like the United States was fully capable of providing security for Saudi Arabia. It's quite clear that that's no longer the case. Not only has the United States not provided security for Saudi Arabia, but it has turned Saudi Arabia into a giant magnet for attacking Iranian ballistic missiles and drones. So you have a situation here where Saudi Arabia is involved in a war with the Houthis, where the Houthis are inflicting great damage on Saudi Arabia, and Saudi Arabia does not have a war-winning strategy.

SPEAKER_00And at the same time, Saudi Arabia is sitting on the sidelines, badly damaged from a war that it waged with Iran earlier this year that might restart again. And at the same time, the Iranians don't have the American security umbrella over their head in ways they thought would be the case before February 28th. So once the shooting stops and Saudi Arabia takes stock of its strategic situation, once it takes stock of the threat environment that it's operating in and it starts to think about the best ways that it can defend itself, the Saudis are going to quickly realize that they don't have a meaningful protector anymore.

SPEAKER_00The United States cannot protect them. It's extremely unlikely that China or Russia could fulfill that role. And nevertheless, the Iranian Saudis face serious threats in the form of the Houthis and especially in the form of the Iranians. And again, we're hypothesizing a situation here where Iran does not have nuclear weapons. But nevertheless, Iran is a much more formidable military power than Saudi Arabia is at the purely conventional level. And that will incentivize the Saudis to think long and hard about acquiring a nuclear deterrent of their own.

SPEAKER_00So what I'm saying here is if you look at the consequences of last year's Iran war, this is the 12-day war in June of 2025, and you look at what's been happening in the war between Iran and the United States and Israel right now.

SPEAKER_00And the Saudis have powerful incentives to acquire nuclear weapons. And apropos of the question, it's not just the Saudis who will be interested in nuclear weapons if Iran gets nuclear weapons. It will be the Egyptians, the Iraqis, and the Turks as well. So the potential for nuclear proliferation in the Middle East is very great at this point in time. But I do want to emphasize, however, that the United States and Israel, but especially the United States, will go to great lengths to prevent proliferation.

SPEAKER_00Just want to understand that. Just because Iran is incentivized and Saudi Arabia is incentivized to acquire a nuclear deterrent doesn't mean they're just going to go out and do it. It won't be easy to do. And I'll say more about that in a minute. But it's very important to emphasize that it won't be able to do, it won't be easy to do because the United States and Israel will go to great lengths to prevent proliferation. Because, as I said earlier, from Israel's point of view, the ideal situation is to make sure no other country has nuclear weapons in the region.

SPEAKER_00And the same logic applies to the United States, not just in the region, but uh in the international system at large. Now, I want to make the argument that the proliferation process is a very dangerous one. And let me explain to you why I think that's the case. I think embedded in the question that was addressed to me is the idea that if these countries all had nuclear deterrence, uh, that you'd have a relatively, if not very stable, region, because obviously, given the fact that your potential rivals have nuclear weapons, would incentivize you not to start a war against them for fear that you'd get incinerated.

SPEAKER_00So the argument here might be that the more countries that have nuclear weapons, uh, the more stability that you'll get uh in the Middle East. There are three problems that you want to be aware with, uh you want to be aware of that cut against this logic. The first is that uh this war that's taking place now, the war that started on February 28th, makes it quite clear that if Iran does go down the nuclear road, uh it's not going to be possible for the United States or for Israel to take out that burgeoning Iranian nuclear capability with conventional weapons.

SPEAKER_00Uh it's quite clear that if Iran decides to go nuclear, that both the United States and Israel will be incentivized to use nuclear weapons to prevent that from happening. If you're the Israelis, you are going to want to go to great lengths to make sure it's absolutely certain that Iran does not acquire a nuclear deterrent. All you have to do is listen to the Israelis talk about how they think about Iran as an adversary and how they think about a nuclear-armed Iran, to recognize that if they think there's only a reasonable chance that conventional weapons can prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons, the Israelis will surely think long and hard about dealing with that problem with a nuclear attack.

SPEAKER_00And by the way, it is possible, I don't think it's likely, but it is possible the United States would come to the same conclusion. So you want to understand that the proliferation problem in the Middle East, especially as it applies to Iran, has embedded in it this possibility that the Israelis or even the Americans will use nuclear weapons to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear deterrent. Second point I want to make is that I think there's no question that if you have a situation where, let's say Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Turkey, and Egypt all have nuclear deterrents that are highly survivable.

SPEAKER_00In other words, none of those nuclear deterrents can be attacked and destroyed. Then you have a very stable situation, because no one is incentivized to attack the other side's nuclear arsenal because it is impossible to destroy it with a first strike. This is sometimes referred to as having an assured destruction capability.

SPEAKER_00In other words, in the scenario I'm describing, each country has an assured destruction capability. No matter whether it's struck first by the other side or not, it has enough survivable nuclear weapons to retaliate. And that removes any incentive for another country to attack it. So what I'm saying here is that in a situation where all the countries in the Middle East that have nuclear deterrents have survivable nuclear deterrents, nuclear deterrents that are not vulnerable to a first strike by another nuclear power, you would have a great deal of stability.

SPEAKER_00I'm not saying that this is a desirable situation from an American point of view or from an Israeli point of view, because it's not. But I'm simply making the case that in a world where you have survivable deterrence among all of the states in the Middle East, survivable nuclear deterrence, you will get a lot of stability. However, and this is my second point, you have to acquire those nuclear weapons to start with.

SPEAKER_00In other words, there's an actual proliferation process that takes place. There's a period when those aspiring nuclear weapons states do not yet have a nuclear deterrent. And the incentives for the Israelis and for the Americans to attack during the proliferation process are enormous. In other words, if the Israelis catch wind that Iran is going down the nuclear road, or even Saudi Arabia is going down the nuclear road, the Israelis would have a huge incentive, as would the United States, to attack those burgeoning capabilities, to attack those growing nuclear capabilities before you had a full-fledged nuclear weapon in the hands of the Iranians or the Saudis.

SPEAKER_00So all of this is to say that the proliferation process itself is extremely dangerous. Again, once you get to a world where everybody has a survivable nuclear deterrent, it's a different matter. But getting to that world is tricky. And as you're moving from being a non-nuclear state to being a nuclear state with a survivable deterrent, you are vulnerable to an attack from a country that doesn't want you to have a nuclear arsenal.

SPEAKER_00And in this case, that would be Israel and the United States. So again, the proliferation process is very dangerous. My third point is that if these countries like Egypt, Iraq, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Iran develop a nuclear arsenal. They get a nuclear deterrent of their own, it's not likely to be a large nuclear arsenal.

SPEAKER_00It's likely to be a small nuclear arsenal. Because these are not terribly rich states that have the capability to build huge nuclear arsenals like the United States and the Soviet Union had during the Cold War. And it's very important to understand that if you have two countries with huge nuclear arsenals, it's almost impossible to strike the other side and eliminate all of its nuclear weapons. In contrast, if you have a situation where you have two states, each of which has five nuclear weapons, and those five nuclear weapons are vulnerable, and each side knows where the other side's five nuclear weapons are, the incentives to strike in a crisis are very great because the other side's arsenal is vulnerable.

SPEAKER_00So what I'm saying here is that it may be the case that a number of states in the Middle East are able to go down the nuclear road and build a nuclear arsenal. But there's no guarantee, given the size of these states, that they will build robust nuclear deterrents. To put it in slightly different terms, there's no guarantee that they will build a survivable nuclear deterrent. They may have a nuclear deterrent, but it may be vulnerable. And if you get into a crisis, another nuclear state will be highly incentivized to take out that vulnerable nuclear deterrent, if that's what you have.

SPEAKER_00So all this is to say once the proliferation process is completed in this hypothetical scenario, and once all of the relevant states have a survivable, a survivable nuclear deterrent, you would have, I think, a stable Middle East. Again, I'm not arguing this is in the American national interest. It's not. But you would have a survivable, you would have a stable Middle East. But the problem is you got to get there, and that's not easy to do because the proliferation process is filled with danger, and there is also always the possibility that the nuclear deterrent that any of these states develops will be vulnerable, and that will create great incentives in a crisis for other states to attack that vulnerable arsenal before it can be used.

SPEAKER_00So, what is my bottom line here? My bottom line here is that the two wars against Iran over the past two years, as well as the war between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia, have created a situation where a number of states in the region, in the Middle East, are incentivized to acquire nuclear deterrence. These various conflicts have really given the states in the Middle East that feel vulnerable a powerful set of incentives to acquire nuclear deterrence of their own.

SPEAKER_00And at the same time, this is my second major point, it is imperative that we understand that the proliferation process is a very dangerous one. And even once all of the states in the region get nuclear weapons, or a number of states in the region get nuclear weapons, that would be a better way of saying it, you still could be in a very dangerous world because it's not clear that those nuclear deterrents would all be survivable.

SPEAKER_00So all of this is to say that when it comes to nuclear proliferation and the Middle East, the potential for real trouble uh is not to be underestimated. Thank you for listening to me. Uh, I hope you found this informative. Uh, and I look uh forward to my next opportunity to talk to channel members about a different subject.

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