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Geoeconomic Competition

Geoeconomic Competition artwork

Brussels vs Beijing: Inside the Trade Standoff with Finbarr Bermingham

Jul 2, 202639 minAudio
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On the 18th of June, EU leaders met to discuss "macroeconomic imbalances" aka China and tasked the Commission to design a new instrument and a solidrity measure. On the 29th of June, Commissioner for Trade and Economic Security Maroš Šefčovič met with the PRC Minister of Commerce Wang Wentao and agreed on a dialogue with four worstreams (trade and investments imbalances, export controls, IP rights, and WTO reform) with an October deadline for results. All of the above on a climate of growing tensions between the EU and China regarding trade imbalances (among other things) and the possibility of a tarde war looming. Finbarr Bermingham, Chief Europe Correspondent for the South China Morning Post, joins Francesca Ghiretti to understand how we got here and what to expect next.

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Transcript

From the show. Tap a time to play from there.

SPEAKER_00Welcome to Geoeconomic Competition. I'm Francesca Giretti, your host, and in every episode I dive into the intricacies of geoeconomics with other experts. This intro is a little long, so bear with me. So, in the past few weeks, there has been an acceleration in the public debate and political support around the idea that the EU should respond to the economic challenge and economic negative spillovers China poses for the bloc. Most recently framed as the China Shock 2.0. Whether that's correct or not, whether that includes everything or not, is up for debate.

SPEAKER_00So last week the European leaders discussed the potential adoption of new measures, potentially new tariffs, and ultimately tasked the European Commission with designing a new instrument. Yesterday, on Monday, 29th of June, EU Commissioner for Trade and Economic Security Maros Sekovic met with the Chinese Commerce Minister Wang Wentao. The outcome was a joint statement, the first since 2019, if I'm not mistaken, and it included the decision to launch a EU-China trade and investment consultation with four working groups, one on trade and investment rebalancing, one on expert controls, one on IP rights, and the last one on WT reform.

SPEAKER_00What is most interesting is that this dialogue needs to bring results by October. And today, to talk about all of these, we have one of the biggest experts of U China relations, Finbar Birmingham, who's Chief Europe correspondent at the South China Morning Post. Welcome, Finbar.

SPEAKER_01Hello, thank you for having me.

SPEAKER_00So I should have had a glass of water before doing this really long introduction. But so, Finbar, you've been following the relationship between the European Union and China for a very long time. You have a lot of details. How did we get here? How did we get to last week where European leaders sit down and say, well, we have to do something about this?

SPEAKER_01Very slowly. Maybe a more appropriate question is why did it take so long? How did this not happen sooner? You know, I'm the one um journalist who goes to each of these councils, Foreign Affairs Council or European Council, diligently with my notebook in the expectation that they're going to discuss China. But remarkably, this was the first time in three years that the leaders had a substantive discussion about China policy. And just to sort of uh let the listeners know, this was a discussion about China policy, but you wouldn't have known that if you were only reading the agenda or you were only looking at the invitation letter, or you were only indeed reading the actual conclusions of the uh of the summit itself.

SPEAKER_01I mean, this was about a mysterious actor called global macroeconomic imbalances. It's the Voldemort syndrome that we that in Brussels were there, you dare not say the name of China. Um and I suppose there's a two-way um a two-way uh reason for that is to avoid retaliation, but also to not spook those member states who are more pro-engagement to sort of manage inwards and manage outward. I don't know if it makes any difference, but but anyway, they've they they had the discussion two hours over dinner on the on the Thursday night.

SPEAKER_01We finally got a bit of information about 1.30 on on Friday morning. Um but why why did it take so long? Why why now? I mean I suppose it's um it's obvious that what they weren't doing what they were doing, or what they weren't doing, but whatever it was, it wasn't working. Um there you know, they've been complaining for so long about the trade deficit, about Chinese overcapacity. Um you know, the tenor of and tone of that debate has worsened as it has taken place alongside geopolitical problems like China's relationship with Russia since the invasion of Ukraine.

SPEAKER_01These issues aren't new. I mean, you know, that we they've been complaining about a lot of these things since way before then, but just the tone of it has has taken on new uh life since then, I would I would say. So how were they doing this? They were using trade defense investigations, which are sort of like whack-a-mole, you know, they take about more than a year to do each one, they're very narrow on a specific product. They were looking at stuff like candles. I think that's something you and I have joked about before, big candle. Um, you know, so it's not not the most strategic and systemic way of dealing what is considered to be a generational systemic challenge.

SPEAKER_01Um you know, so that so that wasn't working. The dialogue wasn't delivering, you know, the these sort of um endless rounds of discussions between the EU and China, and we in which both sides seem to be talking across purposes, not really, you know, in the same room, but maybe not on the same planet in terms of of what they're discussing. And then the economic data, I suppose, was just getting too bad to ignore. You know, the week after the meeting we had this explosive report that Volkswagen is going to shed a hundred thousand jobs in Europe. Now that's not just about China, but it's obviously partly because of competition from China.

SPEAKER_01Merz, the German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, has been so obsessed with I call it his simplification fetish, where he's sort of deregulating and getting rid of red tape that it felt like he had done all of this and um or he'd done some of this at least, um, and nothing was improving. Things were still getting worse. So maybe uh he he finally got around to thinking that there might let's talk about the elephant in the room also, which is the China factor. Uh I was reporting in Berlin around the time, the turn of the year, and I remember hearing at this point everybody was talking about these 10,000 industrial jobs being lost every month in Germany.

SPEAKER_01I mean, how many jobs is too many jobs? I mean, I was wondering why are they not talking about it then? So in the end, it seems as though by hook or by crook they got to the point where they couldn't avoid this discussion any longer. And, you know, they so they had their two-hour discussion, and we can we can talk about the results. But interestingly, it seems that Mertz um was finally convinced by some research that was doing the rounds by our our mutual friend Sander Tordor and uh US macroeconomic whiz Brad Setzer.

SPEAKER_01And the figure that seems to have caught Merz's eye is the currency, is the sort of 30% what those guys um uh what was Mertz himself after the council talking about 30% undervaluation of the Chinese yuan. So that's I suppose a potted uh guide to how we we got to the discussion. We can we can get into the what actually happened in the discussion if you like.

SPEAKER_00Let's do that. But just before that, I I want to share with the listeners that we were joking about the fact of whether Sander and Brad should have written this report years ago and maybe we would have been in a different in a different situation, or maybe not. Not that there weren't other reports out there warning of a similar trend, right? But there was something about this one that really, really um struck home.

SPEAKER_01Yeah, it was strange to me. Um great report, um, you know, by some brilliant minds, but there was a lot of other brilliant people looking at this for a long time. Um so why now? Why did Merz why did it catch his m his eye now? I mean, I mean Merz has is surrounded by talented people also, you know, Michael Klaus is his advisor for Europe, who was the former sorry German ambassador in China, a very uh very well-regarded analyst of of um Sino-European affairs. So why was his voice not being listened to?

SPEAKER_01I I don't understand it, but but whatever it was, uh the moment was right. And whoever put this report in front of Merz seems to have judged the moment correctly and it seems to have captured his attention.

SPEAKER_00Okay, let's talk about the outcome. Let's talk about the debate during the dinner and and the conversation among the European leaders and the outcome in general, but also specifically this new uh measure that in theory the European Commission is tasked uh with.

SPEAKER_01Yeah, so so I think the the the mandate, I mean, the whole point going into this was um the European Commission was going to present their findings of what they see to be this China Shock 2.0 to the member states, and they were hoping to get a mandate to do something about it. And I mean that is effectively what happened. Um two-hour debate, as I mentioned, uh weirdly it was 20 minutes each for Von der Leyen, the Commission president, for Antonio Costa, the council president, and for Kaya Kallas, the the High Representative.

SPEAKER_01So whereas this was billed as a big in-depth member state debate, they only had an hour between 27 because the institutions took up the first hour, right? Not everybody intervened, but that was that was what it was. And you know, those who I spoke to who were there said, well, it didn't really matter because they got the job done. So so so the three prongs of the outcome I would describe would be uh to use the trade tools they have more effectively. We already talked about how these trade defense instruments, which is basically the anti-subsidy and anti-dumping investigations, aren't really cutting the mustard.

SPEAKER_01By the time you actually address one thing, the challenge has moved on to the next one. It's too late. Um so what does that mean? Maybe the maybe more of a focus on things like safeguards, which are broader and which can ta target sectors, although they're they're not perfect because they target all the world. They're not they're they're country agnostic. So we've we've seen this morning actually they've brought in these new steel tariffs um to replace the safeguards, and they've been frantically trying to uh assure their British and and Korean friends that they're they're not meaning to target them, but that you know them's the brakes.

SPEAKER_01The second prong I would say is to come up with the new instruments that you mentioned where there are gaps in the toolkit, and the third, I suppose, to is to engage with Beijing to come up with um come up with a diplomatic solution, I suppose, or perhaps more realistically, to manage the fallout and try and take the sting out of of what might might happen once they do number one and number two. So that's what that's what we got to. What we expect to happen now, I suppose, is that we've got the summer months. Um Ursula von der Leyen does her State of the Union speech early September.

SPEAKER_01Uh, she likes to have uh some announcements in there, so I wouldn't be surprised if she announced one or more instruments in that um uh in that speech. She then is expected to present those findings and those announcements to the European Council in October. So after three years, we may have two successive European Councils in which global macroeconomic imbalances is discussed. Um in the meantime, I suppose we may see a ramping up or some use of safeguards, but after the meeting yesterday, I I kind of wonder whether that might happen in the autumn as well.

SPEAKER_01Um the meeting yesterday, I suppose, was the third prong in action, the pre the sort of engagement with um with the Chinese government. Um, you know, so this engagement uh happened in the form of a meeting between Moros Shevkovich and Wang Wontai, the Chinese Commerce Minister. As you mentioned, there were four work streams agreed. The more interesting thing for me is that they they put a deadline on this. They want to see meaningful results, tangible results by October, and if not, they're going to do something. That to me ties in with that sort of preordained schedule of um announcements in September and action in October.

SPEAKER_01Perhaps between the State of the Union and the European Council, Shefkovich will be in China assessing the progress. Look, nobody really expects China to change its economic model over the course of the summer. So I would expect that there we're probably going to be moving ahead. What it does do, this dialogue, is it allows the European Commission to say to those member states who um are more cautious, look, we tried. We tried. Dialogue for the sake of dialogue is what you said you didn't want. So we had the dialogue, we put a deadline on it, and then if there's no nothing delivered, then I suppose they can be emboldened to take whatever action they see fit.

SPEAKER_00Maybe a couple of things that I was thinking about while you were speaking. The first one is the October deadline, and um literally done to me as you mentioned it now, which is also sort of the deadline for the end of the pause of uh China's export controls, right? The second round with the within that that is part of the agreement with the United States. So a lot brewing in autumn, uh, and and something that can come up and uh disrupt a couple of things.

SPEAKER_00And then the second part is the plural of uh measures being announced potentially. We were discussing before starting to record that in the past few years we had a number of measures, again, plural being mentioned, whether it was the overcapacity instrument, the competitiveness instrument, the diversification instrument. So do you have a sense of uh uh where we're going with this?

SPEAKER_01It's unclear to me whether there will be more than one instrument. I mean, we definitely heard following the European Council that there would be an instrument, at least one, and a mechanism, a diversification instrument and a solidarity mechanism. And that second would have to me was very interesting because it would be, I guess, some pot of EU money that would go towards companies from member states that had been targeted by Chinese retaliation, or you know, I suppose indeed in the future, if there was something with the US, maybe it could also be used in that manner.

SPEAKER_01Um now the overcapacity instrument is the is the really mysterious one. Um there have been rumblings about this for uh I'd say at least two years. I remember being at an event organized by DG Trade in sort of late 2024, um seemed to be laying the groundwork for an overcapacity instrument. But when I talked to some officials and asked them, and they said, Well, what do you think this should look like? And I'm like, Well, if you're asking me, it probably means you're not that advanced in your thinking.

SPEAKER_01It's it's it's quite complicated. In recent months, we've seen like President Macron talk about a section 301 for Europe. You know, some research has also come out calling for stuff like this, and again, this would allow you to target sectors rather than products, and unlike the safeguards, it would allow you supposed to be geographically more precise, so you're not going to take out all your trading partners. But how do you make that WTO compliant? They still care deeply about this in Brussels, so I don't know how you square that circle. I'm sure there are smarter people than me thinking about this already.

SPEAKER_01Now, one question I have is could this be part of a diversification instrument? Could you use tariffs as a tool to compel companies to stop putting their eggs in one basket? I mean, I wonder if we're going to see some sort of giant Frankenstein's monster of a of a beast of a thing that sort of combines all of the above, you know, solidarity, diversification, and overcapacity. I just don't know. But you know, you're right. I think you you listed several iterations. I've also heard like a resilience instrument, which was mentioned in the sort of um the paper by the led by the French uh several weeks ago.

SPEAKER_01So look, uh the the last thing you want though, I suppose, is just to agree that you're going to come up with a really complicated new instrument and not really use the ones that you already have. I suppose that's a trap that the EU may well predictably fall into. Um but but yeah, I mean that the the talk in Brussels these days is very much about you know new tools, um, even though there are plenty of them that they're not really using. The anti-coercion instrument has has never been used.

SPEAKER_01International procurement instrument has been used a single time. Foreign subsidies regulation has been used quite frequently. Maybe it will be used more. But look, there's there's plenty of options there for them to play with.

SPEAKER_00On the 301, um, I I agree with you in the sense of in theory, you can raise barriers in order to force your companies to diversify, right? And just for the listeners who do not do not know what 301 is, because maybe you know some people don't, which would be absolutely fair, is a tariff that the United States has to tackle um unfair, basically, um, trade practices. So this is something that the EU at large doesn't necessarily have, and so they were discussing whether to adopt something of the sort.

SPEAKER_00But here is where, and the other option that has been brought up, sorry. The other option that has been brought up in relation to this diversification instrument is whether to find a way to ask companies to have basically three different sources of supplies. For unclear whether it is just for strategic items, for you know, it is a little bit unclear how that would look like in reality.

SPEAKER_01Yeah, and one question there, I said how is that different from some of the other stuff that's going on? Because if you want to say use access to EU funds or like the fast track permitting as incentives, I mean a lot of that's within the NZIA and within the Industrial Accelerator Act as well. So it's are you duplicating the same sort of stuff over again? I don't know.

SPEAKER_00So yes, I agree with you. And I guess the other question is something that you've already brought up and raised. To me, is it is a little bit unclear what we want to get out of all of this, right? And I do understand that the sort of macroeconomic rebalancing, which apparently is sort of the new Voldemort, the you know who type of framing and diversification de-risking, have a lot of points of contacts and commonalities, and they can be achieved at the same time through maybe one instrument.

SPEAKER_00But I also feel that it needs to be clear exactly what it is that we want to get out of this process. Is it getting China to the negotiating table and therefore trying to find a negotiated solution? So you raise barriers, you raise costs, then basically lower them in order to get a desired outcome. Do you raise them just to unilaterally rebalance? And then that means that basically you're not lowering them. Where I'm getting at is that macroeconomic rebalancing doesn't automatically lead to de-risking, right?

SPEAKER_00Either you have some very specific clauses around de-risking and increasing resilience, or it's not just an automatic consequence of doing macroeconomic rebalancing measures, and vice versa, the risking measures do not automatically lead to macroeconomic rebalancing. So maybe it's just me overthinking it, and that could very much be the case, but I'm sort of feeling that we are kind of losing the north at this point, in sense of in the sense of where what are we aiming for?

SPEAKER_01Yeah, I agree. I mean, I do think it's a sort of um like a big ball of wool, or like a big, a big messy blob of issues, and they're not easily differentiated. And I think like perhaps something that has made it more challenging over the last year or slightly more than a year, is the the lack of um willingness to talk about this publicly from the commission's perspective. Um you know, since since um you know, since Trump's come back, uh the the the modus operandi has been do more say less.

SPEAKER_01So the work goes on in the background, but there's less of the grand, or are fewer of the grandstanding speeches than we would have seen during Von der Leyen's first um term as president of the commission. Um and so perhaps that is a is a factor in this that they're not saying as much publicly as they previously were. And you know, even around the time of the EV investigation, I remember a lot of journalists in the press room would have been asking about de-risking, and the commission folks were very careful to say, well, this is not de-risking, this is um this is something that's very it's not about de-risking, this is about a sort of uh anti-market behaviour that we see, and we're trying to rebalance and trying to countervail the impact of that.

SPEAKER_01So so but you are right. Um and of course there are points of contact as you mention, um, but but diversification is probably more in the basket of de-risking than than an overcapacity instrument would be, which will is why it will be, I suppose would be interesting if they try and bundle all together into one giant monster of a thing. But yeah, I I I I I I I'm not sure. I mean, look, I'm I'm sure within the commission itself there there there are delineations and they're you know they're very smart people working on the these um these issues.

SPEAKER_01But but yeah, I mean this has always been the case. The mainstream reporting on China con con maybe conflating problems that are separate or or connected but perhaps are not the same. It's complicated, right?

SPEAKER_00It is very complicated. And again, I I'm pretty sure that you know people within the European Commission have a clearer idea of uh what they're aiming for and which direction they want to go. As you said, they've been working on these sort of things for a long time. So it's not that this conversation hasn't like the processes behind it had haven't been going on for a while. It's just sort of the political mandate came last week to be able to do something about it. But in my head, since now there is a dialogue with the Chinese, with very clear four work streams, and you may well be right, it may be just uh the case of okay, let's give this a try so we can tell to the most reluctant, to the more reluctant member states we tried, and to the Chinese as well.

SPEAKER_00We tried, but we didn't come to any valuable conclusion. But that does create, in theory, a process that should have an objective at the end, right? So we take like trade and Investment rebalancing without even going into export controls because we know what the Chinese want out of the export controls conversation, which is very much probably lowering the export controls on ASML. But if we think about the trade and investment bucket, then what is the objective of that particular conversation? Because it cannot be changing the Chinese economic system.

SPEAKER_00To be totally frank, I don't think it can be trying to appreciate the Ramin B because it's something that the Chinese probably wouldn't be keen to do just as a consequence of European pressure. So I'm sort of wondering, what is it that we are trying to get out of this situation?

SPEAKER_01I think you are you are right in saying that perhaps having these stated aims would be would be helpful. But just to sort of backtrack a little bit, I I don't think it's exclusively that they're embarking on this dialogue for the sake of keeping the member states happy. I think the EU always, as you know, is very open to having dialogue and to working through the problems in that way. If something comes out of it, great. But I think that the people in the commission have seen this movie before, you know. Um and they've it's not their first rodeo, not to be mixing my my metaphors too much, but but I I I just think that expectations are probably quite well managed.

SPEAKER_01Um this is designed to manage the fallout rather than re achieve groundbreaking breaking results. At least that's the expectation, and maybe they can be as uh surprised on the upside. Look, when we heard from Shefkovich yesterday, he talked about this um trade monitoring. So as part of the uh of the imbalances prong work stream, that there's like a trade monitoring um mechanism where they both sides use the same data to monitor the trade flows. So so they're using the same pre-agreed data, and any surges in imports will be escalated to the political level straight away.

SPEAKER_01So more dialogue. But when we sort of were able to ask Shefkovich, well, what are you trying to do here? What what are these results that you want to see by October? The two things that he mentioned were trade deficit reduction and market access. So interesting um that those are the two things that he went for. And I suppose, you know, if you look at it bluntly, I suppose those two things maybe would show that there had been some rebalancing, but it all of a sudden starts to sound a bit phase one-y. You know, if you're talking about reducing using this as a means to reduce the deficit, and I think that the commission has been quite clear, they don't necessarily it's not the deficit themselves that they're fixated on, but what lies beneath that and where does it come from and what what are the sort of unfair practices that contribute to that.

SPEAKER_01But he wasn't terribly clear, he didn't go into details. He um he did sidestep several questions when he was asked, Well, what are you gonna do if the progress isn't uh achieved? And his response was, You know me, I like to focus on the positives. And he said that what we've heard from our Chinese counterparts is a much more constructive acceptance of the problems that we face than ever before. So that was interesting as well. But yeah, I mean what what are they trying to get out of this? I mean, you know, as we both said that uh, you know, China's and when I speak with people in the commission, this is something they'll readily volunteer.

SPEAKER_01They don't think that China's going to change. They think that um, you know, if it's the definition of insanity if you keep doing the same thing over and over again and expect different results. The general consensus among the folks that I speak to is that 90% of China policy these days is domestic policy. You have to do your own homework. You've heard all the lines. Um so so so yeah, what what what what what else can they do? I suppose if they've been instructed to have this dialogue, maybe you get surprised on the upside.

SPEAKER_01The rare earth versus ASML thing, I can't see that being a flyer. How can the European Union doesn't manage that particular export control? It's at the Dutch um government, and in any case, what would happen if the Netherlands tried to loosen that? The United States would would swoop in and and block ASML from whatever stuff from America that it needs. So again, like when you go through each of those strands, WT reform, I mean, how are the EU and China really going to meaningfully contribute to the debate on that if they're at different side if they're at polar opposites, if China refuses to acknowledge that subsidies are a problem?

SPEAKER_01We heard Premier Li Chang last week talk at the Dalian World Economic Forum, where he talked, he said, Well, China China can't afford all these subsidies. What are you talking about? The China Shock 2.0, no, it's China opportunity, you know. So and I get that the public rhetoric perhaps is slightly different than what's been said behind the scenes, but I don't know. I mean, on each of those prongs, it's hard to see that there's going to be major progress, particularly, I mean, certainly not by October. I mean, it's nearly the end of it's July tomorrow.

SPEAKER_01Um, you know, so there's so there's really not that much time. Um, but but they'll they'll give it a go, I suppose.

SPEAKER_00Look, there's always a performative side to this kind of things. And uh and I suppose there's I mean, I don't suppose that that is fine, is how things work. And I don't think anyone expects them to make any progress in all four of them, right? But if if it does create a forum where they can agree on on something, on a way forward, it's just and again, I'm such a pessimist. Uh, probably I'm the wrong person to think about this thing. And and I also probably have sound much more overcritical of the European Commission than I'm actually am, right?

SPEAKER_00And you know that. But it's the idea of at least it would be nice to know that they're aiming for something tangible that they want to debate, right? And market access and trade deficit reduction is not necessarily something useful. And we've seen that in the past, right? And as far as uh trade deficit reduction reduction, you've already mentioned it, right? The difficulty in the relationship is not necessarily the deficit per se. And this is something that the Brussels recognize is the quality of the deficit, right?

SPEAKER_00It's not the quantity. What I like the most is this idea of uh what you mentioned around constructive acceptance of the challenges that the European Union has been mentioning. And I'm wondering if it matches with the internal debate that China is having around not just the anti-involution campaign, but also the struggle around consumption. So I was wondering if you've read anything regarding the EU-China relationship, but China's response to EU's actions before yesterday and after yesterday that can give us a bit of a sense of where China is and and and what its position and perception is of the European Union and the processes ahead.

SPEAKER_01Yeah, I mean you mentioned the sort of there is that sort of internal contradiction in in China where they're still absolutely reliant on the export engine, but perhaps cognizant of the the fact of the side effects that it's creating in the economy. But I mean if reading the press um from China like over the last week has has really not given me any optimism that there will be a breakthrough here. And of course, state media is perhaps um, you know, well, we have to read it, we read between the lines.

SPEAKER_01What is the messaging? Well, the first is that every single article carries a threat. We will take countermeasures to protect Chinese firms, not just against these new instruments, but also against like the Industrial Accelerator Act, the Cybersecurity Act, the inverter financing ban, which was to stop EU funds going towards Chinese inverters. Um these threats have been disseminated not just in state media but through every possible channel. You've like I'm sure you read the official Mofcom feedback to the Industrial Accelerator Act and the Cybersecurity Act.

SPEAKER_01I mean the Chinese mission to the EU, maybe six weeks ago or eight weeks ago had the in five years that I've been doing this job, the first time I ever heard of them doing a media briefing, and they brought in the journalists in Brussels just to read out the threat. You know, so that they were absolutely determined that this this would would be carried in every um every single um channel possible. Now, so that's one element of it. There's also this this seemingly the sentiment is that uh the EU has been ins insincere in its dealings with China.

SPEAKER_01This is something Global Times was was carrying, the insincerity of how the EU has gone about this. Not like you say you want dialogue, but yet you're going ahead with your industrial plans. I mean, how dare you? How could you possibly be negotiating in good faith lest we forget that last week the Chinese government also codified the implementing measures for its Industrial Supply Chain Security Act. So, you know, um so so so it's obviously um doing similar to what it's accusing the EU of.

SPEAKER_01Um then you also had the sort of like these flexing or uh articles where they're talking about how well China can withstand uh total freeze in bilateral trade was something we heard from this Yuyun Tan Tien microsite related to CCTV over the weekend. So this idea that, well, you pesky Europeans don't have the stomach for a fight, but we can definitely finish this if you start it. May not be wrong there. There, but but um but you know, so that those have been the several strands. Um so when you when you put that all together, I suppose it doesn't give me great optimism that the Chinese machine is for moving.

SPEAKER_01The second element of that is I would say two other elements. The first is that I suppose there is a calculation in Beijing that this sort of thing works, that they communicate in this way, and that the threats actually do are quite effective because you know the EU is structured how it is, and member state capitals you know are quite susceptible to these threats to their industries. Um I don't I don't think that the Chinese would bother if it hadn't worked in the past. And the final one is that I suppose it shows to me a bit that they're worried about what is going on in the EU and what the EU is doing is actually maybe could be quite effective.

SPEAKER_01I mean, the Chinese export machine has been on an absolute terror for the last couple of years. You know, you talked about involution, you know, producer price deflation in in China and the consumption challenges, the US tariffs. I mean, they need the EU market. And I think I I feel like that any effort to close that down would would certainly affect Chinese growth targets. It would certainly mean that um, you know, this um what has been a sort of seismic effort to pump resources into new quality productive forces and then the reliance on exports of those, I mean it would it would jeopardize that to an extent.

SPEAKER_01Um you know, so so I suppose there are several strands to it. So that they're worried about it, they're backing on the fact that the Europeans won't execute fully with with their their um plans if they if they continue these threats. But um, but yeah, the the combination, the cumulative, I suppose, takeaway is that it doesn't make me terribly confident that there's much give in the system.

SPEAKER_00I'm afraid I agree. I hope we're both wrong. But I do find interesting that even I was at this conference in uh in Cambridge. Was it Cambridge? Yeah, Cambridge on Friday. And we had quite a few questions about whether, for example, the Industrial Accelerator Act, it was about EU-China relations in Cambridge, yes. And we had a lot of questions about whether the Industrial Accelerator Act was going to be watered down as a result of Chinese pressures or Chinese threat. And I think I was a bit cheeky in saying, well, if that's the case, then in theory you have the ground to trigger the anti-coercion instrument, right?

SPEAKER_00Because then is a foreign entity pressuring you to change your own internal policy? And in that case, that that is to a certain extent economic coercion. I was a bit cheeky, I realize that.

SPEAKER_01At the same time, if they can't if if they're allowing the threat of um of Chinese retaliation to allow them to water down the uh the Industrial Accelerator Act, what are the chances of them having the um stomach to trigger the anti-coercion instrument and execute on that?

SPEAKER_00No, I agree with you on the political question, but it makes it the whole more interesting because in theory, then you can also start that conversation of saying, well, then what we have the ACI for if we don't even use it when you know a foreign country tries to change an internal policy, right? So that is why I was a bit cheeky in responding to that. And on the on on the analysis that the reason why they're threatening so much, one of the reasons why, is because they're worried. There were a lot of people saying, well, it's also a reputational thing, right?

SPEAKER_00In the sense of China needs to show that you cannot um adopt these sort of things to anyone, needs to show to everyone that you cannot adopt this sort of barriers or requirements against China. Uh, a little bit like the manus meta lesson uh for Chinese companies going abroad. And I say yes, I'm sure there is a messaging there and the reputational element, but definitely you wouldn't double down so much if you were not worried about the actual consequences of this measure biting on your economy.

SPEAKER_01Yeah, and I think that's absolutely right. I think all of all of those are have have sort of snowballed into this horrible, nasty, toxic cocktail on which the relationship now seems to be to be balancing. So it's it's really quite uh I don't know. I mean, I've been you've been probably following it for slightly longer than me, but in five years, I don't know that it's been as bad as it has been in the last year. It's pretty pretty pretty bad.

SPEAKER_00It is it is probably worse than he has ever been. And I suppose that both you and I, if we look back at 2023, we thought, oh, this is bad. And then in 2024, we thought, oh, this is really bad. And then you know, in 2025, you're gonna say, No, actually, this is not too good. So it it isn't improving.

SPEAKER_01It's not improving uh improving at all. And like I think there was a lot of people at the start of last year who thought that because Trump came back, then the EU and China would pull closer together, but it's been the opposite. I think actually something interesting to monitor is now, you know, I don't think the the Trump administration. I mean, there are people around Trump who care what the EU does in China, but I don't think that writ large the White House gives a toss. So you almost um you know, whatever Europe has to do now, it has to do it alone. Like there's no United States necessarily cracking the whip.

SPEAKER_01There's no Trade and Technology Council at which they're comparing notes on how best to sort of um move forward on China policy. So everything that's going on seems to be just uh EU on its own. So I suppose China can't really have too many complaints about the black hand of Washington poisoning the well here, but it creates many challenges. Um the EU is out on a limb, it's isolated, it doesn't have that sort of, let's say, North Star, um that it perhaps would have uh taken ideas from in the past.

SPEAKER_01So it's it's it's in uncharted waters and it's quite a risky place to be right now.

SPEAKER_00I don't want to close on such a negative um note. So I will say, before I say thank you, I will say that this is a unique opportunity though. If the EU manages to get out of this situation stronger, more able to take decisions on its own rather than because there is a North Star that is helping taking certain decisions, not just specific China, but you know, in general, whether we talk about defense, whether we talk about a common European policy, on all those topics that have been difficult to discuss in the past few years, this is really a unique opportunity.

SPEAKER_00And I would love for Europeans to be able to leave this as an opportunity rather than just a massive challenge that we we struggle with on a daily basis.

SPEAKER_01Absolutely. I mean, uh it's hard to often view the current moment as an opportunity. But look, if we maybe if we're looking back in five, ten years, we can say that this, whatever period is, has been the making of modern Europe. And let's uh let's hope that's the case.

SPEAKER_00Okay, I like this ending a lot better than the previous one. So I'm going to thank you, Finbar, for spending some time with me to talk about EU-China relations. And if you don't already, follow Finbar on every single media platform, follow him when he writes for the South China Morning Post about EU China relations. And again, thank you so much.

SPEAKER_01Thank you, Frank.

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