Interviewed August 14, 2025 Nicolas Sauvage interviews Tammi Smorynski - 24-year Intel Capital veteran and now GCV Institute instructor - on her winding path from J.P. Morgan to venture and why great CVCs must balance strategic impact with financial discipline. She shares boardroom best practices (say the hard thing first, observers can be powerful, use her eight-slide handover pack) and lessons from Intel Capital’s leaders summed up by Les Vadasz’s mantra: “steady as she goes.” Smorynski compares past downturns to today’s uncertainty, offers guarded optimism for deep-tech hardware, and urges aspiring CVCs to find mentors, treat failures as tuition, and prepare rigorously.
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Welcome to today's Corporate Venturing Insider series. Today I'm so excited to have Tammi with us. She's been at Intel Capital for 24 years, so she's going to be able to tell us about one of the best corporate VCs and the long lasting corporate VC, but also the up and down of the cycle that she's witnessed. But also I will be asking her about some best practices on being on the board, and she's been teaching that recently with the GCV, and I had two of my team members saying it was an amazing training.
Tammi, welcome. Thank you. It's great to be here. So I'd like to always start by asking, what's your journey into corporate venturing? So my journey into corporate venturing was this crazy kind of winding road. When I was in high school, I told everybody I was gonna be an accountant and that was my plan. I was focused on it. And when I was in college my senior year the, all the accounting students would look for jobs in the fall, and all the regular students
would look for jobs in the spring. And one of my friends was like, Hey, why don't you, and he's flipping through this document, like, why don't you apply for a real job? And he's looking around and he points at JP Morgan. And I was like, what? And he's yeah. And you can even apply to their audit group. Why not? And then I moved from audit into investment banking for three years. When I was in investment banking, realized I need to go to grad school because everybody had MBAs practically. At JP Morgan. And so I went to UCLA, got my MBA there.
And while I was there, so I have family in California and I was like, I'm gonna go to UCLA and I'm gonna try to stay on the West Coast. And I might look at investment banking, but I really wanted to see if I could get into venture capital. And people told me I was crazy. This is back in 1999. The people that got hired for venture capital were the CEOs, entrepreneurs, successful people who've, taken companies public you're getting an MBA and back then they weren't really hiring investment bankers that much, or people from investment banking, but that was right before the Dot Com Bubble happened.
And during those like 1999, 2000, and 2001 I would say the VCs hired a ton of people coming out of investment banks as analysts and associates. And actually Intel had a program to hire MBAs to come in. And I was like one of two dozen people that they were hiring out of MBA programs That hasn't happened since then. But did you join Intel or you joined Intel Capital? It wasn't called Intel Capital when I started as an intern, but when I came back
full-time in 2000, they had just branded and it was a business organization. So technically I was working for Intel within the business unit, Intel Capital. Technically I was actually working in the treasury group supporting Intel Capital, but eventually I became that those two groups merged and everybody became members of Intel Capital. So how different was Intel Capital then? The-. And I'm talking from the time where it was really named Intel Capital and you had merged teams.
So first of all, the organization was huge. We had several VPs that had like teams that were supporting the business units. And we used to go to the business units meetings, events, trainings. We were like really embedded in the groups. And so the organization was large. It was very international. And we used to have a bootcamp. We had so many people that they had to put people through these bootcamp trainings. And it was, and we were also doing different deals though. We were doing smaller investments, smaller million, $2 million deals.
So it was a big change during that, the 24 years that I was there from, huge small investments to small and big investments. A lot of changes. Intel Capital today is not small by any means. So when you say it was big, are you talking hundred people? 200 people? I'm not totally sure, this is absolutely correct, but I think we had like around 300 like investors and portfolio managements running around, around the world, global. So you're right in terms of most other CVCs, even at the size of, until
Capital now it's large, but it is significantly smaller than what it was. And even the portfolio size has shrunk, right? We were, for many years, we were around 450 companies in our portfolio. I think if you go look at data more recently that the portfolio is smaller because we worked on actually shrinking the size of the portfolio because we wanted to have we wanted to have a narrower focus and more focus on fewer companies, and so that's why the portfolio size even shrunk. But yeah, you're right. Relative to other CVCs is still fairly large, but it's compared to where it
used to be, it's pretty small, so-. It's all relative and 99'. 99' means you work directly with the founder of Intel Capital, Les. Yes. I actually worked on a deal that he was involved in. And, we've always had a lot of interaction. No matter what level you were, when you're at Intel Capital, you were always interacting with the, whoever the Intel Capital president or most senior person was, just by nature of how the deals worked and stuff like that.
So you were interacting, with Les. And then Arvind and remember I said, I came from the treasury side. So Arvind was actually over the treasury side, and when he took over as president, he brought his treasury people with him, and that's why they merged in 2005. So worked with him then. And and then it was Wendell and, I can't remember everybody. I think there was John Miner, actually, I think I skipped him. I, it was Les, John Miner, Arvind, Wendell, and then Anthony. So there's been a whole series of heads of the group.
Maybe you can share one best practice you learned from each of them something that you remember was quite impressive. So I think with Les, I remember, because remember we-, I joined at the beginning of the Dot Com Bubble. And I remember the first deal I worked on was cratering and everybody, I felt like everybody was looking at me like, we're all like doing deals and they're going public. What's wrong with you? But shortly after my deal collapsed, a bunch of other deals started collapsing
and the stock market obviously crashed. And I remember Les saying, steady as she goes just don't don't panic, steady as she goes. Arvind. I learned a lot from him, but I actually thought that his strategy of diversification was really good where he wanted to invest around the globe and we actually saw a lot of positive benefits when some markets weren't doing well and other markets were doing well. I really enjoyed that season when he was in charge because we were so integrated into the business units and I felt like I had really good resources in terms
of due diligence and understanding what the business units were working on. By the time I left I was like, man, my whole network of technologists was so much less because I wasn't in the business units as much. He just was, he was just a brilliant sort of in how he thought about like portfolio management in terms of like diversification I thought was really good. Wendell, he really pivoted the group to this new strategy of larger bets and more focused and getting on boards.
And it, I think that he was like, about leaning in on the deals a lot harder, a lot more, not harder, but a lot more. And I will say that, because of where I was in my career, I felt like it was growing me up, right? I was learning and stuff and growing up, and Wendell was a little bit more, I feel like he would stop by your cube, so you better be doing stuff, right? Arvind was like, you would have to go to Arvind. But Wendell would, he'd stop wire cube check in and say, Hey, what's going on? So I like that aspect because it just, I don't know, it felt like a personal touch from him, but it was definitely a different strategy.
And as leading your group, you may start a strategy today, but it takes a little, almost a decade before you know if that was the right call. It takes 10 years. Yeah. Yeah. So in the next few years they're gonna figure out whether or not, some of the changes that were made were the right call. It's hard to tell. It's a lot harder to take bigger bets and really work them. I will say that. So we'll see. I won't be there to see, but the team will see. And then Anthony was the final one before I left, and I had worked with an Anthony on deals before he took over the group.
And he was just great collaborative. I felt like it was easier for me to talk to Anthony than the rest. But again, when Les was there, I was just this little, person. I just was like, terrified, so by the time I left I felt a lot more about who I was. I had a lot of experience. So I think that's why working with Anthony was just easier to speak from that perspective. And Intel's going through a very tough time and I think he's, I know he's very hardworking and he is working to help Intel as well as Intel Capital to go through this. And I would go park and back to Les's comment, steady as she goes.
Just keep calm, steady as she goes. And I heard that Anthony and the new CEO, Lip-Bu are sitting next to each other, so I'm sure there is very good alignment between Anthony and the top. So that I think is probably very helpful. I would say most of the Intel Capital presidents sat very close to wherever the CEO was sitting. Wendell sat very close to where BK was sitting. Many people when I started doing corporate VC told me about Intel Capital as an example of a corporate VC that moved from being financial
to being strategic to be financial. But the more I talk to those in Intel Capital, I think it has always been strategic. It's more the degree of financial that changed, but there was always this kind of engagement with business groups and making sure you bring value to the portfolio company. Can you speak to the, that debate that keeps going about financial and strategic and how Intel Capital navigated through this 24 years you witnessed? So as you were right, it's been a, we call it pendulum swing, right?
Certain years, certain times we were more strategic, less strategic, but always strategic. 'Cause at the end of the day if the corporation's not doing well, and let's say until capital's just having a down year because of the markets or whatever. If we don't have strategic relevance, we always believe that we would be easily cut. So yeah, it's a delicate balance. You look at what Intel's going through right now, they were gonna spin out Intel Capital and now they're not. So clearly the the company is having to make some pretty dramatic decisions.
And if you think about it, if Intel Capital wasn't making money and it's not strategic, I'm telling you, they would've shut it down, right? They're doing all the right things and every CVC group needs to be constantly thinking about that. And No. I think it's a golden nugget. You have to be both. Yeah. I think when, there's many things I'm proud about being at Intel Capital, but one of them was that we were very conscientious about, monitoring the financial and that's by the way, too, Arvind coming from the treasury side, right?
So I think there is something very interesting because coming from treasury implies someone ex extremely risk adverse and very cautious. And here I'm going to use the CFO of TDK. Yeah. Yamanishi-san. I expected him to be like extremely cautious and he is extremely cautious when it's about TDK, but somehow he understands the risk adjusted pricing. He understands that we get low valuations because it's very risky.
And so I want you to speak to how much learning or unlearning there is for someone coming from treasury to do venture capital? So let me tell you something about me personally. I'm very risk averse. So this is another reason why it's crazy that I ended up in venture capital because I personally, if you look at how I manage my own money, I'm very risk averse. But I think what happens, and I think this is why with the CFO, this is the case, is that it's like your own portfolio. Within your own stock portfolio.
You're gonna have a portion that you're very conservative with. Like you're gonna, CDs, money markets some treasuries, bonds, whatever, right? There's, you have that, then you have your, maybe your 401k you have, and you'll take more risk with your 401k, and then you have a pot of money that you'll stick in stock, or you'll put 'em in more risky things, right? And I think what happens is, like at a corporation. The CFO is doing the same is thing. He's got all of his conservative bets and then he is got some room to go do some, to do some risky bets. And so that's why I feel like you, if you're managing a portfolio,
you get comfortable with that. I think if you look at Intel historically we had so much cash that we were willing to take risk. And you know, I think if I was gonna tell one piece of advice is that I always try to be really honest about the risk that we were taking so that management could never be surprised. And I learned the hard way I had this weird situation where I had a manager switch. To be fair to myself, I didn't recognize that the information wasn't getting all the way to the top. But that's a key thing, is that if they know, if they understand
the risk that's being taken and it goes south, okay, it's fine. What they don't like is that the, as yourself, right? You don't wanna be surprised, you don't wanna find out you were taking a different risk than you thought you were taking. And you want risk to be highlighted as quickly as possible so you can try to mitigate it. So I totally agree and it's interesting because I think the intuition for an investment member to go to the investment committee is let's pitch the investment, let's say why we should do it.
And we have our process and we have a scorecard and we have a risk table, and we try to be as transparent and earnest as possible. And one time the scorecard. So I think we have seven item in the scorecard, and I think it was all red and one yellow. And simply because of the facts, and they're like, why are we going to the investment committee? They're going to say no. And they look at the score card, but we went there, we explain all the risk, but also what would be the upside behind it? And they approved it.
And at that point it was a revelation for the team that actually what the investment committee wants is tell us as it's, tell us the risks, tell us the upside, and then we'll make up our own mind. That literally I took one deal. I was probably one of the last deals I worked on at Intel, and I actually at the very beginning said, I cannot justify this valuation to you. There's nothing I can send show you to justify this valuation. But if you really think about it in the early rounds of Google, Facebook, many others, you cannot justify the early valuation.
But look what ended up happening, right? Anybody who didn't get in, when it was, you know, $200, $300, $500 million pre-revenue company, or a couple million dollar revenue company, and you would've said, I can't. But if you would've put your money in. You'd be sitting on a beach, relaxing right now. But I remember working with somebody who was new and they were so shocked. They were like, I can't believe you're gonna say that up front. And I'm like, it's the room. Why would I wait till the end? Like, why would I go through this whole song and dance about how wonderful this deal is and then go, oh, by the way, here's the valuation.
You preempt it right away. Yeah. That way every time it got brought up in the thing, I said, yeah, I said that at the beginning. I said, I already told you I can't justify this valuation. And Actually, that's a good nugget. I and it's a good nugget for presenting to an investment committee, but I think it's true for when you preempt concerns with customers, which is make sure that any concern that's going to be brought up, you preempt them, you explain it so that then they are in the listening mode for the rest of the presentation. Otherwise, I think the risk is they're not even listening.
They're waiting for the chance to ask a question. They're concerned about Or they'll feel like you've, pitch them and then you at the end gave 'em the bombshell, right? And so then it's almost like what we talked about earlier, about being shocked. So just get it off the table as quickly as possible. So I also want to talk about the down cycles. How do you see the current cycle compared to the previous down cycles? It feels very different, but feeling is not the same as you having witnessed them and gone through them.
So I'm very interested in your take. I think this is a pretty wild time right now. I think there's a lot of wait and see and yeah, this is a, this to me is uncharted territory, to be honest. The markets are obviously continue to do really well, but it it's been going well for a while. So it's you feel like, okay, when is the, when are we gonna have an adjustment, right? Because what, I don't know, what is it like every five to seven years or eight years, you see some kind of adjustment. So if you look at my career, like we had the 2001, we had 2008. We had a blip in 2012.
We had COVID, so there was some volatility, but not as much, you might have thought would've happened in 2020. So it feels like the markets are due for a correction. And then you see corporations leaning into CVC. But then we've also heard of some pretty, well known CVC shutting down, right? But I will tell you, one of the interesting things I noticed when we got through the Dot Com Bubble, it was interesting how right after that was the optical bubble. And just gotta be careful, like when everybody's running towards something, it doesn't necessarily mean that's where you should be running.
Like just, be thoughtful about your investments and don't over invest in one sector because they're all in their sort of cycles. Now, before we move on to best practices for board, which I, you have so much experience, if you were to talk to Tammi when she joined Intel and you could give her only one advice, what advice would that be? That's a great question. I just, I feel really good about a lot of what I did. I would just, I guess I would say not to stress as much, to be honest,
And was that when I first started, especially my first deal that went south, I almost had a breakdown. Like I just, I was like, a million dollars. We're losing a million dollars on this investment. I didn't even break the deal. It was actually somebody else brought it and wanted me to work on it and do it, but when it was going south, I was like, I just took it so personal and I felt like a failure. And then my boss reminded me, that's venture, Tammi. You better, if you're getting upset about a million dollars, like you, you better
hold on because it's gonna get harder. One person said that to train up a venture capitalist, you have to spend as much money as you would on a, a fighter jet $40, $50 million, whatever it was at that point. So maybe that would one, be one piece of advice earlier in my career. I remember one of our investment directors, one of our portfolio companies, went to zero and we had invested $1 million and I asked him what would do differently? And actually had quite a very thoughtful response about, I think if I could
go back in time, relying on a single customer was already a red flag. And I saw it as it's okay because they could win more customers. And so he was very thoughtful about it. So I say, great, you got your $1 million training. Exactly. And I, I wish I could tell you that there was some magic thing about which deals I should have worked on and which ones I shouldn't. But the truth of the business is that it's like finding a job in venture capital, right? You gotta have the skill and the opportunity, right? Yeah. I think Lei Jun, the CEO of Xiaomi has this expression in Chinese, which
is basically even peaks can fly in a storm, which means that you could be a bad entrepreneur, but a huge market that's growing you're going to do well. And I think he was saying that because his previous firm was doing antivirus, which is like such a difficult market and he could never grow it. And then he went to mobile phone and it became a huge success. But yeah, I think the team really matters. But what's interesting is what you said is it nearly feels like the French language. You have all these rules, but for every rule you have an exception.
It just, yeah, like I said, like I remember I, I picked up a deal that I was told like, don't even waste your time on this. But when the COVID lockdowns happened, it actually benefited this company, and all of a sudden they just did fantastic. So I was like, I couldn't have planned COVID, right? So it was like, and like the whole thing was Silicon Valley Bank. Who could have ever imagined that was gonna, when I saw the news that there was a run on SVB, I was like that's never, that's not gonna happen like that. They've been around the entire time.
That's not, and then it happened. I was like, okay. It was crazy. And indeed it's hard to believe, but once you've seen it, then you cannot unsee it. So Tammi, now you are in a very interesting role where you can share all your wisdom and your learnings with GCV. You do some trainings on board. I know that two of my investment team members have joined and they loved it, and they're raving about it. So maybe you can share high level first about the training and your
role, but then we will go into some of the best practices, so at least the audience knows why they should consider training with you. Okay. So one of the things that when I was at Intel that I'm really grateful I got to be involved in was a lot of training and I did group training and as well as mentoring. And so when I left Intel, to be honest with you, I was in this point in my life where I'm like, I'm not ready to retire, but I'm also not sure. I wanna go back into venture because once you've been there 24 years, you'll
understand it's really taxing because you will have a success one day and the next day a company's going bankrupt and there's just this constant pressure, intention and you can't quite get away from it. And this opportunity to do to teach with GCVI institute was just like, it was like, I felt like a gift from God. I just felt oh my God, this is exactly what I love to do because I always teaching. And the first class that they asked me to work on was the CVC board member and board observer class. And the irony of that class is that I'm telling you everything
I wish somebody would've told me. But like even the last session, one of the things that I talk about is I don't know if you guys do this at TDK, but when people leave, you have to move their accounts to other people. And so we, we call it like an inherited company and obviously as I was there for a long time, I got a lot of companies from other people as they left. And I created a, an an eight slide template that I use to even though I may have their investment pitch to the partners or I have the company
presentation, I would create my own document with just these eight slides that would give me a quick way to think about the company and understand the situation. And I would always go and talk to my manager about it, because I didn't want them to be caught by surprise if things weren't exactly the way had been portrayed. So anyway, so that's the stuff I'm working on and I'm really excited about it. So it gives me a way to use the knowledge that I've gained over the past 24 years in venture, but also do what I love, which is teaching.
And then I also am doing substitute teaching at a Valley Christian high school. So I, I like working with you. It's my give back. Okay. Uh, Count me in. I think that's gonna be extremely valuable and probably the next best practice for TDK Ventures. So my last question, Tammi, for someone thinking about joining a corporate VC today, what would be your advice to them? I've had people come talk to me and they're saying, oh, I wanna do this. And the thing I'm always trying to make sure is, do you.
And I think that, I think the key thing is to get training and to have good mentors around you to make sure that you can weather through it. And just having that group of people around you that can support you and you can talk through issues because everybody, it's just like in life, right? Everybody's not gonna behave the way you would've hoped. That's a great way to end this interview. Tammi, thank you so much for your time today. Great. Thank you. I really enjoyed this.
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