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Compendium with Josh Johnson

Compendium with Josh Johnson artwork

The Sound of Distant Guns IV

Oct 6, 20263 hr 19 minAudio
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Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, and Gettysburg are three of the most famous battles in the Civil War. Casualties are immense, and public opinion begins to sour. It all builds toward a muggy Friday morning in July, 1863, when it seems the entire war, and American identity, hangs in the balance. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit compendiumshow.substack.com/subscribe

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Transcript

From the show. Tap a time to play from there.

SPEAKER_02Hey folks, it's Josh Johnson. I wanted to let you know really quickly before we get going here, there's a couple different ways you can support what I'm doing here with Compendium. I don't run ads on these episodes, so if you want to support what I'm doing, you can support me on Spotify. Substack, it's just $6 a month and you get to listen to all the episodes early. If you want to do that, please feel free to click the link below. You get to listen to Compendium episodes about a week before everybody else does in the free feeds. So please do that. But the other thing,

SPEAKER_02if you don't want to support me financially, I totally understand things are tight, you know, in this economy. I get it. One way you can support the show is just leaving a rating or review wherever you're listening to the podcast. It helps a ton, believe me. But all right, that's enough for announcements. We're here for Distant Guns Part 4. The fall of 1862, the winter of 1862 and 1863, and then the summer of 1863 are sort of the culmination of the war militarily.

SPEAKER_02It is this big crescendo moment where Robert E. Lee gives one final big push into the North, and then Lincoln as well thinks that this is sort of the moment to take advantage of the situation. It is this big, nasty six-month period where the fighting is as bad as it's ever been, but the principles undergirding everything are just as prominent as they've ever been. It is a big struggle, theologically and militarily, and it's all here in The Sound of Distant Guns Part 4.

SPEAKER_02Here we go. You're listening to Compendium. From Dallas, Texas, the flash, apparently official, President Kennedy died at 1 p.m. Central Standard Time.

SPEAKER_01Now I am become death, the destroyer of worlds. We shall fight on the beaches. We shall fight on the landing grounds. We shall fight in the fields and in the streets. We shall fight in the hills. We shall never surrender.

SPEAKER_00The people who knocked these buildings down

SPEAKER_02I'm Josh Johnson. Throughout the Civil War, there will come to be known this hymn that Unionists will sing, soldiers will sing it. At first, it's called John Brown's Body, sort of this abolitionist hymn that exalts John Brown as an abolitionist figure. The hymn will undergo lots of changes in Eventually, it will be called the Battle Hymn of the Republic, or some people will affectionately just call it the Battle Cry of Freedom.

SPEAKER_02There's a stanza in the song, and it goes like this. In the beauty of the lilies, Christ was born across the sea. With a glory in his bosom that transfigures you and me, as he died to make men holy, let us die to make men free. It's a song that, as you can imagine, gets a lot of traction because as the war changes, so too does the Union need a little bit of an anthem to cheer that change onward.

SPEAKER_02But what if that change isn't exactly as welcome as the history books that you and I have been reading growing up in school? What if it's not as welcome as those history books would lead you to believe? As we've talked about, there's the political realities of a conflict like this, which it does have about 15, 20, 30 years, especially we talked about in the first part of this conversation, years upon years of building up political realities that then shape what

SPEAKER_02the war becomes. But then as the war breaks out, there's political realities that further still shape how the war is going. And perhaps the American Civil War is the most political war in America's short 250 year history. There's always politics involved in war, as the the theorist Clausewitz says that war is just an extension of politics. It's politics by other means, he says.

SPEAKER_02But in the Civil War, the realities of politics and the realities of war are interlinked. They're intermingled. They are the same. And I have a difficult time, I guess, pinpointing the exactitude of this political change that we're about to talk about because it is, is it something that was deliberate? Is it something that the Lincoln administration sort of fell backwards into? It's hard to know. But there is this great change,

SPEAKER_02and it is a change that walks astride the Emancipation Proclamation. And what's difficult to fully understand about the Emancipation Proclamation is, one, did Lincoln know what was going to happen as a result of the Emancipation? It's hard to know. It's hard to know if he did it as this extremely pragmatic measure. Was it a moral measure? Was it a pragmatic political measure? It is difficult to know because it's difficult to know the motivations of Lincoln the man.

SPEAKER_02It's much easier to understand the motivations of Lincoln the president. Now we talked about in the last part of this conversation how he was trying to get the border states to come along with him, to back him up. He was trying to get the border states to abolish slavery via constitutional means. And here's what's so interesting about the Emancipation Proclamation. It's a war measure. The proclamation doesn't free any slaves in states that are loyal to the Union.

SPEAKER_02Rather, it proclaims all the slaves free that exist in the Confederate states, which seems like a pretty interesting kind of a proclamation to make, right? Because Lincoln doesn't have technically—if we're being really technical here, and this is where we get into some legalese— But if we're being technical, Lincoln doesn't have any power in the Confederate states because they are states, in his mind, in rebellion. But in the states that he does have power, he doesn't free any slaves. If you played this out as sort of a thought experiment,

SPEAKER_02it's like, well, Wouldn't this already be somewhat understood? Wouldn't slavery already be something that the Union Army was tackling in rebellious states, sort of just as a war measure? As in, the Confederate forces have a whole lot of enslaved people helping out the army. You've got porters, you've got Personal men, as some of these Confederate soldiers will call them. They'll have their manservants. They'll have workers digging trenches, fortifying places, carrying things, cooking, all of this.

SPEAKER_02It's supplementing the Confederate war effort. Wouldn't this already be sort of an understood thing? It's possible the Emancipation Proclamation is just proclaiming something. You remember in the TV show, The Office, Michael Scott's having money problems. He goes into the break room and Creed, the crazy person, is sitting in the corner and he says, here's your get out of jail free card. You just declare bankruptcy. And because The Office is a comedy, Michael Scott just walks out into the main part of the office

SPEAKER_02where everybody's working and he screams, I declare bankruptcy. Of course, that's not exactly how declaring bankruptcy works, but, you know, it works for the TV show. Isn't the Emancipation Proclamation sort of like that? Lincoln can just say, I declare all the slaves are free and everybody around him is like, well, it doesn't work like that, Abraham. But it sort of does because by declaring, by proclaiming that slaves are free in the Confederate States,

SPEAKER_02he has in one fell political swoop changed the entire course of the war. Because remember how we talked about this at the beginning? The war begins not at all as something to end slavery. It begins entirely as a cause for union. The beginning of the war is all about getting the Confederate states back into the union. And slavery is just sort of this uncomfortable reality.

SPEAKER_02But the thing is, and I think we touched on this a little bit, Union soldiers haven't ever really seen slavery. They don't understand it. Northerners just don't have a conception of what slavery is. And a few people have gone into the South and written about it. William Howard Russell from the London Times is one. But for the most part, slavery is just misunderstood. So you have this propagandist view of what the institution is. And therefore,

SPEAKER_02because you have sort of this propagandized understanding of what it is, it shapes how policy is considered. Historian James McPherson writes about the general misunderstanding of what the Emancipation Proclamation is and How it was understood at the time and how it's even understood now. McPherson writes this, quote, Lincoln acted under his war powers to seize enemy resources. He had no constitutional power to act against slavery in areas loyal to the United States.

SPEAKER_02The proclamation would turn Union forces into armies of liberation after January 1st, 1863, if they could win the war. And it also invited the slaves to help them win it. End quote. Now, because of the implications of the Emancipation Proclamation, there's a lot of considerations that now have to be made, things that need to be ironed out and understood that hadn't been considered before because the enslaved people were always enslaved.

SPEAKER_02But now that you make them free, it sets a precedent. And all the legal scholars, the lawyers, are starting to think about it in these terms. And Lincoln certainly thought about it in these terms as well. If you free enslaved people, what does that mean that their legal status is? If they're freedmen, that means that wouldn't it follow that they would be citizens? It sort of creates this interesting little liminal area that hadn't been considered before.

SPEAKER_02Attorney General Edward Bates writes about it. He's reasoning out what it means in a letter to a friend. He writes this, quote, If blacks be in constitutional law citizens, and if the state legislature can exclude for color, then why not for race, religion, nativity, or any other discretionary cause? The Constitution was made as it is for the very purpose of He continues, End quote.

SPEAKER_02There's obviously a lot of racial, racist undertones in there that you just sort of have to bake in because it's common for the times. But it does introduce this new layer of things where it's like, okay, we are the land of liberty, and if we pronounce these enslaved people now free, and they're excluded from taking part in the system on the basis of just their color— And that extends maybe to creed or religion or all of

SPEAKER_02a sudden perhaps we decide we don't like the Irish or the Germans and we're going to exclude them from the project. You can't do that. So Edward Bates is starting to puzzle out the long-term effects of something like this. And in his mind at the time, he thinks, well, it's a wart. We're just going to take it, warts and all, because... The Constitution follows that you can't exclude anybody based on these sorts of things, so we're just going to have to deal with it.

SPEAKER_02But because there are these perceived warts, there is, I think, this notion, perhaps, that the emancipation is received with open arms and everybody's all excited about it. We've you know, we've now changed the war into something that it hasn't been before. Hooray. Hurrah. Let's go win this war of abolition. But that's not exactly true either. Lincoln faces huge backlash. He can only make a proclamation like this if he thinks he's got the political capital in order to see it done.

SPEAKER_02But the people in individual states, broadly speaking, are, shall we say hesitant about the proclamation and what it means. Bruce Catton, in his book, Never Called Retreat, writes about this public unrest, but then also what it means politically, because there is quite a bit of uncertainty at the very least, that's probably the kind way of putting it, the uncertainty. Perhaps nasty way of putting it is there is very much this idea that there's now going to be a slave revolt because of

SPEAKER_02the Emancipation Proclamation. Certainly the more democratic leaning individuals in government are saying, well, this is just you're just going to instigate slave rebellion. They're going to see that, oh, we're free. So now we're just going to go kill all the white people and emancipate ourselves. And Lincoln doesn't necessarily foresee that. Its own can of worms, potentially, for just going to burn the entire South, kill everybody in it, and okay, now we have all the enslaved are free, but at what cost?

SPEAKER_02That's how some people sort of view it. Bruce Catton writes about this political reality that is kind of the result of how people view the Emancipation Proclamation. He writes, quote, Increased public unrest, in short, rested at least partly on an uneasy awareness that the price of victory was likely to be an illimitable commitment to the future. Mr. Lincoln's hope that he might carry a truce in the belly of the war was an expression of his own anxiety, for a war in which no truce was possible was bound to bring such a commitment,

SPEAKER_02and neither he nor anyone else knew how that commitment would finally be met. But the immediate necessities of war were controlling. End quote. He's talking about this concept that Lincoln has where he and this is probably naive. He thinks that he can make the Emancipation Proclamation as a war measure, but sort of use it as the stick in a carrot and stick sort of situation where he is talking to Confederate members of the Confederacy's government.

SPEAKER_02And he's saying, I'm going to free all the slaves. I'm going to announce that all the slaves are free if you don't come to the table and make a deal. But then, of course, they don't come to the table and make a deal. But Lincoln does have this talk fight kind of a thing going on where he's listening to the voices on his shoulders and he's saying, we have to be able to bring the war to a conclusion if at all possible. But at the same time, we can't. We have to win.

SPEAKER_01Yeah.

SPEAKER_02It's sort of a, again, it's complicated to figure out what his motivations are, what he thinks on any given day in terms of how does he feel about slaves in general. I mean, he is very much putting forward the idea at times of, okay, great, we'll free all the slaves, but then we got to ship them off to Africa. Still, that's still how he thinks about things. The reason he thinks that is because it fits within the Overton window of American politics. And I think we talked about this in part one of this conversation where we talked

SPEAKER_02about Abraham Lincoln's own sort of racist beliefs. And it's because those beliefs fit within the Overton window of acceptable ideas that his electorate is going to believe, the electorate that in 1858 in those Lincoln-Douglas debates was going to elect him to a Senate seat. Now, the same thing is still true. The same concept applies in 1863 now, or 1862, going into 1863. There's this Overton window of ideas. So when you're talking about...

SPEAKER_02About deporting all of your enslaved people after you free them to Africa or something. It sounds horrendous when you talk about it with 2026 on the brain. When you start thinking about it with the modern mindset. Because it sounds really, really bad. But if you try and strip all of your modern sensibilities and put yourself sort of in the perspective of somebody living in 1862... It makes it a little bit more,

SPEAKER_02not necessarily palatable, but at the very least, you sort of start to see this as a common belief. It fits within the Overton window of ideas. Bruce Catton illustrates this perfectly, probably better than I ever could. And it's one of those things where you try and find the perfect explanation for this weird thing. And Bruce Catton happens to be the one that puts it perfectly in a couple sentences. And I've been trying to find this now for about a year.

SPEAKER_02And I finally found it. It's in his book, Never Call Retreat. He's writing about how white America views black America, race relations as they exist in 1861, 62 and 63. Bruce Catton writes this, quote, Jefferson Davis, as humane a man as ever lived, had said that emancipation must mean extermination of slaves. And SLM Barlow's Washington tipster, T.J. Barnett, warning at the end of December 1862 that the government meant business

SPEAKER_02about emancipation, added as a matter of course that scenes of horror whose bare imagining chills the heart and congeals the blood would be bound to follow. Abraham Lincoln himself felt a touch of this fear, and he still hoped that the freed Negroes might be sent to some colony far from the United States. The least common denominator here was the belief that the races could not get along as equals. White America, Bruce Caton writes,

SPEAKER_02had to believe that the Negro was inferior and in need of restraint because otherwise the whole idea of slavery was morally wrong from the beginning and the Northerner who tacitly consented to it was as guilty as the Southerner who lived with it. End quote. This now introduces a new problem politically for Abraham Lincoln in the North. Now that you have done the Emancipation Proclamation, right, you have implicitly said that Reunion,

SPEAKER_02if it's going to happen, a condition of it, perhaps the main condition of it, is going to be that these seceded states are going to have to forego slavery. Slavery is going to have to go away if these states are going to reenter the Union at all. And so Abraham Lincoln, after delivering the Emancipation Proclamation, perhaps as a stick in a carrot and stick sort of a situation, he goes before Congress when they reconvene December 1st, 1862, and he does something that seems weird.

SPEAKER_02And he's now done this a couple times. Remember, we've described him as a slippery political operator. And Abraham Lincoln is about to do something that comes across slippery and political. On December 1st, 1862, before Congress, he advocates for gradual compensated emancipation. Not immediate emancipation like what he has done with the Emancipation Proclamation, which of course only frees slaves in the Confederacy, doesn't free any of the slaves in the border states in the Union

SPEAKER_02that still have legal slavery. On December 1st, 1862, he comes at it differently, obliquely. He says by 1900, we're going to eradicate slavery. We're going to do it over a 37-year period. And we're going to compensate all of the slave owners. And he's going to allow Congress to decide, you know, all of the nuts and bolts of it. But he lays out the same argument that he did in March of 1862 when he presented essentially the same idea, but pared down.

SPEAKER_02It didn't have as much force behind it or as much thinking behind it or, you know, the exactitude of by 1900. But what Lincoln does is he just looks at how much money they're spending on the Civil War and he says, wouldn't it be better for us to just pay slave owners and eradicate slavery? Because he says slavery is the point of this entire thing. That's why we're fighting all of this, even if we don't want to admit it. He says, wouldn't it be cheaper to just pay slave owners for all their slaves instead

SPEAKER_02of waging more war? He says this to Congress on December 1st, 1862, quote, Let us ascertain the sum we have expended in the war since compensated emancipation was proposed last March, and consider whether if that measure had been promptly accepted by even some of the slave states, the same sum would not have done more to close the war than has been otherwise done. If so, the measure would save money, and in that view would be a prudent and economical measure.

SPEAKER_02Certainly it is not so easy to pay something as it is to pay nothing, but it is easier to pay a large sum than it is to pay a larger one. End quote. Now, you might be wondering why we're sticking on all of this semantic stuff to get things rolling here. And it's because this whole concept, this argument that's developing politically, it's incredibly important and explains why people do what they do.

SPEAKER_02You also pair that with the military realities, and you get a pretty good sense of what everybody's thinking and why, you know, why everybody's kind of on edge. If you're thinking about things from Abraham Lincoln's perspective, on December 1st, First through about the 11th of 1862, a lot of what he's dealing with is this with the Emancipation Proclamation, trying to find perhaps an alternate route, something a little bit more permanent for him at the time.

SPEAKER_02Again, we've got the modern sort of conception about how all of this stuff shakes out. But if you put yourself in the moment in time with blinders on, historical blinders on, And you don't know all the context that we know. A lot of this is people just trying to do the best they can in the moment. So Lincoln at this moment is trying to find some sort of a permanent solution for slavery, but he's also just replaced his general. And it's the sort of replacement that happens often in sports.

SPEAKER_02Where, you know, a team is performing badly or perhaps they're pissing the owner off, the coaches are. They're just, they're not working the way they're supposed to. It's just your average New York Jets season, right? Things are just not going very well. And you get to the end of the season and you're, you know, 4-13 now. You're 4-13, the team's not good, you can't run the ball, you can't pass the ball. Okay, time to fire the coach. Do you have a plan per se?

SPEAKER_02No, but you got to fire the coach. So Lincoln fires the coach, gets McClellan out of command of the Army of the Potomac, and this is after he has sort of regained command in the wake of Second Manassas. He has had this little argument, this fight with Pope, and Pope then went and, you know, flopped over at the Battle of Second Manassas, and okay, Pope's no good. Now McClellan's back in charge of the Army of the Potomac, but he's not moving.

SPEAKER_02He sort of does his thing that he always does, right? He gets the troops outfitted. He sort of reorganizes. He gets about 120,000 men. And Lincoln, as Lincoln has been trying to get him to do for now what feels like forever, he's been trying to get him to move, to do something. Doesn't do anything. So Lincoln relieves him of command, fires the coach of the New York Jets after a 4-13 season. Is it going to get any better with a new coach?

SPEAKER_02Probably not because the team still stinks or what have you, but there's no ready-made coach on the market just waiting in the wings. There's no stud offensive coordinator waiting in the wings that Lincoln can bring in to command the Army of the Potomac. Who does the command go to? It goes to one of McClellan's subordinates, Ambrose Burnside. Why? Why? Well, that's kind of difficult to explain. Not because it's difficult to explain, but it truly is one of those situations where it's like, he'll do.

SPEAKER_02Ambrose Burnside had not acquitted himself especially well at the Battle of Antietam, but he had experience. He was a ranking general that Lincoln felt like he could work with. And frankly, at this point, with all of these revolving doors of generals that are becoming very difficult to work with, and they all have egos and they're all a pain in the butt, Lincoln goes, Ambrose Burnside won't be too bad. So he puts Burnside in command of this 120,000 man army of the Potomac.

SPEAKER_02And it's, you know, they're outfitted in brand new uniforms. Everything looks great. This is in the minds of the Federals, the apogee of the Union Army so far. And we've got a replacement level coach commanding things because there's no ready-made generals just sort of waiting in the wings. If you're not driving right now, so don't do this if you're driving, but if you're just sitting at home, go look Take up a picture of Ambrose Burnside. You're going to see a 38 year old with the best sideburns you've ever seen in your life.

SPEAKER_02Where do we get the word sideburns? You got it. Ambrose Burnside. He was also famous because he had invented a breech loading carbine rifle that became commonly used throughout the Civil War. But he invented it in the early 1850s and ran out of money trying to build a business around this breech loading carbine rifle. But in one of the weird, funny turns of history, Burnside's carbine ends up becoming really, really popular in the cavalry until the Sharps rifle kind of becomes standard.

SPEAKER_02So he's got the sideburns. He's got the history of gunsmithing or gunmaking. And he's also a general in the Army of the Potomac. And when Abraham Lincoln makes him in charge of the Army of the Potomac, it's fair to assume that probably nobody's more surprised by this turn of fortune than Ambrose Burnside. But he realizes that he's put in charge because Lincoln wants somebody to do something to sort of create upward momentum for the union.

SPEAKER_02And so Burnside says, OK, we're going to go after Robert E. Lee at this town in Virginia called Fredericksburg. The thing is, with Fredericksburg, Robert E. Lee knows it's coming. He's allowed about a fortnight to fortify his positions just outside of Fredericksburg. And this he does, especially around this row of hills called Mary's Heights. It is sort of the perfect concoction for disaster to happen here for the Union.

SPEAKER_02Burnside has a little bit of a fire under his butt to get something done. Robert E. Lee has been allowed to fortify so he's not rushed into anything. He gets to choose the ground, as it were. And again, And there is this kind of political situation brewing where the federal troops almost have to have a good result. There's no other alternative because everything is precariously hanging in the balance and Burnside has to deliver a result.

SPEAKER_02And so he rushes. Town of Fredericksburg is situated just below the Rappahannock River. And Burnside has to cross the Rappahannock with his entire 115,000 to 120,000 man army. He's got to get them across the Rappahannock, but he has no bridges. And so it creates this situation where he's got to Get his troops across the river, they have to create pontoon bridges, but there's Confederate sharpshooters inside of Fredericksburg picking off his men.

SPEAKER_02So there's this situation where December, you know, before the battle gets going in early December, he's got men going out at night trying to build this pontoon bridge and they're getting shot and most of them are getting killed and it's terrible. And it begs the question of Burnside in this gentleman's war that's not really all that gentlemanly. What do you do about all of these Confederates inside of Fredericksburg? Burnside orders his artillery to shell the city, to which Robert E.

SPEAKER_02Lee reportedly says, and this is from Volume 2 of Shelley Foote's Trilogy of the Civil War, quote, Those people delight to destroy the weak and those who can make no defense. It just suits them,

SPEAKER_01end quote.

SPEAKER_02Regardless, Burnside establishes a beachhead, as it were, at Fredericksburg and then assembles his army in three columns on the Confederate side of the Rappahannock River and marches out to meet them. Now, he had conferenced with Lincoln where he'd presented his battle plan and he said, here's what we're going to do. We're going to, well, I mean, we're going to attack them here at Fredericksburg, but because of the delays in getting the pontoon situated, because of the Because they don't have bridges to get across the Rappahannock,

SPEAKER_02it allows Lee to fortify. And it creates this situation where Burnside is going to attack him in two places. He's going to attack Stonewall Jackson's core on one side, on the left and on the right. He's going to attack James Longstreet's core. But James Longstreet's core is fortified at this place that we've talked about previously called Mary's Heights. About Mary's Heights, historian Bruce Catton writes in his book, Never Call Retreat, quote,

SPEAKER_02None of this elevated ground from Mary's Heights to Hamilton's Crossing is really very high, but Lee's army occupied all of it, and for purely defensive purposes, the position was extremely strong. To be sure, it was not good for anything more than defense. Burnside had artillery planted all along the Yankee side of the river, and Lee had no scope for a counteroffensive, but as a place on which the Army of the Potomac might easily break its back, the Confederate position here was ideal."

SPEAKER_02Now, a lot of the writing about this battle has to do with Burnside and his ability to adjust to new situations, namely that he doesn't. And this is probably due to the fact that people look at the situation of the battle as it begins and they say, well... Why doesn't he do anything differently than he ultimately does? The plan is to attack in two places on the left and the right to attack these cores and to sort of fold them in on each other.

SPEAKER_02But to attack the left is one thing to attack the right. You have to cross this wide field with sort of irrigation ditches in it so that you can't do a full out charge per se. It's not an open field. There's impediments, but you have to sort of continually march under fire until you reach this stone wall that's been reinforced and fortified. And then you have to carry the wall. There's also artillery that are supporting the Confederates there behind that stone wall. It's a very, very difficult position to take if you're going to take it.

SPEAKER_02But it reminds me a little bit when we're talking about Burnside and his inability to adjust, it reminds me a little bit of Robert E. Lee at Malvern Hill. Remember, Robert E. Lee at Malvern Hill has this terrible position. Now, there's not, you know, the irrigation ditches in the wide field and everything like that. And there's not necessarily the stone wall. But at Malvern's Hill, McClellan's able to assemble his artillery in a way that Robert E. Lee can't take the hill. It's a terrible sort of a situation where people are just going after the hill and they're getting slaughtered in the process.

SPEAKER_02And it's a bloodbath and it's nasty. But there's no considered alternative, perhaps. And we talked about the fact that it was because Robert E. Lee believed in infantry. He believed in the rifle and he believed, you know, in the strategy. And Burnside here at Fredericksburg is similar. And the reason I bring that up is because Burnside gets a real bad rap for this battle. And yet, if you think about it in context of the times, yes, he doesn't adjust and there's no real, you know, the plan is very, very simple.

SPEAKER_02And it's like, well, I mean, if this would work, it would work. But there's not any sort of ingenuity or creativity here. It's just the enemy's over there. Let's go take him. So military historians have been like, why would you ever try and take this position? And, you know, because of the pontoon situation of Burnside, he just sort of sticks to his guns. He seems like a fish out of water from the very start. So it's very easy to then look back on this whole situation and say,

SPEAKER_02well, Burnside was out of his depth. December 12th dawns foggy and Burnside commences the attack on the left, the right and the center. The attack on the left is supposed to contain Stonewall Jackson's Corps, while the right is supposed to take this low hill at Mary's Heights. The spectacle must have been incredible. And Bruce Catton writes about this spectacle. But just imagine this, because the Confederates at their positions opposite this federal army

SPEAKER_02that are raised in front of them, they would have seen the most incredible army that the United States had ever put into a field. It's 115 to 120,000 men freshly arrayed in all the newest stuff. It's battle flags, it's pennants, it's bright blue uniforms. McClellan has whipped this thing into a machine and there's fog on the field and you just see these clusters of men opposite you and they take up almost

SPEAKER_02the whole horizon. Bruce Catton writes about this, trying to reimagine what the Confederate might have seen when this federal army arrays out in front of them. He writes, quote, They could see all of them at once, as if the footlights had suddenly lit up some unimaginable stage, and in no other battle did they see anything quite as breathtaking. Here was the army of the Potomac, on the move and coming out to fight. It seemed to be made visible all in one instant,

SPEAKER_02the wind rippling in its flags and the sunlight sparkling from musket barrels and bayonets and the brass field pieces. Out of Fredericksburg, Bruce Catton writes, came long columns of four, marching west towards Mary's Heights. Other columns moved down the country roads to the south, and by the river still more columns were coming across the pontoon bridges. Below the town, battle line upon battle line began to swing forward through the brown fields towards Stonewall Jackson's position, and under Mary's Heights the endless columns fanned out to make more battle lines.

SPEAKER_02Far beyond, across the river, quick flashes of light flickered up and down the length of Stafford Heights as the powerful Federal siege guns began to feel for their targets. End quote. Shelby Foote, in his trilogy of the Civil War, sets the scene this way after the fog dissipates around noon on December 13th. At noon, however, the fog lifted. Lee, with a close-up view of the bluecoats massed in their thousands beyond the plain, saw at once that this was no faint but a major effort.

SPEAKER_02He sent for Jackson's other two divisions, instructing them to begin their long marches immediately in order to arrive in time for the battle, which he now saw would be fought tomorrow. Beyond that, he could do no more.

SPEAKER_00End quote.

SPEAKER_02December 13th dawns foggy yet again, and Confederates can look out across their lines and they can see a hundred plus thousand Federals arrayed out in front of them. It must have been an awe-inspired And yet, despite the spectacle in front of them, despite the numbers and what would I mean, putting myself in that situation, if you're standing behind a little stone wall and you see that many men out in front

SPEAKER_02of you and you're outnumbered three to two, as the sources have it. Still, that's got to be. An awe-inspiring sight. And yet all the Confederate generals, Longstreet especially, are optimistic. And maybe optimistic is an understatement. They're almost in disbelief that this battle is about to happen the way the situation is. And because the Confederates are entrenched behind this stone wall, it's sort of like it's a suicide march, and everybody kind of knows it.

SPEAKER_02James Longstreet will say to Lee at one point that I'm going to kill all of them, meaning all of the Federals that come across that field, I'm going to kill them all. He's going to get his chance starting about 10 a.m. on December 13, 1862. On the left is more of your traditional Civil War style battle. But on the right is this dramatic moment, almost this forlorn hope, as the people write about it at the time call it. It is in the minds of a lot of the federal troops and even the Confederate troops.

SPEAKER_02It is very similar to the Charge of the Light Brigade. They're all thinking, that's what this is about to be. This is about to be the charge of the Light Brigade. And you have sort of in the backdrop this idea that there is a good death. It's still pervasive even now after we've had a year and a half of war. There is still this idea that, you know, a man can die honorably in battle and bring honor to his family and to his country. And there's sort of this feeling that it's not a new sort of a sentiment

SPEAKER_02and it certainly doesn't go away after the Civil War, but the Civil War dampers it, certainly. It's this concept that culture and society are improved by a good war. You know, the elder Helmut von Moltke, the German marshal, will always talk about this concept that, you know, society is degraded and people are weak and how do you make everything better? A good war, a good scrap. And so that's all bundled into this sort of cultural,

SPEAKER_02individual feeling about the Battle of Fredericksburg as the Federals array in their beautiful pageantry and their bright blue uniforms and the pennants. And the, you know, the sounds of artillery are crackling over this wide field and it's beautiful and it's heroic. And it's all of these things that if you have a romantic view of war going into the Battle of Fredericksburg, you see all these things and you think, man, isn't war cool? And then the fighting starts and it's decidedly uncool.

SPEAKER_02People start dying in their thousands, especially on this right side of the battle where you get this dramatic forlorn hope and it's nasty and it's gross. And it sort of dispels this entire notion that war can be, you know, this romantic thing. Famously, Robert E. Lee will say after this battle, thank the Lord. I'm paraphrasing here. Thank God war is so bad, otherwise we'd get too fond of it. The guy in charge of this first assault on Mary's Heights is a man named Edwin Vose Sumner.

SPEAKER_02He had been an officer since 1819. So he's an old timer. He's been in the army his entire life. If you can imagine Winfield. Winfield Scott leading an attack at Fredericksburg. That's not dissimilar to what would have happened here with Edwin Sumner. He is of that same generation of Winfield Scots, and he leads this forlorn hope, this first attack on Mary's Heights, and Bruce Catton narrates it this way, quote, Sumner was brave and so were his men, but bravery was not enough.

SPEAKER_02He sent his two army corps into action unimaginatively after the Antietam system, one division at a time so that the attack on the heights became a long series of battles and the defense never had to bear the weight of one massive blow. Each division had to cross the wide plain where the dead grass was blistered by Longstreet's artillery, and the men who were not killed by the gunfire had to march up toward the stone wall that concealed the sunken road. The wall was a quarter of a mile long, there were six ranks of infantry behind it enjoying almost perfect protection,

SPEAKER_02and the blue brigades coming up elbow to elbow offered a target that could not be missed." If you're a Confederate, this is the perfect battle. If you're a Federal, it is the perfectly awful battle. Confederate Captain Valerius Cincinnatus Giles writes about this charge up towards this stone wall at Mary's Heights, and he writes about it in almost this tone of awe, but of respect and also sadness,

SPEAKER_02and it's just, it's all of these things bundled up into one account, and he can't believe it's happening, and he's seeing it anyway, and it affects him permanently. Giles writes about this assault, quote, The Confederate batteries along the crest of the ridge were silent, but it was only that silence which precedes the storm. When the first column reached a point about 600 yards from the lines, the batteries opened simultaneously as though fired by a flash of electricity.

SPEAKER_02The roar of musketry joined the bellowing artillery, and the whole earth trembled. In a few moments the scene before us was enveloped in smoke and we could see nothing but a seething roaring crater of fire and smoke. Splendid murder reigned supreme there. It was that character of murder that the world applauded at the time. But now, after the lapse of more than three decades, a few silver-haired old mothers scattered all over this union in the twilight of the evening or the stillness of the night. Think of the noble boys who fell at Fredericksburg, long since forgotten by the busy world.

SPEAKER_02End quote. James McPherson writes that the Federal troops never got closer than 50 yards to that stone wall. Shelby Foote says they never got closer than 100 yards.

SPEAKER_02On the left, General George Meade's Federal troops Momentarily punched through Stonewall Jackson's brigade at this place called the Slaughter Pen. You can imagine why it accrued that name. But because of demoralization and poor planning, and I guess this thing that we attribute to Burnside, he can't necessarily improvise, can't figure things out on the fly. And as December 13th turns to dusk, the fields outside of Fredericksburg are strewn with 13,000 federal casualties.

SPEAKER_01Reportedly, there are just 6,000 Confederate casualties.

SPEAKER_02And Burnside recrosses the Rappahannock with his tail between his legs. And this beautiful Army of the Potomac is completely ruined in almost a parallel sense to the way that the Army of the Potomac is destroyed. Before or after the first battle of Manassas, they go in, you know, all of this pomp and pageantry. And there's, you know, writing that they're streaming back to Washington, D.C. And it's just chaos. In a similar fashion,

SPEAKER_02the federal army retraces their steps, goes back across the Rappahannock River. And there is kind of this lull, this almost lingering shock. Federal troops go to collect their dead and those who've been wounded who've been lying out on this field for two days in December air, right? It's cold. The sun sets at 430, so it's your classic winter's day. It's freezing. You've got wounded and torn up men lying all over this field that nobody's been able

SPEAKER_02to get to them. And before they withdraw back across the Rappahannock, they're going to send out men to collect their wounded and their dead. And the writing about it is... Oh, it's horrible. There's one man who says, quote, the bodies sprawled in every conceivable position, some on their backs with gaping jaws, some with eyes as large as walnuts protruding with glassy stare. He continues, quote, End quote.

SPEAKER_02Whether or not Robert E. Lee actually did say, thank God war is so bad, otherwise we'd get fond of it. Whether or not he actually said that, anybody who walked out on that field after the fighting at Fredericksburg would have been disabused of the notion that war in any way could be romantic. Indeed, the march away from Fredericksburg will disabuse anybody of the notion that war can be romantic because it is a muddy, disorganized slog for Burnside and his Army of the Potomac.

SPEAKER_02It is so bad. Men are so disorganized and flooded and muddy and it falls into total chaos to the point that Ambrose Burnside is dismissed and he's replaced by one of his lieutenants, Joseph Hooker. There's a lot of damning evidence against Ambrose Burnside, but like a coach that's sort of a lame duck coach in the NFL where the locker room turns on you, I think about Urban Meyer in Jacksonville a couple years ago, everything seems fine if the coach appears like he's in control,

SPEAKER_02but once he loses the locker room, the saying goes, he's done. Fredericksburg is Ambrose Burnside's losing the locker room moment. And the army, this great grand army that's been reorganized by McClellan and put back into the field, this great grand army of the Potomac thinks of itself as a professional fighting force. And so they expect competence and professionalism from their generals. And when they don't get it, you lose the locker room.

SPEAKER_02A soldier in the Army of the Potomac, Theodore Errolt Dodge, wrote in his journal where he predicted what would happen as soon as Ambrose Burnside was put in control of the Army. He almost, if he were to put this in a betting slip and send it to Vegas, he would have won a lot of money. Here's what Theodore Dodge wrote on December 23rd, right after Fredericksburg. He writes, quote, Just what I foretold has come to pass. McClellan, who was slowly on his way to Richmond by way of Warrington,

SPEAKER_02was removed and Burnside put in his place. I was sure it would end in some botch or another. Burnside's first idea was a blunder. He expected to get halfway between Fredericksburg and Richmond before he met the rebels and forced them to fight at a disadvantage by cutting off the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad and consequently their supplies. Instead of that, the rebels got to Fredericksburg first. Then instead of shelling them out of the town at once, he gave them 16 hours respite. Three weeks later, when he had given them time to erect strong fortifications,

SPEAKER_02he attacks them and is, of course, beaten. Had McClellan been left in his place as commander-in-chief, I believe Richmond would have been taken almost a year ago. But, of course, what is destined to be is. I feel as if nothing but our reputation for good fighting were left us." Of course, his assumptions about things don't necessarily make them true. McClellan had his shot, failed in the Seven Days Battles, but this sentiment remains. And you've got this sort of a difficult situation

SPEAKER_02that now fighting Joe Hooker is put in, and it's Joe Hooker's job to sort of massage and fix this really nasty situation with the Army of the Potomac. 1,300 of them have been killed. There's numerous wounded. This muddy slog back to Washington is a total fiasco. And as the army's marching through the mud back towards Washington after the Battle of Fredericksburg, if you're asking yourself, how long is the tale of implications from Fredericksburg?

SPEAKER_02How bad is it going to get because of Fredericksburg? You don't Have to wait all that long because the tale seems to just rear its head a couple days later on December 16th. The Republican senators hold a Republican wide caucus. And they're aiming their ire at the presidency. But because there is this prevailing view that Abraham Lincoln isn't actually the guy in charge, a view that has been held by establishment Republicans since Lincoln was elected.

SPEAKER_02We are now a year and a half into it, and there's a lot of people that think that there's somebody else pulling the strings behind the scenes because Abraham Lincoln isn't established enough as a political operator to be able to, you know, control all the variables. People still think of him as a bit of a neophyte. And so the Republican senators caucus on December 16th and they're aiming their fury at the Secretary of State, William Seward. They think that all the calamities that have accumulated one after the other on top

SPEAKER_02of each other are Seward's fault. They think because McClellan took too long to be dismissed, the radical Republicans wanted him gone months ago. It took him too long to get dismissed. They think that's Seward's fault. They think the army is being directly controlled by Seward. And so the army's failures are Seward's fault. The radical Republicans think that this whole business with emancipation is what Abraham Lincoln really wants to do. He's the guy trying to free all the slaves and Seward is holding him back.

SPEAKER_02And so all of this, you know, two steps forward, one step back sort of a deal with regard to slavery. They think it's all Seward's fault. So all these Republicans work themselves up into a froth and they come to a point where they think that they're going to deliver a bill that's a vote of no confidence in Seward as secretary of state. But then some cooler heads prevail and they think, well, all of this is just substantiated by rumors. We don't have anything substantial to go on. So we should probably calm down.

SPEAKER_02But then one of the senators goes to Seward's house and he sits down with Seward and he tells him what's going on. And so Seward writes his resignation letter to Lincoln, who then when Lincoln sees the resignation letter, he's like, what the hell is going on? He recognizes pretty quickly the implications of all this meeting. He realizes that the Republicans are unhappy with Lincoln's decision making, but because they don't actually believe Lincoln is pulling the strings in his own administration— They're directing their anger at his cabinet

SPEAKER_02because his cabinet is full of all of these, you know, industry standards. These are the stalwarts of the Republican Party. Salmon Chase is an established guy up in Ohio. William Seward was the So there's all of these kind of establishments. So the Republicans adjourn for a day and then they come back together

SPEAKER_02and they deliver a resolution that basically says we want to reorganize the entire cabinet. So they elect a committee of nine to go to Lincoln and tell them, here's what all the Republicans are thinking of doing.

SPEAKER_02And you got to sort of pull back for a minute and realize how massive of a situation this is. It's something that Lincoln will say was the most catastrophic moment in the first term as president. His entire power base has just sort of upheaved. We've talked a little bit about the Overton window of political ideas, and it gives you a pretty good sense of what the Overton window is. The Overton window, of course, being sort of the range of acceptable political ideas, and it shows how things are changing, at least in the halls of Washington.

SPEAKER_02Because just a couple of years ago, some of these more radical views on human rights and slavery are not. I mean, they're in the Overton window, but they're not primary views within the Overton window. You can see this as recently as 1858 when Abraham Lincoln is involved in the Lincoln-Douglas debates. Because his approach to the Lincoln-Douglas debates is defined in large parts by what is acceptable at the time. At least that's how historians interpret it. How do you reconcile some of his more racist beliefs that he espouses in 1858 with

SPEAKER_02the same guy who delivers the Emancipation Proclamation, who eventually, after, you know, in 1865, will try to And and will succeed in passing the 13th Amendment to the Constitution, which eradicates slavery. How does this happen with just a few year period? Well, it's because Lincoln, as we talked about, you're a slippery political animal, but also it seems he is defined at times by the predominant views within the Overton window.

SPEAKER_02Now, you've got to, again, you've got to separate his personal views from his sort of political views because those at times seem to be at odds with one another. Or at least it's very difficult to parse out what his personal views are versus the views he holds as the president, which are two different things. But this moment here on December 18th, 1862 shows that the Overton window has shifted. If you ever needed the sign that says things have changed, this is it. Because the Overton window has moved more radical.

SPEAKER_02Conservative Republicans are concerned about the Emancipation Proclamation. As we have seen, they're pretty racist themselves. In fact, many of the radical Republicans are going to be pretty racist themselves. But when you have some of the language like that's The Declaration of Independence that talks about all men being created equal. Well, there's implications in those words. If you accept that slaves hold certain innate humanity, well, that obviously has implications for the state.

SPEAKER_02And the radical Republican wing inside of the Republican Party is saying, we can't stop with the Emancipation Proclamation. We have to get rid of slavery yesterday. And anybody who stands in the way of that, namely McClellan is going to be your avatar for people who are not helping the cause of abolition. Everybody who's not helping the cause needs to get out of the way. And William Seward is at first the avatar that everybody is furious with,

SPEAKER_02but then it's just the entire cabinet. And Lincoln now is holding in his hands two burning coals. He has difficulties within his cabinet because they're all fighting with each other, have been pretty much since the beginning. And now the entire Republican Party seems to be collapsing in on itself. And who is going to be the guy that sort of Well, it's got to be Abraham Lincoln, but he's got to do it in a way that he maintains his relationships within the party,

SPEAKER_02sort of keeps the party coalition together while also preserving the goals that he wants to accomplish as the president. Historian Doris Kearns Goodwin writes about this meeting of the Committee of Nine with Lincoln. Here's how she narrates it. Quote, In the conversation that followed, the senators argued that the prosecution of the war had been left too long in the hands of bitter and malignant Democrats like McClellan and Halleck, while the anti-slavery generals like Fermont and David Hunter had been disgraced.

SPEAKER_02She continues, While the Republican senators professed belief in the president's honesty, Lincoln later said, they seemed to think that when he had in him any good purposes, Mr. Seward contrived to suck them out of him unperceived. Lincoln worked to diffuse the anger intention. He confessed that the movement against Seward shocked and grieved him, maintaining that while his cabinet had been at loggerheads on certain issues,

SPEAKER_02there had never been serious disagreements. Rumors that Seward exercised some perfidious influence in opposition to the majority of the cabinet were simply not true. On the contrary, the cabinet had acted with great accord on most matters. Indeed, in his most trying days, he had been sustained and consoled by their mutual and unselfish confidence and zeal. As the conversation continued, Lincoln seemed to sense that the committee members were earnest and sad, not malicious or passionate. He expressed his satisfaction with the tone and temper of the conversation,

SPEAKER_02promised to examine the prepared paper with care, and left them with the feeling that he

SPEAKER_01was pleased with the interview. End quote.

SPEAKER_02Now, believe it or not, for those of you interested in political science, what's actually happening there is a very, very modern issue in politics. A lot of the concerns with the cabinet are really concerns about the executive. And this is all related back to the sort of 1862 understanding of executive power and what it looks like. Obviously, the Civil War is a litmus test for how you view the executive

SPEAKER_02because it certainly changes the executive moving forward or at least pushes the bounds of what the executive can and cannot do. Because there hadn't been any crises anywhere near the Civil War. And so some of the things, the social morays, I suppose, of what the executive should or should not do, they are, well, they're not necessarily hard and fast rules. They're kind of a series of loose expectations. And one of these is an interpretation about how the executive is run.

SPEAKER_02Now, in 2026, we have the unitary executive theory, but In 1862, they don't have the benefit of a John U to sort of espouse this entire concept of the unitary executive. But they do have disagreements about who runs things. There's a disagreement between a plural executive and sort of a singular executive. There is this feeling that if you're a plural executive espouser,

SPEAKER_02you think that the cabinet should vote on things. And whatever the cabinet votes, the majority vote of the cabinet, that is what the executive branch should do. So if Lincoln disagrees with the cabinet, but the cabinet votes on something and they outvote the president, the pluralists, the plural executivists, whatever you want to call them, they think that that's what the president should do because it kind of waters down the individual in the presidency. But then there are sort of singular presidency folks who think that,

SPEAKER_02well, the president is in charge of the executive. Therefore, the president should have final say, should really be the engine driving the whole machine. As it happens, the cabinet itself is a little bit split on this. Salmon Chase is a little bit more of a pluralist executive, which makes sense. He wants political power. What do you think gives him more political power? The pluralist executive interpretation. But Bates, Blair, and Gideon Wells are more proponents of the singularist executive,

SPEAKER_02that they think Lincoln should really be in charge. They can offer their input, but it's Lincoln at the end of the day who has to make the decisions and enforce them. Lincoln calls together a meeting of his cabinet and the entire Republican caucus, and they meet for nearly five hours. And it comes out in this meeting that a lot of the feelings of the Republicans were influenced by letters that Sam and Chase had written. And therefore, they get this vision in their mind that Seward is kind of controlling things behind the scenes, that the cabinet is not being listened to, that Lincoln is just a pawn.

SPEAKER_02And then, you know, Lincoln proves that, well, no, it's not exactly like that. The cabinet gets on pretty well and we all work together fairly well. And so the Republican senators start to turn on Sam and Chase because they see him as duplicitous. At one point, one of them even says outright Sam and Chase lied. Lincoln agrees. But then he gives you one of his witty moments where he says he hasn't lied tonight, though, because the truth has come out. But it appears in the course of this long meeting that Salmon Chase is to blame for a lot of this discord and unrest within the Republican Party.

SPEAKER_02And so Salmon Chase delivers his resignation letter to Lincoln's desk. This gives Lincoln an opportunity to get out of Dodge here. It also shows you what kind of political operator he is here. He writes a letter the next day to both Seward and Salmon Chase, and he says, I've received You've received both of your resignation letters, but it's in the public interest that both of you maintain your positions in the cabinet. And he does this. It seems fairly obvious to everybody keeping a close tab on the situation that Sam

SPEAKER_02and Chase is a political necessity. He represents the collected political power of the state of Ohio. Seward, on the other hand, while he does represent New York power, he is also close. He and Lincoln have forged a great working relationship. And through Seward, Lincoln can sort of get a lot of things done within the party that he wouldn't otherwise be able to do because he's got Seward helping him to do it. The other thing here, perhaps the biggest thing here, is Lincoln preserves the executive's right to dictate who remains in the cabinet

SPEAKER_02over the legislative. Which is, I suppose, in the very long tale of things, quite important. Although it is probably more of a minor discovery at the moment because the major discovery is that the cabinet's not broken up. Things can carry on as they have. And it also serves to sort of bind the Republican Party tighter together. But in the long tale of things, you get an interpretation of the executive branch of government that is stronger

SPEAKER_02than it had been before. As 1862 closes into 1863, though, the Army of the Potomac, while the presidency has started to figure some things out, the Army of the Potomac is in shambles. And it's up to General Joe Hooker, fighting Joe Hooker, as he's called, to figure things out. The army that Joseph Hooker inherits after the Battle of Fredericksburg, in the words of Bruce Catton, was in need of a spiritual fix. The problem was Joe Hooker is not known for his spiritual qualities.

SPEAKER_02Well, there are some brass tacks that can be fixed, and Joe Hooker immediately sets about these. The problem with the Army of the Potomac after Fredericksburg is obviously the casualties and the weather, but more than that, it's problems of port administration. Bruce Catton writes about it this way, quote, There was plenty of food, but it was so bad the army was actually showing signs of scurvy. Camps were miserably policed, hospital services were atrocious,

SPEAKER_02discipline was slipshod, and generals were Catton continues, The soldiers needed to feel that they were being used sensibly by a general who knew what he was doing. In

SPEAKER_02some ways, Hooker is the heir to McClellan in that he starts whipping the army into shape. He's the best one to do it since McClellan. He... Shakes up the commissary and medical departments. The rations get better. The camps are made clean. And he starts to discipline the troops evermore. And Hooker has this philosophy that an idle army is a bad army. And so he just puts the army to work. They're entrenching. They're drilling at all hours of the day. He says,

SPEAKER_02we're not going to leave any of these men to just sit in their tents and play games with one another. We're going to have them doing things around camp. So the Army does things around camp and starts to whip itself into shape. The commissary medical things start to improve. You know, supplies get better. And then the Army is also being drilled to a fine finish. Once again, the Army of the Potomac starts to look pretty good on paper. All of these improvements start to provide different problems, though. Maybe you could call these distinctly American problems,

SPEAKER_02because the Army of the Potomac, for the first time in the war, actually is starting to operate like a professional army. This is no longer an army of civilians that have been pressed into uniform and given weapons and just told where to march. We've sort of departed from that part of the story where at the beginning you've got all these, you know, random people showing up. And they're trying to figure out...

SPEAKER_02How to do this thing on the fly. Those days have come and gone and the army is now, at least it considers itself to be a professional fighting force. And because it considers itself to be a professional fighting force, that offers a totally different direction. This is something that Roman generals in ancient Rome figured out that if you got a professional army, it's going to be somewhat autonomous. It's going to be separate from the politics of the day.

SPEAKER_02So it creates situations where generals like Julius Caesar can invade Rome because the army is loyal to him because they think themselves self-sufficient and they are. The Army of the Potomac isn't going to march on Washington, but they do view themselves as separate from all of the politics happening in Washington. It views itself as an autonomous arm of the American government, and because it views itself as an autonomous arm, It basically is like, prove to me, Joe Hooker, that you're the guy for the job.

SPEAKER_02We're professionals. There's this distrust of generals that it's almost like Joe Hooker has to prove to his army because of Burnside. I suppose you have this little bit of a Burnside PTSD situation. Where Ambrose Burnside sent thousands of them to die at Fredericksburg, even though Lincoln will write a letter to the Army of the Potomac, almost massaging their collective military ego, saying, you did a great job at Fredericksburg. It wasn't your fault that it was all bad. And honestly, we didn't lose all that many casualties, Lincoln will write to them.

SPEAKER_02But that's neither here nor there. The Army of the Potomac looks to Joe Hooker and says, prove to me you belong. It reminds me of the story in the American Revolution. Where the Prussian general Baron von Steuben comes to Valley Forge in 1778 and he's training the Continental Army. And there's this anecdote that just is very American and applies here to the Army of the Potomac as well. Baron von Steuben is training the Continental Army and they are intractable.

SPEAKER_02They won't listen to him. They won't do what he tells them to do. And he's frustrated about it and writing about it. And he can't get through to this group of headstrong Americans until he explains why they are doing what they are doing. And he writes that essentially once the Americans believe that what he's doing is good, they are the greatest soldiers that he's ever had. But until that point, they're completely obdurate. They're just a pain in the ass to general.

SPEAKER_02But once they get to the point where they believe that you're the right guy for the job, that what you're going to teach them will help them, they'll be the greatest soldiers you ever had in your life. The Army of the Potomac here in January 1863 is having a little bit of a Baron von Steuben moment with fighting Joe Hooker. They're looking at him like, prove to me that what you're doing is going to be good for everybody. Obviously, he's fixing some of these things around camp. But in the broad sense, there is this general distrust of Washington, of the generals.

SPEAKER_02The men in the line feel like they are pros and they've got to almost have these generals earn their keep. The Army's not the only entity that Hooker has to prove himself to. He's got to prove himself to the cabinet. Joe Hooker, as soon as he is made general, he receives a letter from Abraham Lincoln where Lincoln tells him all the things that he doesn't like about fighting Joe Hooker. And I try to think about it from the sense of you've had a couple failures here.

SPEAKER_02If you're Lincoln, you're speed dating these generals and there's no apparent air awaiting in the wings. There's no Robert E. Lee sitting there that's this obvious next guy up. You had Winfield Scott. He gets drummed out. You have McClellan, who's this, you know, chosen son, the young Napoleon, as they call him. But it turns out he's a little bit too political, potentially. He's a little too Democratic. There's a couple rumors that perhaps he collaborated with Robert E. Lee after Antietam. There's rumors that went through the papers in Washington.

SPEAKER_02It's like they had this conference and they said, hey, if we combine our two forces and march on Washington, we can bring this whole thing to a close. That was floating in the air. McClellan gets dismissed. And then immediately you go to Ambrose Burnside, who just is sort of like the Gumby character, at least how some people write about him. He's the Gumby character just sort of sitting there waiting in the wings. And then now he's You know, Ambrose Burnside turns out to actually be a Gumby character, gets into the worst disaster fiasco of the entire war.

SPEAKER_02And you got this PR campaign afterwards trying to make it seem like it wasn't as bad as it actually was. And now we have Joe Hooker. And just to get things off on square footing so everybody knows where everybody stands, Abraham Lincoln writes fighting Joe Hooker this letter where he says this, quote, I think it best for you to know that there are some things in regard to which I'm not quite satisfied with you. I believe you to be a brave and skillful soldier, which, of course, I like.

SPEAKER_02I also believe you do not mix politics with your profession in which you are right. Maybe a little nod to McClellan there. He continues, quote, You have confidence in yourself, which is a valuable if not indispensable quality. You are ambitious, which within reasonable bounds does good rather than harm. But I think that during General Burnside's command of the army you have taken counsel of your ambition and thwarted him as much as you could, in which you did a great wrong to the country and a most meritorious and honorable brother officer.

SPEAKER_02I have heard, in such a way as to believe it, of your recently saying that both the army and the government needed a dictator. Of course, it was not for this, but in spite of it that I have given you the command. Only those generals who gain successes can set up dictators. What I now ask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship. The government will support you to the utmost of its ability, which is neither more nor less than it has done and will do for all commanders. I must fear that the spirit which you have aided to infuse into the army,

SPEAKER_02of criticizing their commander and withholding confidence from him, will now turn upon you. And then perhaps the greatest close to a letter ever. Neither you nor Napoleon, if he were alive again, could get any good out of an army while such a spirit prevails in it. And now beware of rashness, beware of rashness, but with energy and Gideon Wells,

SPEAKER_02Secretary of the Navy, also weighed in. He's one of the great diarists that we have from the Civil War. There's a lot of really good ones. But Gideon Wells is your great look into the Lincoln government, the Lincoln Cabinet. And he wrote this about Joe Hooker as soon as he was made commander. Quote, I hope the change may be beneficial, but I have apprehensions. The president asked me about the time of the Second Battle of Bull Run when Pope was to leave and McClellan was out of favor. Who can take command of this army? Who is there among all these generals?

SPEAKER_02The address to me was unexpected, and without much consideration I named Hooker. The president looked approvingly but said, I think as much are you as any man of Hooker, but I fear he gets excited. He continues later talking about Hooker, the man, or at least his impressions of Hooker the man. He says, quote, What I had seen and observed of Hooker had impressed me favorably, but our interviews had been chiefly business-wise and in the matter of duty. If we return to our ledger, as it were, for how the war is going, there's a lot of different metrics you could use

SPEAKER_02And if you chalk things up and you go, you know, how's it going on the scoreboard? Well, if we look at what the victory conditions are, or at least what the presumptive victory conditions are for the federal forces, for the Union, you have to subdue the Confederacy somehow. You have to take Richmond.

SPEAKER_02You have to capture the government. You have to force them to stop fighting somehow. On the other hand, the Confederacy's victory conditions, it's a little bit easier to get done. We talked about that a little bit, haven't we? You just got to survive. You got to pull the North Vietnamese playbook from the Vietnam War, from the 1970s. You got to make it too difficult to survive. For the North to continue. And since we're in a democracy, not an autocracy, all you got to do is convince the public that it's too difficult to keep fighting.

SPEAKER_02After the Battle of Fredericksburg and right before the Emancipation Proclamation is formally instituted and even for a few months afterward, this might be the lowest low point of the war for the federal government, for the unions. They've just lost 13,000 men at Fredericksburg. They've been annihilated, as it were. They've lost yet another commander just a couple weeks after they lost another one. The Western Department is doing markedly better,

SPEAKER_02but Nobody's really paying attention to the Western theater all that much. Not in Europe, anyway. You know, it's the footnote at the bottom of the page. You've got some important battles happening, and certainly Shiloh is an eye-opener. But as it relates to what are the papers printing every day, everybody's focusing on the Eastern theater. They're focusing on Lee. They're focusing on Fredericksburg. And also we have all of these political considerations with regard to slavery. And a lot of the questions now are about, OK, things aren't necessarily going well.

SPEAKER_02Should we start drafting troops? Should we start introducing black troops, formerly enslaved people? Should we introduce them into the federal forces? This is, I suppose, the full circle moment for Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation, because if you just have the Emancipation Proclamation and then you don't follow it up with any sort of action afterward, well, it doesn't do as much for you.

SPEAKER_02But if you're able to follow up the Emancipation Proclamation and have some of these, quote unquote, difficult conversations about, hey, Now that we have, quote unquote, freed slaves, we have made this a political war. We've made this a war about slavery now. We should really double down. And doubling down means, well, if we consider them free, shouldn't we also allow them to fight in the army? Wouldn't it be great if we introduced black regiments into the army to sort

SPEAKER_02of have this image of formerly enslaved folks fighting in the war? Wouldn't that be great that they're fighting for their own freedom and all the PR and all this stuff? All of these thoughts are coalescing into the minds of folks in government in Washington. A couple weeks after he announces the Emancipation Proclamation, Lincoln will write to Major General Dix where he says this, quote, The proclamation has been issued. We were not succeeding.

SPEAKER_02At best, we were progressing too slowly without it. Now that we have it and bear all the disadvantages of it, as we do bear in some certain quarters, we must also take some benefit from it if practicable, end quote. He's talking to Major General Dix about, they call them contrabands, but it is escaped slaves that are going to Fortress Monroe, and they're showing up, and this has been something that's happened from the very beginning. Benjamin Butler is at Fortress Monroe. Fortress Monroe at first,

SPEAKER_02and there's these contrabands, they call them contrabands, that come up to the works of Fortress Monroe, and they're like, hey, can we do anything? And it's this weird situation where it's like, do you allow the formerly enslaved to come here? Do you like what do you do? There's the political considerations, and I think we've talked about that in the past, but it's there's also some of these like racial undertones. Some generals just don't want anything to do with them. Some are more they recognize what it is and they're more willing now that we have

SPEAKER_02the Emancipation Proclamation. You can be more overt about it. You can introduce formerly enslaved people into your works as workers, but also now, well, with freedom, let's try and raise regiments of black soldiers. And Lincoln will write in March to Governor Andrew Johnson of Tennessee. And Governor Johnson apparently is thinking about raising what's called a Negro military force. That's what Lincoln calls it.

SPEAKER_02Lincoln writes to Andrew Johnson this, quote, In my opinion, the country now needs no specific thing so much as some man of your ability and position to go to this work. When I speak of your position, I mean that of an eminent citizen of a slave state and himself a slaveholder. The colored population is the great available and yet unavailable of force for restoring the Union. The bare sight of 50,000 armed and drilled black soldiers upon the banks of the Mississippi would end the rebellion at once. And who doubts that we can present that sight if we but take hold in earnest?

SPEAKER_02This the same Andrew Johnson that will eventually be Lincoln's vice president when he runs for presidency again. Why does Johnson get that gig? Well, because he's a Tennessee Democrat. He's the military governor of Tennessee. He's also a slaveholder. He is the perfect example of sort of the nasty bedfellows that the Republican Party aligns itself with in order to promote the preservation of the union. And he himself owned slaves. So it's sort of this conciliatory move by Lincoln,

SPEAKER_02who is viewed as the radical Republican, the abolitionist Republican, even though it's not entirely true. But you know what? It works for bare definitions at this point. Andrew Johnson is this he's sort of a physical embodiment of an olive branch. If you have somebody who owned slaves who then turns and says, hey, I used to own slaves. Now I'm raising a regiment of freed black soldiers. It's it's very weird.

SPEAKER_02But there's obviously the PR and political considerations. For something like that, it looks pretty good if you've got a former slaveholder that's now like, hey, look at this. Isn't this great? We've got all these soldiers that are now fighting for their freedom. It feels very weird to say out loud, but that's what a lot of people are thinking. This is just sort of an extension, though, of this broader conversation that the Union needs more soldiers. They've got a lot of potential here, but they need more soldiers in the Army. So on March 3rd, 1863,

SPEAKER_02the Conscription Act is passed by Congress, which says that all men aged 20 to 45 must register for a draft. But... If you pay $300, there's this commutation fee, which will hire a substitute to go in your place. So a lot of rich guys end up paying the $300 fee and sending somebody else to go in their place. Famously, Theodore Roosevelt's father is one of those. So it's a situation where you've got a lot of poor men going into the army.

SPEAKER_02A lot of the rich guys stay out, which I suppose is not a new phenomenon. Historian James McPherson writes about the Conscription Act or the Enrollment Act of 1863 this way, quote, End quote. End quote.

SPEAKER_02You've got this situation now where in 1863, all the people who would volunteer already have. And so now you're pressing into service people that don't want to go to war. And it creates a system that was very similar to what happened in the Vietnam War because now you've had enough time for the propaganda of the war, the PR of the war to go bad. And you're releasing this enrollment act at the lowest point. So signing up for going to war doesn't sound like a thing that's really fun.

SPEAKER_02And you've also got a lot of papers that are writing fake letters from home that are encouraging soldiers to desert. There's a situation where Ulysses Grant will disband two Illinois regiments because so many of them have deserted. There's draft riots in New York where Irish population rises up and burns buildings, does about $39 million of damage in today's money. They lynch at least 12 black men, probably more. They lynch. Are angry at the government for conscripting troops,

SPEAKER_02but they're also afraid that because of the Emancipation Proclamation, freed black workers are going to migrate to New York and steal all the low wage jobs. So there's this massive, nasty race force. Draft riot and draft riot in New York in July 1863. Lincoln, after the Battle of Gettysburg, has to send a force of troops from Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, up to New York to put it down. It's very bad. PR's rough. And. And it's also not just a thing for the Union, for the Federals.

SPEAKER_02And Robert E. Lee has to deal with some of this same stuff himself for a lot of the very same reasons. For the Confederacy, all the troops that were going to volunteer have already volunteered. They're already in the Army. And the Confederacy has to figure out how we can get more troops in the field, just like the Union does. But also, the Confederacy has a compounding issue that there's the issue of the home front and the issue of all the So you have a situation where some soldiers are getting almost reprieves to go back home and work

SPEAKER_02to create things for the army. And Lee's like, no, you got to stay in the army. And it creates a situation where there's a lot of troops that are trying to desert from the Confederate army to go back home so that they can work together. In an industry position to get things going for the war effort at home, and you have this push and pull between the home front and fighting in the field. Bruce Catton writes in Never Call Retreat about this, quote, Hundreds of soldiers,

SPEAKER_02he said, meaning Lee, Went home on sick leave and then pulled every imaginable wire to promote a safe detail in some shop. Of the thousands who'd been detailed for special purposes, hardly one ever got back to the army. Some regiments were almost useless as a result, and the whole thing had given Lee, now quoting Lee, the impression of waning interest on the part of the people and our cause. If the department flatly ordered the details, he would of course obey, but if he were allowed any discretion, he would disapprove as long as life remained, end quote.

SPEAKER_02Lee and the Confederacy are facing a problem that countries, nation states will face in both of the forthcoming world wars, but nobody's really had to deal with this to this degree before. There's not the handbook for how to deal with the home front, how to deal with an army in the field. Nobody really knows or has codified what total war means for both the home front and for troops in the field. This concept of all-out war,

SPEAKER_02of total war, requires total effort in two areas that seem like sometimes they compete with one another. And Lee is dealing with this while you've got draft rights going on in the Union. Both sides are trying to reckon with this issue of the home front and the war front. Industry needs every warm body it can get, just as the Army needs every warm body it can get. And these two needs compete with one another and you have to figure out a way to balance them. In the Second World War, the United States figured this out.

SPEAKER_02But that's also because it was maybe the most industrialized nation in the history of the world. And so they were able to figure it out to a level that nobody fully expected that they could. There's the stories about Churchill and Hitler both reviewing, you know, the industrial numbers that the United States was pushing out and Churchill's giddy and Hitler doesn't even believe them because he thinks they're fantastical. Well, when you have the greatest industry in the history of the world, you have a little bit of room for error. And even still, it was a difficult situation in the 1940s.

SPEAKER_02Imagine what this situation is like for the 1860s for a Confederacy that is not industrialized anywhere close to that extent and is having to balance these two rival needs with one another. And they're really unable to find the balance. Bruce Catton writes about this, quote, The Confederacy could have an adequate army or it could support its army adequately. It could not conceivably do both because it did not have the resources to do both."

SPEAKER_02On April 2nd in Richmond, they have their own version of a draft. It's not necessarily a draft riot, but they've got a riot on the home front that Jefferson Davis hops on a horse and he empties his pockets to start throwing money into the crowd to sort of quell them. But then he calls in a militia force, fixes bayonets, and they disperse the crowd. But it's the same kind of unrest happening in both the Confederacy and in the federal North. They're dealing with these big problems that nobody fully knows how to understand.

SPEAKER_02And the war now is starting to kind of adopt a whole new tone to it. You're getting a lot more pushback. There's there's not the whole I got to go defend home and hearth thing anymore. There's not the whole I got to go defend the union. All of this, you know, great excitement and passion. All of that is starting to die down because the war is nasty and a lot of people are going to die for it. And there's a lot of questions about, hey, how can we go sue for peace?

SPEAKER_02And because of the Conscription Acts, because of the Emancipation Proclamation, the abolitionist Republicans are losing a little bit of footing in hearts and minds. McClellan has a lot to do with this because he's enormous. Northern Democrat. He's somebody that in his private letters, he's talking about how this whole thing is stupid. We need to sue for peace. Lincoln doesn't want to sue for peace. The Republicans don't want to sue for peace. They want to win the war because if you don't win the war, what was it all for?

SPEAKER_02And Democrats are there's there's this coming election in 1864. There's a coming election where all of this will be put to the ballot box. You got this insulation in the Democratic system where the Emancipation Proclamation, the draft, all of this stuff is going to be put to a vote. You're going to see if Lincoln was right or not, because it's going to be determined by the people. And there is this growing feeling, both in the North and in the South, Lee,

SPEAKER_02Lincoln, everybody, there's this feeling that, and Lee writes his wife this, that if the Army of Northern Virginia can just stay in the field until We'll see you next time.

SPEAKER_02And there is also this fear in the North, in Lincoln's administration, of the same. There's this fear that if they don't get a wrangle on things quickly, they might lose at the ballot box. And so at this low ebb, at this really nasty position for the North and this kind of precarious position for the Confederacy, even though they've just won the Battle of Fredericksburg, The stakes are rising. They continue to rise evermore. And Joseph Hooker knows this.

SPEAKER_02So he marches his army towards Richmond. Lee is trying to figure out what to do. It all leads to this confrontation at this little place called Chancellorsville. Hooker has a really good plan as plans go. The idea is he's going to send George Stoneman along with some cavalry to Harry Lee's supply lines. They're going to go cut the railroads and essentially force Lee out of his position. At Fredericksburg where he's been entrenched throughout the winter.

SPEAKER_02Everything looks good on paper. It gets checked off by Washington and Hooker is unfathomably confident going into this forthcoming fight here at Chancellorsville in Fredericksburg. He is so confident that he's saying things like, I hope God has mercy on Robert E. Lee because I won't. Things like this. It sounds very much like something that McClellan would say. And there could be several different reasons for all this confidence. You've got to think about it from the perspective of you have this veteran army in

SPEAKER_02the Army of the Potomac that sees itself as a veteran army. So you sort of have to You got to do a little bit of PR moves for the forthcoming plan to say, hey, look, we're going to go in the war in a couple of weeks here. You know, hop on board. Buy stock low now before things get really, really crazy. So he dispatches cavalry under Stoneman to go and cut the supply lines, but then it rains. So you can't find the roads anymore and Stoneman comes back.

SPEAKER_02Nothing happens. So they wait. He dispatches troops under Sedgwick over towards Fredericksburg to come up behind Lee's lines at Mary's Heights. And the theory goes there that it will be a holding force or it will be a force that will flush him out. The theory goes that if you cut his supply lines and you go flush him out, you can send Lee's army out onto the plains of Virginia where the rest of Hooker's force can essentially chop him to mincemeat. It's a good plan. But best laid plans, right?

SPEAKER_02Sedgwick has about 47,000 men at Fredericksburg. And with these 47,000 men, he lays down pontoon bridges and crosses, trying to convince Robert E. Lee that the real threat is right there. Hooker has approximately 50,000 men at Chancellorsville, and there were expected about 22,000 more men on the way. So these numbers look great. The army looks fantastic. The plan seems like it's going really well, but the plan assumed a couple things.

SPEAKER_02It assumed, number one, that Robert E. Lee would react predictably to what Hooker was trying to do. It assumed that when Sedgwick laid down his pontoon bridges and started setting things up over in Fredericksburg, that Lee would think Sedgwick was attacking and therefore react, you know, as if Sedgwick was attacking. But Cedric's attack was a bluff. It was trying to suck Lee in so that then Hooker could come in and ruin things for him. And the other thing that the plan assumed was that when Stoneman's cavalry was going

SPEAKER_02to ride rampant around and snip supply lines and things like this, that Lee's own cavalry, led by Jeb Stuart, was going to predictably pursue Stoneman's cavalry. But the problem was Stuart's cavalry did nothing of the kind. It didn't pursue Stoneman at all. It just stayed right there on Lee's flank. And what it effectively allowed Stewart to do was get reconnaissance on Hooker's flanking force over in Chancellorsville without allowing Hooker to get a whole lot of reconnaissance on what Lee was doing.

SPEAKER_02So what happens is Lee understands that Sedgwick's attack at Fredericksburg is the bluff. It is the instigating attack that tries to get Lee out into the open plains of Virginia where Hooker can smash him. Lee knows what Hooker's trying to do. And against most generals, the plan probably still works. But against Lee, it doesn't because it's just this right concoction of the individual who happens to have the certain amount of daring and bravado and also this operational ingenuity.

SPEAKER_02All of these things buttoned up into the person of Lee. Lee decides, let's do something that Hooker doesn't expect. Hooker thinks I'm going to react predictively. Let's react unpredictably. Lee detaches 10,000 men under General Jubal Early as a blocking force to handle Sedgwick at Fredericksburg, packs up all his other men and moves towards Chancellorsville. Now, things still look like they could be going pretty well for Hooker's force

SPEAKER_02at Chancellorsville. But the problem is when Lee's army detaches and starts marching towards Chancellorsville, Hooker unaccountably just loses the offensive, loses the initiative. He tells his forces to sit still. And there's this weird situation where, and perhaps it's best personified in Dan Sickles, where General Dan Sickles sees Confederate skirmishers moving towards the flank and he thinks I need to attack them.

SPEAKER_02But the order comes in, no, retreat, pull back to a defensive position and Sickles is freaking out like the enemy's right there. I have him right where I want him. We're in a good position. If we can just attack, we'll take care of him. But the order comes in, no, retreat, pull back to a defensive position, and we'll figure things out tomorrow. Pretty much at every point, Lee situates his deployments to where his forces at the point of attack have just as many men, if not more men than Union forces,

SPEAKER_02because Union forces are sort of slowly pulling backwards constantly. It creates this situation where even though Lee is badly outnumbered, at the actual point of attack, the point of fighting where all the hot and heavy stuff is, there's just as many Confederates as there are Federals. And inexplicably, Hooker, who's been talking all of this junk before the battle, as soon as he has the opportunity to do something decisive, he doesn't do it.

SPEAKER_02He is very timid. And then, to make matters even worse, a Cannonball explodes a column. He's standing at the chancellor's mansion and a cannonball explodes the column that he's leaning against and he gets majorly concussed and he's pretty much compromised the entire rest of the battle. But it doesn't necessarily matter because he was already compromised in his staff officer's eyes. But still, he's majorly concussed, and that evening, he has a meeting with his staff officers where they say, you have to attack tomorrow.

SPEAKER_02He ignores all of them and orders a retreat back across the Rappahannock River. Then the next day, Cedric breaks the And now Robert E. Lee has another issue on his hands, but he's already handled Hooker, who's been forced to retreat. He sends another division, Lee does, he sends another division back towards Sedgwick. He blocks Sedgwick and essentially has divided his force three times and defeated

SPEAKER_02a much larger Union force. The problem was, in the process of this great tactical victory, it had become Perrick. Not only had the Confederates lost 13,000 men, they lost perhaps the one man that they couldn't afford to lose. They lost Stonewall Jackson. He was shot by his own men on the evening of May 2nd as he was doing reconnaissance in the waning light. And that wound took his life a week later.

SPEAKER_02It's a massive blow for the Confederacy, for Robert E. Lee especially, who, when he hears that Jackson's right arm has been amputated due to the wounds he receives, he says, I've lost my right arm. And Jackson has become famous everywhere for his foot cavalry, for these flank attacks, for basically being the North's boogeyman. He shows up out of the woods, out of nowhere, and he steals your lunch while you're not paying attention. He's a terrorist. He's a terrifying figure to the north, and so the north naturally celebrates his demise.

SPEAKER_02It forces Lee also to reorganize his army. He's had these two large corps, one under Jackson, one under Lee. He separates them out. So it creates a lot of immediate things that need to be adjusted militarily. But there's also kind of the underlying questions, the things that don't necessarily make it into the history books, like what does it do for the individual man, this thing that we can't necessarily quantify?

SPEAKER_02I remember I was talking with a historian about this very thing. We were talking about in ancient history, there's so many things you don't know. And so you have to put yourself into the shoes of some of these individuals and ask questions like, well, what was it like to witness a charge of Alexander's Macedonian army if you're a Persian? What do you see if you're a Persian? What does that look like and feel like? On the other hand, if you see an elephant, what does that do to the individual's nervous system if you see

SPEAKER_02an elephant come charging towards you? These are some of the, I guess, unquantifiable things. The little things, the things that sneak in on the margins that make all of this an interesting conversation— And so there's a lot of debate now amongst military historians about what Stonewall Jackson's death really means. What does it mean on the margins? In terms of command, there's this obvious debate about, OK, if you don't have Jackson, how are you going to replace him?

SPEAKER_02And what does it mean if you don't have Jackson and you have to adjust to the fact you don't have Jackson? It's like if you lose a star player in a football game at the beginning of the first quarter, you can't game plan necessarily for this massive change, but you have to adjust quickly. And it's always more difficult to do than if you're able to plan and sort of figure things out ahead of time. In the military sense, it's a very difficult adjustment that Lee has to make because he's been able to rely on Jackson and Jackson's autonomy for a couple of years.

SPEAKER_02And he's gotten used to this and they have sort of had this right brain, left brain sort of relationship. And now he doesn't have that anymore and he's sort of hamstrung. Historian Robert Crick writes about this sudden difference. And Lee has to adjust to the fact he doesn't have Jackson anymore. And Crick is of the school of thought that is a massive change and it greatly hinders Lee moving forward.

SPEAKER_02But there's also this counter argument that comes out, namely by historian Peter Carmichael. He essentially says that history judges Jackson's replacements through the lens of Jackson. So he's replaced by Ewell and A.P. Hill. And historians look at Ewell and A.P. Hill and say, well, Jackson used to do these things and you're not doing them anymore. Therefore, you know, you're inferior, you're bad. But there's this question that. That comes up when you have that kind of a situation and it's well,

SPEAKER_02obviously there's the adjustment that has to be made. It's inconvenient for everybody. You've got to get used to this new operating procedure. But as we will see, Lee sometimes still thinks he's got Jackson, but he doesn't. He has A.P. Hill and Ewell. And there will be some times in the next few months, especially where he will order things that maybe Jackson could have pulled off, perhaps. At least Jackson would have attempted it. But Ewell and Hill don't because they're not Jackson.

SPEAKER_02And so it creates now this question. Again, we're getting into the weeds on some of this stuff, but it creates this question. It's like, do you blame Lee for not being able to adjust to this sudden change at this critical point, the summer of 1863? Or do you blame Lee? Why do you just say, well, because there is this inability to adjust, because obviously Jackson is so important, you know, Jackson's death creates a bigger hole on the margins than even perhaps the obvious thing that you don't have.

SPEAKER_02It's a very interesting argument. It's something that I had fun looking into. But it is sort of this thing that's happening under the surface. The individual soldier has certain feelings about Jackson that will manifest somehow in some way that perhaps isn't quantifiable on the battlefield. But there's also these arguments that you can have manifesting. You know, distinct opinions about because you've got new generals coming in to fill the place of this guy who's adopted like a mythic reality around him,

SPEAKER_02an aura, the foot cavalry, you know, Stonewall's brigade, Stonewall's corps that has this sort of invincibility complex that now because Stonewall Jackson has been killed, maybe that invincibility complex doesn't exist anymore. What's also interesting about Jackson is that if it's anybody else, they probably aren't in the situation that Jackson finds himself in, which costs him his life.

SPEAKER_02On the evening of May 2nd, he's off doing Jackson things. Trying to push Hooker's Army back across the Rappahannock River. And it is this that sort of causes the general malaise or confusion that allows for North Carolina infantrymen to fire on Jackson and his staff officers, ultimately killing Jackson. Here's what Bruce Catton writes about it. Quote, His corps, meaning Jackson's, his corps desperately needed realignment,

SPEAKER_02not to mention rest, and a cautious general would have called a halt in order to get people sorted out. But Jackson knew that if he could put Confederates on the bank of the Rappahannock before the night ended, Hooker End quote. Things are very, very bad on the morning of May 3rd for General Hooker, but at the same time, he still has everything in front of him.

SPEAKER_02It's a team that starts out a season 0-3. Things are bad. But what if the rest of the division is one and two? You still have everything in front of you if you can figure some things out. The problem is Hooker's concussed. His staff officers are not convinced that he has it anymore, whatever it was. And the battle just sort of falls apart. Hooker's got about 70,000 men in between the two halves of Lee's army. And Lee has just lost Jackson.

SPEAKER_02And A.P. Hill, Jackson's ranking division commander, gets injured. So Jackson's corps is being commanded by Jeb Stewart. It is a patchwork situation here for the Confederates at Chancellorsville on May 3rd. And yet... They succeed in pushing Hooker back across the Rappahannock, not necessarily because of anything great the Confederates do, although they do a great job of pressing their advantage and taking advantage of the fact that Hooker is incompetent for reasons unknown other

SPEAKER_02than perhaps his major concussion. But Hooker withdraws back across the Rappahannock River. The battle's done, and Lee has just captured the greatest victory of his career. It will be the thing that military students will study for years and years. It's the thing that military students will call Lee's perfect battle. The issue is there's many layers to battles. You've got the individual tactical battle, but then there's the broader strategic sort of place for a battle.

SPEAKER_02Just like with the United States military in the Vietnam War, you win a lot of battles but don't accomplish a whole lot. How valuable are the battles? You can win the Battle of the Idrang Valley, but you don't necessarily accomplish a whole lot by winning the battle. What have you really accomplished? The same problem presents itself to Lee after Chancellorsville. He wins the battle, but what does he gain? He sends messages back to Richmond afterward, essentially saying,

SPEAKER_02if you don't send me reinforcements, I'm going to lose this position. He retreats back to his entrenchments at Fredericksburg. And you essentially have a status quo situation from what happened before Chancellorsville. Lots of people have died. Hooker has been destroyed. His staff officers start conspiring against him just the same way that Ambrose Burnside's staff officers conspired against him after the disaster at Fredericksburg. And obviously Stonewall Jackson has been killed, so there's the great chasm that you've got to fill there.

SPEAKER_02But for all intents and purposes, nothing changes. Federal troops return to their camp at Falmouth and Stafford Courthouse. Confederate troops return, for the most part, to Fredericksburg. In some ways, things have continued on in a stasis from what they already were. You know, the Confederates, their goals here are just to survive, to live, to fight another day. And this is the great example of living to fight another day. It's a great tactical victory. Yippee.

SPEAKER_02But Lee has higher goals. He wants strategic victories, not just tactical ones. And while Chancellorsville is an excellent tactical victory, it is the thing that you can study for years and still find excellent tactical things to point out. It's a brilliant victory, but it accomplishes virtually nothing. And Lee wants to accomplish something. And he is broadly frustrated with Richmond because he sees that there's

SPEAKER_02a strategic impetus available for him. He can use, if he's capable of it, he can use Chancellorsville as a launching off point with which to launch a summer offensive that could wrap up the war. Things are going swimmingly for the Confederacy. You've got a lot of issues. You've got the home front. You've got the military issues. And there's only a couple ways they can win. But their ways of winning are, as we've talked about, pretty simple.

SPEAKER_02And Lee thinks that if perhaps they can launch a summer offensive into Northern Territory, remove the fighting from the Virginia Theater, Perhaps he can bring the North to the negotiating table. Vice President of the Confederacy Alexander Stevens has already tried negotiating a little bit, but there's really no reason for Lincoln to give anything at the table. Chancellorsville, perhaps, is a little bit of a nudge towards the peace movement, the Democrats in the North that are now crying, you know, end the war.

SPEAKER_02This war is terrible, very much like what you would have in the Vietnam War. But just as people in the North are disillusioned with all the casualties, people in the South are disillusioned with the fact that they can't grasp any strategic victories from all of these tactical ones. There's this growing feeling, as Shelby Foote puts it, that the South thinks that no matter what they do, the North is going to survive. Shelby Foote writes, quote,

SPEAKER_02A whole season of victories apparently had done nothing to bring peace and independence so much as one day closer. Howell Cobb of Georgia could say, not altogether in jest, now quoting Cobb, only two things stand in the way of an amicable settlement of the whole difficulty, the landing of the pilgrims and original sin, end quote. The combination of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville for the North are a lot like what Cuny was for the Roman Republic. It is devastating on the casualty lists.

SPEAKER_02I mean, the North loses about 26,000 casualties between the two armies. It essentially, effectively destroys the careers of two generals, and it is this legend. I'm sorry, I'm sorry. And as we've talked about a little bit before,

SPEAKER_02you've got this religious element where it's like we are failing so badly. If you're if you're a federal, if you're a unionist, you're like things are going so badly. We're getting whipped up and down all over the place this summer. And we have sort of staked our claim as the moral good guys in this whole affair. And we're getting smacked. What does that do to the people thinking that God is on your side? We've talked about this a little bit in previous episodes. We probably should have touched on this a bit more in the first episode,

SPEAKER_02but frankly, I hadn't read enough about the nuances of this little rabbit trail we're about to go down. Fair warning, we're about to co-opt this whole conversation to really flesh out the theological mindset of a lot of people that are existing in this period. Why are we doing this? Because I think it's good history. It also, you know, when we ask these questions like, how do these things happen? How does the Civil War come to exist? How does it get so bad?

SPEAKER_02How do you get views on race and slavery and things like this? Where do they come from? Because it's sort of this historical anomaly at places. Some parts of it are not anomalous, but some parts are. Some parts are very, very odd, and they're strains of thinking that have sort of warped and changed and become entirely unique things, historically speaking, and they all coalesce into this one thing, and then you get this great civil war that explodes,

SPEAKER_02and as some people call it, it becomes this late unpleasantness. Thousands and hundreds of thousands of people are killed. We probably don't talk about the Civil War enough as a theological sort of religious war. Some folks listening might think of that as somewhat obvious based on the subject matter at hand. Obviously, you've got this war of morality. I think most of us can see that,

SPEAKER_02that there are strains of moral thinking and moral upheaval that are happening throughout the Civil War and perhaps even instigated by the fact that you have this great war happening and people are trying to figure out what to do with it. A lot of people think slavery is the instigator for the war. And if you go back and read a lot of the primary documents, it does seem to be a pretty instigating factor in a lot of different ways. There are other things involved, as we've talked about, but there's this big elephant in the room.

SPEAKER_02And religious leaders, theologians, have to sort of wrangle that issue and square it with the Bible. And so you get this pretty interesting theological sort of frame of mind that starts to exist in the 1800s that is pretty interesting and I think explains a lot of the headspace for a lot of these individuals. That it informs some of these things like when people are viewing God as this providential being and when things go bad

SPEAKER_02and you feel like you're God's chosen people, What does that do for your worldview about God? What does that do for your view about all the people? You know, if you're in the South and you think God is this divine being and your cause is just and righteous and things aren't going well for your cause, what does that mean for your cause? That means that you're sinning somehow, right? Or that there's some sort of unrighteousness that needs to be purged. And the same thing is true for the North. When things are going bad here in late 1862 and early 1863,

SPEAKER_02You start to have questions like, well, I thought we were this righteous cause. I mean, we just we just did the whole Emancipation Proclamation, right? We're freeing the slaves. We're getting rid of the scourge of slavery. And yet. We're not winning. What does that mean for your cause? All of these things are wrapped up in one thing. It is this kind of encroaching Protestant ethic that explodes in the early 1800s

SPEAKER_02and flowers and blooms into the religious environment of the 1860s in America. Theology and religion, especially Protestant theology and religion, is dominant. It is almost a universal thing. It informs everything in American life, but it is defined in large part by three tenets. These tenets are outlined by historian Mark Knoll in his book American God. He writes, quote, This hermeneutic merged three positions.

SPEAKER_02One, the Bible was a plain book whose meanings could be reliably ascertained through the exercise of an ordinary person's intelligence. Two, a main reason for trusting the Bible as true was an intuitive sense sealed by the Holy Spirit. Three, Now, Null narrates, quote, End quote.

SPEAKER_02Part of this whole American experience that he's referring to is this belief that America is a divinely chosen people. And this is a pretty widely held belief in the 1860s, a belief that now comes It comes up against the rough waters of the Civil War because if America is a chosen people and this nasty, nasty war is going on and this great, you know, factional split and theological and moral split is happening,

SPEAKER_02can that still be true? Mark Knoll writes about how theologians interpret the Bible and try and apply it to cultural events, but also how Lincoln does it, because Lincoln approaches things slightly differently in a way that I think is profoundly interesting. Knoll writes, quote, America's best theologians joined Lincoln in believing that God was the disposer of all events, but they also continued to affirm the two principles that Lincoln had come to doubt. Almost universally,

SPEAKER_02they maintained the long-treasured axiom that the United States had enjoyed and would continue to enjoy a unique destiny as a divinely chosen people. The war, they held, had decisively reconfirmed this calling. Second, the theologians continued to speak as if the ways of providence were transparent, as if it were relatively easy matter to say what God was doing in the disposition of contemporary events. Moreover, what was clearly seen could also be controlled.

SPEAKER_02Knowing what God was about gave theologians the confidence that they could determine the course of events. On these points, the chorus of theologians sang with one voice." But like he mentioned, Lincoln has come to doubt this belief, or I guess this series of beliefs. One, that America is a divinely chosen people, and two, that Providence is easy to see and understand. Lincoln, through his own experience, writes in a personal letter or a personal diary about this kind of thing that

SPEAKER_02And he starts to wonder, perhaps even out loud or on paper, that the will of God could not simply be identified with efforts to preserve the union, as many theologians and religious people around him think. He wrote a meditation on the divine will, which was not meant for public consumption, but we have it now. And he writes this in September 1862, right after Second Bull Run, right before Fredericksburg.

SPEAKER_02But things are not going very well. And he has started to wonder. About how emancipation will sort of play politically, but also how it will exist as a religious measure, how it will sort of carry on theologically throughout the United States. And I probably should mention we I think we probably talked about this a little bit in the first show. Maybe not enough, but there is this theological separation between race and slavery.

SPEAKER_02If you go back, even abolitionist theologians at the time struggled to defend slavery in the Bible because slavery exists in the Bible. But also, antebellum slavery adopts a different sort of feel to it, doesn't it? It's a distinctly different racist thing. It's a historical anomaly in its uniqueness. And there are theological buttresses for it. These theological buttresses,

SPEAKER_02like we said earlier, kind of come out of this distinctly American flavor of theology that proliferates throughout the United States becomes very, very common. You got this great awakening in the 1820s and 30s, and the United States is overwhelmingly Protestant Christian and It is not necessarily an exaggeration to say that everybody, at least if they aren't Protestant Christian or a church-going Christian, they think with a Protestant Christian worldview.

SPEAKER_02Or perhaps they recognize the influence of the Protestant Christian worldview on how everybody else is thinking. But there is this sort of separation between race and slavery that gets inserted in and it gets very, very weird. It is probably best exemplified by James Henley Thornwell in 1861. He's a Southern theologian, one of the foremost Southern theologians before his death in 1862. He is in many ways the best exemplar at the time of the Southern theological view of slavery.

SPEAKER_02Now, he gave a speech at the Southern Presbyterian Church where he was defending the Southern way of life. And it gives voice to this separation between race and slavery that perhaps isn't even recognized at the time because they're so wrapped up with one another. But now we can look back and with clearer heads and clearer eyes, we can see this this delineation that's happening. Mark Knoll narrates what Thornwell says. He says that Thornwell offered the customary profession that he would reason only

SPEAKER_02from Scripture. Now, quoting Thornwell, "...let it be distinctly borne in mind that the only rule of judgment is the written Word of God. The Church is founded upon express revelation. Her creed is an authoritative testimony of God and not a speculation." Thornwell, Noel writes, then offered an abridged version of the standard biblical defense of slavery, which, an aside, is basically slaves existed in the Bible, therefore slavery good. But that is extended to, you know, this antebellum slavery, which is not at all like slavery in the Bible.

SPEAKER_02Noel continues, Now he quotes Thornwell, quote, We feel that the souls of our slaves are a solemn trust, and we shall strive to present them faultless and complete before the

SPEAKER_02End quote. This is a very common feeling amongst Southerners, especially Southern aristocrats. You could probably say with some accuracy that what Thornwell says here is very much how Robert E.

SPEAKER_02Lee views slavery, which is interesting because when people talk about Lee, we talk about him as this guy who opposed slavery, at least our more favorable views of Lee will say this. He opposed slavery, right? He generally opposed secession, but he went along with it. And, you know, he writes this famous letter to his wife where he talks about how with divine providence will sort of bring about the end of slavery. It's not it's not going to be something that Lee will do, but God will do it in his own just timing, essentially, Lee says.

SPEAKER_02But he says, even still, you know, slaves are here for their I don't remember the exact words used, but it's something like moral correction or, you know, their their general, you know, They're here and it's the duty of the slave owner to make them better or something. That's kind of the general gist of what he's saying there. And it's a commonly held view and it's all wrapped up in this like multi-layered onion. That is this Protestant ethic,

SPEAKER_02that is this belief in divine providence that talks about, you know, our side is just and right and moral and righteous and God supports it. And, you know, providence, we can understand it because God God's nature can be understood through reason, which is this enlightenment thing that is apparent in the founding fathers as they're talking about things. They're talking about how theology can be understood through man's reason and understanding, which is a radical thing at the time.

SPEAKER_02But all of these things proliferate and man's reason has reasoned some things into God that are somebody's clearly wrong. Either the North is wrong or the South is wrong, but you can't both read the same Bible and come away thinking very, very different things. So we come back to this personal reflection that Abraham Lincoln writes in September 1862, where he is basically writing a theological commentary of the war because the war is innately theological.

SPEAKER_02It is the culmination of a lot of these religious disagreements as much as it is a political one. And perhaps something that is not commented on enough, that there is an absolute religious element to this thing that makes it sort of like the next crusade. But it's a distinctly American flavor, and it's a very, very interesting, anomalous historical moment. But in September 1862, Abraham Lincoln writes this, quote, The Will of God Prevails In great contests,

SPEAKER_02each party claims to act in accordance with the will of God. Both may be, and one must be wrong. God cannot be for and against the same thing at the same time. In the present civil war, it's quite possible that God's purpose is something different from the purpose of either party, and yet the human instrumentalities, working as they do, are the best adaptation to affect His purpose. I'm almost ready to say this is probably true, that God wills this contest and wills that it shall not end yet.

SPEAKER_02By his mere quiet power on the minds of the new contestants, he could have either saved or destroyed the Union without a human contest. Yet the contest began, and having begun, he could give the final victory to either side any day. Yet the contest proceeds." End quote. How ironic is it that perhaps the best theological conception of the war comes from somebody who is reputed to not have been a member at a church,

SPEAKER_02rarely attended church meetings unless it was for sort of a political reason, was not a devout religious Protestant individual, but at the same time was somebody who was informed by this Protestant worldview that proliferates in the wake of the Great Awakening. But when we're talking about how people view God and his dispensation of providence, all of this is wrapped up into this weird sort of anomalous historical onion.

SPEAKER_02There's a lot of odd layers to it. But after the Battle of Chancellorsville, people start turning to God. And in the future, you know, after battles like Vicksburg or Gettysburg, the losing side, no matter which one it is, there is this only... Almost universal returning to God and this paying of penance internally and this positioning oneself towards prayer, towards God's will. Because it is this bedrock theological belief amongst most people that God is ordering events.

SPEAKER_02And as a result of the Civil War, there is almost this post Protestant movement that's going to happen because people can't square this. If God is ordering events, did he order that? And Fredericksburg and And Chancellorsville are very nasty for a lot of people trying to think about the war theologically. But it also shows this individual resilience, this sort of American spirit, I suppose, that is not dissimilar to the Roman spirit.

SPEAKER_02You can take 26,000 casualties in these battles and still get up off the mat and keep fighting. It is the Roman Republic dusting themselves off after losing the battles of Caney and Lake Tresamine and all these other ones to Hannibal and still being able to put armies back into the field. It's even, I guess, doubly more surprising because you've got the expiration of all these two-year men after the Battle of Chancellorsville.

SPEAKER_02So the Army of the Potomac takes pretty heavy losses there. You've got a lot of staff officers that are resigning. It's a very convoluted, difficult situation for the Union, just as it is a difficult situation for the Confederacy. They've got their own problems to figure out. But the Union and Shelby Foote writes about this a little bit. He describes it this way. He says the public's reaction was not unlike that of a boxer who delivers his best punch square on the button, then sees his opponent merely blink and shake his head and bore back in. The Union, after Chancellorsville in the summer of 1863, refuses to die.

SPEAKER_02And yet, despite the fact that the Union refuses to die, it doesn't mean that the Union is all hunky-dory and they're just, you know, plugging through, they're putting their heads down, they're going to be fine. People in the North are furious. Public opinion after Chancellorsville is terrible. People are getting very tired of all the casualties. There's thousands more of them after Chancellorsville. And Lee thinks, OK,

SPEAKER_02if we can take advantage of the tactical victory at Chancellorsville, we can use it as a launching point for a strategic victory through the rest of the summer of 1863. But he faces problems. Grant in the West is achieving some victories in and around Vicksburg, Mississippi. And Confederate Secretary of War Seddon recognizes that Grant is about to break apart the Confederacy or break it in half, I should say. And Seddon thinks that Vicksburg is the key.

SPEAKER_02Lee disagrees for possibly a myriad of reasons. Lee leaves the United States Army because of Virginia. And I think it is probably because of Virginia that he opposes what Seddon tells him to do, which is to detach Longstreet's Senate to help Joseph Johnston fight Grant at Vicksburg. Lee says, no, I need Longstreet because I'm trying to get all these Federals out of Virginia. Lee knew that something drastic had to be done.

SPEAKER_02There were problems everywhere. And Seddon says, go to Vicksburg. And Lee says, no, Lee has a different idea. Shelby Foote writes it this way, quote, Lee wanted to launch a second investigation. The first, back in September, had come to grief in Maryland because of a combination of mishaps, not the least of which had been McClellan's luck in finding the lost order issued by Lee when he snapped at the bait left dangling at Harper's Ferry. This time, though, Shelbyfoot writes, he would profit by that experience.

SPEAKER_02He would march without delay into Pennsylvania, deep in Washington's rear, where a victory might well prove decisive, not only in his year-long contest with the Army of the Potomac, End quote.

SPEAKER_02I'll see you next time. If you look at the rearrangement of Lee's army after Chancellorsville, there's 15 major officers and 10 of them are from Virginia. There's a lot of Virginians. Longstreet even thinks there's there's one officer from North Carolina that Lee. He thinks should take over one of Lee's three corps, but instead, A.P.

SPEAKER_02Hill gets the job, and he's a little cranky about it. He's like, well, we should probably have some representation outside of Virginia. Doesn't matter. It's sort of a formality. Longstreet has a little bit of a chip on his shoulder. He also views tactics and strategy slightly differently from Robert E. Lee. Lee, as we've talked about, is a little bit of this offensive, take risks, daring Elon kind of a general. He is your classic example of the dash and the pop and the just it's the sort of

SPEAKER_02a general that he has a little bit of a predilection for taking risks. He likes flashbacks. At least perhaps that might be how Longstreet would characterize it. Whereas Longstreet is much more cautious. He's also proven that it works, especially at Fredericksburg, where he entrenches himself and his forces only take 2,000 casualties and he inflicts about 9,000 federal casualties. Longstreet sees Chancellorsville as a potential problem, a potential bug in the code.

SPEAKER_02Because Chancellorsville is a flashy victory that is all the good things, right? It's great for the papers. It's great for international recognition for, you know, all the things that the Confederacy cares about. The PR. It's great for all of those things. But for the prosecution of the war, Longstreet worries that it will teach Lee all the wrong lessons. He worries that Lee is going to try and get another Chancellorsville under his belt in this new campaign.

SPEAKER_02Shelby Foote writes about it this way, quote, Chancellorsville was the kind of flashy spectacle the South could ill afford. Facing what Lincoln called the arithmetic, Longstreet perceived that four more such battles in which the Confederates were outnumbered two to one and inflicted casualties at a rate of three or four would reduce Lee's army to a handful, while Hooker would be left with the number Lee had at the outset. End quote. Worried about this northern campaign that Lee is proposing, Longstreet protests.

SPEAKER_02He says we can't pursue anything like what happened at Chancellorsville anymore. And I think Lee is going to try and get us a few more of those Chancellorsville victories. And if that happens, we're screwed. But Lee's mind was already made up. So James Longstreet says he writes in his own memoirs later, quote, I then accepted his proposition to make a campaign into Pennsylvania, provided it should be offensive in strategy, but defensive in tactics,

SPEAKER_02forcing the federal army to give us battle when we were in strong position and ready to receive them, end quote. Sounds great on paper, but it doesn't sound like Robert E. Lee, does it? In fact, Lee later on after the war would hear that Longstreet had written this or said this or had intimated these kinds of feelings. And Robert E. Lee refused to believe that James Longstreet thought that way. He thought there was only one way to win this war, and that involved invading the North.

SPEAKER_02So he gathers his army again, picks up the remnants, adds more recruits, reconstitutes his army into three corps instead of the previous two corps, and gathers himself an army of about 75,000 effectives to make his push into Pennsylvania. Seems pretty clear that nobody meant to actually fight at Gettysburg. Lee's plan was to move up towards Chambersburg and then perhaps draw the Army of the Potomac into a conflict there or push down towards Washington.

SPEAKER_02Either way, it is a move to try and draw the Union into a place they don't want to go, to draw them into deep water where the Confederates have been operating in Virginia for the first couple of years of the war. Likewise, Hooker doesn't want to fight in Pennsylvania either, although Lee's going to make him fight in Pennsylvania. But Hooker doesn't move quickly. He's afflicted by, I suppose, the same problem that McClellan had for a long time. It's something that... That Abraham Lincoln is he's got some PTSD with with these generals

SPEAKER_02that don't move quickly, that don't take the initiative. Hooker had taken the initiative and then somewhere between Lee's forces moving. Pretty quickly on that first little bit at the Battle of Chancellorsville and the point where the cannonball explodes near his head, Hooker fell to pieces and immediately turned himself into a facsimile of George B. McClellan, but without all of the bravado. He shrinks, for lack of a better term.

SPEAKER_02On June 27th, 1863, he offers his resignation and Abraham Lincoln is all too happy to accept it. Next guy up. We haven't had a next guy up this entire time. The next guy up gets pressed into duty. Immediately on June 28th, he is George Meade. He is one of McClellan's lieutenants. He really gets the job because he's one of McClellan's lieutenants. At this point, Lincoln is hoping for anybody, any warm-blooded individual who happens to have some capacity for command,

SPEAKER_02you know, he'll do. If those are your parameters, Meade fits the bill. He is a West Point guy. He is somebody with a respected pedigree, not necessarily a star, but at this point, we've run through all of our stars. We are just hoping... We're hoping for, you know, role players at this point. We just need somebody to manage things. And George Meade supposedly will manage things pretty well. As Lee moves pretty quickly into Pennsylvania,

SPEAKER_02Meade gives chase and it culminates at this sleepy little town in Gettysburg. But pretty much from the get go, everybody is wrong footed. General Lee isn't expecting a fight at Gettysburg because he's been using or relying on Jeb Stewart's cavalry as a screening force, but also as a reconnaissance force. And he hasn't heard any word from Jeb Stewart, who's gone all the way down. He's skirmished a little bit. He's caused mayhem and havoc, but he hasn't sent any word up to Lee in Pennsylvania.

SPEAKER_02And so Lee has his army spread out across this wide range, like a 45 mile area, not really prepared for battle. He's at Chambersburg. He's got a lot of men at Chambersburg. But George Meade pulls a Stonewall Jackson. He steals a march on Robert E. Lee. He gets up to Gettysburg, but he doesn't realize that any Confederates are up there. They're sort of all flying blind a little bit. And pickets meet each other right outside of Gettysburg.

SPEAKER_02And then the battle just sort of accumulates like a snowball, and it's out of everybody's hands. And before you know it, wouldn't you know it, There's thousands of guys and artilleries being unlimbered and it turns into a whole pitched battle on July 1st, 1863, before anybody really understands what has happened.

SPEAKER_01About 10 o'clock on July 1st, the Union infantry starts to

SPEAKER_02stream into the fray. The first Union general really on the scene is General John Reynolds. And he sends a message back to General Meade after a couple hours of figuring out He sends a message back that he says he's going to fight inch by inch. And if he's driven back into Gettysburg, into the town, he's going to barricade the streets and all this stuff. As soon as he sends that message back, he's struck in the head by a bullet and killed. So then now somebody else has to come in and figure things out.

SPEAKER_02It is very much an improvised sort of a situation, especially at the very beginning. Theodore Arold Dodge was in the 11th Corps, and he fought on the first day at Gettysburg. By 10 a.m., they had crossed into Pennsylvania, and by about 2 p.m., Dodge's Corps is engaged with Confederate troops right outside of Gettysburg. He wrote in his diary as he's writing letters back home, but he's also writing sort of for posterity's sake or for something to have

SPEAKER_02for his family. He writes in this diary that Where he gives sort of a minute-by-minute accounting or an hour-by-hour accounting of his time fighting in Gettysburg. He writes this, quote, We are engaged. We lie in a column supporting a battery with skirmishers in front. Shells are flying and bursting at a considerable rate. The rebels are about half a mile off. The country is open and we can see everything. We see their batteries in the men at work very plainly.

SPEAKER_02Our batteries are working hard. Reynolds has fallen, and in him we have lost much. But he died bravely and took 1,200 prisoners before he fell. Our core is to hold this position of Gettysburg. God grant we may have victory. And you can almost insert a dash in there because he's shot in the ankle, his leg is later amputated, and he is drummed out of the fighting before the fighting even really gets going. It's all over this place that will be called Seminary Ridge.

SPEAKER_02And the Confederates will drive Union forces off of Seminary Ridge and Union forces will go and find an entrance position across from Seminary Ridge on Cemetery Ridge. Not to be confused with Seminary Ridge. Military historian John Keegan narrates the situation this way. He writes, quote, The situation was fluid in the extreme, however, and almost as he spoke, meaning Lee, The Union line which was stretched across the Carlisle and Harrisburg roads leading

SPEAKER_02into the town from the north gave way, the fugitives streaming south towards Cemetery Hill. The Union force on McPherson's Ridge and Seminary Ridge was shortly driven off and Lee now changed his attitude, deciding to fight as hard as necessary to hold as much critical ground as he could while the day lasted." It's this moment where you get to now return to this question of what do you do now that you don't have Stonewall Jackson, where A.P.

SPEAKER_02Hill and Ewell now get to be, unfortunately for them, they get to be competitive. You will receive orders from Robert Lee after Robert E. Lee decides, yes, we are going to fight here at Gettysburg. You will receive orders to take Cemetery Ridge, if practicable, as as Lee puts it. For Ewell, it's not practicable. It reminds me a lot of Stonewall Jackson. I think we talked about this at Gaines Mill,

SPEAKER_02where he's slow sort of getting things going after his Shenandoah Valley campaign. It's very out of character for Stonewall Jackson. Perhaps the Confederates struggle early on in the Seven Days Battles because Stonewall Jackson doesn't acquit himself very well. But all of that has to do with expectations. He's been so good before that, you know, this sudden inaction is now out of character for what people expect from Stonewall Jackson.

SPEAKER_02What Ewell does here on the first day of fighting at Gettysburg, it's very similar to the worn down Stonewall Brigade, Stonewall's Corps, in those early days at the Seven Days Battles. Ewell doesn't take Cemetery Ridge. Instead, he spends the afternoon trying to reconstitute his core, trying to reassemble things. And you now get the the boo birds come out.

SPEAKER_02It is all in expectations. What did you expect? Well, you expect somebody to act like the guy we just had. But he doesn't. Edward Porter Alexander wrote in 1877 sort of as a recollection. Somebody asked him, you know, what were you thinking that decade ago? What were you thinking when Gettysburg started? What was the plan? What was... What was General Lee thinking? What was Longstreet thinking? All of these questions that,

SPEAKER_02you know, we would love if we could resuscitate a soldier fighting at, you know, Gettysburg. We would love to ask those questions. We would love to interview them. Patrons, Edward Porter Alexander responds about the first day's fighting that there was this push and pull, this tug of war internally in the Confederate general staff about the offensive defensive, the tradeoff. And the first day's fighting is emblematic of General Lee's feelings on

SPEAKER_02that question and then also everybody else's feelings on that question. Edward Porter Alexander writes this, quote, My general recollection is that we considered the enemy very slow and moving upon us and took our time everywhere to give him opportunities to attack if he desired, and that the concentration which was ordered at Gettysburg was intended as an offer of battle to him. In making this concentration, Hill's Corps unexpectedly came in collision with Reynolds' Corps,

SPEAKER_02and the thing began. Reynolds' Corps was not expected there, and our information of the enemy's movements was incomplete on account of the absence of all of the cavalry, or nearly all, with General Stewart, who instead of being between us and the enemy was on a raid around him. In this way the action began, and the first day's success stimulated the second day's effort. This effort should have been successful and would have been, but for delays and faults of detail in its execution. End quote.

SPEAKER_02That execution that Porter Alexander is referring to there, no doubt, refers to the staff officer Samuel Johnston, to whom Lee delegates the task of gathering reconnaissance and information about Meade's forces for day two of the fighting. Meade arrives with an infantry corps late in the evening of July 1st, and then by mid-morning July 2nd, two more corps arrive on Cemetery Ridge. Samuel Johnston assures Lee that none of that is true.

SPEAKER_02There's no new infantry up there on Cemetery Ridge. Nobody has arrived after day one. And so Lee operates day two with faulty information. He thinks that there's less guys up there on Cemetery Ridge than are actually up there on Cemetery Ridge. Due to this information, Lee proposes a flank model And it's at this point that you do get to see the push and pull between the offensive and defensive.

SPEAKER_02He's pretty well convinced that now that the battle has started, the battle must be joined. The battle must be continued. And as Lee says to Longstreet, he's right there and I will either whip him or he will whip me. You know, we've talked about Lee as being fond of the rifled musket, believing in the rifled musket. And he believes in infantry and all of these things, but there is another element in the Robert E. Lee stew.

SPEAKER_02It is the same reason that Winfield Scott said that if you insured Robert E. Lee's life for $5 million, it wouldn't be enough. It is that personal honor. It is the same thing that led him to be second at West Point, not receiving a single demerit. The same thing that creates this mythos around the man. It is his upbringing in the Old Dominion. It is being the son of revolutionary war hero Light Horse Harry Lee.

SPEAKER_02It is this personal conviction, this almost irascible sense of honor. This personal courage and duty and honor all wrapped up into one thing. And it is also this belief in Lee that command is a personal thing. The Army of Northern Virginia is Robert E. Lee's hand. It is an extension of Robert E. Lee. And this,

SPEAKER_02you know, the fighting for the past, you know, 10 months plus has all been taking place in his backyard. So it's an intensely personal thing for him. Fredericksburg, you And it's like, you know, this is our place.

SPEAKER_02And there's this personal connection to it, coupled with this personal feeling of duty, all wrapped up into one sort of aristocratic stew. He is very much this old cavalier, this English gentleman, except he's from Virginia. And so you get this situation where tactically the Confederates win day one. They drive Union forces back onto Cemetery Ridge,

SPEAKER_02where then Union forces fortify themselves on the ridge. And they also have, by the way, this open field in front of them where their artillery can take care of whatever Lee throws at them. It's perhaps the best position Union forces have held since Malvern Hill in the Seven Days Battles. And yet Lee decides we're not going to be defensive. Longstreet says we should bypass all of these forces up on Cemetery Ridge. We should go find a place where we can pull them into a fight on our terms.

SPEAKER_02And Lee says no. It's a very interesting kind of a situation. Gettysburg shows Lee's stubbornness more than anything else does. He's organized this invading expedition. They're on enemy ground now up in Pennsylvania. They've seen all these farms that are untouched by the fingers of war. And Lee has this opportunity, I suppose, to be a little bit more choosy with the kinds of battles that he fights.

SPEAKER_02And yet he gets up here to Gettysburg and he has this one good opportunity, he thinks, and he's going to take advantage of it. Porter Alexander writes in that 1877 recollection that they had enough ammunition for one good fight. And if they won that one good fight, they would collect more ammunition from the victory. But Going into it, they were pretty much prepared for one big all-out scrap, and Lee decides after the first day's fighting,

SPEAKER_02you know, whatever you might think about how that first day went, whether it was inconclusive or tactically effective, strategically, all of these things, Lee decides, come hell or high water, we're going to fight right here. The second day of fighting at Gettysburg is spent trying to answer the question, will the Confederate troops turn Meade's flank? It is this rush up and down Cemetery Ridge, and there are close calls, and there's fighting in this bloody place called Devil's Den.

SPEAKER_02But the real meat of the fighting takes place on the extreme left side of Meade's army. The commanding officer for this Union force is a colonel named Joshua Chamberlain. He's a schoolteacher from Maine. He is in charge of the 20th Maine Volunteers, and he's dispatched about 4 p.m. on July 2nd to occupy that extreme left side of Meade's line. They know the fight is coming there at some point. It's just a matter of when. And Chamberlain is there with his 20th Maine volunteers waiting for it.

SPEAKER_02They know something's coming. They don't know exactly what it's going to be, but they're ready just in case. And as soon as they get there, Confederate troops are right on them. Chamberlain writes in his report of the battle afterwards, That pretty much as soon as he established his line on the crest of this small spur of rocks, and it's a rocky and wooded hill, that's how he describes it. He sends out a company of skirmishers to sort of foray out and see what they can see. He says this, quote,

SPEAKER_02"...these dispositions were scarcely made when the attack commenced, and the right of the regiment found itself at once hotly engaged." Almost at the same moment from a high rock which gave me a full view of the enemy, I perceived a heavy force in rear of their principal line, moving rapidly but stealthily toward our left with the intention, as I judged, of gaining our rear unperceived. End quote.

SPEAKER_02Confederate troops, the 15th Alabama Regiment, think that they're going to overrun Chamberlain in a matter of moments. And it's evident because as soon as Chamberlain executes this movement, his forces push back the charge from the 15th Alabama. And the 15th Alabama almost have this this moment where they're thinking, oh, we thought this was going to be easy. It's not that easy. Chamberlain writes that the fighting from that point forward was some of the nastiest he had seen to that point in the war.

SPEAKER_02And he just fought in Chancellorsville. He achieves his command of this regiment because of a promotion at Chancellorsville. He's fought at Fredericksburg. And this moment here on this little hill called Little Round Top, Chamberlain says, is the nastiest fighting he has seen yet. He writes about it,

SPEAKER_02Three times our line was forced back, but only to rally and repulse the enemy. As often as the enemy's line was broken and routed, a new line was unmasked, which advanced with fresh vigor. Our sixty rounds were rapidly reduced. I sent several messengers to the rear for ammunition and also for reinforcements. In the meantime, we seized the opportunity of a momentary lull to gather ammunition and more serviceable arms from the dead and dying on the field. With these, we met the enemy's last and fiercest assault.

SPEAKER_02Their own rifles and their own bullets were turned against them. In the midst of this struggle, our ammunition utterly failed. The enemy were close upon us with a fresh line pouring on us a terrible fire. The heroic energy of my officers could avail no more. Our gallant line withered and shrunk before the fire it could not repel. It was too evident we could maintain the defensive no longer. End quote.

SPEAKER_02So in this moment, Chamberlain thinks to himself, what are we going to do? We can't lose this spot. If Chamberlain loses here, and he steadily begins to realize this, if he loses here on the extreme left of Meade's left wing, the whole battle might be lost. Because if the 15th Alabama can push through this 20th Maine and they can get to Meade's flank, they can roll up Meade's entire line. They can, at the very least, create this place where they'll have enfilading fire for artillery, which essentially means that they can fire sideways down the length of Meade's line,

SPEAKER_02which means that you're basically killing two birds with one shot. The entire length of General Meade's line here. It would be catastrophic. It probably means the end of the battle for the Union. Chamberlain realizes this, has begun to realize this, and decides, And Chamberlain says, Well, boys, fix your bayonets. We're going to charge.

SPEAKER_02And in one of the all-time military moments, something that's going to rank up there with just about anything, Chamberlain orders a charge from his beleaguered 20th Maine into the 15th Alabama. And this This is how he narrates it. And at the same time wheeling to the right,

SPEAKER_02the whole regiment described nearly half a circle, the left passing over the space of half a mile while the right kept within the support of the 83rd Pennsylvania, thus leaving no chance of escape to the enemy except to climb up the steep side of a mountain or to pass by the whole front of the 83rd Pennsylvania. The enemy's first line scarcely tried to run. They stood amazed, threw down their loaded arms, and surrendered in whole companies." By now it's dusk and Chamberlain's men are completely worn out.

SPEAKER_02They're sitting down underneath the shade of the trees. They're throwing down their guns. They're panting. And then the order comes that there's more troops about a half mile away, more Confederates, on top of a large... And they're about a half mile away from that at Little Round Top and the order comes, we've got to go push the Confederates off of that hill over there. Chamberlain's men still don't have much ammunition. Not enough has really come up. They've gotten about 3,000 rounds of ammunition from the rear, but it's still not a ton.

SPEAKER_02And Chamberlain says that his men are worn out, but they get back into line and it's dusk and dark and supported by the 83rd Pennsylvania. They charge and overrun the Round Top a half mile away. They hear as soon as they get up. They hear that General Powell Hill's division is right in front of them. And so, Chamberlain... Organizes some artillery basically in trenches around the rocks on this round hill

SPEAKER_02and they wait out the night. But they, in this sort of moment, they have turned this battle into a place of weakness, this little extreme left from a place of weakness to a place of strength. They're reinforced by the 5th Pennsylvania and the 12th Pennsylvania. And then the next day at noon, they're relieved by the 1st Brigade. Joshua Chamberlain earns himself the Medal of Honor with this action here. It is one of those all-time Americana moments.

SPEAKER_02It turns Lee's offensive in on itself, and it creates a nasty situation for Robert E. Lee on July 3rd, because now that he's been unable to flank Meade on July 2nd, he's got to figure out how to attack entrenched union positions on July 3rd. And it feels like we've talked about this almost ad nauseum. Attacking entrenched positions in the Civil War is a fool's errand. More broadly,

SPEAKER_02Lee thought that if he could attack in one more complex He thought that the Union forces were nearly spent. This is because Longstreet's corps had almost overrun the Union on Cemetery Ridge. One of Powell Hill's brigades almost ran Cemetery Ridge by itself. Ewell, just a couple miles further down the line, had almost won his attack on Cemetery Hill and then Culp's Hill. And for Lee,

SPEAKER_02who's looking at the run of battle on the beginning of July 3rd as the day dawns hot and muggy, he's looking out across this miles long line thinking to himself that he's come so close to driving the Federals off in a route. If only this happened there. If only this happened over there. You know, if Powell Hill's forces had been able to take Cemetery Ridge, the Confederates win. If Joshua Chamberlain doesn't organize this dashing heroic charge

SPEAKER_02on Little Round Top and then take further the larger Round Top, the Confederates win. If Longstreet has been able to, in this cooperating attack with Ewell's forces further down the line, if they've been able to at the same time push back Federals and roll them up on Cemetery Hill or Cemetery Ridge, the Confederates win. Lee is thinking to himself on the beginning of July 3rd that he is dangerously close, that if only he's got one last dashing attack in him, he can drive Union forces off.

SPEAKER_02The problem is Union forces are not nearly as spent as Robert E. Lee thinks they are, and Longstreet seems to know it. Longstreet is still of the mind that an offensive defensive strategy is the way forward. Remember, he had this conference with Lee before the whole Gettysburg campaign where he says, let's not, you know, get ourselves into a silly battle here. Well, in the third day's fighting here at Gettysburg, Longstreet is of the mind that defense still needs to be top of mind.

SPEAKER_02Lee finds him just after dawn on July 3rd, and Longstreet says essentially that he can go again around Meade's flank. He's like, we need to be trying to draw Meade into a fight where Meade doesn't want to go, draw him out into deep water. And Lee is having none of it. He sees the enemy there on Cemetery Hill and he says, we're going to take him there. And he leaves the task of organizing this attack to General Longstreet. Longstreet has been scouting all night,

SPEAKER_02so he does some quick mental calculations and he says this to Lee, quote, Now, quoting what Longstreet observed later, End quote.

SPEAKER_02This is a famous historical debate. Was Longstreet right? Was Lee right? Now, obviously, we have the benefit of 2020 hindsight here where we can settle Lee with some of the blame of what's about to happen. But with the benefit of that hindsight, Longstreet's plan here to go around Meade's left and set up a defensive position and draw Meade into a frontal attack on a entrenched Confederate position, that's a pretty good tactical plan. It is the inverse of what Lee is ordering Longstreet to do here on July 3rd, 1863.

SPEAKER_02And you got to think, too, you know, we've talked about how the Civil War has to be learned during the Civil War, like the tactics and things that are going to be used in the Civil War have to be learned during the Civil War. But by now we haven't. Think of the book written on Civil War tactics. If you're a defensive position and you happen to have a wide field of fire from where you can deploy artillery and then the enemy is going to attack you across that field of fire, well, that enemy is going to lose.

SPEAKER_02We've seen this now at Gaines Mill. We've seen this at Fredericksburg. You know, flank attacks generally pretty good. So if you can do a flank attack, that's pretty great. Also, just as a rule of thumb, don't attack entrenched positions. If there are any lessons that can be learned from the Civil War in the first couple of years, those three are probably top of mind, top of the list. And what Lee is ordering Longstreet to do here is essentially flagrant violation of two of the three lessons. And Longstreet is trying to get Lee to do something that aligns with the third lesson.

SPEAKER_02But Lee doesn't want to listen to it. There's a lot of different layers to it, but Lee really does believe that if they can attack here and break Union positions, the entire North will be broken open. The stakes here for Lee are massive because he sees the cost benefit analysis in front of him. He thinks if he can just deploy, you know, a grand attack here and he can break Union forces, he can then basically own the rail lines between Philadelphia and Washington, D.C.

SPEAKER_02He can cut Washington off from the entire rest of the Union. He can win the war. In Lee's mind, if this one charge works, the entire war is over. Longstreet doesn't see it that way, but that's what Lee is thinking here when the morning dawns hot and muggy on July 3rd. So he orders the attack, and Longstreet is then faced with another conundrum. You can be the guy who's You said no to Robert E. Lee, or you can be the guy who tried and probably,

SPEAKER_02in Longstreet's mind, failed to do what Robert E. Lee ordered you to do. So he sets about ordering the attack, gathers about 12,500 men for the attack, and then goes and meets with Colonel Edward Porter Alexander to organize the artillery barrage that's going to cover the attack. What he learns in that meeting with Porter Alexander is that there's a limited amount of shot and shell that Porter Alexander has at his disposal.

SPEAKER_02He would write later that Confederate batteries always conserved their ammunition for precious moments, for specific moments. This is one of those. But the ammunition is not endless. There's a point where Porter Alexander is going to have to think about conserving ammunition. He's got that in the back of his mind after Longstreet tells him to cover Pickett's charge. Porter Alexander writes that he'd been hearing throughout the army that Lee had ordered every single able man to charge Cemetery Hill. So he was pleased to see that there was a limited number.

SPEAKER_02It wasn't going to be a complete all out effort. He was a little worried about that. But he conversed. He was happy about the opportunity that Pickett was going to be the guy that was synonymous with this charge. And because of the ambiguity, he was going to be the guy that was going to be the guy that was synonymous with this charge. Ammunition situation, Porter Alexander realizes very quickly that if this thing is going to work, it can't be done in any half measures because there's a limited amount of ammunition

SPEAKER_02that he's got at his disposal. The timing of all this has to go off without a hitch. He's got to soften up Union defenses just right so that when Pickett gets rolling here with his charge, he does it not in the face and to the teeth of a nasty artillery barrage, but against a really softened up Union war. So Porter Alexander sets to work and there's this pretty prolific artillery duel there about 1 p.m. July 3rd. Porter Alexander writes in 1877 about it,

SPEAKER_02that it was his intention since the charge was going to be a three quarter mile charge that Pickett should not start any later than 15 minutes after Porter Alexander's artillery had started firing. Porter Alexander writes about this in 1877, quote, I accordingly said,

SPEAKER_02The fire on neither side slackening for a moment. End quote.

SPEAKER_02Pickett gets the note from Porter Alexander about 1.30 p.m. and immediately gallops over to Longstreet and asks Longstreet, should I coordinate the attack? And Longstreet is looking across this wide field thinking to himself that this is all a big giant mistake. And he doesn't respond in any noticeable way. He just nods. Pickett says, I'm going to go organize the attack, gallops off. And then five minutes later, Porter Alexander sees slackening fire from the Union artillery and thinks,

SPEAKER_02if we don't time this up perfectly, it's all going to fail. He's low on ammunition and Union forces have slackened and he's thinking, it's got to happen right now. He looks through his spyglass and sees the 18 guns that he's been dueling with have moved, and he sends a note to Pickett that says this, quote, For God's sake, come quick. The 18 guns are gone, end quote. Longstreet comes up to Porter Alexander right after this. Alexander gives him the lay of the land,

SPEAKER_02tells him the situation, tells him how low his ammunition is, tells him that the Union batteries have left, and Longstreet is immediately alarmed. Porter Alexander narrates it afterwards. General Longstreet spoke up promptly, now quoting Longstreet. Go and stop Pickett right where he is and replenish your ammunition.

SPEAKER_02I answered that the ordnance wagons had been nearly emptied, replacing expenditures of the day before, and that not over twenty rounds to the gun were left, too little to accomplish much, and that while this was being done the enemy would recover from the effect of the fire we were now giving him. His reply was, I don't want to make this charge. I don't believe it can succeed. I would stop Pickett now, but that General Lee has ordered it and expects it." In Longstreet's mind, the attack should only commence if Alexander's artillery had the desired effect,

SPEAKER_02meaning if they had driven off Union troops. But there was sort of this question mark in that entire premise that the artillery had to have a desired effect. And Union artillery does move off after this nasty artillery duel, but seeing that Porter Alexander's only got 20 rounds to a gun, he realizes that the cover, the artillery cover that is essential for this thing to go off correctly is not going to be there. And it's nobody's fault, but the whole attack in Longstreet's mind is doomed to fail from the outset.

SPEAKER_02Even still, it's this moment where everything kind of hangs in the balance. Pickett is so excited that he gets to be the guy that gets to be synonymous with the charge. Lee is banking everything on this one attack. It's kind of this moment of the unknown where the entire Confederacy is risking its entire hand of cards. Writer William Faulkner has a quote in one of his novels where he writes about this moment and kind of this leap off into the abyss

SPEAKER_02where you're risking everything in one moment. Faulkner writes about Pickett's Charge and the effect that it has on everybody involved this way. He writes, quote, For every Southern boy 14 years old, not once, but whenever he wants it, there's an instant where it's still not yet 2 o'clock on that July afternoon in 1863. The brigades are in position behind the rail fence, the guns are laid and ready in the woods, And the furled flags are already loosened to break out.

SPEAKER_02And Pickett himself with his long oiled ringlets and his hat in one hand probably and his sword in the other looking up the hill waiting for Longstreet to give the word. And it's all in the balance. It hasn't happened yet. It hasn't even begun yet. It not only hasn't begun yet, but there's still time for it not to begin against that position and those circumstances which made more men than Garnett and Kemper and Armistead and Wilcox look grave. Yet it's going to begin. We all know that. We've come too far with too much at stake,

SPEAKER_02and that moment doesn't even need a 14-year-old boy to think this time. Maybe this time with all this much to lose and all this much to gain. Pennsylvania, Maryland, the world— The Golden Dome of Washington itself to crown with desperate and unbelievable victory the desperate gamble. The cast made two years ago, or to anyone who's ever sailed a skiff under a quilt sail. The moment in 1492 when somebody thought, this is it, the absolute edge of no return. To turn back now and make home or sail irrevocably on,

SPEAKER_02and either find land or plunge over the world's roaring rim. End quote. Winston Churchill, the British aristocrat who loved the game of war, the chance of fortune that war provided, narrates Pickett's Charge this way. And you got to think of anybody that's going to have a fond view of Pickett's Charge, it's going to be Winston Churchill. He writes about Pickett's charge this way, quote,

SPEAKER_02We see today upon this battlefield so piously preserved by North and South, and where many of the guns still stand in their firing stations, the bare slight slopes up which this grand infantry charge was made. In splendid array, All their battle flags flying, the forlorn assault marched on. But like the old guard on the evening of Waterloo, they faced odds in metal beyond the virtue of mortals. The Federal rifled artillery paused till they were within 700 yards.

SPEAKER_02Then they opened again with a roar and cut lanes in the steadfastly advancing ranks. On they went, and without flinching or disorder, then the deadly sound like tearing paper, as Lee once described it, rose under and presently above the cannonade. But Pickett's division still drove forward, and at trench, stone wall, or rail fence, closed with far larger numbers of men who, if not so lively as themselves, were at least ready to die for their cause. All three brigadiers in Pickett's division fell killed or mortally wounded.

SPEAKER_02General L.A. Armistead with a few hundred men actually entered the Union Center and the spot where he died with his hand on a captured cannon is today revered by the manhood of all the United States." At the end of this 1,400-yard march, the thing that the Union soldiers would have seen, the sight they would have seen, would have been very similar to what Confederate troops had seen from Mary's Heights at Fredericksburg just a few months before. They would have seen Confederate troops marching slowly onward,

SPEAKER_02grim faces, battle flags flying, smoke filling the air. They would have seen these troops coming up to their position and they would have wondered, what are they doing? Union troops cut the charge to pieces. Pickett's division loses about 70% of it to casualties. When Pickett comes struggling back to Lee's lines, Lee tells him to reorganize his division in case that the Union wants to capitalize on their defense and organize an attack of their own.

SPEAKER_02And Pickett tells Lee rather sassily, I don't have a division anymore. And Lee looks at him. You get this quiet, somber moment. And Lee says, it's all my fault. He walks up and down the lines as men come streaming back, wounded, torn up. It's all my fault. There's a moment. After this charge where Meade could have theoretically capitalized on his victory, he could have chased Lee down below the Potomac if he wanted to. Lee's army's broken after Gettysburg.

SPEAKER_02He loses 28,000 casualties of approximately 75,000 men. He's never really going to have a chance to attack North again because the Battle of Gettysburg is so catastrophic. And Meade has this chance, theoretically, where he could really take advantage of the day. Lincoln sends him letters. He's like, you need to go. You need to go. Meade doesn't press the advantage. There's this feeling in the North that perhaps he's another McClellan, even though he's just won this great decisive battle, theoretically.

SPEAKER_02Meade doesn't chase him. Lee slinks off into the night, and it leaves this carnal house in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. There's 30,000 injured and dead men. And there's only 2,400 people that live in Gettysburg. The air is disgusting. Blood covers the fields. It is a total mess. And photographers and newspapermen descend on Gettysburg. They take pictures of the bodies lined up in the fields.

SPEAKER_02The newspapermen write about the stench and the smell and the sights. There's ads that go out in the papers trying to get people to bury all these bodies. Photographer Matthew Brady had taken some photos of the battlefield in the wake of Antietam. So the North had seen what a battlefield looked like to some extent. But for the most part, the North didn't really know what the battlefield was like. And Gettysburg, it's this lightning in the bottle moment where, you know, regular people get to see what this war is about.

SPEAKER_02There's an account from a resident of Gettysburg where he goes out to the battlefield and he sees it and he doesn't see it as a military person would have seen it. He sees it how you and I would see it. He writes about the battlefield this way in the wake of Gettysburg, quote, I saw a small portion of the battlefield but I saw all I wished too. The rebel dead and ours lay thickly together, their thirst for blood forever quenched. Their bodies were swollen, black, and hideously unnatural.

SPEAKER_02Their eyes glared from their sockets, their tongues protruded from the mouths, and in almost every case, clots of blood and mangled flesh showed how they had died and render a sight ghastly beyond description. I thought I had become hardened to almost anything, but I cannot say I ever wished to see another sight like that, like I saw on the battlefield at Gettysburg." A writer from Philadelphia wrote about it on July 6th. He described it this way, The air is polluted with a heavy, sickening, disgusting stench.

SPEAKER_02Thanks for the heavy rain we have had carrying off much of the blood. Otherwise, I do not see how the people could live here. As it is, it's the most disgusting atmosphere I ever breathed, or I thought it possible human beings could live in. End quote. There was no possible way to bury all the bodies. Those in the north decided that Gettysburg should be the site for a new cemetery, a place to not only remember what the battle was, but a place to honor those who had died for the fight.

SPEAKER_02Which then led to the question, what was the fight? If the fight had cost so much, if so many people had died for the fight, it then leads to the question, what are they all dying for? Perhaps the most important question of the war in the North at that time, what are we doing? What's the point of all of this? In October 1863, a cemetery is built on Cemetery Hill where some 3,500 dead soldiers are buried.

SPEAKER_02In November 1863, there's a ceremony to dedicate this new cemetery. We've talked at length about what sort of an individual Abraham Lincoln is. With him, you get both the good and the bad. If you go look at his 1858 debates with Stephen Douglas, you get quite a bit of bad. You get a lot of stuff that seems to fly in the face of what he eventually becomes.

SPEAKER_02But with Abraham Lincoln, you also allow for a material change. There's a character arc to Abraham Lincoln that you don't often get with public figures that you certainly don't get often with politicians. If you try and think And then by proxy you get to see what Lincoln is all about.

SPEAKER_02It seems like it has been somewhat shaded. It's been kind of couched in all of this politicking that he's been doing for years. He's been fighting back both sides of these peace Democrats and also these abolitionist Republicans who think that the war can't go on long enough. He's fighting these two wings, and at times he'll say things that just don't quite square with this conception that we have of Lincoln the Emancipator.

SPEAKER_02Because if you just have this view of Lincoln the Emancipator, it sort of misses all the The Gettysburg Address is his chance to square all of these circles. It's the opportunity for us to see what Lincoln cares about, what he thinks all of this is for. Lincoln in some ways offers a political justification for the war, but he also offers a theological justification.

SPEAKER_02He views the war as the perseverance of a concept. He views the war as a defense of a proposition. In his Gettysburg Address, he opens by saying this, Four score and seven years ago, our fathers brought forth on this continent a new nation, conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal. End quote. It is the direct juxtaposition of the federal aims to the Confederate aims.

SPEAKER_02He's taking aim at every speech from fire eaters in the secession crisis to Alexander Stevens, where he delivers his cornerstone speech to everything Jefferson Davis has said about blood and soil. Lincoln says, no, none of this is about blood or soil or any of those things. It is about these propositions that the Founding Fathers gave us four score and seven years ago. He's saying that this war that we're fighting, He says to all those gathered there underneath,

SPEAKER_02Underneath this platform on which he stands, that those there now must dedicate themselves to the task. And what is the task, he says, to those gathered there? The task is this, quote, that this nation under God shall have a new birth of freedom and that government of the people, by the people, for the people shall not perish from the earth, end quote. It's not explicit in the speech,

SPEAKER_02but he's talking to a wide audience of people that are not there in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. He might have been talking directly to abolitionist Frederick Douglass when he says this, because this is now an invitation to all men, because it's the furtherance of that Declaration of Independence principle that all men are created equal, a principle that has not been true in American history. And Lincoln realizes, as he said,

SPEAKER_02As his views change over time, that if this proposition is true, it's a theological, almost religious proposition. It is the upending of everything everybody's ever believed. And it is this great change in how people think about race and how people think about government. It is a fundamental change, but as Lincoln says, it's just the furtherance of what this entire project was from the beginning.

SPEAKER_02It's not, as Lincoln sees it, a great upheaval. It's the furtherance of all of these bedrock propositions that we agreed to four score and seven years ago, and it's up to us to further them. All these men died. He gestures back to this cemetery behind him. All these men died to preserve this idea that all men are created equal and that a government of the people, for the people, and by the people shall not be destroyed.

SPEAKER_02Perhaps he's thinking about the presidential election to come in November 1864, where at the ballot box he gets to see if all of this stuff that he's been trying to do, the war, yes, but also some of these other measures, The Emancipation Proclamation. Will it be backed up at the ballot box? In Lincoln's mind, all of this has sort of been in the back of his mind, that while he's done some things that perhaps other presidents haven't done,

SPEAKER_02he's had to do things, he feels, that other presidents haven't had to do. And always lurking there in the back of his mind is the thought that, well, will the people continue to back what I've been doing? Will all of this be worth it? Perhaps he's asking. He's also thinking to himself, we've beaten Lee on his terms and now we've got to take the war to him. We've got to put him back on the defensive. We have to defend all of this that we fought for.

SPEAKER_02We can't lose the initiative. Perhaps in the West, there's a general that can do that for him. There's a great task remaining, as Lincoln says in the Gettysburg Address, for all the people there to further these ideals, these propositions. But there's also the great task of winning this war. Gettysburg, in Lincoln's mind, is a great step toward that goal. But the war still has to be won. And perhaps there's somebody in Mississippi that Lincoln hasn't met yet that can do it for him.

SPEAKER_02He's about to meet Ulysses S. Grant, and the war is about to take a dramatic turn because Ulysses S. Grant has his own way of fighting the war. It's a nasty way, but it might be the only way. [music] I just want to thank you all really quick before we get out of here for listening,

SPEAKER_02for supporting the show. All of your kind comments are massively appreciated. Again, if you want to support what I'm doing, you can do that on Substack. There's a link to that in the show notes below wherever you're listening. But also please leave a rating and review. It does help a ton with whatever these podcast algorithms are. So please do that. The show continues in The Sound of Distant Guns Part 5. 1863 sort of grinds things to a standstill in the Eastern Theater.

SPEAKER_02But in the Western Theater, things are just as lively as they've ever been. There's this new... Well, with his Vicksburg campaign, he becomes a known quantity. He launches himself into stardom, and it changes the trajectory of the Civil War irrevocably. His, if you want to call it grit and grind style of warfare is something that

SPEAKER_02the Eastern Theater hasn't acclimated itself with. It's going to get acclimated and he's eventually going to bring this grit and grind style of fighting to the East and it's going to get really, really rough. But in Grant's mind and in Lincoln's, there's only one way to win this war and you got to win it ugly. All of that and more coming up in The Sound of Distant Guns, Part 5.

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  3. The Life & Career of Denis Johnson w/ Ted Geltner

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  5. Don Hollway — The Coolest Viking You've NEVER Heard Of

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