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CommBank View: Economics & Markets

CommBank View: Economics & Markets artwork

Global Trade Is Changing. How Vulnerable Is Australia?

Oct 13, 202628 minAudio
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Global trade has made economies more connected than ever, but has that interconnectedness also left Australia more vulnerable to disruption? Host Mandy Drury speaks with CommBank Head of Commodities and Sustainable Economics Vivek Dhar about why oil prices remain elevated, how Iran's influence over the Strait of Hormuz is shaping the market and what a potential US-Iran deal could mean for the outlook. Mandy then speaks with CommBank Senior Geo-Economics Analyst Dr Madison Cartwright about the global trade vulnerabilities exposed by disruption in the Strait of Hormuz, the growing risks across Asia-Pacific trade routes and where Australia is most exposed to global trade disruption. Plus, CommBank Economist and Currency Strategist Samara Hammoud shares the key focuses for markets in the week ahead. Important Information This podcast is approved and distributed by Global Economic & Markets Research (“GEMR”), a business division of the Commonwealth Bank of Australia ABN 48 123 123 124 AFSL 234945 (“the Bank”). Before listening to this podcast, you are advised to read the full GEMR disclaimers, which can be found at www.commbankresearch.com.au. No Reliance This podcast is not investment research and nor does it purport to make any recommendations. Rather, this podcast is for informational purposes only and is not to be relied upon for any investment purposes. This podcast does not take into account your objectives, financial situation or needs. It is not to be construed as a solicitation or an offer to buy or sell any securities or other financial products, or as a recommendation, and/or investment advice. You should not act on the information in this podcast. The Bank believes that the information in this podcast is correct and any opinions, conclusions or recommendations made are reasonably held at the time given, and are based on the information available at the time of its compilation. No representation or warranty, either expressed or implied, is made or provided as to accuracy, reliability or completeness of any statement made. Liability Disclaimer The Bank does not accept any liability for any loss or damage arising out of any error or omission in or from the information provided or arising out of the use of all or part of the podcast. Usage of Artificial Intelligence To enhance efficiency, GEMR may use the Bank approved artificial intelligence (AI) tools to assist in preparing content for this podcast. These tools are used solely for drafting and structuring purposes and do not replace human judgment or oversight. All final content is reviewed and approved by GEMR analysts for accuracy and independence.

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listener. Hello and welcome to ComBankView Economics and Markets, where we unpack the key issues every single week. My name is Mandy Drury and I'm always delighted to be your podcast host. So we've witnessed in real time Iran's ability to exert leverage over the global oil market, primarily through its geographic control of the Strait of Hormuz. which is a body of water that is only 21 nautical miles wide at its narrowest point.

However, 20 to 25% of the world's seaborne oil supply passes through this single passage. The Iran war has now dragged on for over seven months, and while the initial consumer panic has subsided somewhat, energy prices are yet to return to pre-war levels. So where do prices go from here? We have joining us from Singapore, Vivek Da, Head of Commodities and Sustainable Economics. And after that, we're going to assess what we've learned about the structural issues related to maritime choke points and global trade vulnerability.

That will be with Dr. Madison Cartwright, who is Senior Geoeconomics Analyst, also at ComBank. So Viv, first of all, let's talk to you about the oil market. We've seen oil supplies from the Middle East lift to nearly pre-war levels, and yet, as I mentioned in the preamble, prices are still stuck at around US$100 a barrel. What gives? So look, in terms of what's happened, and I would say last week, certainly that was the thematic, that we saw crude oil supplies outside of the Middle East get to levels close to pre-war.

But in terms of what's happened just in the last seven days, we've actually seen a material fall in Middle Eastern exports. And what has really driven that decline in Middle East oil flows in the Strait of Hormuz, in particular attacking ships. And that's something that has caused a lot of tankers to actually turn around and reconsider this highly treacherous route now, which we're seeing every day and a rapid escalation in fighting.

So right now, the situation is slightly different, but that premise still holds because we saw Brent oil futures at $100 to $105 a barrel, even when we saw flows recover to pre-war levels. And that is something that is, for us, an indication of the market expectation that Iran is not going to accept those flows to continue without coming in and intervening. And that's exactly what we saw. So in terms of why prices stay that high, it was just this market confidence that Iran has control and Iran is the one that's going to agitate.

And therefore, the situation with pre-war flows reappearing was going to be temporary. But the premium for me is the most eye-opening. So the last time we saw flows at those pre-war levels, and this was shortly after the Memorandum of Understanding on 17th of June. So this happened on the 2nd of July. We saw Brent fall as low as $70 a barrel. So we're talking a $30 insurance premium just on the bet that Iran will not be happy with flows returning to these levels. And in many ways, they were correct.

And to your earlier point about just how critical this Strait of Hormuz is, You know, we are really talking about Iran expanding this war front from not just that singular choke point, but also now including with its proxies, the East-West pipeline. And we saw attacks there in the middle of September and as well as the Red Sea and in particular the choke point Bab al-Nandeb Strait. So this war and Iran's control, it's not just the Strait of Hormuz. They really expanded that front.

You make such a good post about the East-West pipeline, which suggests that Saudi Arabia is increasingly being drawn into the conflict. So given all of that, where do you think oil prices and oil markets go from here, Viv? So if we go back to when the East-West pipeline was attacked in the middle of September, we were very much on the view that we were going to see U.S. and Iran come together and agree to a deal. And a big reason for that was without that East-West pipeline, which has been a major supply route which has bypassed the Strait of Hormuz,

we were talking roughly five to 10 weeks of global oil and refined product stockpiles. So things had got to such a situation that we thought the US has to come to the table. Now, what we ended up seeing was the US doubled down on trying to get oil out of the Strait of Havos. It was a risky strategy, but it worked because they got it near pre-war levels, but of course, prices didn't respond. So in terms of how we see this now play out, is that they've tried their strategy to get oil out of the Strait of Hormuz.

Iran has agitated again and exerted its control. And we think now is the timing in which a U.S.-Iran deal makes the most sense. Now, how this deal looks matters for prices. If it is purely a ceasefire arrangement, we're talking $85 to $100 a barrel for Brent in our view. But if we see this be a very Iran-friendly deal, where we see the U.S. naval blockade lifted, then we could see Brent oil futures drop to about 70 to 85.

So those are our base case expectations. And you can see that this rise in tensions is almost necessary to force this U.S. Iran deal. Now, you know, this deal isn't something that I think the market should see as long dated and both parties will accept. It is going to be a temporary outcome, but it is certainly one to watch because it will have price implications and particularly with physical flows. The key risk in all of this, though, is we see inventory depletion because what U.S. has done, it has bought time by getting flows out of the state of Homo.

So we're talking right now 10 to 15 weeks of oil and refined product stocks available. But if we run out, then we would say the market has to price in uncontrolled demand destruction, particularly in emerging Asia. And that's when high prices force lower demand. And if we do see something like that take place, then we would see Brent having to rise to about $150 a barrel. Now, we consider that a tail risk and something that won't eventuate. But you can see that when prices get to this 100 plus and you see strong incentives for a deal, if you see any partner in this, whether US or Iran, overplaying their hand, that 150 the market has to consider as a risk.

And that's where we are right now with Brent between 105 to 110. And I guess the thing about a risk is that it is a possibility. Thank you so much, Viv, for laying out the energy side of the equation. That was Vivek Dar joining us there from ComBank. Now let's turn to Dr. Madison Cartwright. And Madison, thank you so much once again for joining us here in the podcast studio. You know, for decades we were told that globalization made us more resilient. It made us more prosperous as a globe. And yet you've got a counterargument that maybe it's actually showing up some vulnerabilities.

Can you explain that for us? Yeah, so I mean, globalization makes sense when you think that I can rely on the supply chains that I've developed in order to get the goods and services that I need. And that has been the case for quite some time. And governments haven't really had any reason to necessarily question the availability of what they get from overseas. And that is sort of starting to change. I mean, we talked about the Strait of Hormuz and how we're seeing these sort of choke points weaponized. But there are a whole host of other choke points that are not related to maritime choke points, but just control over particular industries.

And we've seen, for example, in the technology space, in semiconductors, we've seen the US weaponize its choke points. And obviously, in critical minerals, we've seen China do the same. So where do you think we are in terms of the arc of globalization? Are we moving away from it? Are we sort of stagnant? What would you say we're in right now in terms of the globe? Yes, I think we are in a sort of gradual de-globalization phase. And I don't want to be too alarmist with this because there's not a rapid turn away from globalization, but you're starting to see trends away from this idea that the entire global economy is essentially accessible.

And so this is taking two primary forms. The first is that countries are starting to think they need to be able to do things for themselves, bring industries back. in order to maintain access to things that I think are critical. And we've seen debates in this, for example, in refined fuel at the moment. Are we really comfortable having to access that through the international market? Would it be better to be able to refine it ourselves, et cetera? So that's one way we can deal with these vulnerabilities, and that is a deglobalization trend. The other way to look at this is, well, I'm happy to buy things from overseas, but I'm concerned about the fact that I buy it from these particular countries.

So, for example, as I mentioned, we've seen China weaponize critical minerals, and now there's a big push to say, we need to expand out of China and have supply chains that aren't implicated in China when it comes to critical minerals. And we're not going to do this by ourselves, but we are going to do this with allies. So we're going to move production or encourage production in alternative countries, alternative markets that are more politically aligned. And that creates a political division of global markets, which is also a deglobalization trend. It sounds like the world is becoming increasingly protectionist under the guise of national security.

Well, yes, I mean, and I think that's because countries are reassessing this bargain they made, right, between, yes, we're happy to take on this increased vulnerability to our economy if it means we can maximise efficiency. Now we're starting to question whether or not that balance is right. And that means that, yes, we are going to have to, if we want to address those vulnerabilities, if we judge them to be so, right, we are going to have to have policy lead that. And so, coming back to critical minerals, right, the USTR, the United States Trade Representative, came out and told the allies of the United States saying, look, if we're serious about decoupling when it comes to critical minerals, we are going to have to have price flaws.

And that means we are going to have to have some sort of protectionist measures because we're not going to be able to compete with China on price. So pegging the conversation back to the Strait of Hormuz, what have we learned from that crisis about how the global economy really works? So when I've talked about these other examples, semiconductors, critical minerals, these are geo-economic tools, right? They come from the position within the market. They're an economic dominance that is enabling this weaponization. What is happening in Hormuz is not that, right? This is purely geography.

It's not purely geography because they need the missiles and drones, et cetera. But this isn't coming from Iran's position within the global market, right? This is coming from their geographic positioning. And so that means that you don't necessarily have to be the largest, most powerful economy in order to seek opportunities for weaponization. And so when you look at the global trade networks, where are the other choke points, right? Where are the other sort of geographic opportunities that even smaller, middle-power, or weaker states are able to utilize in order to weaponize the global economy to their advantage?

Hamus is quite unique in the sense that there's only one way in and out, right? It's the strait. And the only other choke point of that is the Bosphorus-Ladenaeus, right, to the Black Sea and to the Mediterranean Sea. But we've seen the Houthis, which are from Yemen. Yemen is quite a poor country, right? That has been able to quite effectively weaponize the Babel Mendeb Strait. And we're starting to look at other parts of the world, and we're seeing a large concentration of these choke points, particularly in our region in Asia, around these sort of island chains that go up to China, right?

Particularly passing through the various islands of Indonesia. Do you think that the Asia-Pacific, therefore, and you've mentioned China in this conversation a number of times, and particularly, of course, in the context of their chokehold over the critical minerals trade, do you think that Asia is becoming the center for geoeconomic risk then? Yes. I mean, I think the big driver of this broader structural change we're seeing in the global economy is the rise of China. And there's no way to get around that. Right. And, you know, on the one hand, there's questions as what does China want?

What is its ambitions? And that will impact the trajectory of this. But even independent of those discussions, right, the mere fact that China is rising is going to create disruption. because it is emerging as a potential competitor to the United States, and the United States is responding. So the mere fact that it's there is going to create that destabilization. And I mean, it's in our region, it's in the Asia-Pacific region. And if its influence is going to increase and if the challenge it poses to US influence is going to increase, it's going to be in the Asia-Pacific first. And so what we see in our region is that countries are starting to realize they've got this big emerging power on their doorstep.

They're trying to figure out the best way to address that challenge. And meanwhile, we've got trade increasingly being centralized in this region. It's not just China that has emerged as a major trade hub. Obviously, we have Korea and Japan that emerged earlier. But also, Southeast Asia is a very rapidly emerging part of the global economy, particularly when it comes to trade and supply chains. So, these sort of confluence of factors are centralizing here. Then we look at the geopolitical risks around the South China Sea, around Taiwan, and they are also sort of aligning with these maritime choke points as well.

So, there's a lot going on in our region at the moment. What do you think China wants? Or do I think China wants? So I think China at the moment is aware that the global economy has served it very well. And so the rules of the game have served it quite well. I think it's trying to change them where it can, but it's also not wanting to disrupt things too much. The longer it can access the global market, the longer it can export, to Europe, to the United States, the better for it. But it's thinking long term. It's thinking, well, there will be a point in the future when these markets, for political reasons, are not going to be accessible to us, either for our exports or in order to get the critical things that we need as part of our own supply chains.

And so they're looking ahead to that and they're planning for a future when these markets might go away. But in the meantime, they're trying to keep hold of these access as long as they can. What is the Malacca Dilemma and how does it explain China's behaviour in the region? So the Malacca dilemma refers to the Strait of Malacca, which is between Indonesia and Malaysia and I guess Singapore as well.

Now, this is an incredibly important maritime choke point. The trade that goes from Asia across the Indian Ocean to Africa, Middle East, and perhaps Europe, depending on the route, will go through the Strait of Malacca. And it's a critical choke point for that, particularly for energy. So more energy passes through Malacca than passes through the Strait of Hormuz, for example. because all but at least in an African energy heading towards Northern Asia, China, Japan, Korea, et cetera, will pass through that strait. So China has for a long time considered this quite a critical vulnerability.

And this is what they refer to as the Malacca dilemma. And this has had a big influence on their investment decisions in the region and their naval development in order to address that vulnerability that they could be cut off from global supply chains. through the Malacca Strait, but also, I guess, alternative routes around the Asia-Pacific region. Do you think that countries who have their borders, their maritime borders on the Malacca Strait, like Malaysia and like Indonesia, are they looking at what's happening over in the Strait of Hormuz and how much leverage Iran has and thinking, oh, maybe we could start charging higher premiums for passage as well?

Yes, I think they are. I think what's really important is that what we've seen with the Strait of Hormuz is not only this display of force in order to weaponize something like this, but we have seen this erosion of international norms when it comes to commerce, right? So we have these very well-established norms that… commercial vehicles, commercial vessels, for example, should be able to traverse straits and go through territorial waters and be able to do so freely, et cetera.

So these are the norms of being disrupted. And it's not only coming from Iran. When the president of the United States openly muses that perhaps they will charge a toll for the Strait of Homoose, this undermines some of If Iran is to establish the more formalized tolling system in the Strait of Hamuz, that certainly erodes these norms further and creates opportunities for other countries to do the same. And we'll note that Indonesia, the finance minister in Indonesia, did say that perhaps they should charge a toll for the Strait of Malacca.

He later walked that back and claimed it was sort of in jest. But I mean, I think market participants are correct to look at that and think a bit worried that perhaps this is something Indonesia could or might do, especially when we've seen the Indonesian government pursue more sort of assertive policies when it comes to economic statecraft more generally in recent years. It's obviously something that has been talked about and could come up as you say. Your trade vulnerability index, the TVI, it sort of challenges how we've traditionally looked at trade, doesn't it?

Why do you think it's wrong to look at just the things that we would normally look at like trade balances or share of exports? So the TVI is based on two sort of observations. The first is that we can look at how much we export to China, for example, as a share of our total exports. And yes, you'll come up with a large percentage share there. But I think what the TVI first says is, well, it's also important to see how much that's spread over particular products, right? And the insight here is that, well, to have one product that accounts for 20% of your trade is much more significant with a particular country, is much more significant than having, say, 1,000 products, right?

The ability for that other country to weaponize that trade is easier if it's concentrated in fewer products. So that's the first observation. So instead of looking at share of trade, it's looking at share of country product pairs first. Then it's saying, well, if we didn't have access to that other market, where else could we go? So the second part of the TVI equation is to say, well, what percentage share does that partner have of the global market? So when we think about something like iron ore, for example, China buys a large share of our iron ore, which is our largest export.

So the country product part of that is quite robust. But also China buys 70% of the world's iron ore, at least in terms of imports. And so that means it has a big, you know, market dominant position. So, if we're not selling iron ore to China, there's not many other options we can sell to. So, that heightens that vulnerability. So, bringing that back to Australia, since you mentioned iron ore and selling it to China, what kind of vulnerabilities in trade do you think that Australian policymakers and businesses should be thinking about? And do we have any leverage? So in terms of what we should be thinking about, I mean, if you're looking at the TVI measure, by an order China is by far the largest one.

And there's a bunch of other sort of relationships, particularly around commodities, coal to India, for example, thermal coal. And so those are the measures we should be looking at in terms of export vulnerability. But on the import side, it's very heavily weighted to things like consumer electronics and other consumer goods, and again, particularly from China. Now, the other way to sort of think about this is I have another measure called the bilateral measure, which says, OK, well, let's take our vulnerability to them on this, say, exports of iron ore to China.

then take away China's import vulnerability of iron ore Australia, right? To get an idea of who's got the upper hand in that relationship. And so if you have a negative number, that means that you're in a position of leverage. That's what that means. Now, a lot of our exports, we do not have that leverage, right? And the majority of our TVI measures are positive, indicating we have some type of vulnerability. Right. In terms of the areas where we do have leverage, a lot of it on the import side is goods that go into agricultural production, a lot of fertilizers and things like this. When it comes to our exports, again, there's a lot of agricultural output, particularly lamb and other related products, various forms that lamb comes in.

And the largest one is actually aluminium oxide is one of the areas that we have the biggest net leverage in. So it's very clear whether you're Australia and China, whether you're Europe and China, or whether you're another country in another country. We've all become very dependent on each other, haven't we? So does that suggest, going back to the globalization and deglobalization question, are we genuinely headed towards decoupling in world trade or is it not possible at this juncture? Yeah, so that's why I try to preface it by saying it's not going to be a rapid transition, right? Because these vulnerabilities affect all countries and this interdependence is very difficult to unwind.

And I think if we look at the relationship between China and the United States, last year we had this very eruptive trade war. And both sides had to walk back from that because they came to realize that the damage to their economies, the mutual damage to their economies was too great. and they needed to come to a more sustainable solution. And so if we look at the relationship that they have now coming through the summits that we've had this year, they're not saying that they're going to go back to the way things were, right? What they're saying is that we're going to create a bit more stability in this sort of competitive relationship that's emerged while they mutually pursue long-term objectives of decoupling.

So the TVI is a way of measuring this interdependence and it does show that these vulnerabilities are mutual and that countries just can't suddenly turn off from each other. De-globalization is not a tap we can just turn on and move away very quickly. But it doesn't necessarily mean that the trajectory long term won't be towards greater de-globalization. So when we saw that summit a few weeks ago in Washington between Xi Jinping of China and President Donald Trump of the United States, I mean, a lot of really warm niceties were said. Do you think that's just lip service or do you genuinely feel that right now in the trade truce scenario that this is something that could hold?

I do think it could hold, and I think it's in both interests, the interest of both parties that it holds. I mean, what I have been saying is that China and the United States want an amicable divorce, they don't want a messy divorce, right? So they understand that long-term, that they are going to, for strategic reasons, move away from each other. They're trying to do so in a way that doesn't create broader instability. And that is, I believe, will be the trajectory moving forward. And so future meetings between Xi and Trump, I expect to continue to, and past those leaders themselves, right, continue to maintain this stability with an eye to the long-term goal that they will decouple Trump.

more thoroughly. And they're very open about this. The United States talks openly about, and it has policy initiatives around decoupling from the critical mineral space, for example. I mean, there's not a hidden agenda here. And similarly in China, self-sufficiency is at the center really of their economic policy at the moment. And this is explicit as well. It's all about resilience, isn't it? Yes. Thank you so much for joining us today, Dr. Madison Cartwright. Before we let you go, why don't we take a look at the week ahead in the markets with Samara Hamoud, who is economist and currency strategist at ComBank.

Samara, great to have you with us once again on the podcast. I believe we've got a snapshot of what's happening with the labour force here in Australia coming out. Yeah, exactly. Here in Australia, inflation has kind of been top of mind, but of course the labour market is also really important to watch. So, we forecast for September employment to increase by a more modest 10,000 following a roughly 40,000 increase in August and we expect the unemployment rate to remain steady at 4.6%.

But if you just kind of look through the month-to-month volatility, we think that the labour market here in Australia is gradually loosening and we expect the unemployment rate to drift higher from here. And that easing will be really important in helping bring down domestic inflation pressures as the economy slows. And it's also quite an important part of our view that the RBA will remain on hold until late 2027. And you've mentioned a couple of times that inflation is front and centre of everybody's minds at the moment.

We've got some numbers coming out of both the US and China on inflation as well. Yeah, so just starting with China, we expect annual inflation picked up to 1% in September, driven by stronger non-food prices. But of course, when you hear that kind of 1% number, you think that's quite weak. And it is comparatively to other economies around the world. is that consumer demand in China is quite weak and so that constrains firms' pricing power and limits any upward pressure on consumer prices.

As for the US, inflation over there is being driven by a combination of persistent supply and demand shocks. For September, we expect headline inflation increased by 0.5% over the month. driven by higher energy prices because of the ongoing conflict in the Middle East. But higher energy prices aren't the only thing that's driving higher price pressures. In the US, underlying inflation is still quite firm, so we expect that core inflation increase by a solid 0.3% over the month in September.

And that would be above consensus expectations and so kind of reinforce the view that the Fed cannot relax just yet. Another important thing to watch this week is Fed Chair Walsh's fireside chat. That happens on Friday and the timing of that is really interesting because it comes shortly after Thursday. that CPI data is out, but just before the Fed's communication blackout starts. So that will potentially offer Walsh an opportunity to comment on the inflation data or provide his view on the outlook, which could potentially sway market expectations on US interest rates.

And while we're on the topic of the US, you often hear people say never underestimate the power of the US consumer. But to your point, the Fed seems to have started a hiking cycle and they too are suffering from a cost of living crisis. So what are we going to see in terms of US retail sales? Yeah, so US retail sales, it doesn't normally attract as much attention as the CPI report, but as you said, it provides a really important update on the strength of the US consumer. And so we estimate headline retail sales rose by 0.2% over the month in September, and that follows a quite strong 1.1% increase in August.

So a bit of a moderation there. Higher energy prices will support headline sales, but I think it's important to note that part of that simply reflects consumers paying more for petrol rather than a genuine increase in spending volumes. And that's because retail sales is measured in nominal terms. But just working the other way, we think that the decline in auto sales over the month will be a weight on retail sales. Thank you so much for that snapshot and for the look ahead, Samara Hamoud.

Thank you. And thank you for joining us for this week's edition of ComBank View. Make sure that you tune in every single week for your analysis on what's moving and shaping economies and markets. I'm Mandy Drury. This podcast is not investment research and is for informational purposes only. Please visit combankresearch.com.au for the full report and the full disclaimers.

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