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Civil Discourse

Civil Discourse artwork

Stories Behind the Names: Archibald Cox

Nov 20, 20261 hr 10 minAudio
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Nia and Aughie explore the life of Archibald Cox, legal scholar and former Special Prosecutor for the Watergate investigation.

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Transcript

From the show.

FEMALE_1: Welcome to civil discourse. This podcast will use government documents to illuminate the workings of the American government and offer context around the effects of government agencies in your everyday life. Now your host, Nia Rogers, Public Affairs Librarian and Dr. John Aughenbaugh, political science professor.

N. Rodgers: Hey, Aughie.

J. Aughenbaugh: Good morning, Nia. How are you?

N. Rodgers: I am excellent. How are you?

J. Aughenbaugh: Very good. In part, Nia and our listeners. We get to spend a little bit of time exploring one of the most prominent legal figures in the second half of the 20th century, somebody who played a rather prominent role in the Watergate situation. But I would probably dare say, even if he was not the special prosecutor for the Watergate investigation, he would still have had a pretty huge impact on American law in the second half of the 20th century. An individual by the name of Archibald Cox, and we should probably give a shout out to one of our long standing listeners. Neil went ahead and recommended that we take a deep dive into the life and career of Archibald Cox, and we thought that it was an excellent suggestion. That's what we're going to be doing today.

N. Rodgers: There've been some really interesting special prosecutors, right?

J. Aughenbaugh: Yes.

N. Rodgers: Kenneth Starr.

J. Aughenbaugh: Walsh, where I ran Contra.

N. Rodgers: Who's the guy who Smith?

J. Aughenbaugh: Jack Smith for Donald Trump's various activities. There was also the Robert Mueller special.

N. Rodgers: That's right.

J. Aughenbaugh: Exploring the Russian connection to the 2016 presidential election.

N. Rodgers: It's not an enviable Job.

J. Aughenbaugh: No.

N. Rodgers: Aughie and I often talk about jobs we would like to have or we would have fun doing or interested, if nothing else, we would learn. You would learn a lot in these jobs. But the land mines that are set for these people are, it doesn't matter who you are or what you're investigating. Someone is going to be angry with you.Hate your guts and want bad things to happen to you. They want you to step on egos every day for the rest of your life, right? That's their wish for you is that you are barefoot in a pile of legos for the rest of your life. Anybody who's never stepped on a Lego barefoot, go do it and then come back and you'll know what we're talking about. I'd rather walk on shards of glass. At least, they would just be embedded, and then you wouldn't feel anything. But but those guys are some of the most trusted figures.

J. Aughenbaugh: Yes.

N. Rodgers: In legal aspects because they are generally speaking, seen as truth finders and more or less neutral, right? They're not coming in hot. They're trying to figure out if something happened and if so, what it was and who did it and how they did it. They're not there to actually bring prosecutorial cases, right?

J. Aughenbaugh: No.

N. Rodgers: They're basically detectives.

J. Aughenbaugh: They're in an awkward position because usually they are investigating somebody who is in charge of the executive branch. It's the executive branch who usually appoints, for example, attorneys general. You're investigating wrongdoing in the branch of government that is supposed to be implementing the law. It's already an awkward position, theoretically.

N. Rodgers: You're a lawyer.

J. Aughenbaugh: Yes.

N. Rodgers: These are all people that you are colleagues with. These are all that group of people Archibald Cox, I feel certain that he already knew Elliot Richardson, he already knew Nixon, he already knew or had met them. Dean and all the guys involved in that were all lawyers that he would have known.

J. Aughenbaugh: Elliot Richardson was his former student. Yes, so let's get into this. Archibald Cox was born in 1912 and he lived until 2004. What? 92 years. He was a legal scholar. For a period of time, he was at Harvard. He was the US solicitor general for the Kennedy administration. For those of you who don't know, the Solicitor General's position, as we talked about previously with Elliot Richardson, that is basically the third in command of the Justice Department. They argue cases representing the federal government in federal court, but particularly the United States Supreme Court. They are the litigation specialist for the federal government, right?

N. Rodgers: It's not the Attorney General. It's the solicitor general that does. I always get this mixed up in my head.

J. Aughenbaugh: Yes, so it's attorney general, Deputy Attorney General, and then solicitor general, right?

N. Rodgers: The Attorney General is basically decides the direction of the department, more administrative.

J. Aughenbaugh: Yeah, the Solicitor General's office decides which cases the federal government should appeal or if the federal government is the defendant in a case, what their arguments will be. As we also mentioned, Archibald Cox was the special prosecutor during the Watergate scandal. But here's the point that I made when we started this episode. Even if he had never been special prosecutor During Watergate, he was considered one of the pioneering experts on labor law in the United States, particularly during the 1950s. He was also an authority on constitutional law. The Journal of Legal Studies, which is a very prominent journal in the legal community, identified Archibald Cox as one of the most cited legal scholars of the 20th century.

N. Rodgers: Intellectually pretty up there. Pretty strong. In a different life might have been a Supreme Court justice?

J. Aughenbaugh: Yes, so very prominent, we're going to get into his prominence in just a few moments. But as we are want to do, we first start off by talking about their early life, family,etc. He was born in New Jersey. He was the son of Archibald and Francis Bruin Perkins Cox. Good Lord. His father, Archibald Senior was also a lawyer and his grandfather was a lawyer.

N. Rodgers: He had no choice but to be a lawyer.

J. Aughenbaugh: Yes, exactly, right?

N. Rodgers: Not a doctor, I guess. We've seen that before.

J. Aughenbaugh: His grandfather was a prominent patent and trademark lawyer who wrote at the turn of the 20th century, the classic, if you will, manual for lawyers in getting trademarks. It was known as Cox's manual on trademarks, right? I tried to peruse it, but within 15 minutes, I got to be honest, it was beyond my knowledge.

N. Rodgers: For trademarks?

N. Rodgers: Yes.

N. Rodgers: Patent and trademark law is a whole [inaudible] .

J. Aughenbaugh: It is [inaudible] . Yes.

N. Rodgers: Not for the weak of heart.

J. Aughenbaugh: Well, it forces you to combine two bodies of knowledge. One is law, and then two is Art Science.

N. Rodgers: Art and Science. The whole thing.

J. Aughenbaugh: When Roland, the grandfather died in 1900, Archibald Senior inherited his father's solo practice almost right out of law school. He actually, I did not know this. Again, when we do these episodes, we end up finding out something. Archibald Senior's prominent achievement was he secured the trademark of the Red Cross for the Johnson and Johnson company.

N. Rodgers: Which to this day they still use.

J. Aughenbaugh: Yes, they do. Cox attended private school, the Wardlaw school in Plainfield, New Jersey until he was 14. Then he attended St. Paul's School in New Hampshire interestingly enough, the only reason why he got into that school was because of his dad's intervention. Archibald junior was not the best student in his youth. However, when he got to St. Paul's, he started to do really well. He led the school's debate team. He read a biography of John Marshall, and he got a really warm recommendation from the headmaster, which allowed him to attend what little known school up in Cambridge, Massachusetts?

N. Rodgers: That tiny little law school known as Harvard Harvard College.

J. Aughenbaugh: Yes. He went to Harvard. He was aboard. He was a member of the Delphi Club, which was known for parties, gambling and liquor, actually during prohibition.

N. Rodgers: He had brushed up gently against the law several times.

J. Aughenbaugh: Remember, listeners, when prohibition was ratified as an amendment to the US Constitution, Congress then passed a law known as the Volstead Act, which basically said, you cannot sell and distribute new liquor. But if you already were in possession of it, you could still consume it. Apparently a number of these social clubs at prominent universities like Harvard and Yale had stocks. They still could go ahead and have their parties. He was not an excellent student. A number of the articles I found said that though he majored in history, government, and economics, he did only slightly better than what was known then as the gentleman Cs, which was basically, you got to C for attending.

J. Aughenbaugh: So he did slightly better. However, where he really turned around?

N. Rodgers: Is that what George Bush did at Yale?

J. Aughenbaugh: Yes, pretty much.

N. Rodgers: I think that's not an uncommon thing for a certain class of individual.

J. Aughenbaugh: That's right. Where he turned it around was for his senior project, which allowed him to graduate with honors in history. This is great. I found this quote. His advisor for his senior thesis was a history professor by the name of Paul Buck. Buck told him he didn't have the brains enough for the project, which Cox took as a challenge, and he completed the research project and earned honors. His research project was the constitutional differences between the composition of the Senate and the House of Representatives. I got to admit as somebody who was sometimes challenged by their professors for the same reason, as in, you don't have the brains to do this. I took that as a challenge sometimes surpassed their expectations. He gets into Harvard law and he thrives. He graduates first in a class of 590 plus people or no, he was ranked first after his first year in law school. Then he gets a job working for the Harvard Law Review. Again, he met his future wife, Phyllis Ames who was going who was a student at Smith College. Her grandfather was James Barr Ames, the one time dean of Harvard Law.

N. Rodgers: She comes from a family of lawyers?

J. Aughenbaugh: Yes.

N. Rodgers: His mom came from a family lawyers. Just swing a cat and a lawyer in this family cause.

J. Aughenbaugh: Imagine family dinners?

N. Rodgers: The litigation.

J. Aughenbaugh: They need the debates over what's on the menu.

N. Rodgers: Who's doing the dishes.

J. Aughenbaugh: What beverage to serve, right? He graduates in 1937, Magna cum laude, and weeks before he graduates, he and Phyllis marry. Then he moved to New York and he gets a clerkship with an individual who we have previously done a podcast episode United States District Court then District Court judge Lernard Hand, who ended up becoming one of the most prominent federal Appeals Court judges in the United States during the 1900s.

J. Aughenbaugh: Yes. He does the clerkship, works a year in New York City, and then gets an associate position in the Boston Law Firm of Ropes, Gray, Best, Coolidge & Rugg. By the way, if that name sounds familiar, in our podcast episode about Elliot Richardson, that's where Elliot Richardson got his first job at a law school. Picking up some themes here, folks. We're talking about the good old boys' network with [inaudible].

N. Rodgers: Right. I know a guy who knows a guy who gets you a job doing a thing with some stuff and some people. Yeah.

J. Aughenbaugh: But to Cox's credit, when World War 2 broke out, he applies for and he takes a position in the United States Solicitor General's office. And by 1943, basically in a year and a half, he had advanced to become the assistant solicitor of the labor department. So he makes [inaudible].

N. Rodgers: It should be noted his father or his grandfather and his mother's father, none of them were public servants much. They did a little bit of public service, right? Because lawyers always end up doing a little bit if they serve on a board or they serve on a counsel because that's part of being a lawyer is that you do that sort of thing and build out your name that way, your reputation. Like some families it's clear. My father was a governor and my uncle was a senator and my blah blah blah. Like the Bushes where you see that over and over. You're not seeing that with Cox. So him saying, I'm going to do this public service thing, it's kind of big in his family. Like It's a new pattern.

J. Aughenbaugh: Yeah, it was somewhat unusual within the Cox Ames family, if you will, trees of genealogy, right? So he takes a lateral position with the labor department, and it's there he develops his area of expertise, because he takes control of the enforcement wing of the labor department. He had a staff of eight lawyers.

N. Rodgers: He's young.

J. Aughenbaugh: Yes.

N. Rodgers: This is not like he's in his 50s.

J. Aughenbaugh: 31-years-old.

N. Rodgers: Yeah. He's young.

J. Aughenbaugh: 31-year-old. He's got a staff of eight lawyers, and they are basically running around the countryside enforcing the Fair Labor Standards Act, which meant that they were upsetting a whole bunch of corporate interests, right? And he handled the bulk of the Appeals Court work, okay?

N. Rodgers: So early on, he's taking on heat and managing it. He's managing people who are crappy with him for not staying in the Old Boys Club and being for the little guy.

J. Aughenbaugh: After the war ends, he returns to Ropes & Gray and he lasted there all of five weeks when Harvard reached out to him and asked him to take on a position as a probationary teacher, which basically was a substantial cut in salary. But what he negotiated was a condition that he wouldn't have to teach corporations or property law.

N. Rodgers: He wanted to teach labor.

J. Aughenbaugh: Yes.

N. Rodgers: He wanted to teach about this thing that he has developed a deep interest in. So he takes this huge pay cut. But I think that's not uncommon thing for some people in some faculty members. You and I have discussed off recording that as a private consultant administrator, you could be making a lot more money than you make as a VCU undergraduate professor. But that's not where your heart is. Where your heart is with undergraduate students and them learning about American politics and the law and all that other stuff. I like that he's like, yeah, no, I want to teach what I want to teach, and I'll do it for on what would have been pennies on the dollar in terms of a big law career.

J. Aughenbaugh: Within a year, he is made a permanent professor. Again, this is sort of a theme that we discussed, for instance, with Condoleezza Rice, Janet Reno. The speed in which they advance is just awe inspiring. During the 1950s, he becomes a labor law expert. It was during this period of time that his writings begin to really shape the Supreme Court's thinking. What we see here, Nia, with the examples of Condoleezza Rice and Janet Reno is one of these themes that we picked up with some of these government officials is that their advancement is just awe inspiring. How quickly they go ahead and get advanced degrees or they move up in positions in institutions that are not noted for rapid advancement.

N. Rodgers: You and I are double his age and we're not doing anywhere near what he's doing it.

J. Aughenbaugh: Yes, because to your point, when he moves into his 40s, so this is during the 1950s, he is considered the leading labor law expert in the United States to the point, Nia, that his work was beginning to influence Supreme Court decisions on labor law. And put this in context, listeners, the United States federal government did not recognize union's legal authority to collectively bargain until the mid 1930s. So he's writing on a blank canvas known as the Supreme Court in terms of influencing how they were interpreting these labor laws that were 10, 15 years old.

N. Rodgers: Yeah, they're building this plane while they're flying it.

J. Aughenbaugh: Yeah, pretty much, right? Now, where his career really blossoms is that in the 1950s, a new US senator representing the fine state of Massachusetts, John F. Kennedy, asks Cox to testify before the Senate Committee on labor and Public Welfare. He was one of Kennedy's constituents. Like Kennedy, he was a Harvard alum. And they then struck up a professional, if you will, relationship, friendship. And Cox pretty much becomes one of Kennedy's members of his Camelot. You may recall this, right? This kind of sort of.

N. Rodgers: Young, smart. They were all like visionary in the sense of they wanted to create Camelot. They wanted to create this utopian vision of the United States as this fair labor, it's a great world for everybody to live in, blah, blah, blah, kind of thing.

J. Aughenbaugh: Yeah. In part, Kennedy did this for a political reason. When he did run for president, he had only had one term in the United States Senate and many people discounted his run for the presidency as the handiwork of his rich, wealthy father, Joseph, right? But it was also part of Kennedy's thinking that there is all of this intellectual talent that is in the Boston area. I would be a fool not to tap it. So when Kennedy ends up winning, Cox thought he was basically just gonna continue working at Harvard, right? He thought at most he would be offered a position in the labor department, but he ends up being offered the solicitor general position by Kennedy's brother Bobby. Because Bobby Kennedy was the Attorney General for President Kennedy. What Cox did know was that one of his law school colleagues, Paul Freund had recommended him for the position. So Cox becomes the solicitor general and starts arguing cases in front of the Supreme Court. Again, you want to talk about the right person at the right time with the right court. The court at that time was led by Chief Justice Earl Warren. Earl Warren was pushing the court to accept more cases that previously had not been considered appropriate for the court to decide. So cases concerning civil rights and sit-in cases, Cox, argued those cases, reapportionment, which is redistricting cases.

N. Rodgers: Wait, before we leave his civil rights stuff, there's Archibald Cox, and he's measured. He's like, we need to do a thing. We need to stay on target. We need to specifically argue this point, not a larger grand vision of the United States is a completely civil rights oriented because we're not going to get that from this court. And yet is incremental change, as opposed to Bobby Kennedy, who's over there baying at the moon, saying, let's just wipe it all out and fix everything and change everything, because Bobby Kennedy was very progressive relative to Jack relative to the rest of the people involved. And so not only did Cox manage the court, he managed the AG. He managed Bobby Kennedy and was like, yes, sir, we'll get right on that next time. But we're going to do it this way, this time, though, and he kept doing that with these incremental things, which is why they managed the court so well because he wasn't trying to get the court to go way out on a limb because that wasn't going to happen. He was getting shift the way he needed it to get shifted slowly incrementally so that it would stay.

J. Aughenbaugh: Cox understood that the Supreme Court as an institution does not make quick broad change.

N. Rodgers: All their socks are black socks. None of them were wearing pink and orange flowered socks. They're just not. That's not the group of people who end up on the Supreme Court generally.

J. Aughenbaugh: Think about, listeners, the fact that it took the Supreme Court nearly 60 years before it overturned Plessy v. Ferguson and said that segregation was unconstitutional. Cox knew this. So Cox with the civil rights type cases, even with the reapportionment cases concerning redistricting, advocated an incremental approach and was always surprised when the Supreme Court went even further than what he asked for. But again, his logic was, let's give the court something that they can accept, and then if they're willing to go further, well, that's all the better. But don't go to the court and saying, you have to take this huge leap when many of them only want to dip their toes into the water first to see how cold it actually is, right? Let's give them that opportunity when they recognize that the water ain't all that cold, then they can go ahead and jump in with both feet, sink their body in, etc.

N. Rodgers: Well, if you're looking for something slightly less arcane than the reapportionment, think in terms of the fact that the first marriage laws allowed interracial marriage. You had to get that before you were going to get LGBTQ marriage.

J. Aughenbaugh: Yeah, same sex marriage.

N. Rodgers: You had to get past race first. And you had to build towards getting that and then you get Loving v. Virginia, and then you can start to say, okay, well, now what about same sex marriage? Because the court is not a leap out in front group of people, for the most part.

J. Aughenbaugh: No. That's a really good example, Nia. So he's solicitor general, and then President Kennedy gets assassinated. Before Kennedy was assassinated, there was talk within the Justice Department that Cox would be the next Supreme Court nominee when a vacancy arose.

J. Aughenbaugh: Cox stayed on through the remainder of the Kennedy term. Johnson runs in '64. He wins, but in 1965, it was pretty apparent that Cox and a whole bunch of Kennedy's appointees were falling out of favor with LBJ.

N. Rodgers: Because it was his presidency. He's no longer finishing out the presidency of Kennedy. He's now his own.

J. Aughenbaugh: Johnson thought that all of Kennedy's Harvard appointees were too intellectual, too elite, and they frequently talked down to him. As you pointed out, LBJ was his own person.

N. Rodgers: He was trying to separate his presidency from Kennedy's. He was trying to say, I'm not the carry on of Kennedy.

J. Aughenbaugh: Cox gives his resignation and he returned to Harvard Law School. While he's teaching at Harvard, he also begins to volunteer. He argues a landmark legal services case for the legal services program, Shapiro versus Thompson. Cox pretty much thought that he was going to finish out his time at Harvard. Until he gets a phone call in 1973 from one of his former students, the then Secretary of Defense Elliot Richardson, who asked him if he would be willing to take the position of special prosecutor in the Watergate affair. As we discussed previously when we looked at Elliot Richardson, Nixon was not planning on appointing a special prosecutor, but Congress basically said to the Nixon administration, if you don't will, and you won't be able to control. These were Republicans within the Congress who basically said to the president, if you don't appoint a special prosecutor, committees in Congress are going to investigate this and you won't be able to control them. Cox, who's 61 years old, has a hearing problem. He can't really hear all that much in his right ear.

N. Rodgers: I can or I don't pick side and Richardson is like, you don't understand. You have to do this.

J. Aughenbaugh: Yes, and Cox to his credit, had some conditions before he was willing to accept it. For instance, the special prosecutor would have sole discretion to decide whether or to what extent he would inform or consult the attorney general of the United States. That basically meant that the investigation would not be controlled by the Nixon administration. Cox also got it in writing that he could only be dismissed by Richardson and only for "extraordinary" improprieties.

N. Rodgers: Standard virtually impossible to meet.

J. Aughenbaugh: Yes.

N. Rodgers: Because really, what he would have had to have sex with a goat on the Senate floor in order for that to be. Sorry for that graphic image. But what he's basically saying, if the president really did this, I need the power to investigate it and not be pressured and not be beholden to anybody. Because otherwise, this is going to look like a cover up, and I don't want to be part of a cover up. He was trying to help Nixon. What I think Nixon didn't understand about these guys is they were like, sir, if we investigate and we're open and clear about our investigation, and nothing comes of it, then your presidency walks away untouched and it's fabulous. But if we do anything to stymied this investigation, we will look guilty even if we aren't. It is the appearance of evil, and the appearance of evil is bad as evil itself. Anyway, sorry. If I could go back in time and convince anybody of anything, first of all, I would convince Hitler to stop. But also, I would go to Richard Nixon and say, you are making this 1,000 times worse than it has to be. You won't just said, man, I screwed that up. Sorry, you all. I'm sorry. I was scared about the election. I didn't handle that appropriately. mea culpa. People would go, okay.

J. Aughenbaugh: What's funny, Nia, is in all my research about Cox, Nixon was upset that Richardson forced Cox on him. Washington elites were like, Cox is too soft. Because as you mentioned, when Cox was solicitor general, the complaint within the Kennedy administration was Cox was not aggressive enough in his arguments in front of the Supreme Court. We're getting he was too timid. He went with an incremental approach, etc. Everybody basically thought Cox was the wrong person for the job and they were all wrong. They were all wrong because in particular, what Cox ended up finding out was that Nixon recorded all of his conversations in the Oval office. In particular, he found out about it because of testimony that John Dean made in the hearing in front of Sam Ervin, who was conducting his own investigation in the United States Senate. Cox was like, we got somebody on the record who testified under oath saying that there are tapes. Well, what better way to go ahead and figure out if the president was involved than to get the tapes?

N. Rodgers: By the bye, listeners, if you've never listened to the Watergate hearings, listening to that moment when he's like, blah, blah, blah, the tapes. He just says it like, yeah, then we had hot dogs for lunch. You know what I mean? He's very casual. Ervin says, "There are tapes?" He's like, "Yeah." But there's a pause where everybody in the room goes, my heck, you've got to be kidding. Is this all on record somewhere? It's a great moment. It would be film worthy.

J. Aughenbaugh: Well, in Cox's point when he issued a subpoena for the tapes was, well, either Dean is telling the truth and if he is, then we have tapes that will either prove the president's innocence or show actually what did go on, or Dean's lying, and therefore the United States Senate should have the Justice Department prosecute Dean for lying. But that wasn't how it was perceived by the Nixon administration.

N. Rodgers: No. Well, Nixon was a bit paranoid and it didn't help that he had actually committed the [inaudible] Do you know what I mean?

J. Aughenbaugh: Yes. Then over a period of months, and this was, what, '73.

N. Rodgers: Wait. Can we mention something before we move? Cox is basically offending everybody involved in this because he says to Sam Ervin, I'd like for you to suspend your investigation so that I can figure out what the heck's going on, which is not an unreasonable position. But Ervin's like, are you talking to me? I am a sitting senator. I'm sorry. Were you talking to me? Ervin's not having it and he says, Prof. Cox's request is extraordinarily arrogant. He's made Ervin mad, who would have been a natural ally cause Ervin's also investigating. But he's now made Ervin mad. Nixon thinks that he's out to get him because Nixon gave mixed signals to Richardson when he said, I want you to get to the bottom of this and you figure it out no matter who it hurts. Richardson's like, yes, sir. Richardson didn't realize what he meant was, I want you to give me cover and get me out of this, which was what Nixon meant, but not what he said. Richardson took him at his word and said, we'll get to the bottom of this. This is already people seeing each other as enemies. At one point, there's a phrase you use in here, which I love, partisan viper. There's some name calling going on. There's a lot of paranoia going on.

J. Aughenbaugh: Not only does Cox upset prominent US senators. He's quite clearly upset Nixon. When he goes to court and asks for Nixon to turn over the tapes, Nixon makes his next mistake because Nixon goes ahead and adopts an absolutist position, which is no communication with a sitting president by any of the president's advisors can be forced to disclose in any legal proceeding.

N. Rodgers: It's all privileged.

J. Aughenbaugh: It's all privileged.

N. Rodgers: Including the rude things that LBJ said in the office about the way his pants fit.

J. Aughenbaugh: Everything.

N. Rodgers: All of it is privileged, according to Nixon.

J. Aughenbaugh: Nixon loses at the trial court level. Judge John Sirica was just like, no. Then Nixon loses at the DC.

N. Rodgers: You can't just say, I have privilege. It doesn't matter what I did. If I admit that I murdered 85 people and buried them in the White House, that's not privilege. Anyway, sorry.

J. Aughenbaugh: Nixon appeals to the DC Circuit Court of Appeals. The DC Circuit Court of Appeals gave the president an opportunity to articulate whether or not there were certain tapes that should be excluded because of confidentiality reasons. Well, the White House and Cox's staff negotiate for weeks, but that was getting nowhere. Cox goes back to Judge Sirica for a court order to force Nixon to turn over the tapes. It's at this point, Nixon orders Attorney General Elliot Richardson to fire Cox. As we've discussed in a previous podcast episode, Cox refuses, then Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus refuses, but then eventually Robert Bork fires Cox. But that's not the end of the tapes because though Cox has been fired, Senator Ervin, he hasn't let go of this bone. He's an old dog, he's got his teeth into this bone, and he is the one that issues the subpoena that ends up being the Supreme Court case, where the Supreme Court ruled against Nixon and forced him to turn over the tapes. But it all starts because Archibald Cox is like, hey, wait a minute here. There's tapes?

N. Rodgers: It all starts because nobody tells Dean that he can't testify about the tapes. Dean sitting there in front of Sam Ervin is like, well, it's probably on the tape somewhere, and Sam Ervin's like, huh? Then Cox went, there's tapes? Richardson went, there's tapes? I like that Cox's argument was, if Nixon was okay with him mentioning tapes, then the tapes are now in play? Either they were privileged to the point where you don't even mention that there are tapes or once you mention it, we get to know what's on the tapes. I do think that Archibald Cox was not saying, we will release the tapes in their full to the American public. They wanted a certain group of people to be able to listen to them. Obviously, if things had been covered that were national security issues or personnel issues or things like that, that part would not have been released. But the president saying, we should cover this up because this is terrible was not privileged.

J. Aughenbaugh: Well, again, hindsight is always 2020. But if we learn anything from Nixon and the Watergate scandal, is that cover up always gets you. Two, when you adopt an absolutist position, you basically give whoever's deciding a case only two options. If you lose, you're going to lose badly.

N. Rodgers: You lose all of it. He had said there are some information that we don't want to turn over because it's not appropriate. It is privileged. That would have been a discussion. But him saying it's all privileged was like, but if that goes against you, then it's all not privileged.

J. Aughenbaugh: Nia, what happens to Cox after Watergate?

N. Rodgers: He moves to Aruba and lives on the beach.

J. Aughenbaugh: No. But he did spend a year guest lecturing at the University of Cambridge.

N. Rodgers: Wow. Which is pretty fabulous.

J. Aughenbaugh: Then he returns to Harvard in '75. By the way, while he's over at Cambridge, President Ford does him a solid by making him the ambassador to the Court of St. James.

N. Rodgers: He got to meet Queen Elizabeth.

J. Aughenbaugh: Yes, and it's largely ceremonial, but that's a really nice way to go ahead and spend your first year.

J. Aughenbaugh: Then he returns to Harvard, but he does more than just teach and write. Because he ends up arguing two more cases in front of the Supreme Court that are landmark US constitutional law cases. One, Buckley versus Valeo. Arises because Congress amended the Federal Election Campaign Act in 1974, which were in response to the financial abuses of Nixon's reelection Committee. Those amendments required financial reporting for all federal campaigns, established limits on campaign donations and spending, a number of people challenge these amendments including Senator Buckley, who went ahead and argued that these restrictions violated the First Amendment freedom of speech of the US Constitution. The senators who were defending the law, requested that Cox file a friend of the court brief and common cause, the interest group who would like, how should I describe common cause? There an interest group that would like free fair elections, and they would actually like to see limits on campaign funding and spending.

N. Rodgers: Me too.

J. Aughenbaugh: Yeah. Cox was asked to argue on behalf of common cause, and he said something that and I included this because I knew you would like it. Cox's key argument was that contribution of money, even if it was designed to enable public discourse is not speech, rather it's conduct. Therefore, Congress should have the constitutional authority to regulate how much money individuals, organizations, corporations, interest groups can donate, and they can also make it public who's donating money and how the money is spent, etc. Unfortunately.

N. Rodgers: It doesn't really come out that way, does it?

J. Aughenbaugh: No, no. First of all, the court split the difference, the court was all over the proverbial map. But basically what it did say was limits on campaign spending by candidates was unconstitutional. However, limits on contribution limits, financial reporting requirements were constitutional. By the way, those last two things end up being overturned by the Supreme Court in one of Nia's favorite Supreme Court decisions of all time. Citizens United.

N. Rodgers: Citizens United. Hating, hating.

J. Aughenbaugh: The other Landmark Constitutional Law case that Cox got involved with was in 1976. And this is the Bakke case, Bakke versus the Regents of the University of California. Bakke was a 37-year-old white engineering student who applied for medical school. He did not get admitted, and he claimed that the reason why was that the UC Medical School violated his equal protection rights by giving seats to students of color in furtherance of its affirmative action program. And Cox defended the University of California and Cox.

N. Rodgers: He came out with an argument that is still an argument today, which I think is interesting, which is if you don't allow universities to look at race as part of admissions, then a lot fewer minority students will end up in college. Because of if you go strictly by scores because of the way tests are administered in the United States. He was basically arguing the grading is unfair, so if you only go by the grades and you can't balance in any other way, and it's an ongoing that is an ongoing argument. Is that how do you make admissions into college, fair? How do you get a level playing ground when the high schools don't provide a level playing ground and the elementary schools don't provide a level playing ground.

J. Aughenbaugh: The Supreme Court bought part of Cox's argument, but not the entirety of the argument. So Justice Powell's plurality opinion said that colleges, universities could pursue affirmative action programs to achieve greater diversity in its student body.

N. Rodgers: That's one factor among many.

J. Aughenbaugh: Okay, there comes the caveat. The caveat is you can't use quotas.

N. Rodgers: That can't be the only criteria. It can be a criteria.

J. Aughenbaugh: Again, unfortunately, Cox's handiwork in this case was later overturned by the Supreme Court in the Harvard College and UNC cases from this decade, where the Supreme Court went ahead and said that colleges and universities affirmative action programs did violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. Sorry, dude.

N. Rodgers: No ever turned twice.

J. Aughenbaugh: Yes.

N. Rodgers: But the more nuanced question of the modern cases has to do with, at what point do you stop taking that into account as an equalizing force? It's the Sandra Day O'Connor question of how long affirmative action? Like, how long does it take in order to make the playing field even?

J. Aughenbaugh: So at one point, Cox was being considered for a Federal Appeals Court position. But a disagreement that he ended up having, the disagreement was between his sponsor, Senator Ted Kennedy and the president who would be making the nomination, which was Democratic President Jimmy Carter. Kennedy did not think Carter was liberal enough as a president and had already made it known that he was more than likely going to challenge the sitting president for the Democratic Party's nomination in 1980. So Carter basically went ahead and said, well, I'm not going to go ahead and pick somebody who-

N. Rodgers: That's unfortunate because Cox would have been good on the Court of Appeals.

J. Aughenbaugh: Yeah.

N. Rodgers: He could have done some cool things, but I'm sure at that point, he was like, You know what? Whatever. Like, did he walk away from trying to be a judge at that point?

J. Aughenbaugh: Yeah, he pretty much did.

N. Rodgers: Because politics kept him off the Supreme Court, and then politics kept him off of this court.

J. Aughenbaugh: Yes. Eventually, he took over the chair position of common cause, and he did that until 1992. All right?

N. Rodgers: 1980?

J. Aughenbaugh: No.

N. Rodgers: '80-'92?

J. Aughenbaugh: Yeah, for 12 years. During that period of time, he was forced to retire from Harvard at the end of the 1983, '84 school year. But he was not unemployed for long because the Boston University School of Law went ahead and-

N. Rodgers: Scooped him up?

J. Aughenbaugh: Scooped him up.

N. Rodgers: Harvard mandates retirement at a certain age, doesn't it? And Harvard's like, once you're a Geiser geezer, you got to go. It doesn't matter if you're a super smart geezer. It doesn't matter if you're still an active geezer.

J. Aughenbaugh: Yeah. So he retires. Effectively, he retires from teaching and litigation work in 1992. And he lives another 12 years. He dies in 2004, he and his wife, Phyllis, were married for 67 years. Phyllis died in 2007, so three years after him. So yeah, Archibald Cox.

N. Rodgers: He's quite the dude.

J. Aughenbaugh: Yeah.

N. Rodgers: He had quite the. It's unfortunate to me that a lot of what he could have done with stymied by politics. But as a professor, I imagine he influenced thousands of attorneys and he did amazing things with a career in that way.

J. Aughenbaugh: And that's always-

N. Rodgers: Your legacy. Your legacy is that. You've got students who've gone on to law school and they're going to go on to be eventually judges and other.

J. Aughenbaugh: Prosecutors and I've had a number former students who are now college professors themselves, Commonwealth Attorney.

N. Rodgers: Many of your students are also working in the federal government and stuff. I think that's a great thing for teachers is that their legacy is that their students go on to do.

J. Aughenbaugh: Really great things. Yeah, their success is my success.

N. Rodgers: A certain almost parental pride.

J. Aughenbaugh: Oh, yeah, sure, there's no doubt about it. I take great joy when I get an email or phone call from a former student and they're like, because I'll ask, what are you doing? Where are you working? Are you married? Do you have kids, etc. When they're doing well, then I'm doing well. That's the cool thing about my job, particularly when they go ahead and say, something along the lines of, you were tough on me, but you prepared me to go ahead and do X.

N. Rodgers: Like, you made me better at being this thing. What I think is I'm going to end on this happy note. We don't have a Geezer clause at VCU. You can teach until you just drop dead. You'd be 110 up in the classroom teaching. I hope you're not because I hope you do get a break at some point. But it's interesting to me that Harvard has that. And that some institutions have.

J. Aughenbaugh: Well, you and I have talked about this in regards to federal government officials, like US senators, members of the House, presidents, judges. There's a fine line between getting rid of talented older people who still have something to contribute versus do they have the mental faculties and energy to do their job?

N. Rodgers: You're keeping around someone who's adult and not quite there.

J. Aughenbaugh: The natural cycle is that at some point in time, we older folks should get out of the way and let younger people remake institutions and for them to be able to go ahead and leave a lasting impact like the opportunity we had. How it goes about is always the difficulty. That's the infamous finding the needle in the haystack because if you just go ahead and say somebody, well, you're a certain age, so you now must retire. Well, but what if they still have something to contribute? On the other hand, there's too many examples of people who are stay too long.

N. Rodgers: You have to have some self awareness to be able to say, oh, I've reached the end. It's like at that point in your life when you should give up your car keys. You should say, it's time to be driven around by somebody else. It's really hard to do. If you've been independent your whole life and you've always just gotten in a car and driven where you wanted to go, it's a hard thing to suddenly say, oh, I'm going to need somebody to take me to the doctor. I'm going to need somebody to take me to wherever. Knowing that line, that's a hard line. But the good thing for me as librarians is we're expected to be old. I'm going to be fine for a while. Little old ladies who yell ssh, which we don't do anymore because that's silly.

J. Aughenbaugh: But anyway, thank you, Nia.

N. Rodgers: Thank you, Aughie. He's an interesting fellow, Mr. Cox.

J. Aughenbaugh: Yes. I would argue one of the most important Americans of the second half of the 20th century.

N. Rodgers: Well, certainly one of the great legal minds. And of those people who didn't end up on the Supreme Court, he's probably right up there in the top five of legal minds that probably should have been but didn't end up in the Supreme Court.

J. Aughenbaugh: Yeah. I would agree. So thank you, Nia.

N. Rodgers: Cool. Thank you.

FEMALE_1: You've been listening to civil discourse brought to you by VCU Libraries. Opinions expressed are solely the speaker's own and do not reflect the views or opinions of VCU or VCU Libraries. Special thanks to the workshop for technical assistance. Music by Isaac Hobson. Find more information at guides.library.vcu.edu/discourse. As always, no documents were harmed to the making of this podcast.

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