EP25: The Impact of the 23andMe Breach: Protecting Personal Information Online
16 minAudio
The recent breach of the 23andMe service, a DNA ancestry testing company. It highlights the impact of the breach, the potential risks of sharing personal information, and the lack of adequate security measures taken by the company. It also suggests various security practices that could have been implemented to prevent such breaches in the future. Finally, it mentions the importance of individual users taking steps to protect their own security and the recommendation to freeze credit to prevent identity theft. --- I do hope you enjoyed this episode of the podcast. Here's some helpful resources including any sites that were mentioned in this episode. -- -- Find subscriber links on my site, add to your podcast player, or listen on the web players on my site: Listen to Byte Sized Security -- Support this Podcast with a Tip: Support Byte Sized Security -- If you have questions for the show, feedback or topics you want covered. Please send a short email to marc@bytesizedsecurity.show with the Subject line of "Byte-Sized Security" so I know it's about the podcast. Connect with me on TikTok: https://www.tiktok.com/@bytesizedsecurity
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Transcript
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So by now. You know that 23 and me. Was breached. And 23 and me is basically one of those who am I related to ancestry type. Services. And it got breached because. There were somewhat like 14,000. People or accounts. That had reused passwords. And. Whoever, whatever logged into those. And then was able to use this DNA family tree, something or other sharing.
And scrape a bunch of data from, I don't know, 6.9 million accounts, which is kind of a lot. But you do have to wonder, like, I understand that you log into these sites and you've got to give away all this PII, personally identifiable information. I get that. First of all, I don't know why you're giving away to just check that out, but I understand people do that. Whatever. But you're giving it away to a private company. And then they get breached and all this data. I get scraped now. I don't think that whoever, whatever did this is getting actual DNA.
That's not what it is. You weren't giving DNA samples, but you are giving away a lot of information about who we related to. Things like that. That can be used later for really good social engineering tactics. And that's going to make. That's going to make a huge difference. And I don't know what the ramifications of that are. But the thing that's a little bit disheartening is twofold. One. Quite a lot of cyber security community. At least the pulse I got was well. You know, basically it is the user's fault because they're reusing passwords
and they shouldn't be doing that. And. Uh, while I agree that you should not be reasoning passwords. I completely disagree that it's on the users to do that. We're talking about. P I. And information. This is not just some news site or whatever. This company had an obligation to do something. And what they're falling back on is the definition of reasonable security, which there really is no definition for that. Right. You could argue that, Hey, reasonable security is username password. Okay. But there are so many things they could have done.
From the start that they did afterwards after the breach. And this is about 10 things and I got these 10 things from chat GPT, my $20 subscription. But I'm sure that they paid a lot of money not to do any of these things or be told that they should do these and then said, okay, we'll do it. And then never did. One mandatory, mandatory, two factor authentication. They could have done mandatory two factor authentication. Now they did it after words, but they didn't do it in the beginning. I'm not even sure it was an option in the beginning. To be honest with you, I didn't sign up for the services.
So I don't know. But it's weird that they did it. Much later. And I think some of the excuses were, well, it would stop people from, you know, adopting as quickly. As they normally would. And I completely disagree. Chat made me do two a Fe. Now I am in tech. So I'm going to adopt that anyway. But if people are really interested in their ancestry, which they were, and that was something that was just so hot three whatever years ago, they absolutely would have said it to a Fe on their phone to get past that, to continue on,
to figure out who they're related to. There's just some things that are not going to stop a user from doing. And I think figuring out who you're related to, when you're really, really interested. Setting up to a fire on your phone is not going to stop you. Advanced password policies, you know, they could have enforced a strong password policy mix of letters, numbers, and special characters and a minimum password length. That most likely would have gotten rid of the reuse passwords because those aren't things that people are going to remember necessarily. Now they may, they may just say, oh, I'll just use the same password and I'll copy and paste it in there.
But it would have been a little bit harder. For people just to type things into a box when you force them to do something. Crazy now they may still write it down somewhere. But. It may not be used in another breach, things like that. You also could check against known password lists. Like have I been poned to make sure, oh, you can't use this password because it's been found in a previous breach. You need to use a new one, right? Things like that. Account lockout mechanisms so they could have done, you know, temporarily locked accounts, side of number of failed login attempts.
Now what happened was it's considered to be. Brute force, but it was really credential stuffing. So they're just using usernames and passwords that have been reused in previous breaches. So they weren't necessarily brute, forcing to get into accounts like. Trying someone's account over and over and over again. But before. But credential stuffing does fall under the us. For brute force. So you could have had account lockout. Mechanisms, you don't know if somebody tried these passwords in the end, the user had changed them. You could have locked it out and seen a high number of lockouts,
which would be kind of weird. Behavior analysts and machine learning. That would have been nice if they had behavior analytics like unusual login patterns from unfamiliar locations or multiple failed login attempts, short period. Uh, 14,000 people logging in, in a short period of time, things like that. Even if you didn't have to have Fe enabled and I've had this on a financial site where someone knew my user and password shame on me. But they knew that it was not normal for me to log in there and they locked my account. So you could have had behavioral analysts, uh, working on that and.
They did not. You could have had a capture challenge. The kind of lame for spam. But it's possible that if they were using an automate, well, they were our, no, one's going to sit down and do 14,000 logins. If you'd had a capture challenge. You potentially could have blocked a lot of this stuff. IP address monitoring and blocking. Did they really use 14,000 different IP addresses to log in in different locations across the world? Highly unlikely. Therefore, if they were coming from a VPN, you could have flagged that and, and, and block that activity.
Which goes back to the. Account lockout mechanisms where you're seeing something coming in, you know, you. Web application firewall sees that, and you could have blocked that so they could have done something like that. Use your education and awareness. Now nobody does this. I mean, they do it internally, right? But you could have encouraged your users over time because this is a sensitive site that they shouldn't reuse their passwords. They should check if their email address had been part of any data breach, like have I been poned and then use a different password, but no. To be fair, no company does this, right.
You just sign in and they're not going to educate you on security training. That's for your employer to do. Um, that could change though. Uh, regular security audits and updates. So somehow they got an ISO 27 0 1. Aye. Don't understand that. And there's me give me much credit that that's a useful search. But they've had that for a while. It could have been regular security audits to updates and fix these kinds of things. We don't know. We don't know. Uh, you don't know if that actually was true and then no one did anything with it. Who knows? So I don't know about this one.
Multilayered security approach. So defense in depth. So firewalls intrusion, detection systems, regular vulnerability scanning. Now vulnerability scanning wouldn't have helped this, but. Honestly, you could have looked at, you could have looked at the loss stuff and you could have picked this stuff up. And that was intrusion detection systems may have flag that, Hey, this is unusual activity. You've got all these people logging in from all different places, all over the world. And that's not normally where they log in from. Right. If I'm from. If I am from California. And all of a sudden I'm logging in from, you know, a different country.
Don't you think that's kind of weird. I mean, it's not, it's not impossible, but isn't it kind of weird that you'd want to like, maybe prompt me for something else. Like, Hey, you don't normally log in from. Europe, maybe we should ask you for some other thing, like your two FFA, which they didn't enable. And then of course encouraging the use of password managers. And promoting the use of password managers to help maintain strong, unique passwords for each of the online accounts. Again, it goes back to the user education awareness. Nobody's doing that, right? The people that are doing that at the cybersecurity, people telling you
years using a password manager, right. But. If you want adoption to happen, sometimes companies have to force adoption and then everyone just starts doing it. So if you want to have faith to happen. Kind of like chat did at some point, probably because they had some kind of COVID incident. You just force everyone to start doing it and they're going to do it because they'd rather use the service to not use the service. And so you force them to do that. And it ends up being something that they can do. So when I, when I look at these lists of things they
could have done, but didn't do. It's just concerning. And of course they've already, they've already turned around and blamed it on the user saying, Hey, you guys used reuse passwords. That's on you. We have reasonable security measures in place. And if you're going to just, you know, Reused. His name is passwords and I, there's not much we can do about it. So that's, that's on you and I completely disagree about disagree. With that. There's also the, it doesn't fall under the HIPAA laws because it's not medical information. Right. It's personally identifiable information, but it's not medical information is they're not actually getting DNA.
And then there's some other obscure laws. That are going to say, well, they've had this information, but what exactly did they take that was used against you that caused you harm? Who knows man. So. And then they changed their terms of service at the end that you had to. You had to opt out so that you couldn't do this class action lawsuit. I had. I forgot it had to be like individual or something, but they kind of did it right, right after Thanksgiving. And they switched it and gave you 30 days to opt out. So, if you didn't opt out of this and you opted in, then you
automatically opted into not being part of some class action stuff. So. A lot of shady stuff, but you know, it's an 85 cent stock. My guess is that the lawyers on probably both sides are gonna make a lot of money. They'll go out. They'll just file for bankruptcy. They'll either stay in business and just restructure or they'll just completely go away. Who cares? It doesn't matter. And then. You the end user, you, the person that was using this, you'll just move on to something else. Everybody got your data. You're going to get nothing. You're going to get some credit monitoring for three years, right?
From another agency that was breached that leaked all your data. So, I mean, It's unfortunate at the end, the end user here is going to be like usual. It's going to be the loser in this, in this particular battle. And. You just have to start thinking if you, yourself and your friends and your family, you've got to just be better at security. Use the tools that are available on the site. Most most major sites, maybe, obviously not this one, but most, most major sites. If you go to the number two.
F a.directory. That's the number two F a doc directory. You're going to see all the different sites. This is not, you know, this is not a hundred percent, but you're going to see a lot of sites and how to set up to a Fe on all these major accounts, all your social media, your email. You should just have an authenticator app on your phone. They're free. You should just go set up to a Fe as much as you can just do, make a goal, like one a day or something.
And just don't be that low hanging fruit. Right. Even if you reuse the username and password, if you had to have a, on your account. That would not happen now. In this case, there was that DNA, whatever sharing kind of thing. So even the PR even these poor people that maybe really did have really long and complex passwords and super secure. The person that they were connected with, obviously got hacked and then their information gets scraped too. So this goes back to one of the thoughts that I had is.
You've got to assume a breach mentality and it doesn't matter how safe and secure you are. If the place that's holding your data. Isn't right. So. Again, you could have had to have Fe you could have had a really strong password on this particular site. But because somehow in the backend, somebody opted into this DNA sharing or family tree sharing, and maybe you were, or were not involved in that your information gets scraped because you're connected with someone who's completely insecure. And this is one of those rare use cases, I guess you could say, but.
He just got to adopt better security practices and this gets worse over time. And identity theft is real and identity theft is real painful. And the simplest thing you can possibly do. The simplest thing you can possibly do. Is freeze your credit. Online. For free. At the major credit bureaus. And what that does is that gives you an additional pin code. That you must use to log into those agencies, additional pin
code, long pin code that you log into those additional agencies. That you can then unfreeze your credit. For a certain thought, whatever you want to call it for a certain period of time. And then it gets frozen again. And what that means is if somebody has all my information, they can go get a loan for a house or a car or whatever, and they're gonna apply for a loan and pretend that they're me. When they go to run those credit checks. Those those companies won't be able to get a credit check because they're going to say, oh, it looks like, you know, Experian or TransUnion or whatever.
Is, um, They're not, I'm not getting it back. You're going to need to go and freeze that and that person, that thing is not going to have that pin code that you set up and therefore you're not going to have a loan outstanding in your name. And this goes for kids too, which is odd. But. If you think about it, if your children get their credentials stolen as well. Whatever. A person could theoretically get alone and you wouldn't even really know about that. You know, till much later it'd be 18 years later that your child's credit has been used by somebody and they have terrible credit.
Right. I mean, there's all these possibilities. People always talk about, oh, you can get this thing. That will monitor your credit and do all this kind of stuff. And you pay yearly fee and why. Why. You just go lock your credit. The three major. At the three major. Credit unions. You get that? Pin code. And that's it. And then it's easy peasy and you know what it, yeah, it'll stop you temporarily from applying for credit cards online. But. You still, it's not hard to unfreeze it.
It's quick. You can put a time limit on it. It's not a big deal at all. And in fact, you still get the promos and bonuses. I had my, I have my credit frozen. And I wanted some. Airline credit card. And I went and applied for it. And of course it said, Hey, it looks like your credit's frozen. So we're not able to do this at this online for you. But we're going to send you a met, you know, mail and then you can actually call in and blah, blah, blah. And when I did actually call in, I said, Hey, I need to unfreeze my
credit so I can get this promotion. I just want to make sure I'm still going to get it. And they said, oh yeah, you're still gonna get it because you applied for it. During the promotional period, just because the promo closes and you haven't done it online or whatever you still got. So I just on frozen my credit, they were able to check online. Yep. And then they went ahead and did it, and I still got the promotion. So. If you are worried like, well, if this is a window and I want to get this thing. B you still applied during that time. And just because your credit's frozen doesn't mean you're not going to still hit that window.
It just, it just takes a few, you know, a couple more days. So I'm going to send you a piece of mail and some number that you have to call in for them to do an additional verification check. So it's not a big deal. But people act like it's a big deal and it's a huge hassle. And I'm telling you the hassle is going to be when you get that identity theft. Uh, happens to you or your kid. That's going to be a hassle for you. So you're going to want to go out and, you know, Get better security hygiene. It's not that hard to do. It really isn't. You get an authenticator app and a password manager.
Easy peasy. You go to that to F a that's number two F a.directory, and you just do one thing day. And he locked down all your social media accounts. You locked down your email accounts and things like that. And that just stops you from being that low hanging fruit. So I hope this has been an informative podcast for you, and I hope you weren't part of the breach. Um, it's unfortunate. But, you know, 20, 24 is just starting and I'm sure there's plenty more breaches where that came from.
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