For two decades, Alan Bates, an obscure sub-postmaster, successfully fought to expose the UK Post Office scandal, the worst miscarriage of justice in British history.
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Speaker 1Welcome to some very famous people you've never really heard of. Bite-sized biographies of the famous, the infamous, and the quirky. in less than an hour. My name is Philip D. Gibbons, and there is more information about me, this podcast, and a bibliography at bitesizedbiographies.com. There are also photographs of many of the individuals and items mentioned in this podcast. At the conclusion of Part 1 of this presentation, there will
Speaker 1be additional suggestions concerning further information about today's subject, Sir Alan Bates's and the worst miscarriage of justice in British history. If you have enjoyed this presentation, please like us at our Facebook page, Bite-Sized Biographies, subscribe to my YouTube page at Noblesse Oblige, and please note that all of Bite-Sized Biographies are now available on Spotify. And tell a friend about Bite-Sized Biographies. Now let's get started with our story
Speaker 1about Sir Alan Bates and the British Post Office. On January 1st, 2024, the British television network ITV presented a four-part drama entitled Mr. Bates vs. the Post Office. which dramatized the struggle of hundreds of independent contractor sub-postmasters who were unjustly prosecuted and even imprisoned by the British Post
Speaker 1Office for theft, false accounting, and other charges, when in fact this situation was the result of a faulty IT system, a system that the Post Office understood to be unreliable. The series, broadcast on four successive nights, elicited massive outrage from the general public, which instigated both immediate action and investigation by the government to write what was described at
Speaker 1the time as the worst injustice in modern British history. But one of the more astonishing aspects of this debacle was that it was not months or even years in the making, but began in 1999. the British post office able to recklessly destroy the lives of numerous private citizens for decades without any public or governmental scrutiny. It would seem inconceivable in the U.S. that hundreds of people could
Speaker 1be investigated and even incarcerated by an entity like the U.S. post office. But at the time, the British post office was a very different animal. with legal powers that were unique within the British government and dated back for centuries. In the 20th century, fundamental changes were made to what was for many years a monolithic agency responsible for all aspects of the British postal system. Quasi-privatization and corporate realignment
Speaker 1transformed what was previously known as the Royal Mail into separate divisions handling different functions. One of these divisions was rechristened as the Post Office Counters, an entity responsible for various postal-related processes like retail sale of stamps and parcel postage delivered by another branch of the mail system. But this entity also handled various financial transactions like cashing pension
Speaker 1benefits and unemployment checks, payment of utility bills, foreign exchange, and purchase of traveler's checks, driving or fishing license payments, passport applications, and various other retail financial services for an unsophisticated clientele, the local branch extracting a small fee for this service. These operations, especially in rural areas, were frequently incorporated into another retail business, like a small grocery store
Speaker 1or an urban area as a convenience store. Ownership was occasionally via franchise, but usually the operator was a designated sub-postmaster, paid a modest salary, who had a contractual arrangement with what was still generally referred to as the post office. In the 80s and 90s, these small businesses provided a steady, uncomplicated income for the sub-postmasters who operated them. Frequently upon retirement,
Speaker 1these individuals could sell their collective business to a successor willing to pay a low five-figure sum for whatever retail operation included the postal counter operation. But these small businesses were still mired in paper-driven accounting systems that were rightfully deemed inefficient and archaic. And in fact, other branches of the British government, chiefly those issuing benefit payments, were plagued by fraud, which they wished to combat by implementing a
Speaker 1computerized solution. Understanding that they also needed to adapt to a digital world, the post office management, now a corporate structure implemented by several British government parliamentary legislative acts, decided to replace the existing process with an automated IT system. Although a British company initially developed the software underlying this computerized process known as Horizon, this entity was acquired in
Speaker 11998 by the large Japanese multinational Fujitsu. In theory, sub-postmasters or employees could enter sales on a touchscreen, the underlying system keeping track of sales and inventory information and allowing for a simple ongoing accounting process that made balancing accounts a simple turnkey operation. At the time, in 1999-2000, upon implementation,
Speaker 1the system, dubbed Horizon, was the biggest non-military installation in European business history. Behind the scenes, the construction of this platform had been anything but routine. Because so many of the inputs would be regional or local in nature, there were hundreds of variable transactions that would have to be incorporated into a nationwide system. Think hunting license in a small town in the middle of rural England. There were literally thousands of such iterations. There were over 20,000 post
Speaker 1office locations requiring over 40,000 terminals and suitable training for over 60,000 individuals with varying degrees of technical ability would have to be provided to keep a system that was currently disseminating tens of millions of pounds up and running without a gap in service. Fujitsu stumbled badly when it attempted to deliver a system that functioned properly, missing numerous deadlines prompting the British Social Services Agency, which initially intended
Speaker 1to use the finished system to issue benefit payments via swipe card, to officially notify Fujitsu of a breach in contract. Fujitsu then threatened to walk away from the project completely unless it got several concessions, which centered mostly around an increase in its fee per transaction, the method in which it was to be compensated, handsomely, if they could ever get something that worked. Social Services, possibly presciently, then decided
Speaker 1to withdraw from the project, stating that it would pursue a process involving direct deposit. to a beneficiary's bank account. The fateful decision was then made by the government to entrust the subsequent development of Horizon solely to the post office's IT and business teams, a task that they believed would be handled slowly and deliberately, the project fully tested before it ever was implemented. As late as March of 1999, the internal post office committee responsible for vetting and signing
Speaker 1off on Horizon refused to do so. Fujitsu continued to try and assemble a viable product, and by July, it was announced by the government that the product would go live in October 1999. Several preliminary trial installations in August were a complete fiasco. Again in September, the post office board responsible refused to sign off. Then, mysteriously, only a month later, the same board decided that all of the
Speaker 1issues that had previously prevented their sign-off were now satisfactorily corrected, and the system was now ready for implementation at the rate of 200 new office installations per week. How this decision was made has never been revealed publicly, and one wonders if Fujitsu, already a high-profile public sector vendor, might have been able to use external governmental pressure to make this happen. Years later, individuals involved in the Horizon implementation
Speaker 1process came forward to explain that they had warned post office management and Fujitsu that the underlying systems were faulty and filled with bugs and improper coding, sure to cause errors. These admonitions were ignored, and such detractors transferred or pushed out altogether. A system was eventually cobbled together that never should have been released. The very nature of the status of the sub-postmaster within the post office hierarchy made the
Speaker 1introduction of an automated accounting system a radical change to the responsibility and potential liability of every sub-postmaster. These were not employees of the corporation, but individuals who had signed a contractual agreement that allowed them to run their postal and related business under certain fundamental circumstances. Perhaps the most relevant of these stipulations was the agreement that any shortfall in a postal account was to be made up by
Speaker 1the sub-postmaster, regardless of circumstance. In the paper-driven days before Horizon, at least each sub-postmaster had control of and access to any potential input error and could locate and could correct such a mistake manually. Also, such a mistake would most likely be minimal. However... Now a sub-postmaster was at the mercy of an independent computerized system that needed to run transparently and was subject to improperly manufacturing discrepancies that a
Speaker 1sub-postmaster could neither correct or even ascertain. Another quirk of the centuries-old Royal Mail was that based on the historic task of transporting and handling large amounts of cash, the post office had the legal ability to investigate. and prosecute potential crimes wholly under its own authority and jurisdiction. As many sub-postmasters were about to discover, the combination of the Horizon installation and post office power to handle any perceived
Speaker 1subsequent criminal behavior, free of any independent judicial or government oversight, would have devastating consequences. Although his overall experience with the post office and the Horizon system was typical, One individual's response was quite unusual and proof that even against seemingly impossible adversity, a motivated individual could make a remarkable difference. In the late 90s, Alan Bates and his wife, Suzanne, were leading fairly typical professional lives. He a project manager
Speaker 1for the upkeep and modernization of historic buildings in Wales. She a special needs teacher. After many years in such demanding occupations, they decided they needed a long-term change and were looking for an option that would allow them to work and spend time together in a relatively relaxing business environment. They focused on running a post office within a retail business, and after looking at various opportunities, they agreed to take control of a combination clothing store postal counter in the
Speaker 1small northern Welsh coastal town of Craigie Don. near Londuno, Allen's hometown. The store, called the Wool Post, sold woolen clothing and also contained the local postal counter. Bates had to complete a background check, purchase the existing business from the previous owner for £ 65, 000, and on his own he invested another £ 40, 000 into premise improvements, and by May of 1998 he was the proud sub-postmaster in charge. Allen and
Speaker 1his wife settled into their new careers, and things were fine until the October 2000 installation of three Horizon terminals in his retail location. Immediately, Bates began having problems with the system's accounting function, which, presuming there were no user errors, was supposed to achieve a net balance of zero with no discrepancies. Initially, these discrepancies were small, but Bates, unusual for a sub-postmaster, had very specific experience with the installation
Speaker 1and operation of computerized point-of-sale systems via his former project management experience, modernizing museums and other similar venues, typically requiring an identical cashier system installation. Sub-postmasters had access to what they were assured was a Horizon helpline, ready to handle any questions or even problems that might arise. But Bates quickly determined that this helpline was not particularly helpful. The
Speaker 1individual contacted frequently seemingly reading from a script, and Bates, with his own IT knowledge, having way more grasp of the situation than his alleged helper. One aspect was also readily apparent from his helpline conversations, and this was that at the sub-postmaster level, access to the system was utterly basic and limited, and additional ability to access accounts was not possible. In December, the situation grew exponentially more alarming
Speaker 1when Horizon kicked out a discrepancy of over 6,000 pounds. Bates was forced to spend hours on the helpline with only one terminal able to service customers, the other two printing out reports in an effort to locate and fix the errors that produced the shortfall. This during the Christmas rush, an obviously stressful situation. Even with his expertise and diligence, Bates was only able to reduce the discrepancy to 1,182 pounds.
Speaker 1He not only was in constant touch with the helpline, but he also resorted to writing his regional manager, an actual post office employee, to document not only what he felt was an improper deficit, but the other general issues with the Horizon system itself. He received no reply. But in the interim, he was able to get his outstanding deficit down to 814 pounds 31 pence. He heard nothing for several months until receiving a blunt demand letter per
Speaker 1his contractual agreement to make up the 800 plus pounds out of his own pocket. Bates refused, sending off another letter explaining that certainly at the administrative levels, Horizon data was available that would explain his discrepancy as a system error. He got no official response until February 2002, when he was told that he needed either to balance his account to zero or put any discrepancy like the $ 814. 31 into a separate suspense account. The post office would then investigate
Speaker 1this difference and either declare it an uncollectible mistake or rule that it was a shortfall rectifiable by payment by the sub-postmaster, the latter the almost certain outcome. Bates refused again by mail, claiming that he did not want to take responsibility for errors that he had no means of checking without access to additional Horizon data. He also mentioned that once he acknowledged the data for a week, it disappeared, giving him no ability to ever determine what caused a
Speaker 1discrepancy that frequently he could not verify initially anyway. His letter was again ignored. In 2003, Bates' area manager, his fifth in three years, personally met with him and with a poker face listened to all of his observations and objections concerning Horizon. The manager, a man named Mike Wakely, followed up on the meeting with another blunt instruction, stop rolling over any discrepancies, immediately cover any losses, and be
Speaker 1advised that your contract compels you legally. to cover all deficits regardless of source. Bates refused, and the post office then, in August 2003, issued a three-month notice of termination, which it enforced at the conclusion of this time period. Although Bates and his wife continued to operate the retail clothing store, a large chunk of his investment was now a puff of smoke. Bates went to an attorney who, after reading Bates' contract, told him to take his lumps and forget it.
Speaker 1He'd lose even more money trying to sue an entity with unlimited resources and an ironclad agreement that obligated him to make up any deficit, regardless of cause. Alan Bates did walk away in the short term, but he was far from finished with the post office. He wrote a lengthy letter to a regional newspaper, which was published, generating additional local coverage, and most importantly, he set up a website, www.postoffice.victims.org.uk,
Speaker 1in which he detailed his experience and asked others to send him an email if they had also suffered a similar fate. He embossed the website address on the cloth canopy that covered his shop entrance and waited. Little did he know that his conflict with the post office, while expensive, was relatively benign compared to some of his fellow sub-postmasters. In South Warnborough, Hampshire, England, in the 90s, Jo Hamilton and her husband David were scratching out a living, running
Speaker 1their own small hauling business, but looking for something a little more steady. South Warnborough is a small village. Its post office counter was in a small grocery store that was actually rather run down, the proprietor so elderly that he had another reluctant villager actually managing the property. Several acquaintances suggested that Joe take over the business, which he quickly turned into a thriving deli on top of increasing the grocery sales as well as setting up a small tea area with beverages and baked goods. The postal counter
Speaker 1was practically an afterthought. A half-dozen customers might typically purchase a few postage stamps on any given day. During the Christmas season in 2001, only days after Joe took over the operation, a post office trainer showed up in an attempt to explain the Horizon system and the basics of how it worked. Because there was little activity, and perhaps because he was not particularly competent, he left after a brief interaction, giving her cursory instructions. and telling her to
Speaker 1call the help desk if she had any problems. Even then, Joe was able to operate the system without an issue, the purchase of postage stamps, an occasional pension redemption, and an average cash flow of only 2,000 to 3,000 pounds easily manageable. Then in 2003, an additional tech wrinkle was installed, a chip and pin machine which was plugged into the Horizon system. allowing transactions with various ATM functions. Only days
Speaker 1after the new system was added, on December 23, 2003, Joe implemented the process of totaling debits and credits and suddenly was hit with a discrepancy of 2,032 pounds and 67 pence. To Joe, this was inconceivable. Despite additional Christmas patronage based on the total of her transactions, such a deficit was impossible. She closed down for the Christmas break, assuming that after the holiday, she would get the helpline on the phone and they would assuredly fix this obvious glitch.
Speaker 1Upon her return to work on December 30th, literally while Joe was on the phone with the helpline and dutifully following the provided touchscreen instructions, the discrepancy suddenly doubled to 4,217 pounds. Despite Joe documenting this process via printout, She was informed by post office management that she was responsible for the entire deficit, which she temporarily addressed by agreeing to forego her monthly modest 450-pound salary, an amount usually which allowed
Speaker 1most sub-postmasters to barely break even on their postal business in hopes that post office foot traffic would add to profits in whatever retail business they were also operating. Now, Joe would not even be able to collect that stipend. While this amount was deducted, the discrepancies, unexplained by the helpline, relentlessly continued. Joe's weekly computerized settling up became a nightmare of ever-increasing inexplicable deficits, all of which were her responsibility.
Speaker 1The only advice she got after making over 200 calls to the helpline was that if the post office ever determined that the mistake was their fault, they would correct the mistake. This never happened. By 2004, her discrepancies were reaching over 800 pounds a week. With little choice and hoping that eventually the post office would correct this obvious mistake, she acknowledged that this actual deficit was actually a correct reflection of cash and stock on hand. Through 2005, she
Speaker 1continued to sign off on discrepancies as accurate, claiming that her numbers balanced to cash she allegedly had on hand. In fact, she was merely signing off on an ever-increasing deficit. But she felt she had no choice. She had already spent her life savings covering the initial smaller deficits. She continued to cling to the hope that one day the system would suddenly correct its mistakes and erase the ever-increasing shortfall. This proved to be a complete fantasy. In the interim,
Speaker 1Joe convinced both her husband and her in-laws, who were on the deed, to remortgage their home. generating £ 9, 000 that she stuck in her postal safe in the event of an inevitable audit. Her deficit, which actually officially showed as cash on hand, climbed to over £ 30, 000. The postal black hole was now not only eating up any profits from her grocery and deli business, but also forcing her to pay her formidable lease out of a small short-term loan
Speaker 1she begged from close friends. Typically, she stayed in her shop well past closing time to try and figure out what could possibly be causing her deficit to keep growing, typically bursting into tears out of sheer fear and frustration. Finally, one evening, a couple of friends noticed her lights still on and Joe in seeming distress. Joe told them about the situation, and after they all took a cursory look at the inscrutable paperwork, they advised her to stop the
Speaker 1process immediately. and reach out to any available help. Jo was at a breaking point, having received a request to remit 25,000 pounds in cash, her supposed holdings of over 30,000 pounds in cash on the premises, a violation of postal security policy. In despair, knowing that the 30K plus number was a mere bookkeeping phantom, she made a call to the National Federation of Sub-Postmasters, the trade union that allegedly represented the interest's of thousands of individuals like Joe. They
Speaker 1immediately contact the post office to set up an audit. When Joe told the auditors that the cash surplus was actually non-existent and exactly how it was created by her deliberately okaying incorrect numbers, they called in postal investigators who immediately suspended Joe from her branch and after conducting an interview and their own investigation determined that they would charge her with criminal fraud. something they had the legal right to do. They responded to any of her protestations by
Speaker 1asking what she had done with the stolen money and that no one else had any of these issues at other post offices. After retaining a lawyer, he cut a deal where Joe agreed to repay the 36,000 pound deficit, plead guilty to false accounting, and the post office would drop the more serious charge of fraud. Jo and her husband remortgaged their home to raise 28,000 pounds, leaving them with 8,000 pounds still to pay before her court appearance and sentencing. Then, on February 4, 2008, an extraordinary situation
Speaker 1unfolded in the Winchester Crown Court where Jo made her appearance. So many friends and neighbors packed the courthouse that an overflow required the clerk to open private staff areas in the courtrooms to accommodate the entire group. Over 100 individuals had submitted letters of reference and pleas to issue the most lenient sentence possible. The reverend and vicar of Joe's church made a speech in which he told the judge that she was a kind and caring person and the
Speaker 1center of the community. The judge was beyond impressed by the turnout and the community loyal to the extent that he seemed bewildered by the entire incident, at one point exclaiming extemporaneously, Why are you in my court? Although he sentenced her to the bare minimum, 12 months of supervision, kind of parole with no confinement, Jo now had a criminal record and a massive debt to pay back, all for a deficit she did not believe she even incurred.
Speaker 1For the foreseeable future, she could only find work as a house cleaner. Her husband hustled whatever day laborer positions he could scrape up. Hard work for a man of retirement age. Over and over, postal investigators told Joe Hamilton that no one else was having any kind of problem with Horizon. That was a lie, and the investigators knew it as a lie, because they were busily not only investigating other discrepancies, in which a sub-postmaster had no explanation for random deficits, they were deliberately bullying some of these
Speaker 1unfortunates to intimidate others into merely paying any deficits and keeping their mouths shut. threatening them with prison terms if they didn't comply. They even went after some sub-postmasters legally, well after an individual had exhausted any and all means of repayment and was literally bankrupted. This is a warning to others who might think legal defiance was an appropriate response. Lee Castleton was just such an individual who had the audacity to actually challenge the post office and court. Ultimately,
Speaker 1his treatment would be among the most egregious received by any sub-postmaster during this incident. Castleton was a 10-year veteran of the RAF who held several positions following his service, including managing a supermarket and stock brokerage, but he eventually decided running a small business was more to his liking, so he used some of his savings to purchase a newsstand in Bridlington, Yorkshire, with an attached residence and a postal counter within the business. For this package in July 2003,
Speaker 1he paid a total of 300,000 pounds with a mortgage underlying the investment. He operated the postal counter. His wife ran the newsstand. For six months, things ran smoothly, Castleton balancing out his weekly account literally down to the penny. But in early 2004, his system began to become completely erratic, showing both large surpluses and deficits. Dozens of calls to the helpline were worthless. He was told not to worry.
Speaker 1Everything would balance out in the end. He became alarmed enough to attempt to involve his regional manager, who either ignored him or even refused to meet with him personally. Unlike many of his own overwhelmed fellow sub-postmasters, Castleton was utterly meticulous, documenting and checking every transaction, which eventually prompted Lee to demand an official audit. He felt he had no choice. His manager didn't care, and the helpline couldn't explain what was now a 22,963-pound deficit. The auditors did respond.
Speaker 1Their immediate action was to suspend Lee Castleton on the spot. They then installed their own temporary sub-postmaster, who ran up a 240-pound discrepancy in her first week. The system was then shut down. She began to conduct postal business manually, the system screen having gone blank. Later, this individual testified in court that she made the decision on her own to ignore the system. When the system was eventually up and running, the imbalancing problems disappeared. Castleton believes that his
Speaker 1software issue was addressed internally, a fix applied which then corrected the initial problem. It didn't correct Lee's suspension or his alleged deficit that the post office still wished to collect, and also via several meetings implied that he had stolen the money, investigators repeatedly asking him, what did you do with the money, why did you steal it, etc. They also kept telling him that his records detailing his transactions were irrelevant, referring him back to his contract, which emphatically
Speaker 1underlined that he was liable for any shortfall. In Lee's case, he had not actually even seen the contract, having merely signed off on a blank piece of paper, assured by all involved that he would never have to even refer to it. It was just boilerplate, the operation so turnkey the previous owner had never even needed to look at it. For many years prior to Horizon, that was the case, but now Castleton was at the mercy of of an organization that was relentlessly attempting to enforce an agreement he
Speaker 1had never even read. Admittedly, a rather recklessly naive, but for most sub-postmasters, a common business practice. Still, Castleton was in an unusually positive position. Unlike other sub-postmasters, he had not hidden or false-accounted his discrepancies, immediately alerting postal authorities of his deficits and asking for help. when they pointed out that his contract required him to make up any shortfalls, regardless of the source, he refused to pay. In June
Speaker 1of 2005, they then officially terminated him and threatened to pursue not a criminal, but a civil case to recover 25,000 pounds that the system declared was Castleton's deficit. A suit was filed against Castleton in his local Scarborough County Court, but at the ensuing hearing in February 2006, No one representing the post office legally showed up. By virtue of his membership in a retail guild involving news agents, Lee had access to a solicitor based on a blanket insurance policy.
Speaker 1The solicitor was present at the Scarborough hearing, and the judge dismissed the post office's case and even granted Castleton's counterclaim for loss of income and defamation. But this turned out to be part of an overall strategy on the part of the post office that to drag the case into a much more formidable arena and appeal to the most senior civil court in the UK, the High Court in London. It would take months for the case to come before this venue, and with legal costs skyrocketing, Lee
Speaker 1Castleton could no longer afford the massive fees such an undertaking required. He was left with the challenge of representing himself against a phalanx of some of the most expensive solicitors in the UK and the post office an entity with infinite assets. The result was predictable, the judge scoffing at his claim that the deficit was caused by a faulty computer system, especially after a statement from Fujitsu was accepted into evidence. The assertion that there was no issue
Speaker 1of any kind with Horizon's performance. The judge then put the onus on Castleton to prove the system was at fault, an impossible task considering the sub-postmaster's complete lack of access to the system's internal workings. The deficit was then declared genuine and Lee's responsibility. But the resulting 22,963 pound and 34 pence shortfall was modest compared to the additional costs Castleton was faced with. Under British law, he was obligated
Speaker 1to pay the 320,000 pound post office legal bill. As his business was now gone and his savings exhausted, The post office got a lien against the Castleton residential property, preventing the family from selling the house and moving elsewhere. Any funds generated would go directly to the post office. Lee Castleton was now completely bankrupted. This was an example of how the post office approached any issue with a sub-postmaster claiming a deficit. Instead of attempting to figure out
Speaker 1what the problem with Horizon was, they instead ruthlessly used the onerous postal contract to intimidate and even prosecute sub-postmasters. In Lee's case, the post office was even notified in advance by the court that he would not be able to pay their expenses. They appealed anyway, the goal to make an example of him in the event that other sub-postmasters had the audacity to also pursue such an approach. By 2010, the post office had already prosecuted over 360 sub-postmasters,
Speaker 1and terminated hundreds more, the latter group having run up deficits considered not worth the effort of criminal pursuit. All of this occurred without any government oversight and outside of any public scrutiny or even awareness. However, despite being devastated by his ordeal, Lee Castleton did not disappear into the night. A British publication, Computer Weekly, had previously written, about a government cover-up of a software glitch that caused a military helicopter crash in 1994. The RAF and its investigative unit
Speaker 1tried to initially pin the blame on Pilot Era in an attempt to absolve the related contractors, but after an outcry from the pilot's relatives and a few members of the British Parliament, an official inquiry assigned the blame where it belonged. on a flawed operating system powered by a faulty computer, a process that concluded 17 years after the crash itself. Perhaps thinking that this publication might be interested in pursuing a similar situation, Castleton sent them a detailed
Speaker 1letter that wound up in the hands of the editor-in-chief, Tony Collins, who was intrigued enough to assign a staff member, Rebecca Thompson, to investigate the story. Impressed by Castleton's demeanor and his account, which was bolstered by his own detailed logs and specific dates, Thompson did some additional digging and stumbled on Alan Bates via his website. With Castleton utterly consumed with trying to put his life back together, Bates became Thompson's main conduit to the then tiny but devastated
Speaker 1group who felt they were victims of a grave injustice. In all, the journalist would interview seven sub-postmasters, including Bates, Castleton, and Joe Hamilton, all sharing similarly appalling experiences. Not only did the ensuing article discuss these experiences, but it reiterated that when asked to respond to these allegations, the post office claimed that they had never received any complaints from sub-postmasters and its IT system could not have caused any
Speaker 1of the ensuing deficits. A version of the, quote, you are the only one having a problem, unquote, acclaimed lack of complaints was obviously untrue, based on the experiences of Castleton and Bates alone, both who sent numerous letters to supervisors asking for help. And while he couldn't prove it, Alan Bates was convinced that the entire debacle was caused by a major IT issue. One major player was left out of the article entirely, Fujitsu. A private entity, and
Speaker 1with Computer Weekly unable to factually prove there was an actual issue with the company's product, Fujitsu, a multinational with access to limitless resources, was likely to sue and potentially able to prevail in an extremely expensive ordeal that would put the Computer Weekly out of business. The post office, with hundreds of potential sub-postmasters having been prosecuted, was not as eager to reveal publicly how extensive the situation had become. Instead,
Speaker 1they engaged in a PR process to minimize as much as possible, hoping that the incident would remain relatively obscure. When her story was eventually published in Computer Weekly, Rebecca Thompson was somewhat disappointed by the lack of any media or even official response, but the article did begin some momentum in initially minimal to start a process that had a major impact. After reading the Computer Weekly article, two television reporters for a Welsh affiliate of the BBC decided
Speaker 1to devote a half an hour to the story, as presented through the experience of an Anglesey Wales sub-postmaster named Noel Thomas. Thomas had experienced the now familiar scenario in which a gradual discrepancy grew to a number that attracted the attention of auditors from the post office, 48,454 pounds. On October 13, 2005, Thomas was audited and immediately suspended, and the post office threatened to charge him with both
Speaker 1theft and false accounting, despite Thomas' claims that his deficit was the result of a system he claimed to the helpline about for years. Unlike some of his fellow sub-postmasters, Thomas had decades of postal experience as both a mailman and sub-postmaster, and was also a member of his county council, a familiar, respected member of his community. That all changed with his suspension and subsequent indictment. Unlike Joe Hamilton, his
Speaker 1neighbors openly gossiped or even shunned Thomas entirely. Because Thomas had admitted to rebalancing his accounts to zero, frequently on advice of the helpline, who were notoriously ignorant about their own system. Technically, Noel had implemented false accounting of sums he knew to be incorrect. His lawyers advised him that he would most likely be convicted of at least false accounting, and pleading not guilty meant a jail sentence if he was convicted. The post office offered to drop the theft charge as long as Thomas made it clear that the
Speaker 1Horizon system was not at fault. Thomas took the deal, thinking he could avoid a jail sentence. At his sentencing hearing, the judge in the case described his offense as grave and worthy of time behind bars, in this case nine months. The story was big in Wales at the time. Television cameras depicted Noel outside of court, suitcase in hand, devastated, being immediately led off to prison. In his case, the Victorian-era dungeon of Liverpool's Walton Gold. typically described as violent, rat-infested,
Speaker 1and decrepit. He had already resigned from the county council, but the post office continued to legally harass him after his release, getting a court order to pursue what was described as proceeds from a crime, the 48,000-pound discrepancy. Thomas coughed up his life savings to cover part of the debt, and despite his obvious bankruptcy, postal authority's unsuccessfully pursued his pension from his decades-long service as a postal employee. The
Speaker 12009 program described his experience, but also depicted him meeting Joe Hamilton for the first time on camera. It was becoming evident to both Joe and Noel that the, you are the only individual claiming a problem with the system, was blatantly untrue. A few months after the Welsh BBC story, Alan Bates decided that it might be a good time to actually convene a group of sub-postmasters, as many as could be found, to try and demonstrate just how many individuals had been, from their perspective, victimized. It took place
Speaker 1in as conveniently centralized a location as possible, the small village of Fennycompton, Warwickshire. Twenty-five sub-postmasters showed up, including Bates, Joe Hamilton, and Lee Castleton. The group assembled in a circle, and each sub-postmaster told their story, shockingly similar in the high-handed conduct and brutal zeal that the post office used to bring about a familiar outcome. Again and again, it was maintained by postal authorities that they were the only
Speaker 1individual experiencing difficulties with Horizon. This now an obvious lie based on the group assembled in Fenny Compton. One definite result from this meeting was an official name for the group. the Justice for Subpostmasters Alliance. The aggrieved subpostmasters then caught a break. Joe Hamilton's representative in Parliament was an individual named James Arbuthnot, another constituent of Arbuthnot's named David Bristow, detailing his postal suspension over 43,000 pounds and discrepancies which
Speaker 1Bristow claimed was the result of Horizon malfeasance. Although Arbuthnot, a graduate of Eaton and Cambridge, might be perceived as a rock-ribbed member of the establishment, he was a key figure in the investigation of the Chinook helicopter crash, the subsequent military cover-up, and was familiar with the outstanding investigative reporting of Computer Weekly in that instance. After meeting with Joe Hamilton and Bristow, Arbuthnot then called an acquaintance who was a high-ranking member of the National Federation of Sub-Postmasters.
Speaker 1the supposed sub-postmaster trade union who assured him that Horizon was perfectly fine and the individuals involved were prosecuted because of their own malfeasance. But after reading the Computer Weekly article, which detailed additional examples of potential Horizon problems, seven cases in all, Arbuthnot became skeptical. Could seven people have actually individually conspired to steal or misappropriate money? that was sure to be eventually discovered in an audit, essentially the alleged
Speaker 1perpetrators stealing from themselves. What Arbuthnot didn't understand but would become clear over time was that the National Federation was made up of highly paid management with decades on the job in positions that came out of a budget that was provided by the post office itself, an obvious conflict of interest. Would such a group champion a bunch of veritable independent contractors? And a scandal that would embarrass the very entity that provided them with their cushy, high-paying, non-demanding jobs? Unlikely.
Speaker 1In 2010, Arbuthnot began to inquire among his fellow MPs as to any other examples of similar cases of post office suspensions and prosecutions. He heard from 20 in total, another red flag. Government ministers responsible organizationally for administering the post office said technically an entity of the government, were eventually asked by MPs about the unusual number of sub-postmasters alleged to have misappropriated funds. They responded with boilerplate answers,
Speaker 1stating that Horizon was sound. The post office had thoroughly examined such cases and had acted appropriately, but would continue to review any such complaints in the future. Meanwhile, the post office and Fujitsu were about to, in 2010, roll out what was deemed an upgrade to the Horizon system called Horizon Online, which changed little at the end-user perspective, but transmitted data internally in real time. As the post
Speaker 1office was losing revenue from the government branches who were now providing direct deposit to their benefactors, bypassing the post office, it was felt that such an upgrade would be appealing to the financial institutions who might or did sell insurance issued credit cards, installed ATM terminals, and provided other financial service that hopefully would replace the revenue lost from British social services. The system upgrade only added to the horizon dysfunction.
Speaker 1Reports of doubling of cash receipts when in fact the lesser amount was accurate were widespread, creating massive deficits in a single transaction. Performance was so bad that the rollout was discontinued. Still, a post office official in charge of branch accounting circulated a company-wide memo dismissing any concerns over Horizon, which was described as, quote, robust, unquote, that the current prosecutions of defendants claiming issues with the system would still
Speaker 1be successful and that the system was tamper-proof and irrefutable. Such bravado in light of the actual facts and performance of the system was probably designed to maintain confidence in But this official also warned that any information concerning Horizon's potential issues would be legally consequential. The collective inference that any attempt to even investigate such a possibility was legally unwise. The managing director of the post office and many other high-level individuals were sent this compromising document. Ten years later,
Speaker 1this person, David Smith, when asked about the memo, said he couldn't remember receiving it. Inevitably, the increasing dysfunction in media coverage, sparse as it was, generated even more individuals coming out of the woodwork. Another BBC entity, station BBC Surrey, began an investigation after a reporter named Nick Wallace received a random tip from the husband of a woman named Seema Misra, who had been treated horribly by the post office, sacked,
Speaker 1financially ruined. and even imprisoned while pregnant as the result of alleged deaths. she denied incurring. In the course of his investigation, Wallace encountered another individual, a former prominent official in the NFSP, Michael Rudkin, who after an invitation to personally tour the Fujitsu Horizon facility to assuage any concerns on the part of the trade union, was inadvertently exposed by an unwitting employee tour guide to an actual terminal
Speaker 1location in which employees were routinely accessing sub-postmaster's account. This, if true, would be a bombshell that threatened not only any future prosecutions, but the convictions already obtained, as the post office had always claimed it had no ability to alter sub-postmaster accounts and was also doing so without informing sub-postmasters. To underscore how serious this information was, Rudkin was confronted at his home early on the morning after this tour
Speaker 1by an auditor that told him his own postal outpost was 40,000 pounds in the hole. He was suspended and threatened with termination if he didn't keep his mouth shut and resign from the NFSP. As his executive duties with the trade union took much of his time, his wife actually ran their postal counter at Ibstock. She was charged with false accounting and convicted. The inevitable court-ordered confiscation issued to make up the alleged missing money, essentially destroying their
Speaker 1related retail business. Because Wallace was a regional reporter, his focus did not include Rudkin's part of Britain. But this sobering tale indicated that the entire post office approach was way more than a bureaucratic attempt to hide a deficient computer. It demonstrated a level of corruption, deceit, and arrogance that was profoundly criminal. Wallace's subsequent story on the situation did include such individuals as Joe Hamilton and an interview of
Speaker 1James Arbuthnot, who wondered on camera if the post office was being heavy-handed, although not exactly the type of fire-and-brimstone criticism the victims might have desired. Even the hint from a prestigious member of the government that the post office was not acting in good faith was a significant development. This degree of coverage in a well-populated area of the UK generated even more sub-postmasters who emailed Wallace after his reporting aired. In addition, Alan Bates retained a law firm
Speaker 1to begin to file cases against the post office. The first such claim on behalf of Julian Wilson who was intimidated into a guilty plea, sentenced to community service, and had his assets attached over a claimed deficit of 27,000 pounds. His lawsuit claimed breach of contract, negligence, and misrepresentation. But the post office prosecution machinery continued to rampage forward. 55 prosecutions in 2010, 44 in 2011. In addition, the Horizon
Speaker 1system suffered a temporary complete breakdown in July 2011 of all pinpad systems, and in December a temporary breakdown of over 4,000 terminals. When these failures, as well as an article mentioning the IT problems at the post office, appeared in Private Eye, a popular satirical investigative journal, and became national news, Even board members of the post office began to ask about the integrity of Horizon. As late as 2012,
Speaker 1the post office general counsel minimized any concerns by responding within a board meeting that the system had been audited by parent Royal Mail internal audit with results verified by Deloitte. Counsel also pointed out that it had won every prosecution undertaken. Relying on evidence of a Horizon operating system, behaving appropriately. The methodology behind these successful prosecutions was omitted. 2012 would
Speaker 1also conclude with another 50 postal prosecutions. None of this was happening in a vacuum. The entire post office unit was in the process of being completely separated from royal mail, the ultimate goal, the privatization of mail and parcel delivery and streamlining the division into a profitable entity. To spearhead this transformation, on April 1, 2012, Paula Venels was promoted to the office of chief executive officer, the post office
Speaker 1branch's first ever. A veteran of various high-profile corporate senior marketing positions, Venels first joined the post office in 2007 and was steadily promoted. She claimed to be motivated to give back in a position that actually directly served the public interest. Her affiliation as vicar within the Church of England, making her officially Reverend Venals, certainly underlined a deeply moral and ethical conviction, at least on paper. With this promotion,
Speaker 1the British government added a £ 1. 3 billion subsidy aimed towards making the post office independently profitable by the year 2020. Thank you for listening to part one of this podcast
Speaker 1about Sir Alan Bates. Information for this podcast came from the book The Great Post Office Scandal by Nick Wallace. There are also additional photographs, bibliographical and musical information at bitesizedbiographies.com. Thank you for listening. Tell a friend about Bite-Sized Biographies.
For two decades, Alan Bates, an obscure sub-postmaster, successfully fought to expose the UK Post Office scandal, the worst miscarriage of justice in British history.