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Beginner's Mind

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#182 - How to Lead When You Don't Know Where You Are Going: 4 Lessons from Ben Horowitz (Part 2 of 2)

Sep 8, 202657 minAudio
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What does it mean when the most respected adviser in Silicon Valley tells you that you are the best chief executive he works with, while your company is heading straight into a wall? Bill Campbell said exactly that to Ben Horowitz. Campbell was advising Steve Jobs, Jeff Bezos and Eric Schmidt at the time, so Horowitz assumed the compliment was absurd. Campbell explained himself: there are plenty of good peacetime chief executives and plenty of good wartime ones, and almost nobody who can do both. Horowitz's own accounting of his career: peacetime chief executive for three days, wartime chief executive for eight years. This is the second half of a review of The Hard Thing About Hard Things. Part one covered how to survive the worst weeks. This half is about the job itself, and the way it changes underneath you while you are busy doing it. [AFFILIATE LINK TO THE BOOK] Four lessons, and two places where I part company with the book. Wartime CEO, peacetime CEO. Two situations that reward opposite behaviour, and the sixteen contrasts Horowitz draws between them. My first disagreement: his wartime leader is loud, and the ones I have watched save companies are calm, well dressed and listening. Volume is not decisiveness, and a generation of founders read that list and concluded otherwise. My second: Horowitz treats wartime as an episode. In deep tech and life science it is the standing condition, for decades. Moderna, BioNTech and Katalin Karikó are the evidence, and the numbers are in the episode. Ones and Twos. The chief executive's job splits into knowing what to do and getting the company to do it, and founders reliably come apart on the second one. Where I push back: at scale, the first skill is not knowing the answers. It is judging who has them, and holding one story that points a hundred expert answers in the same direction. Horowitz's own book says so in two passages he files under a different heading. Why the impressive senior hire produces nothing. Three new initiatives a quarter in a large company. Eight to ten a day in a small one. Rhythm mismatch, skill mismatch, the three interview questions that expose both, and what Berkshire Hathaway did when it faced the biggest succession in modern corporate history. Look for a market of one. Thirty investors say no and one says yes, and the round is closed. Why most of those thirty were never a judgment about your company, how to tell a fit rejection from a real one, and the discipline that keeps this from becoming permission to stop listening. This is a practical review for founders, chief executives, board members, investors and senior executives who build or finance hard companies, particularly in deep tech and life sciences. Part one is the previous episode, and it stands on its own if you want to start there. Chapters (00:00) Introduction: Two Chief Executives, Two Different Jobs (01:30) Lesson 4: Wartime CEO, Peacetime CEO, and Why Running the Wrong One Kills Companies (16:38) Lesson 5: Ones and Twos, and the Half of the Job Founders Get Wrong (28:26) Lesson 6: Why the Impressive Hire From the Big Company Produces Nothing (40:26) Lesson 7: Look for a Market of One, and What a Rejection Really Means (50:16) Key Takeaways and Wrap Up Follow Beginner's Mind for long-form conversations on leadership, capital, technology, and the people shaping what comes next. Ranked in the global top 10% of all podcasts, named #1 Deep Tech Podcast in 2025, and #8 Deep Tech Podcast in 2026 Send us Fan Mail Support the show Join the Podcast Newsletter: Link Your Next Move: Link

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Christian SoschnerThis is the second half of a review of The Hard Thing About Hard Things by Ben Horowitz. If you have not met him yet, Horowitz built a company called Loudcloud straight into the dot com collapse, took it public when the market wanted nothing to do with technology, sold it six years later for$1.6 billion, and then founded the venture capital firm and reason Horowitz. He wrote the book while he still remembered exactly how the bad years felt and that it was what makes it worth your time.

Christian SoschnerThe first half covered three lessons: the struggle and why no formula for success exists, why a chief executive who shields the team from bad news damages the company instead of protecting it, and how to lay off people in a way the people who stay can live with. If you missed it, go back and start there. It's episode number 181. These seven lessons build on each other, and the first three set up everything that follows.

Christian SoschnerFor everyone else, we pick up with the idea from this book that I use more than any other. Whether a company is at war or at peace, and why running the wrong script is a common way to lose a company that had every reason to survive. Here is lesson number four. Wartime CEO, peacetime CEO. Here is one question for you. Are you at war or at peace with your company? Most leaders cannot answer that about their own company.

Christian SoschnerThey know the numbers, they know the plan, they know what the board wants next quarter. Ask which of the two situations they are in, and they go quiet. Horowitz puts that question above almost anything else the chief executive decides. The two situations reward opposite behavior. Run the wrong mode for the moment, you are in, and you lose a company that had every reason to survive. And this is also the most quoted idea in the book.

Christian SoschnerIt is also the one I use most, and later in this chapter, I will show you where Horowitz gets it wrong. Here are his two modes, and he defines them cleanly in the book. Peace time in business means those times when a company has a large advantage over the competition in its core market and its market is growing. In times of peace, the company can focus on expanding the market and reinforcing the company's strengths. In wartime, a company is fanning off an imminent existential threat.

Christian SoschnerSuch a threat can come from a wide range of sources, including competition, dramatic macroeconomic change, market change, supply chain change, and so forth. And then the discovery which he calls the biggest of his management life. My greatest management discovery through the transition was that peacetime and wartime require radically different management styles. Interestingly, most management books describe peacetime CO techniques, and very few describe actually wartime.

Christian SoschnerRead that second sentence again. Walk into any airports bookshop. Almost every title on the business shelf documents companies during their good years. And Horowitz explains why. Be aware that management books tend to be written by management consultants who study successful companies during their times of peace. As a result, the resulting books describe the methods of peacetime CEOs. So the bookshelf sells your advice built for the situation you are least likely to be in.

Christian SoschnerThe operational difference comes down to how many things you get to do at once. In peacetime, leaders must maximize and broaden the current opportunity. In wartime, by contrast, the company typically has a single bullet in the chamber and must at all costs hit the target. The company's survival in wartime depends upon strict adherence and alignment to the single mission. One bullet, that is the whole difference. In peace, you widen, in war, you aim and focus.

Christian SoschnerThe origin of the idea as a compliment, Horowitz did not believe. Bill Campbell told him, Ben, you are the best CEO that I work with. And Horowitz thought this was absurd. Campbell was advising Steve Jobs, Jeff Bezos, and Alec Schmidt at the time, and in Horowitz's own words, his company was going straight into the war. Campbell explained himself.

Christian SoschnerYou're a peacetime and a wartime CEO. Horowitz's own accounting of the split is the funniest line in the chapter and the bleakest. By my calculation, I was a peacetime CEO for three days and wartime CEO for eight years. I still have a hard time shaking the wartime flashbacks. And he can name the exact moment he crossed over. Loudcloud was in trouble and he had quietly started a project he called Oxide, the software effort that became the whole company.

Christian SoschnerTwo of his employees, both with Stanford business degrees, booked the meeting and presented him with a 45 slide stack explaining that the decision was, in their words, quixotic, misguided, and downright stupid. When they finished, I said, Did I ask for this presentation? Those were the first words I spoke as I made the transition from a peacetime CEO to a wartime CEO.

Christian SoschnerFor the canonical wartime example, he goes to Andy Grove. In the mid-1980s, Japanese semiconductor manufacturers threatened Intel's core business and Grove took the company out of memory chips entirely. In Horowitz's words, the competitive threat which could have bankrupted the company was so great that Intel had to exit its core business, which employed 80% of its stuff. 80%.

Christian SoschnerGrove quotes an employee confronting him about it. Does it mean that you can conceive of Intel without being in the memory business? Grove. I swallowed hard and said, Yes, I guess I can. And all hell broke loose. The famous part of this chapter is a list of contrasts, 16 of them. Whoa, give you an idea, and every line that follows is Horowitz word for word. Peacetime CEO knows that proper protocol leads to winning.

Christian SoschnerWartime CEO violates protocols in order to win. Pacetime CEO spends time defining the culture, and a wartime CEO lets the war define the culture. Peacetime CEO always has a contingency plan. Wartime CEO knows that sometimes you've got to roll a hard six. A peacetime CEO strives for broad-based buy-in, and a wartime CEO neither indulges consensus building nor tolerates disagreements. Those are his pairs.

Christian SoschnerReads them and you feel the temperature change. Horowitz closes the section with four words that grant permission to anyone who has been apologizing for their own urgency. Sometimes you need to go to war. And here is where I disagree with Ben. Two things. The first is about what a wartime leader looks like. The second is about who this whole chapter applies to. Start with the empathy question. It is everywhere at the moment, and most people argue it in the wrong terms.

Christian SoschnerWhen times are good and people feel secure, an empathetic leader does very well. The system holds enough safety for people to think about belonging, recognition, and becoming who they want to be. Maslov's ladder and the upper ranks are where good work and good careers happen. That changes the moment an economic earthquake moves the ground. When the money is gone and the fret is close, people stop thinking about self-actualization and start thinking about survival.

Christian SoschnerWhat they want from a leader changes with it. And this is exactly the time when wartime leaders come into high demand. People who decide fast and move a team out of the danger zone. A special forces officer under fire skips the round of the room. His team wants to live and they keep following him for one reason only. They believe he can get them out of the danger zone. So take my position as a minute. Empathy is a peacetime instrument, and Stefai is running peacetime instruments in a war.

Christian SoschnerThe leader who convenes a workshop while the runway burns down calls it kindness. But actually it is negligence and everybody in the room knows it before he does. That officer skips explaining for one reason and it connects back to two chapters. He banked the trust in peacetime. Horowitz's own rule.

Christian SoschnerWhat you did in peacetime decides how much authority you have left on the day the war starts. Another part where I part company with the book. Horowitz wartime seal is loud. Three descriptions from his own list, word for word. Rarely speaks in a normal tone, completely intolerant and use profanity purposefully. Then Andy Grove humiliating a man in front of the room for arriving late. I have never followed that man and I have never watched him save a company.

Christian SoschnerThe wartime executives who did save companies stayed calm. Yes, calm. They held themselves well and they dressed the part. They stayed relaxed in the room and listened more than they spoke. Then they made a decision that left several people deeply unhappy and they never raised the voice to make it stick. Volume is not what makes a wartime leader. Decisiveness is. Horowitz has fused the two, and the mistake is expensive because a generation of founders read that list and concluded that being difficult is the same thing as being serious.

Christian SoschnerThe calm operator who makes the hard call and then stands in the corridor afterwards frightens a competitor far more than the one who shots. And then the structural disagreement, which matters more than the first one. Horowitz treats wartime as the exception. Three days of peace, eight years of war, and the war is the thing that happened to him. In TeepTech and Life Science, wartime is a default condition and it runs for decades. Yesterday handed me the clearest example anybody could ask for. Merck and Moderna reported that the personalized mRNA cancer therapy given with K-Truder met its endpoints in a phase free trial of 1,137 patients with completely resected metanoma.

Christian SoschnerFirst positive late-stage result for an mRNA cancer treatment in history. Moderna closed up 177%. Now count backwards. The University of Pennsylvania demoted Kathalin Kariko four times for staying with mRNA. She took the paycard and kept going for a cancer diagnosis of her own. She met Drew Weismann at the office Photokopia in 1998. Nature rejected the paper that solved the inflammation problem as an incremental contribution.

Christian SoschnerScience rejected it too. Immunity published it in 2005. They received the Nobel Prize for it 18 years later. Moderna offered Stephanie Panzel the job and turned it down. Moderna offered Stefanie Panzel the job and he turned it down. His words? I did not believe the data. That's impossible. mRNA will never be a drug. He took it anyway, and the scientists he tried to recruit told him he was crazy.

Christian SoschnerUgo Sahin and Utzlem Turigy founded Ganymed in 2001 and BioNTech in 2008, chasing an individualized cancer vaccine. The market refused to fund at the price they needed. By 2019, the market delivered its verdict. Biotech asked$18 to$20 a share at their IPO. Finally, it was priced at$15 and raised$150 million. Moderna had listed a year earlier and closed its first day below the offer price. Then a coronavirus arrived.

Christian SoschnerFor about two years, both companies were national heroes, and that was their peacetime. Real peacetime. The kind Horowitz describes a dominant position, a growing market, and the freedom to widen. It lasted for about two years. Then the order stopped and the market brought both companies off as finished. In March this year, Sahina and Tudor G announced they are leaving BioNTech to build their third company, and the stock fell more than 20% in a single day.

Christian SoschnerFive months after that, the phase three result came in. And that is the ratio in this industry. Two years of peace inside four decades of war. For most of her working life, the field told Cariko the thing was impossible and she was right the entire time. Horowitz three days of peace and eight years of war starts to look comfortable. Think about what one of these companies is. It operates in a field most of the market ignores.

Christian SoschnerCapital scars and arrives in tranches tied to results that may never come. The clinical clock runs longer than the funding does. The bills arrive monthly regardless. There is no dominant core business to defend because there is no core business yet. That is a war. A quiet, slow, and glamorous war, and it is where these companies live from the first round until they either work or die. Which means most of the room listening to this is running wartime conditions while reading peace books, taking P-STEM advice and answering to boards that grades them on peacetime criteria.

Christian SoschnerThat gap is what this chapter is about, and you close it by naming the mode out loud. Before any other item on your next leadership agenda, put one question on the table and make everyone answer it out loud. Are we at war or at peace right now, today? Then take your last five significant decisions and check which mode you made each one in. If the answers do not match, you have found something more useful than anything else on that agenda.

Christian SoschnerHere are my three questions for your next board meeting. The first one, are you at war or at peace and when did that last change? The second, which of your management habits belong to the mode you are no longer in? And the third, if this is wartime, what is the single bullet and can every person in this room name it? The mode is a diagnosis, not a personality. It changes. A leader who cannot tell which one he is in will keep applying the right medicine to the wrong illness, which leaves the other half of the job.

Christian SoschnerThe mode is a diagnosis, not a personality. It changes. A leader who cannot tell which one he is in will keep applying the right medicine to the wrong illness, which leaves the other half of the job. Most founders can tell you what their company should do next. Far fewer can make a hundred people do it, and most find out which group they belong to far too late. Here is lesson number five. Ones and twos.

Christian SoschnerThere is a moment in a company's life when the job of the chief executive turns into a different job. The founder misses it.

Christian SoschnerThe board misses it with him. 18 months later, somebody notices that the company has become chaotic or it has become rigid, and the conversation turns to whether the founder can scale. By then, the diagnosis is a verdict about the person which is the least useful form it can take within a company. Horowitz gives that seam a name and a vocabulary. It is the most personally uncomfortable idea in the book if you are running a company and the most useful one if you are on a board.

Christian SoschnerAnd I use it constantly in my advisory. The first half of it is also wrong, and I'm going to show you that the book itself agrees with me. He starts by cutting the job in two halves. He says, I will focus the discussion on two core skills for running an organization. First, knowing what to do. Second, getting the company to do what you know. While being a great CEO requires both skills, most CEOs tend to be more comfortable with one or the other.

Christian SoschnerI call managers who are happier setting the direction of the company once, and those who more enjoy making the company perform at the highest level tools. The portraits are precise enough that most people recognize themselves inside the sentence or two. Here is what he says. Ones like spending most of their time gathering information from a broad variety of sources, from employees to customers to competitors. Ones love making decisions.

Christian SoschnerOnes have great strategic minds and enjoy nothing more than a good game of eight-dimensional chess against their best competitors. The blind spot, in his words, ones sometimes get bored with many of the important execution details required to run a company, such as process design, goal setting, structured accountability, training, and performance management. And then the other type. Twos, on the other hand, thoroughly enjoy the process of making the company run well.

Christian SoschnerThey insist upon super clear goals and strongly prefer not to change goals or direction unless absolutely necessary. And I think one of the most famous pairs of ones and twos in the economic history of the last 50 years is actually at Apple, Steve Jobs and Tim Cook. And now guess who's the one and who's the two? And the twos blind spot, which is one of the best observations in the chapter, where a one might be perfectly comfortable spending one day a week reading, studying, and thinking.

Christian SoschnerDoing so would make it two very nervous because it would not feel like work to them. A day a week thinking to one person, that is the job, to the other, it is not work at all. Now, the sentence that makes founders go quiet. Orowitz says, most founding CEOs tend to be ones. When founding CEOs fail, a significant reason is that they never invest the time to be competent enough in the two tasks to direct those activities effectively.

Christian SoschnerThe resulting companies become too chaotic to reach their full potential and the CEO ends up being replaced. The FAIA runs both ways. If a CEO ignores the dimension of management she doesn't like, she generally fails. Ones end up in chaos and twos fail to pivot when necessary. The whole thing exists to fill a hole Horowitz found in somebody else's research. Jim Collins showed in Good to Great that internal chief executive candidates dramatically outperform external ones.

Christian SoschnerHorowitz response. Collins does not, however, explain why internal candidates sometimes fail as well. I will attempt to do so here. His two examples are worth having. Microsoft in 2000 replaced Bill Gates, who Horowitz calls a prototypical one with Steve Barmer, who was literally his number two. The consequence he predicts and then documents. The natural ones leave. He names Paul Meritz and Brad Silverberg.

Christian SoschnerGeneral Electric in 1981 went the other way and promoted Jack Welch from two levels down, past all his superiors, the youngest chief executive in the company's history. Horowitz's line. In very short order, almost none of the original GE executives remained under Welch. And then he does the thing that keeps the book honest. He admits the framework does not solve the problem. The big conclusion we Be a big disappointment for those looking for an answer.

Christian SoschnerThe answer is there is no easy answer. My problem is only with the first half of his definition. However, it says the first core skill is knowing what to do. And that is the wrong description of the job, and it stops describing the job almost at once. When one person is starting out and building a first team, yes. The founder is the only one in the building who can know, so he has to.

Christian SoschnerThat phase is real and it is usually short. By the time the company is scaling, no chief executive on earth knows what to do across chemistry, manufacturing, clinical operations, regulatory strategy, commercial launch, finance, and law. The idea that they should is a fantasy that has cost a great many companies a great deal of money, most often when a founder overruled somebody who knew. So what is the job?

Christian SoschnerTwo things hiring the right person into each key function, people who do know what to do. And then holding the whole team pointed at one shared vision, one mission, one goal. I agree with the second half of Horowitz model without reservation. Getting the company to do what you know means alignment, execution, and clearing the path so people can work. That is the job, and he describes it better than anyone. Now, watch what happens when you go back to his own text.

Christian SoschnerOn hiring in a different chapter, he writes, As a general manager, you must hire and manage people who are far more competent at their jobs than you would be at their jobs. In fact, often you will have to hire and manage people to do jobs that you have never done. How many CEOs have been head of HR, engineering, sales, marketing, finance, and legal all at the same time? Probably none. And that is my argument in his own words.

Christian SoschnerThe knowledge lives inside the functions. The job is picking the people who know what to do. Then on the story, which he treats as the output of all strategic work, he writes this. The CEO doesn't have to be the creator of the vision, nor does she have to be the creator of the story. But she must be the keeper of the vision and the story. Keeper, not creator. Again, the author states my position for me. So the material is all in the book.

Christian SoschnerHe has filed it in the wrong drawer. Building the team appears under his second question. Can the chief executive get the company to do what she knows as though hiring were an execution task? At scale, selection is the highest leverage judgment call a chief executive makes, and it belongs on the first axis. Restate the model that way and it works better. The first skill is judgment about people. Knowing who has the answers and keeping one story that makes a hundred separate expert answers points the same direction.

Christian SoschnerThe second skill is what Horowitz says it is. My argument has one hard limit and it bites hardest in the room I am talking to. Selection demands content. A chief executive who cannot evaluate a technical claim cannot tell a genuinely excellent scientific officer from a plausible one. And their own hire will sell them inside a year. In Deep Tech, you need enough domain judgment to assess the people, even where you will never do their jobs.

Christian SoschnerDelegate the answer, keep the judgment about who gives it. And an entrepreneur who is excellent in that people selection is actually Elon Musk. And this is one of the reasons why I think his companies perform extraordinarily well. Think about SpaceX and Tesla. This matters beyond the vocabulary. Orwit's own test for the second skill is a question worth taking into any company. How easy is it for any given individual contributor to get her job done?

Christian SoschnerHis verdict on the test is blunt. When a CEO fails to scale, it's usually along this dimension. In practice, very few CEOs get an A on this particular test. Very few. Not the incompetent ones. Very few of all of them. So have this conversation before the 18 months run out and have it in this vocabulary. Failing to scale is not a character verdict. It is a namable gap on one of two axes, and a gap is something you hire against.

Christian SoschnerA verdict is something you get replaced over. Two questions scored out of 10 in writing tonight. Do I know what this company should do next? Can I get this company to do it? Then hand the same two questions to your two most senior people and ask them to score you anonymously with a deadline. The gap between your numbers and theirs is the most valuable management information you will get this quarter, and it costs nothing.

Christian SoschnerAnd here are my three questions for your next board meeting. One, which of the two skills comes naturally to you and who on this leadership team owns the other one? The second one, how easy is it for any individual contributor here to get their job done? And what evidence do you have for that answer? And the third one, over the last 12 months, has this company been staffed of direction or of execution?

Christian SoschnerThe skill that gets a company funded is not the skill that gets it scaled. The job changes silently. The founders who survive that seam are the ones who went looking for that moment, it changed. Every board reaches for the same fix first. Bring in somebody impressive from a large company. That fix fails more often than it works. And the next lesson is about why. Here is lesson number six why it's hard to bring big company executives into little companies.

Christian SoschnerWe all met Jensen Wang earlier in this episode running Nvidia with dozens of direct reports and no private one-on-one meetings. Now picture him walking out of that building tomorrow to go and run Berkshire Hathaway. Or run it the other way. Warren Buffett and Charlie Manga at the height of Berkshire 20 years ago, deciding they understand capital allocation well enough to go and run Nike.

Christian SoschnerYou probably laughed, or at least you winced, which means you already know the thing this chapter is about. Excellence belongs to a particular job inside a particular organization at a particular size. And at a particular point in time. Move any one of those four and the person you hired disappears. And yet, this is the single most common expensive mistake in company building and boards cause most of it.

Christian SoschnerHorowitz opens with a scene, and every founder listening has either lived it or watched it from a board seat. He says, The board encourages you to bring in some Binder Dandet executives, but the venture capitalist on the board says, you are undershooting. This is going to be a huge company. We can attract better talent. So you aim high and bring in a super accomplished head of sales. This guy or woman has run huge organizations with thousands of employees.

Christian SoschnerHe has stellar references and even looks apart. Your venture capitalists love him because he has an awesome resume. Note who is speaking in that paragraph. The investor on the board using the word undershooting. Holds that thought for a minute because it comes back. Then the section heading, which is just six months later. He says, fast forward six months, and everyone in the company is wondering why the sales or marketing or finance or product guy who has produced nothing got such a monster stock option package.

Christian SoschnerWhat the frack just happened? Horowitz answer starts with a sentence that sounds obvious and it is not. He says, when I was managing thousands of people at Hewlett Bacar after the sale of Opsware, there was an incredible number of incoming demands on my time.

Christian SoschnerEveryone wanted a piece of me. Little companies wanted to partner with me or sell themselves to me. People in my organization needed approvals, other business units needed my help, customers wanted my attention, and so forth and so on. He is describing himself in that job as precisely the executive who fails in a startup. And then he gives the number that makes it concrete. Most skilled big company executives will tell you that if you have more than three new initiatives in a quarter, you are trying to do too much.

Christian SoschnerThree a quarter. And now to the other world. He says, When you are a startup executive, nothing happens unless you make it happen. In the early days of a company, you have to take eight to ten new initiatives a day, or the company will stand still. There is no inertia that's putting the company in motion. Without massive input from you, the company will stay at rest.

Christian SoschnerThat is not a difference of degree. It's a different occupation. From it, he names two failure modes. The first is rhythm. He says, your executive has been conditioned to wait for the emails to come in, wait for the phone to ring, and wait for the meetings to get scheduled. In your company, he will be waiting a long time. If your new executive waits as per his training, your other employees will become suspicious. You will hear things like, What does that guy do all day long?

Christian SoschnerAnd why did he get so many options? The second is skill set. Running a large organization requires very different skills than creating and building an organization. The big question here is how to screen for it, and he has the fix in two lines. He says, screen for devastating mismatches in the interview process. Take integration as seriously as interviewing. He gives three interview questions and each one has a trap attached.

Christian SoschnerWhat will you do in your first month on the job? Beware of answers that overemphasize learning. And the sentence that does the real work, beware of any indication that the candidate needs to be interrupt-driven rather than setting the pace personally. The interrupts will never come. What you want instead? Candidates who come in with more new initiatives than you think are possible. How will your new job differ from your current job?

Christian SoschnerBeware of candidates who think that too much of their experience is immediately transferable. Why do you want to join a small company? Beware of equity being the primary motivation. 1% of nothing is still nothing. Hire the person who wants to create more than they want to own. Then integration, where almost every company fails because the search consumed already all the energy. Force them to create. Make sure that they get it.

Christian SoschnerContent-free executives have no value in startups. He recommends a daily meeting where the new executive brings every question about everything they heard that day and did not understand, and then this. If they don't have any questions, consider firing them. If in 30 days you don't feel that they are coming up to speed, definitely fire them. And here are three things from my side to add. The chapter is right. It is also incomplete in three places, and each of them is where I match this fail in life science.

Christian SoschnerThe first one is the one I opened with. Every company is a unique organism, and excellence inside one of them travels badly into another. Berkshire Halfway proved that in public at the largest succession in modern corporate history. They passed over every celebrated chief executive available and promoted from inside.

Christian SoschnerGreg Abel took over on the 1st of January this year after decades in the business running their energy operations. The most respected capital allocators alive concluded that the right person for their organism was already inside it. That decision is the whole lesson made by people who had every option available to them. The second edition is about what kind of person you are getting, and it is a distinction I use in every hiring conversation. In any company, the real driving force is a small number of people.

Christian SoschnerEveryone else is supporting, which is necessary and honorable, and it is a different job. Frank Slutman, who runs ServiceNow and Snowflake, puts it as drivers and passengers. Drivers take the wheel and own the outcome. Passengers ride along on momentum somebody else created. Now think about a large corporation. It has enormous momentum. A capable passenger inside it produces excellent results for years. The results are real, and from the outside, a driver and a passenger look almost identical.

Christian SoschnerTake that person into a company with no momentum at all, and the difference becomes visible in about six weeks. So the interview question underneath all of Horowitz's interview questions is this one. In your last big win, were you driving or were you in the vehicle? The third edition is about resource constraint, and it is the one that surprises people most. In a large corporation, there is somebody for every problem. Legal question, there is a department.

Christian SoschnerData problem, there is a team. Something breaks at 2 in the afternoon, you raise a ticket. You get used to that quickly and you stop noticing that you are used to it. In a small company, you are the department. You prioritize brutally, you do a great deal yourself, and every single day you drop tasks that genuinely should be done because there is no one to do them and there never will be. That last part is the real test, and it tests tolerance rather than stamina, leaving good work undone on purpose every day without it eroding you.

Christian SoschnerSome very senior people find that liberating, others find it unbearable, and they will not tell you which they are because they do not know until they are in it. Now back to the board. Because I said the investor's line would return. It was you are undershooting. We can attract better talent. That sentence in the book comes from the venture capitalist on the board, and it is where a large share of these hires begin. Boards optimize for the resume, partly because a famous name is defensible at the next partner meeting in a way that an unknown operator is not.

Christian SoschnerThe resume that impresses a board describes a different job from the one you are filling. If you are on a board and you hear yourself saying that sentence, ask the next question out loud. Which of these two jobs has this person done before? Hiring in Europe changes one thing about Horowitz's advice. His 30-day rule, decide in a month and fire if they are not coming up to speed, collides with most employment law on this continent and with our notice periods.

Christian SoschnerThe judgment behind it holds. And it is this one. The rare capability this person brings, which our current team lacks, is blank. If you cannot fill in that blank with something specific, you are adding just headcount rather than hiring talent, and the search will find you a resume rather than a person.

Christian SoschnerOnce you can write it, ask every candidate what they will do in their first month and count the initiatives. Here are my three questions for your next board meeting. The first one, your last senior hire. And the third, how many hours of your own time are booked for integrating your next executive this quarter?

Christian SoschnerThe executive was never the problem. You bought an excellent one for a job that does not exist inside your company and then left them alone to discover it. Everything in this episode so far assumes you are still in business. The last lesson is about staying in it. And here is the final lesson. Look for a market of one. 300 emails, five replies, and three meetings. If you have ever raised money or sold into an enterprise, you know those numbers and you know what happens in your head on the morning you count them.

Christian SoschnerSomething must be wrong, and your mind starts working down the list. The pitch, the price, the evaluation, the target list, and finally, there is something wrong with you. That instinct is the subject of the last lesson, and Horowitz takes it apart in the space of a paragraph. The line is his own in his own narration. He says, During this time I learned the most important rule of raising money privately. Look for a market of one. You only need one investor to say yes, so it's best to ignore the other 30 who say no.

Christian SoschnerA market of one. Forget the conversation rate and forget the funnel. One believer, and your search is over. The context gives that line its authority because he wrote it from inside a collapse. The dot-com crash had arrived. The NASDAQ peaked at 5,048.62 on the 10th of March 2000 and eventually fell below 1200, a drop of about 80%. LoudCloud had already spent nearly all of the$66 million it raised in equity and debt.

Christian SoschnerMost of the customers were.com startups, which is to say most of their customers were about to stop existing. They pitched soft bank capital. Bill Campbell on the board and when connected there offered to find out afterwards how it had gone, all of its rights. I asked Bill what did he say? Bill replied in his raspy coach's voice, Ben, well, honestly, they thought you were smoking crack. With nearly 300 employees and very little cash left, I felt like I was going to die.

Christian SoschnerIt was the first time I'd felt that way as CEO of Loutcloud, but not nearly the last. Take the position seriously for a second. You have a full payroll to meet almost no cash in the market in freefall. And the feedback coming back through a friendly channel is that professional investors think you are on drugs. Then in the next passage, he says, we eventually found investors for a Series C round at an amazing 700 million pre-money valuation and raised 120 million.

Christian SoschnerSame company, same quota, same story in the room. $120 million at a$700 million valuation weeks after somebody concluded he was smoking crack. That is what a market of one looks like in practice. The no's and the yes were describing the same company, the same story pitched by the same person. Now the part I refused to leave out because without it, this becomes a fundraising fairy tale. Horowitz's next line is, and then the wheels came off.

Christian SoschnerWe finished the third quarter of 2000 with 37 million in bookings, not the 100 million that we had forecast. Read those two events together because they happened almost simultaneously. He raised at the 700 million dollar valuation and missed his quarterly forecast by 63%, which means he had to tell his investors right after their investment that basically what he promised he can't deliver. So the rule is a second half.

Christian SoschnerEveryone quotes the first. A market of one gets you the round. It does not get you a business and it does not get you lasting trust. The S is money, not proof, and money buys your time to find out whether you were right. For anyone on a board, that gives you two things to watch and they point in opposite directions. A founder who stopped raising after eight noes was running a referendum instead of a search. And an oversubscribed round at the number the business cannot support is a bill coming to you.

Christian SoschnerHorowitz collected both of those in a single quarter. You hear an echo of Peter Thiel here. Be precise about it because the two men are saying different things. Thiel's argument in 0 to 1 is about customers, not capital. His words. Every startup is small at the start. Every monopoly dominates a large share of its market. Therefore, every startup should start with a very small market. Always are on the side of starting too small. And his famous interview question: What important roof do very few people agree with you on?

Christian SoschnerHorovitz is talking about investors. Teal is talking about markets. Different domains and anyone who tells you the market of one line is steals has confused the two, which is easy to do. Where they converge is underneath. Both are saying that the number of people who agree with you tells you nothing about whether you are right. Teal says a valuable company does what the rest of the market has left alone, so broad arrangement is a warning.

Christian SoschnerHorowitz says a completed round needs one signature. So Broad's disagreement is noise. Same instinct, opposite ends of the balance sheet. Here is why the no's happen. And I would like to add something. Ignore the 30 no's is good advice and very hard to follow, and I want to name the reason because it is hard and usually happens. We are all consumers. Every one of us spends most of our life on the other side of a transaction that works like this. Millions of buyers, tiny checks, a product under 10 euros, a decision in four seconds.

Christian SoschnerThat is the form of commerce we absorb from birth, and it is the shape every marketing voice online is describing when they talk about millions of buyers and conversion rates. Business to business inverts all of it. Long processes, large checks, very few deals. In venture capital, a fund makes a handful of new investments a year out of a thousand conversations. So when you send 300 emails and get free meetings, your consumer brain runs the consumer arithmetic and returns a verdict.

Christian SoschnerThis is a catastrophic failure rate. Something must be broken. Go find it. And then you start doing damage. You cut the price, you cut the valuation, and you rewrite the story to be more agreeable, which usually means less specific, which usually makes everything worse. So look at what a no in this market really means. In my experience, price is rarely the reason. The real reasons are strategic fit, personality fit, territorial fit, or plain availability of capital.

Christian SoschnerA fund that is fully invested will still take your meeting. They will read your deck, ask good questions, and update their market map, and they will do all of that against the fact they cannot change. The fund has no investable capital right now. Change your terms and the answer stays the same. Rewrite your deck and the answer stays the same. The answer described their own balance sheet and your company was never in the market they were shopping in, which means your 30 nodes are 30 different states or 30 different counterparties, and the great majority of those states have nothing whatsoever to do with you.

Christian SoschnerPush that argument far enough and it becomes a license to ignore all feedback, and I have watched founders do exactly that. So keep yourself honest with your discipline. Sort the nose by the reason. Wrong stage, wrong sector, no dry powder, conflicting portfolio company, geography outside the mandate. That is fit, and fit is noise. But when 10 different investors independently tell you the same substantive thing that they do not believe the data or the market, or that this team can execute, they are handing you the only real market research you will ever get for free, and it arrives disguised as rejection.

Christian SoschnerFit reasons keep going. The same substantive objection ten times, stop and listen. So accept the no's, sort them and keep working until you reach the one yes. That yes is the only outcome that changes everything. Before you build any list, write the profile of the single investor for whom your company is the obvious deal. Name their stage, their sector, their geography, and the portfolio company they already own that yours belongs next to. Then build the target list backwards from that profile instead of working down a ranked list of famous names.

Christian SoschnerMost races fail on list construction long before they fail in a meeting. Here are my three questions for your next board meeting. The first one. The second one, who is the one investor for whom this company is the obvious fit and has anyone reached out to them yet? And the third one, if the round closed tomorrow at a great valuation, what would still be broken in this business on Monday morning?

Christian SoschnerYou need one investor, the judgment to know which knows whenever about you, and the memory that money buys time, not proof. That is the last lesson. Now the part that decides whether any of it was worth your time. What you do with it next Monday. Here is the final part. My key takeaways. Seven lessons and one core idea is running through all of them. Name it, say it, do it well.

Christian SoschnerKnow which war you are in. Know which half of the job you are worse at. Hire for the company you have. Find the one yes. That is the book in seven moves. Every one of them starts this week. One, name it. Say the thing you are most afraid of out loud to someone with the skill to help. The point is to get more minds onto the problem rather than to prove you can hold it alone.

Christian SoschnerTo say it. Announce the change where people hear it and tell them you want bad news the day it exists. Three. Do it well. Draft the three lines a manager reads on somebody's birthday in your own words, months before you need them. Then rehearse those lines with the people who will one day need to speak them. For know which war you are in.

Christian SoschnerOpen your next leadership meeting with a single question and make everyone answer loud. War or peace, what is it today? Then audit your reasoned decisions against whatever answer the room gives you. 5. Know which half of the job you are worse at. Tonight, score yourself out of 10 on knowing what to do and again on getting the company to do it. Then let your two most senior people score you anonymously and study the gap.

Christian Soschner6. Hire for the company you have. Name the rare capability your team lacks before the search opens. When that name refuses to come, you're filling a seat rather than hiring talent and every candidate afterwards will look impressive. 7. Find the one yes. Describe the single investor for whom this is the obvious deal, then work your target list backwards from that description.

Christian SoschnerRounds die in list building long before they die in a meeting. 7 moves, run one. Pick the one that made you look up while you were listening. The one where you recognized your own company or your own week. Put it in the calendar before Friday with a name and a date so it survives contact with Monday. One single move applied beats always seven you just admire. Every single time. The other six rules keep.

Christian SoschnerThe book, keep it. This episode, keep it. But what changes your company is the single thing you do with it. Two honest limits before you go and buy this book. It was published in 2014. No artificial intelligence, no remote work, nothing about the capital environment of the last five years. And every example is American software and enterprise infrastructure. You will find nothing in here about a 10-year clinical timeline, a regulator, or a science risk you cannot engineer your way past.

Christian SoschnerWhat survives both of those is the frame, and the frame is why I choose it. The situations, Horowitz names do not age, and neither does the vocabulary he built for them. One more thing about the man, which is the real reason to trust the book. He publishes the layoff he got wrong. He prints the email where his own employee calls him stupid and then agrees with the verdict. He tells you the investor who called him a fake chief executive in front of his co-founders was right.

Christian SoschnerOperators rarely write about themselves at that resolution, and everything else in the book rests on it. So three things. Get the book. The hard thing about hard things by Ben Horowitz. The link is in the show notes. Read it beside a book about somebody winning because this one is about surviving, and you need both to see the whole picture. Pick one move from the seven and run it this week. Not all of them, just one. And if it was worth your time, follow the show.

Christian SoschnerThis is what I do with the book that earn it always with the same question in front of me. What can a serious builder or investor use on Monday morning? One last thing for anyone listening from inside the hard part. Horowitz was 300 employees and six weeks of cash away from the end, with the market telling him he was finished. And he wrote the only line from this book I would put on a wall. Your job is to find it.

Christian SoschnerThank you for your time, and I will see you in the next episode.

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