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AI Security Ops

AI Security Ops artwork

AI News Stories | Episode 36

Jan 22, 202635 minAudio

This week on AI Security Ops, the team breaks down how attackers are weaponizing AI and the tools around it: a critical n8n zero-day that can lead to unauthenticated remote code execution, prompt-injection “zombie agent” risks tied to ChatGPT memory, a zero-click-style indirect prompt injection scenario via email/URLs, and malicious Chrome extensions caught siphoning ChatGPT/DeepSeek chats at scale. They close with a reminder that the tactics are often “same old security problems,” just amplified by AI - so lock down orchestration, limit browser extensions, and keep sensitive data out of chat tools. Key stories discussed 1) n8n (“n-eight-n”) zero-day → unauthenticated RCE risk https://thehackernews.com/2026/01/critical-n8n-vulnerability-cvss-100.html The hosts discuss a critical flaw in the n8n workflow automation platform where a workflow-parsing HTTP endpoint can be abused (via a crafted JSON payload) to achieve remote code execution as the n8n service account. Because automation/orchestration platforms often have broad internal access, one compromise can cascade quickly across an organization’s automation layer. ai-news-stories-episode-36 Practical takeaway: don’t expose orchestration platforms directly to the internet; restrict who/what can talk to them; treat these “glue” systems as high-impact targets and assess them like any other production system. ai-news-stories-episode-36 2) “Zombie agent” prompt injection via ChatGPT Memory https://www.darkreading.com/endpoint-security/chatgpt-memory-feature-prompt-injection The team talks about research describing an exploit that stores malicious instructions in long-term memory, then later triggers them with a benign prompt - leading to potential data leakage or unsafe tool actions if the model has integrations. The discussion frames this as “stored XSS vibes,” but harder to solve because the “feature” (following instructions/context) is also the root problem. ai-news-stories-episode-36 User-side mitigation themes: consider disabling memory, keep chats cleaned up, and avoid putting sensitive data into chat tools - especially when agents/tools are involved. ai-news-stories-episode-36 3) “Zero-click” agentic abuse via crafted email/URL (indirect prompt injection) https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/new-zeroclick-attack-chatgpt/ Another story describes a crafted URL delivered via email that could trigger an agentic workflow (e.g., email summarization / agent actions) to export chat logs without explicit user interaction. The hosts largely interpret this as indirect prompt injection - a pattern they expect to keep seeing as assistants gain more connectivity. ai-news-stories-episode-36 Key point: even if the exact implementation varies, auto-processing untrusted content (like email) is a persistent risk when the model can take actions or access history. ai-news-stories-episode-36 4) Malicious Chrome extensions stealing ChatGPT/DeepSeek chats (900k users) https://thehackernews.com/2026/01/two-chrome-extensions-caught-stealing.html Two Chrome extensions posing as AI productivity tools reportedly injected JavaScript into AI web UIs, scraped chat text from the DOM, and exfiltrated it - highlighting ongoing extension supply-chain risk and the reality that “approved store” doesn’t mean safe. ai-news-stories-episode-36 Advice echoed: minimize extensions, separate browsers/profiles for sensitive activities, and treat “AI sidebar” tools with extra skepticism. ai-news-stories-episode-36 5) APT28 credential phishing updated with AI-written lures https://thehackernews.com/2026/01/russian-apt28-runs-credential-stealing.html The closing story is a familiar APT pattern - phishing emails with malicious Office docs leading to PowerShell loaders and credential theft - except the lure text is AI-generated, making it more consistent/convincing (and harder for users to spot via grammar/tone). ai-news-stories-episode-36 The conversation stresses that “don’t click links” guidance is oversimplified; verification and layered controls matter (e.g., disabling macros org-wide). ai-news-stories-episode-36 Chapter Timestamps (00:00) - Intro & Sponsors (01:16) - 1) n8n zero-day → unauthenticated RCE (09:00) - 2) “Zombie agent” prompt injection via ChatGPT Memory (19:52) - 3) “Zero-click” style agent abuse via crafted email/URL (indirect prompt injection) (23:41) - 4) Malicious Chrome extensions stealing ChatGPT/DeepSeek chats (~900k users) (29:59) - 5) APT28 phishing refreshed with AI-written lures (34:15) - Closing thoughts: “AI genie is out of the bottle” + safety reminders Click here to watch a video of this episode. Creators & Guests Brian Fehrman - Host Bronwen Aker - Host Derek Banks - Host Brought to you by: Black Hills Information Security https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com Antisyphon Training https://www.antisyphontraining.com/ Active Countermeasures https://www.activecountermeasures.com Wild West Hackin Fest https://wildwesthackinfest.com 🔗 Register for FREE Infosec Webcasts, Anti-casts & Summits https://poweredbybhis.com

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Transcript

From the show. Tap a time to play from there.

Bronwen AkerWelcome to AI Security Ops, the weekly show where we cut through the hype and dig into how AI is being weaponized and how we can defend against it. This week's headlines range from prompt injection exploits that turn ChatGPT into a data leak tool, a critical vulnerability discovered in the n eight n platform, and malicious Chrome extensions siphoning AI chat histories, not to mention a classic a p t 28 credential stealing campaign that now leans on AI generated phishing lures. Fun times. This episode is brought to you by Black Hills Information Security and Antisyphon Training. BHIS helps organizations find real world security gaps before attackers do through penetration testing, adversary emulation, and purple teamwork.

Antisyphon delivers hands on practitioner led training built around real attacks and real tools. So you can use what you learn immediately. Learn more at blackhillsinfosec.com and antisiphontraining.com. So the first story that we have is about a zero day in n eight n, which is an open source workflow automation platform. The flaw resides in the HTTP endpoint that parses workflow definitions without proper authentication checks.

An attacker can send a graphic JSON payload that triggers remote code execution with the privileges of the n eight m service account effectively taking over the host. Now because n eight m often runs with elevated rights to access internal APIs, the impact can cascade across an organization's automation layer very quickly. Automation platforms like n eight n are increasingly the glue of modern infrastructure. So a single remote code execution vulnerability can compromise the entire the entire pipeline. So with that introduction, I'm gonna open up the floor.

What do you gentlemen have to say about this? I have wanted to dive into n8m, but, you know, only so many hours in a day. What do you think?

Brian FehrmanYeah. So Derek and I have both been playing around with this quite a bit as well as a couple other people I know at the company, Bo, has been playing around with this

Derek Banksa

Brian Fehrmanlot. One of the baits we're still having is it n eight n or is it Nathan? Which I said to Derek the other day is kind of like the southern pronunciation of Nathan.

Bronwen AkerAccording to the n eight n website, it is n eight n. So

Brian FehrmanYeah. n8n Alright.

Derek BanksThat's what I've heard most folks on YouTube saying, but I do like Nathan. It's Nathan. Yeah.

Brian FehrmanIt just kinda rolls right off the tongue. Nathan.

Derek BanksWell, I mean, is it Azure? Is it Azure? Is it Azure? No one knows. Azure. Azure.

Brian FehrmanIf you want to be fancy about it.

Bronwen AkerPotato, potato. Can we call the whole thing off?

Brian FehrmanBut this I mean, this the the tool though is awesome. It makes automating these different workflows or throwing together a workflow automation, I'll say, so much easier. I mean, could you go out and code this all up yourself? Certainly. I mean, you could go out, you could put together the discrete Python pieces. I mean, you could have Chachapiti and Anthropic, whatever you like to use, help you put together these pieces. Sure. You can do that. But what you get here is that the whole drag and drop, like, visual style of programming. So if anyone's ever played with something like LabVIEW before, which I've played around with a whole lot back when I worked at the university and dealing with data collection and signals processing, it can make some of these some of these tasks a little more abstract sometimes a lot easier because you can see that, okay, I have this block that does this and the data flows out to this block that then does this.

And before I mean, in no time at all, basically, you can have an entire workflow together that's pulling in information and, you know, sending it massaging it through into whatever format you want and pulling it out. And so, Derek, what's some of the stuff you've been working on with it? I know you've been putting together some cool stuff with it.

Derek BanksYeah. I mean, kind of similar in the same vein where I was using n eight n to actually take proof of concept Python code that I wrote for our class that does essentially a cyber threat intelligence, like, newsletter. And I replicated that literally sitting on the couch watching a basketball game in Nathan. Now I used the template and, you know, kinda changed things around. And but I was I think that your to your point, you can write the scaffolding or the glue code, whatever you wanna call it, around large language models to perform tasks other than chatbot tasks.

Right? But the glue kind of is in the widgets of the web interface. It's like a web canvas interface to to drag and drop different functionality to make it easier. I say easier because it's not easy. I've spent, like, the entire morning today trying to do something much more complicated than a a newsletter. But I I think it's really promising from an orchestration perspective. I I really do. And I I applaud the folks at at Naten for open sourcing or or making available for free, rather, the Docker container that is so full functioned. Alright. And and, you know, kudos to them.

As far as the vulnerability goes, yeah, it's serious. But, I mean, is anybody surprised? I'm not. Right? Because I I mean, I know we've said this on the show before. I mean, you know, the pioneers take the arrows. Right? And, yes, it is a flaw that they should fix. Hopefully, they fixed it already. I I haven't checked. But, I mean, if you're an organization that's running, Nathan, on the outside of your network exposed to the Internet, I would question why you did that in the first place. I'm not saying that you shouldn't take an external data into your workflow, but standard information security rules apply here. Right? Like, you shouldn't expose something to the Internet without you know, thinking of the risks and repercussions. And so to me, that's like the biggest risk, at least from what I can tell.

Right? Yes. It's an unauthenticated RCE, so as you you can communicate with the endpoint. So Internet exposure is the most serious thing. Then internally, I mean, yes, I wouldn't expose it internally to anything either. And I know we've I I would authorize what what should talk with it. Right? And I know that we've said this before, but I mean, this is really what is old is new again in information security. Right? I mean, I I think that you should look at all AI technologies as as beta at this point still in 2026, especially when it comes to agents and orchestration and data processing internally with your sensitive data.

And you should be very careful what you allow to communicate with those things because, look, the folks that are coding, Nathan, are worried about functionality at this point, not necessarily security. But maybe now they're a little bit more worried about security. Yeah.

Bronwen AkerWell, it's it's you said it yourself. Everything old is new again. And over and over again with these AI implementations, I'm seeing that it's the same suspects, the usual suspects that we run into with any type of thing. If the the authentication is bad, if the RBAC is bad, if if there aren't clearly defined policies or or guidelines in terms of what it can access, of course, badness is going to happen. Who is really surprised by this?

Derek BanksWell, not information security practitioners. Right? I mean, the thing that I'm doing with with n a n at the moment is I'm literally allowing a a a a model access to tools that have running in a container with an API and then in some cases, like command line tools. Just those things in itself are, like, risky. Right? Now I'm not putting together a production system at the moment. Right? But I think that, you know, if you are putting together a production system and, you know, whether it's a chatbot or some kind of other AI powered system, just like anything else you've implemented in the last twenty years, you should probably have a security assessment performed on that system by someone who is qualified to do so.

Brian FehrmanYes. Yep. Absolutely.

Bronwen AkerAnything else on the n eight n vulnerability, or shall we move on?

Brian FehrmanNope. Tilt the next one.

Bronwen AkerOkay. So the next story is about ChatGPT's memory feature supercharging prompt injection. Researchers have discovered a zombie agent exploit, which abuses ChatGPT's new long term memory feature. An attacker will craft a prompt which stores malicious instructions in the model's persistent memory, then later trigger it via a seemingly benign follow-up query. The module dutifully executes the payload, leaking conversation history, or running arbitrary code on integrated tools.

So this attack is hinging on the assumption that memory persistence is benign and that user prompts are fully trusted.

Derek BanksDoes anybody else hear the cranberries right now? I'm just wondering. Sorry. Yes. I mean, it's also how memory works. Right? I'm assuming some things I I did not read in-depth about this, but I'm assuming some things need to be true. Like, you send me a crafted URL. I have to click on it. I probably also have to be authenticated to chat GPT. Right? Like and so yeah. I get that, but I yeah. I I mean, the alternative is the term memory off and not use the feature.

Brian FehrmanDon't know. Which which we've talked about on a different episode. Honestly, that's what I do. Not because of the I didn't even have the security risk in mind, but I just I don't like it when it uses other chats as context for current chats. I mean, certainly, I mean, I've you know, within the context of a chat, I wanted to use my previous messages to guide future messages. But if I start a new chat, I don't want it to use anything else that that I've done previously because maybe I'm chatting with it and I went down the entirely wrong path when I'm trying to solve a problem. But now it's using, it thinks that that's the way that I wanna go when I'm trying to approach the problem from a different angle and I don't like that. I like a a blank clean slate. And I know everyone's got got their own preferences, and, know, and you can go about it otherwise too, which you should be deleting your chats periodically. I mean, it's not good to I don't think it's good to just let them keep building up.

So I do like to delete them also, but personally, I'm I'm a fan of just shutting off the the memory feature in in general.

Derek BanksYeah. I mean, so I'm kinda a little more nuanced with it. I don't run it on chatgpt.com, and I use chatgpt for more kinda like one off kinds of things. But I do have it running for Cloud Desktop. I really like Cloud Desktop, and so I want it there. In fact, I asked Cloud Desktop what it knew about me, and I felt like it knew more about me and what I do, especially when it comes from a coding perspective than than, like, than I did. And I was like, dang. This is good enough. I might actually include this in my annual evaluation, CJ. I do.

I did some of the things, man. It was like, I didn't even think about that. That's really good. Right? And so I think

Brian FehrmanPlease do go on.

Derek BanksYeah. Please. Right? And so I I think there's a time and place for it. I think people just need to be aware and evaluate their risks. Right? I'm also someone who I I just I don't even click on links that, you know, Brian Fearman might send me. Right? I'm probably gonna copy

Brian FehrmanI understand why I wouldn't either.

Derek BanksYeah. I mean, one time, I actually had John Strand send me an email, and it had thoughts, question mark, and then a link to a Word document. And so I went and downloaded the Word document in a VM and actually looked at it and made sure that it was, like, not weaponized. Right? And this is years ago. Right? And I actually called John and be like, did you mean to send me that? And he's like, oh, yeah. Want you to take a look. So I I guess maybe I have a little bit higher level of paranoia. But, I mean, just kind of, like, balance that risk kinda reward thing, I think.

Bronwen AkerWell, that's the thing about being an info sec. I often feel like I have this split personality, like an a new Gizmo will come out and I go, oh, shiny. And it's the same thing. Oh, that hurts. You know, it's it every every new shiny toy has a downside, like the teddy bears that got released over Christmas that are that are AI enabled. Did you

Derek Bankssee any That sounds fun.

Brian FehrmanYeah. I haven't seen this.

Bronwen AkerIt's just disastrous as you can imagine. So, I mean, like you, I leverage the memory feature judiciously. And a while back, I had it write up a biography of me for a potential podcast. And of and, course, I'm looking at what it says, and I'm I'm intellectually, I I'm going, I detect no falsehoods. But on an emotional level, it's like, who the hell is this person?

That person sounds like they really know what's

Derek Banksgoing on. My response. I'm like, man. But I don't know. I I could look at the system prompt. I had chat GPT kind of flatter me today and and something. I I asked it about, like, to help me do something. It's like, man, what you're doing is serious and awesome or something along those lines. Like

Bronwen AkerGod. I hate the semantic. I hate when it sucks up to me. The things that I do like about ChatGPT, you have the ability to have a temporary conversation, and those do not leverage any of the the memory features. So I'll use that if say, I have a one off. I don't have any need to to capture it for future reference, And I'm basically using Chechi BT as a search engine in that case. But there are times that the the memory feature is nice because I hate having to tell it over and over again not to use inline dashes in its output. But that's me. So but what do we think about the data breach? I mean, again, are we really surprised?

Derek BanksI mean, don't I think data breach is a strong term here, right? Like, is it a ChatGPT data breach, or is it a like, I don't know. It's it's kind of like kinda sort of a data breach, but not really. It's like calling stealer malware a a data breach. Like, it's not like a whole bunch of data from a whole bunch of folks was taken from ChatGPT. It's that you were, I'll say, targeted and clicked on a link, and then some of your data was stolen. So I mean, not diminishing that for anyone that that's happened to, but I don't I don't know. Like, usually, when I hear data breach, I think of, like, a company and a lot of data. Right? But, I mean, I guess, like you said earlier, potato potato.

I don't know how don't know how architecturally you fix that. Right? I might I actually would think hope that browser controls would help, but obviously not.

Bronwen AkerWell, the idea of the the whole the way they describe the whole zombie agent thing reminds me a lot of a persistent cross site scripting bone.

Derek BanksAnd I Yeah, like a stored cross site scripting. That's what I thought of when I heard this. But a whole lot harder to fix. I mean, it's sort of like a feature. I mean, that's like part of the problems with some of the issues that we've highlighted across the last couple months of this podcast is things like prompt injection is the issue and the feature. Right? I mean, it's just how it works. And so and and I think I actually read here recently over the break that, I guess it was either OpenAI or Anthropic basically admit like, admitted that that prompt injection has no no fix in sight. Well, yeah. No.

I mean, it's the nature of the technology. I don't until we find a different, like what comes after a transformer or what the next technology is that's AI, then I don't don't know that it gets fixed.

Brian FehrmanYeah. No. I mean, at this yeah. I mean, at this point, it's basically like saying fix social engineering. I mean, Yeah. Okay. You know?

Derek BanksYeah. It's it's

Brian FehrmanWith with web forms go ahead. Oh, go ahead. I'm sorry.

Bronwen AkerNo. You first. Please.

Brian FehrmanAlright. No. I was just gonna say, yeah. I mean, it it's about, you know, blocking down the things around it, mitigating the actual risks, and mitigating the damage that come that come along with it, you know. But, yeah, it's at this point, I mean, it's just there's architecturally, there's not really a good way to to fully address the issue.

Derek BanksYeah. I guess one thing that for this particular thing is, I mean, maybe not put things that are sensitive into chat GPT. I mean, there there is that. Right?

Brian FehrmanThere's that.

Derek BanksYep. I can't I don't think that I I typically don't put what I would consider to be sensitive information into chat GPT. Maybe a little bit more with clogged code and clogged desktop. I would consider that a little bit more sensitive, but that's not really applicable in this situation. Right? Different technology, different thing. So

Bronwen AkerThe the thought that comes to mind for me is that when it comes to like web interfaces, input validation is usually fairly straightforward. But with an LLM or some other artificial intelligence generative doohickey, how do you validate the input? Like you said, how do you do that protection for social engineering?

Derek BanksThat A little bit more porous of a Band Aid, Mhmm. But Yeah. I mean, you're you're basically gonna put another classifier in front of it to try and classify the text as, you know, malicious or not. And and and it's not like, I don't know that you can get away with the same kind of input. Like, I've I've done web app tests where, yeah, the the the web input or the, you know, the user input was highly restricted. And in some cases, I was still able to get around it. Right? But I mean, how much could you put in place in ChatGPT before you started affection affecting functionality of being able to use the app?

Brian FehrmanYeah. I mean, that's that's been the that's that's been the ongoing battle with, I mean, security in general. Right? Sec security versus convenience. I mean, at some point, you have to be able to use the thing. Yeah.

Derek BanksYeah. Because the most secure state is off.

Brian FehrmanWell, yeah. Exactly. Just unplug it and it's, you know, probably alright.

Bronwen AkerThere there are reasons why I'm very glad I live in a remote area. If I wanna go off grid, all I need to do is flip one button and it's that is a very reassuring thought on a regular basis. So since we're talking about ChatGPT, the next story is also about ChatGPT. In this case, it's a new zero click attack. Radware's research team uncovered a zero click attack that abuses ChatGPT's agentic features.

By sending a crafted URL to a victim's email, an attacker triggers a model to auto execute a data export routine without any user interaction. Now I'm curious if this is specific to email accounts with a specific provider because I know not all not all email hosting providers are created equal, but I'm getting ahead of myself. So the model supposedly retrieves the user's recent chat logs, exfiltrates them to a command and control server, and then the exploit relies on the model's default permission to access prior conversation history and the lack of authentication on the auto execute endpoint.

Derek BanksSounds like a fancy way to say indirect prompt injection. But that that's what it sounds like to me. Right? Is I I know that you have, I'll say, Gmail. You know, your your OpenAI account is reading agentically your email, so I guess it can give you a summary of your daily email. And then and then there's a prompt in there that gets the model to go off and grab things. And, I mean, I think this is again one of those things that's not gonna get fixed. Right? Not not entirely. I mean and this is actually pretty serious when you start thinking of, like, other things.

Like, I mean, on your phone. Right? Like, you know, you can have Siri summarize emails and thing text and things of that nature. I would bet to some degree there's a vulnerability there. So I think indirect prompt injection is a very, very interesting and sort of like a what do you call it? The silent killer. Right? Like, you don't even know that it's there. Am I reading that right, Brian? Sounds like indirect prompt injection.

Brian FehrmanYeah. Yeah. Certainly. I'm pulling up the whole article over here and they're also labeling this as zombie agent as well. So I'm curious if this if this is related to the last one that we we just did because it it seems like two different things here because the other one is

Bronwen AkerBut it

Derek Banksseems like there's overlap. Yeah. What's that?

Brian FehrmanOne's a persistence. Like, the other one's more of like a persistence mechanism. This one is like more of like the initial like like, a different compromise vector. Like I said, zero click that you've got the email summarization, and you're just embedding the instructions within the the emails, which is, you know, been an idea that's been around for a while. I mean, we participated in that CTF, like, a year ago that Microsoft put on the l l mail challenge, which was basically doing this.

You were sending emails to, you know, a a fake account, essentially, your account set up that had a summarizer, and the entire goal was to get the summarizer to perform some kind of an action. And we actually have a lab of that in one of our our AI classes.

Derek BanksAnd the one that we are teaching in the fall in Deadwood. Oh.

Brian FehrmanThat's right. Fall and also, I think it's coming up in February March? Or March, I'm not mistaken.

Derek BanksI think it's March. Virtual teach of it, I believe.

Brian FehrmanMhmm. Yep. Yeah.

Derek BanksAnd so, yeah. I I don't think this stuff is going anywhere. This is probably gonna be a recurring thing when we do news episodes. Oh, look. It's the latest indirect prompt injection.

Brian FehrmanMhmm. Yep.

Bronwen AkerGood. So the next story is that two Chrome extensions were caught stealing ChatGPT and DeepSeek chats from 900,000 users. This article was posted in the Hacker News. Security researchers found two malicious Chrome extensions that silently capture conversations from OpenAI's ChatGPT and also from DeepSeek along with regular browsing data. Once installed, the extensions inject JavaScript into the AI web UI, read the DOM, the document object model for chat text, and post it to an attacker controlled server.

Supposedly, over 900,000 users were exposed because the extensions passed Chrome's store review by masquerading as productivity tools. Shocker.

Derek BanksI got got a I almost feel like that that that this isn't the story as much as maybe, like, do OpenAI and DeepSeek's websites not have or are they blocking third party scripts, like, in their content security policy?

Bronwen AkerIt sounds

Derek BanksI like it's really don't know how this works. Like, I But would see that's actually, man, that's pretty sophisticated if we go after some chats. Right?

Brian FehrmanOh, yeah. Yeah. I'm trying to look up what the what the actual extensions were. Chat GPT for Chrome with GTP five, Claude Sonnet, DeepSeek AI, and the other one was called AI Sidebar with DeepSeek, ChatGPT, Claude, and more.

Bronwen AkerSounds useful. So they're acting like they're an extension to implement the AI within your browser. And of course, once you log in, now you've given away the keys of the kingdom.

Brian FehrmanYeah. That's dirty.

Bronwen AkerAttackers are sneaky and So

Derek Banksare these extensions, were they actually like on the Chrome store? I guess they were.

Brian FehrmanApparently. Sounds like it. Yeah. That they got that they managed to push their way through. I mean, it'd be relatively easy to do, I would think, with these because I mean, what what are they doing? So they're integrating with with the AI tools, which, I mean, sure. Okay. And then they're just funneling over the data to, like, another another another site. I mean, we have probably tons of extensions that are collecting your data and sending it somewhere else. So I wouldn't think that would send off a lot of alarm bells unless people were, like, really digging through and looking to see, you know, what it's actually doing.

But, I mean, it's not like it's, like, trying to pull out your secret like, your storage credentials or

Derek BanksI was gonna say, anybody who's done web app testing in the last like eight or nine years, like when you go to a modern web app, the amount of tracking and and just scripts that run from third party resources is insane. And most of the web app tests that I did, you know, I spent half of the year, you know, doing web app tests last year for BHS. And I can't remember, like I I mean, it was, a consistent consistent finding for allowing third party scripts through CSP. I was actually able to take advantage of of one of them in a test. And so I just kinda feel like that maybe OpenAI and, I guess, DeepSeek folks, if you're listening, might wanna might wanna fix that on your site.

I don't know. But yeah. And I guess for users, I mean, just be aware of what you're installing in your browser, especially if it's the browser that you use to do things like banking and Amazon and things of that nature.

Brian FehrmanYeah. Work tasks, whatever, whatever.

Derek BanksYeah, I have a browser for work and a browser for personal. And then I have a browser for when I don't want either of those browsers touching what I'm trying to go after on the internet.

Brian FehrmanYes.

Bronwen AkerI do the same thing. And even on my personal system, I have different browsers for different personas. I mean, all the fine online banking stuff stays in one set of browsers and there's other stuff that goes to other browsers and never the twain shall meet.

Derek BanksYeah, I actually take it even a step further. I have a whole separate system that I do banking and financial stuff on that I don't really do anything else that touches the Internet so much. Like, I don't browse on it. I do some other things on it. Right? But, like, yeah, I I'm I guess I'm privileged in that way. I have enough systems where I can do that. But I mean, I I just again, you know, when you evaluate risk for a living, I guess those kinds of things just start to happen. I I think this is browser extensions.

Bronwen AkerYeah. It it I feel bad for, quote, normal people because they don't they don't know the stuff that we know. They don't know that just because it looks shiny that no, these are are mean, nasty, awful people who are looking to steal your entire retirement fund. It's it sucks.

Derek BanksYeah. I wonder how long it's gonna be though because like right now, my wife, she basically doesn't she has a work computer. Right? But at home, she doesn't really use a computer at all. She uses her phone for everything. Right? And so, I mean, I think most like normies kind of do it that way now. So, like, at some point, like, if you're using a computer or a laptop, you're kind of going over into the the danger zone, it seems like, you know? Because you can't install an extension on your mobile browser, can you? I've never actually tried.

Bronwen AkerSo I don't know.

Derek BanksI actually don't know either. I've never tried.

Bronwen AkerNever even considered that. Take the buyer beware approach when using any extensions. That's about all I can say. Alright. Ready for the the next and last story?

Derek BanksYep. The obligatory APT story.

Bronwen AkerOf course. Russian APT twenty eight runs credential stealing campaign targeting energy and policy organizations. So this is another article from the hacker news. APT twenty eight, also known as Blue Delta, apparently launched a credential harvesting operation against Turkish energy and nuclear research agencies entities, a European think tank, and groups in North Macedonia and Uzbekistan. The group distributed phishing emails containing malicious Microsoft Office documents that embed AI generated spear phishing text, making the lures more consistent, convincing.

Once a victim opens a doc, PowerShell loader contacts a c two server, downloads a credential dumping tool, and then exfiltrates the data. So am I the only one who feels like this is a replay of old news?

Derek BanksYeah. I mean, look, we do this here at Black Hills. Right? Like, we we are currently using open like, in-depth open source reconnaissance to then use LLMs to create things like this. Right? I mean, I'd be surprised if every threat actor wasn't doing it. Right? And it certainly, you know, especially, like, with language barriers. Right? So what do you what do you tell people now about emails? I mean, I I think personally, we have failed as a like, one of the biggest failures of the information security, world was to tell people to not click on links from people that you don't know. Don't click on that link in email. And then what does, you know, information security do? They send out links for you to click on. Right?

And then they don't bother to tell you that probably you should be careful of links that come from people that you do know. Right? Because if their account got compromised, then you're probably gonna get a link from them, and then you click on it. And so I think it's always a little bit more nuanced. The advice I've given to my my children is if it comes from the Internet, even if it seems to be from somebody that you know, be very suspicious of it and try and verify it, especially if it's asking for passwords or money. Either one of those. Right? And so I I just yeah. This is this is another one of those things that is not going anywhere, and it's going down the road of, you know, like, crazy, realistic deep fakes on Teams, social engineering in the future. Right?

Brian FehrmanYep. Yeah. And I'm curious of the so they mentioned the malicious documents here. I'm curious if there's macros that they had built in or what and, you if it's in this case, you know, another another point too would be, I mean, macros are disabled by default at this point. And as an organization, you can shut it off so that users can't even re enable them. That's what I saw on a recent engagement I was on. I was just, like, company wide, like, literally just disabled. Like, you and, like, the option to re enable is just literally not there. And I know that feature has been around for, a while, but, like, it's more I think it's basically kind of more it's a little bit easier and more of the default, these days. So would for organizations, which suggests looking into that for your users.

Bronwen AkerThe only thing that truly that's AI related to this story is the fact that the, spear phishing text was AI generated. And I know we've talked before about how phishing campaigns have gotten more difficult to spot because of the AI generated text in the the phishing or smishing or vishing or whatever it is ishing that's going on. But other than that, it seems like the same old

Derek BanksYou know, to bring it back full circle to to n eight n because that's what I'm here for. I'm pretty sure you could create a workflow that would go off and automatically run, you know, some tools to gather open source reconnaissance on a given individual and then have a large language model craft potential spear phishing roosts. Sounds like a fun workflow to create.

Brian FehrmanOh, yeah. I like it.

Bronwen AkerAll right. So, well, those are the stories we have. The bottom line is the and I've said this so many times. The AI genie is out of the bottle, and we're still all learning as we go along. As CJ likes to say, this is the worst that AI will ever be going forward. Hopefully, it will get better. But it has definitely changed a lot of games. And just be cautious. Be careful. Don't just arbitrarily throw sensitive information into any chatbot.

Pause. Any other closing remarks?

Derek BanksI'll channel my inner jaw fire and say keep on prompting.

Brian FehrmanPerfect. Alright. Well, thanks everyone. See you next time.

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