Most founders won't give up 80% of their business. The ones who did walked away with more than if they'd kept 100%. Murray Schnuriger made the jump from 20 years advising founders on exits to actually owning the risk at 5V Capital, a mid-market PE fund across Australia and New Zealand. Toby King has spent his career at Cameron Partners, one of NZ's most established M&A firms, allied with Rothschild and Company. Together they've sat on both sides of more NZ business exits than almost anyone alive. The Education Perfect story is the one that sticks. Two brothers built an edtech platform into 50% of NZ secondary schools, hit their ceiling, and sold 80% to 5V. One went backpacking for a year. 5V brought in a new CEO, put sales teams on the ground in Australia, and tripled the business in three years. Exit to KKR. The 20% the brothers held at the end was worth more than their original 100%. That's the structure most NZ founders never think to ask about. Murray and Toby pull no punches on what founders consistently get wrong, pricing on EBITDA when buyers price on free cash flow, waiting one more year for growth when the multiple compression wipes out the gain, and showing up to a sale process without a narrative that holds up under serious due diligence. We get into: Why selling 80% can leave you wealthier than holding everything The EBITDA trap that costs NZ founders millions at the table Why "one more year of growth" is often the most expensive decision you'll make How PE investors actually think about your exit before they've even finished investing in you What your business narrative needs to nail to earn a premium valuation The succession wave hitting NZ baby boomer founders and why PE is filling the gap If you're building something and wondering what it actually looks like to sell part of your business, back yourself for one more run, and walk away with more than you started with, this one's worth your time.
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Transcript
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Today's episode is a little bit different. I stated a desire to have a panel format podcast and focused on the big end of town deal doers. That meant Toby King from Cameron Partners and Murray Schnuriger, who's with 5V Capital, came in to share the secrets and shed some amazing insight and light into what it takes to build a company of extraordinary value, what that means for the founder, and some things that... Really, you only know from the inside. For every sort of bad story, there's often, well, there are
dozens of good stories of private equity investments that have gone well, but I guess they don't sell newspapers. It requires a lot of conviction in what you're actually articulating, because as advisors... We sell the dream, we paint a picture, we often will describe a business and the opportunity in a way that the current owners haven't executed themselves. You'll be making a call on imperfect information every single time and what you're trying to do is build up layers of imperfect information to hopefully be less imperfect than what you were at the front end. But they got
to a point where, you know, they realised that... the business was getting a bit beyond them from a size and scale perspective. And so they looked to bring in a partner that could help them on the next phase of their journey. That could help develop the business globally, provide opportunities for their employees, commit to things like staying in New Zealand, which they have done. But he wanted full exit. Humility runs deep in the business and what they've got is something very, very special. The reality is there's more higher growth
buyers out there than... no or low growth buyers out there. And so to your point, less competitive tension if there's no growth. Multiples are just a proxy for this present value of future cash flows. I think the other piece is just having the confidence to take risk. De -risk by taking, you know, 60, 70, 80 % of the business off the table. The remaining 20 % has been equal to the first. 80 % because of the value creation. But very invigorating intellectually as well as just the risk. Founders often conflate their identity
with the business itself and so sometimes for people to have that conversation, to hear it from you, is it like hearing that your baby is ugly? It's a phrase that we use a lot. That was accidental, not a set up. Gentlemen, this is the first episode where I've done a three in the studio at the same time. And perhaps if we could start off with a bit of an explanation
of where you work and what you do, what that actually means. So I might start with you, please, Murray. Yeah, sure. I'm head of New Zealand for 5V Capital. 5V Capital is a mid -market private equity fund headquartered in Sydney, Australia. But we've got a New Zealand office here as well. There's six of us. We're 75 in Australia. What does private equity mean? What does private equity mean? Well, I guess what we do is we invest in mid -market private businesses and we look to
then grow those businesses and ultimately return those funds to investors with an exit. And if we do our job right, with a tidy profit, that ensures we get some more money to invest. Yeah, great. And over to you, Toby. So Cameron Partners, an M &A firm. Cameron Partners, M &A shop. Yes. Very well established in New Zealand. Launched in 1995, so just had 30 years. Global alliance
with Rothschild & Company, which we've had for that. The banking family. Yes. 200 -year -old institution. Very similar values and alignment in terms of independent advisory. really supporting businesses like, for example, 5e on transactions, providing commercial and transaction advice. So in other words, you locate businesses that want to have an exit event and then conduct that transaction for them, research, find buyers, go through the negotiation, that sort of thing.
That's right. A lot of it will be off our own bat. So we'll go and hunt down companies that we think look interesting and try and learn about their histories and what their ambitions are. If they're looking to exit, we'll help them pull an equity story together, make sure they're prepared and go about finding high value buyers for them and getting the business in the highest value hands. So that's the intention there, but also we help on the buy side as well. We've established a playing field. Let's dig deep. So Murray, on
our pre -call, you used an expression, barbarians at the gate. And when we spoke, you were talking about the potential misbranding, misrepresentation of what PE means these days. Firstly, can you tell us what it is that people believe about PE that may not be true and what it is actually like when you're in the real world of doing deals, buying companies today? Yeah, look, I think there are... There is a bit of negativity around private equity in the market. It largely reflects some of the things that have gone wrong and largely
historical as well. So Barbarians at the Gate was a story about RJR Nebraska, who was taken out by KKR in terms of an acquisition. KKR went in, stripped out costs, broke up the business, and ultimately... uh the business failed and it was a story around sort of greed and and all things that that could go wrong went wrong um i guess closer to home there's been some sort
of examples where private invest private equity investments haven't haven't gone well um yellow pages um you know blue star print um i'm sure you could name some others as well um but again mostly carpets yeah felties carpets i think historic mainly historical and there's really a confluence of a few factors around large levels of debt but also structural changes in those industries that when those two factors came together led
to the demise as opposed to necessarily anything that private equity had done and there's a few stories like that right but for every sort of bad story there's often well there are dozens of good stories of private equity investments that have gone well but i guess they they don't sell newspapers um and the hints in the name private equity we like to be private we like to go about our business privately with often with partnering with um private founders um or
founders of private businesses so um yeah the hints in the name um and there is a bit of you know we have been i guess as an industry as a whole trying to trying to sell our stories a little bit more, but the reality is, you know, it doesn't get the same cut through. And you've come from the side of the fence that Toby is on and you were once there yourself. So you headed up the deals team at PwC. So what made you make that jump and what was like a misconception that
you had before jumping into private equity that you've now had corrected? Yeah, look. like you said, being sort of in a very similar role to Toby for 20 years. And I really enjoyed that role, helping private business owners crystallize many, many years of hard work, which was pretty cool. Like Toby, I advised private equity and sold businesses to private equity. So I sort of had a pretty good feel for sort of what went on in the inner workings of private equity. That
said, there's nothing like being in the seat. And it felt like it was sort of unfinished business. So there's an element of gamekeeper come poacher. And yeah, I just wanted to see what that looked like on the other side. I'm sure there's a big component. There's a difference between advising and actually... putting capital at risk. And so I'm sure you're finding out that it actually is a very different skill set, requires a lot
of conviction in what you're actually articulating. Because as advisors, we sell the dream, we paint a picture, we often will describe a business and the opportunity in a way that the current owners haven't executed themselves. So it's a big question, right? There's a lot of risk there. So I'm sure you'll be finding in your new role that actually taking risk, making the decision to buy a business, which requires you to be successful, often in a competitive process. So that means,
by definition, you are the highest bidder. So what are you seeing that others aren't? Hey, it's Josh. Thanks for listening to the show. When founders talk about the dream exit, they're really talking about freedom. Freedom to choose how to use their time and to decide what comes next. I'm a client of JB Ware in New Zealand, and I know this is what sets them apart. They help entrepreneurs and leaders turn success into significance. A great exit isn't just about the
commas in your bank account. It's about what those commas enable you to create. Two Commas is proudly partnered with JB Ware, helping founders by putting their wealth to work for generations. So that requires a huge amount of work. a huge amount of risk -taking. And then once you've secured the business, unlike us, we walk away, we get a modest fee, Murray's hard work begins. And so hopefully then we can stay in touch through the course of that investment horizon and then
help on the exit. But through that investment horizon, we'll be providing insights, anecdotes about other relevant transactions, how to think about business plan development. how to think about strategic players and why your business might be of interest to them. And it helps them then ultimately exit successfully. Just building on what Toby said then, taking it to the next level. Yes, you're right. Absolutely have to have conviction when we invest. And what that
requires is, I found as an advisor, you could sort of go to a surface level and present the vision or the picture or the story. But as an investor, you have to go to that next level of detail, peel away the onions. Is that vision real? Can we make it real? Can we execute on it? Have we got the team to execute on it? Is the moat real? Is there the risk of more competition? All these questions that you have to dig really deep on and get as many views and data points
as you possibly can. Where I think in an advisory world, as long as you get the story and paint the picture, that's probably the job done. That's right. But certainly on exit, we are painting a view of the world. But it's really important that we have a credible view of the world because if you present an incredible view of the world, You lose credibility. You lose interest in the asset because bidders will think, well, look, these guys don't understand their business. They
don't understand the risks. If the advisor has convinced the vendor that this is a realistic outcome for the business and it's invalid, it's unreliable, you're going to get a failed process or you're going to get a suboptimal process or at best you might get a very disgruntled. vendor or client, right? Because if you've been presenting a picture that is probably not achievable, that creates challenges in a process as well. So as an advisor, there's quite a lot of judgment to
make sure that the picture that you are presenting has a degree of credibility and ideally a high degree of credibility. But then we often work with buy side as well. So we have sell side and buy side. Buy side, really, it's far more interesting than sell side. Sell side is much more of a process. Buy side, we're actually getting into the shoes of of the client and of the bidder to help them through those judgments because that's all it is. You'll be making a call on imperfect information every single time and what you're trying to do
is build up layers of imperfect information to hopefully be less imperfect than what you were at the front end. So your decision making becomes all about key judgments at those critical moments and helping your client. make the right call. And ultimately, it's a confidence game. So they are a small team. They'll be wanting to surround themselves with as many advisors and support people to just try and corroborate and put in
place the data points and the what do you need to believe type metrics or characteristics to ultimately make a call on. Do you bid? How much do you bid? And then do you execute? So it's quite a fulsome role. And I think the best advisors, I mean, you'll have a view on this, Murray, but I think the best advisors think like owners, whether you're selling or buying. Especially in the context of working buy side, that would be you're probably more operating like a private
equity operator would be than you are like an advisor by the sounds. Is that correct? Yeah. To be a good advisor, you need to think like an owner. And equally, because we do a balance of buy side and sell side, when you're running a sell side process, we know what buyers will be thinking. We know what buyers will be assessing. So we try and get ahead of that. To what extent would the expression all care but no responsibility be true if you're on sell side? To a point. Ultimately,
it is the decision for... for the client to make um we will often say look we think that's quite a bullish case to be to be thinking about as a base case to be bidding ultimately it is the client's call but in a market like new zealand it's quite small uh we only trade on our reputation i often say we're only as good as our next deal it doesn't matter what you did last week or last year we start every year at zero right there's no annuity there's there's no tax advisory streams
or or broken streams or wealth management streams of revenue. We are advisors. So you live and die by the quality of your advice and your reputation. So if you're providing weak advice, you just won't get another call. Warren Buffett says that a reputation takes a lifetime to build and five minutes to destroy. And I personally believe that it's actually genuinely the only legacy that we leave behind in the world. Put aside the Americanisms of buying yourself a wing at the local school gymnasium and that kind of thing, which we don't tend to do in this country so
much. Maybe with the odd exception, the Auckland University Business Schools carries a certain individual's name, but that's quite an unusual thing to do. You've now moved from the world of suggesting and understanding risk to actually now owning that risk. What kind of different pressure has that placed on you now being essentially not the operator but pretty close to the operator now, right? Yeah, definitely. At the end of the day, we're custodians of our investors' capital. We take that very seriously, and I personally
take that very seriously. So there is that pressure for sure. But equally, I think the thing that allows me to sleep at night is that my capital is alongside the investor's capital. And so I know I'm doing the best thing I can possibly do to make sure that my family is looked after and that I'm making the right returns. And so because I'm aligned with my investors, the investors can sleep well as well. Yeah. Famously, there's
been a market increase in the returns that have been generated by PE firms, but what's been some kind of historic and also some projected numbers that you'd be able to share with us? Yeah, look, private equity has really gone from strength to strength in the last sort of 20 -odd years. No matter which way you cut it, whether it's 20 -year returns, 10 -year returns, 5 -year returns, or even in the last couple of years, private equity has outperformed. public markets and most
benchmarks. I think on average in the mid -market, I saw some stats the other day that said that returns over the last 10 years have been 13 % on average. So obviously top decile or quartile private equity funds have returned a lot more than that. And that's significantly above the public markets. So the markets are reasonably efficient. Where there's outperformance, risk -adjusted outperformance in terms of returns,
capital moves that way. And so, again, I saw a stat the other day that there's 50 % fewer listed companies in the US than what there were back in the late 90s. 50 % reduction in listed companies. And is that due to a combination of M &A activity that's gone on? So those firms have been absorbed by another, probably a little bit of failure over the last couple of years, although the States hasn't had too much of a recession the way that we've had it, but also... There's been a lot of public to privates, which
have been funded essentially by private equity, for sure. How's that changing the dream of the entrepreneur? You know, one day for a period of time there, it was a path was to start to build a company and then consider the idea of a listing. So how's that influencing the way that founders now think about their business future? Yeah, well, it's interesting. It'll be interesting in Toby's view, but certainly in the New Zealand setting, I mean, I wouldn't even be able to, I think you can definitely count on one hand the number of IPOs they've been in
terms of proper founder -led. sort of IPOs in the last 10 years of any scale. And so that probably speaks to itself in that the reality is the private markets and trade buyers, international trade buyers, have been a very good exit mechanism for founders. I think where private equity has a point of difference from the trade partners is this whole succession piece that's playing out with wealth transfer. that's going on at
the moment with the baby boomers. And, you know, a company might be going quite well. A business might be trading extremely well. Maybe that founder could be the CEO in the sort of 60s, 70s, looking at potentially retiring shortly, but still got enough fuel in the tank to continue to want to sort of push and build the business and believe that the business has more in it. But equally. recognizing that succession is going to happen
at some point. And so private equity can provide a nice sort of runway for that, where they de -risk their personal balance sheets by taking some money off the table, perhaps selling 30, 40, 50, 60, 70 % of their business, retain a stake, and then bring the private equity fund in to help sit alongside them, but drive accelerated growth. that transition in management, perhaps the founder is a CEO and, you know, there needs
to be a transition take place. And then look to exit together and whether it's three, four or five years time to a potential trade or another large financial sponsor that with new management in place can see another leg of growth. I'd add to that as well that The IPO market is pretty challenging to get ready for as well. There's
a huge amount of preparation work. And it's from a risk management perspective more than, I would say, a value creation perspective. I mean, I'd probably get challenged on that. But if you look at the IPO process, most of it is around compliance. So there's a huge amount of... risk analysis and you're building a governance team that's very focused on compliance and risk, with the
odd exception of directors wanting to really fuel growth. But at the initial IPO stage, it's really about making sure you've got a very, very robust base case because there's very strong incentive to be hitting your guidance, your year one guidance. even though those rules are changing slightly at the moment. But there's that compliance overlay that I think restricts a lot of businesses compared to private equity. And often you can't
sell down as much as you'd like to be selling down if you are a family looking to IPO a business. So you're often bound by how much you can sell and then constrained by how much of the existing stock you hold time period you can be selling that down as well and so 5v you're much more of a growth partnership oriented fund but there are a lot of private equity funds that are full buyout funds right that want to buy 100 so there are there are plenty of examples um and i don't think uh i don't think brendan lindsay would
mind me saying um that he falls into this category that uh so he obviously sold sustainment to uh to new brands we advise new brands on that acquisition But we spent a long time getting to know Brendan and he was very anti -IPO because he was a classic entrepreneur. He was a risk taker. He was out there building a business and he admitted himself, and I'm sure he said publicly, that he wasn't well suited to being listed and being an IPO candidate. So he preferred to sell it to a trade
name, so a strategic. you know large scale existing business that would be a good steward of the business that would invest in the business that would understand the business that could help develop the business globally provide opportunities from for their employees uh commit to things like staying in new zealand which they have done uh but he wanted full exit he said if i can't be driving the ship i'll i'll be out completely so that's another reason why private equity comes to the fore as well And part of the diligence on the way in is for private, okay, well, if
Jimmy's leaving the business, how do we think about leadership? So you're then assessing the next tier of management down, or you might have industry context yourself say, I know who could be the next CEO here. Because a lot of it, frankly, is about capability change. We see it, I think about private equity, capital capability conviction, right? You've got capital to grow a business. Often family businesses, if they're... second or third generation, don't want to be investing in the business. They'd rather be investing in
things outside the business. So are less enthusiastic about transformational growth. Frankly, it might have been dad or granddad running the business that aren't classically trained in business or don't have the confidence to develop a business the way. you know young thrusters like these private equity guys are right they come in and say right we can enhance capability and they've got the conviction around what that growth plan looks like so they invest behind it because they've got a short runway three five seven years to
get in build and exit it's not about making a business smaller it's about making a business stronger bigger and more valuable i think there's an important piece around private capital versus say the ipo market and that the sort of quarterly announcements, profitability pressures, growth pressures, you know, relative to the sort of the private equity model, where, especially in our space, where, you know, we're, like you say, growth investors, you know, in that sort of mid
-market, call it $50 to $250 million sort of enterprise value. Most of the businesses we're investing in aren't IPO ready. They're not institutionalized enough. They've not got the processes, systems, or management to really be ready to IPO. They might be by the time they've invested alongside us and we've done a good job. But what we do is when we come in, often... the business goes backwards in the first couple of years because
we're investing in all those things. Like I say, you know, it could be product development. It could be we're expanding into a new geography. It could be we're putting new management in place and expanding the management team and capability. All with a view of growth. So, you know, really accelerating the revenue growth. But at the bottom line, it could well go back for a couple of years before then popping. And in a public market setting, that's really difficult, like really difficult because you don't know quite when that's going
to pop. You've got conviction it will, but in that sort of when you're having to report every quarter, that can get very uncomfortable. You're chasing metrics which are not necessarily the right. thing for the company over the long term. The strategic intention of the company might not be met by chasing a quarterly number. And I understand that the proportions of reward for understating your earnings when you overshoot those is outweighed by the proportion of the punishment that you'll face if you miss the earnings
number, if you fall short. If you miss them by 10%, the stock price might be hammered by 20%. But if you over get it by 10%, you might get an 8 % increase in your share price kind of thing. So we've talked about trends here. I want to circle this from two different standpoints. So it seems as if the trend that we're discussing is a move away from public markets, from the IPO space and from companies maintaining a listed status, the reduction by about 50 % of the US bourse. And we would probably struggle to name
half a dozen successful listings in New Zealand over the last 10 years. There's been a couple of disasters, which we won't talk about. There's two perspectives that I'd like to talk about that from. Nearly everyone has got some form of retirement. situation in place. A KiwiSaver is what we call it now. And a lot of those funds are deployed into the public markets locally and internationally. So if I'm a person with a KiwiSaver fund and I'm looking out into the future, what do you think that I should be thinking
about in relation to this trend that's going on away from public to private? And how should I kind of factor my behaviour and kind of investment approach over the coming 10 to 20 years, which is the horizon for most people they'll be thinking about? getting out of the workforce. I'm curious on both of your views about that. Well, there are a couple of things to say about that. One is, interestingly, a lot of the bigger KiwiSaver funds now are at a scale where they can start allocating capital to private equity as well,
which is a trend that you've seen overseas because these pension funds or retirement funds get so large that they can actually start allocating capital to private equity. And the reason why it's not bigger is because of that liquidity challenge, right? If there are redemptions on a fund, you can't meet those redemptions if you've got too large an exposure to private equity because private equity, you hold it for a period of time. So you don't want to be a forced seller halfway through that hold period. So it's always going
to be a smaller proportion. But look, it's not to downgrade the performance of public markets either, but it's important to note that there are... better performing public markets as well. I mean, you look at the NASDAQ 100 over any period, whether it's three, six months, three years, nine years, it outperforms because you've got exposure to the fastest growing and highest value companies. So I personally like the public markets
because you have that liquidity. available. So I think the key thing is to make sure that you're in the right parts of the public markets, because you can certainly be in some very underwhelming parts or geographies of the public markets. And I think that the key thing is to just be astute about where you're investing. But it's not to say that one's better than the other necessarily, because that lack of liquidity is, I think, one of the characteristics that is going to put off
a lot of people. from getting into private equity. And, you know, there's a bell curve for everything in life. Not every private equity fund is as successful as Murray's. Yeah. I think you've raised a really good question here. And it's a big question. Real can of worms moment. So, look, my perspective is the largest sovereign wealth funds in the world are probably got the smartest and brightest people in there. managing
their portfolios, right? And to your point, part of their portfolio is definitely public markets and a big piece. But there's a reason why they have 20 % or roughly between 15 and 20 % of their portfolios allocated to private capital and alternative assets. And when you look at sort of mum and dad investors or even small, you know, lower than wholesale investors, so it's sort of the retail investment environment. It's very, very difficult for any retail investors to get access
to private assets or alternative assets. So how does that – that doesn't feel fair, does it? No, not at all. And so what we're starting to see is the emergence of products that do deal with that. Well, firstly, I think KiwiSaver is – and the KiwiSaver funds are definitely looking at this right now alongside the government in terms of changing some of the rules to allow for this sort of liquidity issue. Because the reality is the KiwiSaver funds don't need that
much liquidity. Right. It's about growth. It's about capital growth. If they allocate, I don't know, 10 % or 15 % from the pretty close to zero they've currently got in private equity, they can deal with the liquidity issues around that. The government's looking at it, so that's the first thing I'd say, because they recognise there's an inequality piece here. The second piece is there are these emerging products, certainly in other jurisdictions like the US, where private equity are accessing the retail markets through
evergreen fund structures that provide semi -liquidity, so quarterly redemptions. In fact, even 5V, we've been sort of pioneers in Australia and we're actually launching today a semi -liquid evergreen structure. It's still wholesale investors, but far lower than the minimum $2 million type equity checks that they have to write to get into our closing -end funds. And it is possible to invest in some of these private equity managers, right, the general partners, the KKRs, the Carlyles,
the Blackstones, the Blackrocks. These are massive, massive managers of capital. But that's the manager as opposed to being an investor in the fund, and there is a distinction there. But if the manager's performing, they get these super returns by virtue of the fee structure. Reading between the lines of what you were saying, Toby, and thinking about the performance of the New Zealand Bourse over the last few years or so. uh someone listening to this would probably go it doesn't seem as if it bodes too well for that market
you know we've got this shift to private it's difficult to access private um there's some changes that are going on from a governmental standpoint and like booster i think has a has a product or has some of their money allocated towards um private as well which is great um so Do you have any kind of personal predictions? And I'm always wary of those, but I am curious about it around what might happen for the New Zealand Stock Exchange over the next few years or so. And it's probably, there's a two -part question. What do you think is going to happen and what could be some things that we could do to improve
that environment, that kind of state? Yeah, look, I mean, it is hard. New Zealand's a small market and the competition for capital is such that if you look at the returns, where the returns come over the last few years, certainly not in the New Zealand market. There have been some high -performing stocks, but you needed to be quite an astute stock picker to pick those. I mean, one of the things that, on the buy side,
that the private equity guys are very good at looking at is, what's your addressable market? How big is the addressable market for this company to actually grow? If you look at New Zealand, it's... It's a small economy. So the opportunities for growth are reasonably limited. So by necessity, you need to start looking offshore. And New Zealand companies haven't had a great track record of expanding offshore. And it gets played out in the media publicly. We have a base of public
company directors that cross -pollinate extensively. So we have, you know... and I don't know the numbers off the top of my head, but there's a pool of directors that are on multiple public companies. And so there's quite a lot of institutional knowledge, shall we say, about those companies. You might call it scar tissue, about companies that have failed in executing offshore. It comes back to that risk tolerance, again, that there's
probably just a drag. It might be unseen, but there's an unspoken sort of drag on New Zealand companies really being successful offshore. But then you look at something like a Fisher & Paykel Healthcare or a Xero, companies like that that have done tremendously well because they have had that capability, they've had the right business plan, they've got the right technology and so on, but it's not easy. Speaking of risk, Murray, when you go about looking at an acquisition, what are the motions that you go through with
that acquisition to understand what the outcome might be over the medium to long term and how to manage that risk, given that you're going to be kind of directly responsible for that and your own money's going into that deal as well? Yeah, sure. Look at it from various angles, as you'd expect. I think the starting point is we are partnership investors. The first thing we look at is who are we partnering with? And so is it the founder? Is it the management team? Do we think we've got an alignment around where
we think the business can go and what it can achieve and what we're going to invest and how we're going to go about it? So that's a really important first piece. Second bit, to your point, we do a lot of work around the market. What's the addressable market? what's their right to win and is it defensible? They might have a right to win today, but is that right going to be around in five years' time when we were looking to sort
of exit the business? So that's an important piece. Clearly, margins are an important indicator in that. So there's a strong correlation between high -margin businesses and businesses with some sort of strategic moat. So that's an important piece we look at. And this is, by the way, all conversations in market, data, comparables, looking at offshore markets and how they've evolved over
time, looking at offshore competitors, where the markets are heading, where the industries are heading. We probably spend most of our time on that, you know, competitors, competitive analysis. strengths and weaknesses um and then then comes the financial piece then comes the sort of the legal etc due diligence the more typical stuff but we would spend i'd say 75 80 percent of our time thinking about um the the market how they're
positioned in the market and the right to win and what that looks like over our investment horizon You mentioned that you also do some analysis around what the potential exit could look like down the path. So tell us a bit more about that. Good pickup. Yeah, we absolutely, ultimately, you know, we are investing in closed -ended funds. And so what that means is within a period of time, usually 10 years, private equity has to exit the business and return the funds. They've got a fiduciary duty to do that. So one of the
things we need to worry about is, you know, who are we exiting? the business to and what types of parties they are and what they look for. You can build a great business. It could be an amazing business. It could be the best business on the planet. But unless someone actually wants to buy it, it's no good to us. And so we spend a lot of time. In fact, probably one of the first things we do, sometimes even before we invest in the business, but usually it's in the first
sort of six months post -investment. We go and have a conversation with who we think the obvious buyers are, trying to understand, you know, what the business should look like or what they would like it to look like in three, four, five years' time when we're ready to exit. So you're actually talking to the potential party that could give you that liquidity event down the path and seeing what might appeal to them, what their experience is, the things that they would care about at that moment. That's a level of detail that most founders wouldn't even conceive of when they
were thinking about a moment for them to exit. We mentioned the S word earlier on, succession, which is a form of an exit that I talk about as being one of the legitimate paths for people. I think of it as being a... sale to business partners a management buyout or a familial succession that's what I think about succession but there's actually other forms and so question probably for you Toby is how well prepared do you think most people are when they start talking to you from a succession standpoint I think about a
business that's reliant upon a founder is not really a business you know you've got a fanciful job of some way shape or form and it's not something which is that appealing to other people but how well prepared And what should they be thinking about and what should they be doing to ensure that that business has some form of succession reality to them? I would say as a general rule, most are not well prepared. And I think, again, as a general rule, and this is not to be negative or critical, but most business owners we encounter
think that their business is better than it often is. There are occasions where humility runs deep in the business and what they've got is something very, very special. But a lot of business owners we encounter think that the business will run without them there. I think their systems and processes and information are amazing, but it's probably because they've been running the business since they founded it 50 years ago. So they know
where everything is and how it works. But in many cases, and look, I don't have the benefit of being able to compare New Zealand with other more sophisticated markets, but just the nature of our economy, most of our businesses are small. I was looking at some stats this morning. Less than 1 % of businesses in New Zealand have more than 100 employees. Wow. Less than 1%. I'll add to that, less than 1 % of them do more than 10 million of revenue as well. There's a correlation often between those numbers. So oftentimes you're
dealing with businesses that are frankly undercapitalized and have weaker capabilities than they probably need to be. able to grow the business and be more successful than they are. So you encounter this as you get these clients on board. So it's often quite the process to get a business ready for sale. And one of the characteristics of the
M &A market that we've observed, particularly I'd say the last 15 years, is just the prevalence of vendor due diligence. which is vendors spending money and time having advisors coming in and assessing the business and preparing materials to identify what's going on, right? Because often the systems and information and things is reasonably undeveloped. So you're distilling the business down into the information that we know that bidders
like to look at. It's also identifying issues early. So if we think there are issues that can be addressed before we put it on the market, we can do that. Or if you can't, coming up with a narrative to present the business in the best possible light. So we're ahead of that. Because being in control of your narrative and the information flows is really critical. to have a successful exit so often we we find that um businesses are not well positioned uh prepared rather so we
spend quite a lot of time undertaking that vendor due diligence um to to get them to get them ready so yeah so that look that's a critical part of it and and we just find often that that um business owners don't really know what good looks like. And when you encounter the sophistication of the private equity folks in particular, but even the trade guys, strategics, I'd say that if you're lucky, you can get strategics that can take a view. We've just advised a strategic buying into
a business in New Zealand, and they took a view. They said, look, we're comfortable, we understand the sector, we understand the dynamics. our due diligence needs to only focus on these five things and that's all we're going to do whereas a private equity crowd would come in and want to do i hate to use the term but boil the ocean trying to look look at the look at the macro characteristics of the market look at the trends the growth the margins and so on and then drilling very deeply into the business so so there'll be a difference
between if you're trying to sell a business to private equity versus trade because quite often you can get away with doing a little bit less preparation with trade. But equally, it comes down to the culture of the organization. We've worked with some very, very, very detail -oriented buy -side strategics, whereas others are prepared to take more of a view. And it might be small in the relative scale of their business. If they're a multi -billion dollar business and they're buying something for $50 million, it's like, it doesn't move the needle. Our time is more precious than spending a lot of money on due
diligence. Just listening to that, I wondered whether, going back to one of your earlier questions as well, that this whole piece of succession is massive in New Zealand. Maybe to sort of bring it to life with a couple of sort of real -life examples from 5e Capital and local examples. So New Zealand businesses going through this sort of process. So back in, I think it was around 2018, we partnered with... Craig and Shane Smith,
who were the founders of Education Perfect. Education Perfect was a, or is a education technology platform for K -12 schools, mainly to secondary schools. And they developed that after coming out of university. And it really sort of took off. This is in the sort of, call it 2012, 13 sort of era, 14. And they got into about 50 % of New Zealand schools, secondary schools. Typically just in sort of
one or two subjects. It sort of founded off the back of languages. And so Craig and Shane, I hope they don't mind me saying this, but they got to a point where, you know, they realised that the business was getting a bit beyond them from a size and scale perspective. They were obviously young, which is probably a different... sort of succession. And so they looked to bring in a partner that could help them on the next phase of the journey. And so they ended up selling
down 80 % to us, retaining 20%. One of them actually went away and went backpacking for about 12 months because he hadn't had that opportunity to come in at a university. And then we went on a growth journey, a really aggressive growth journey where sort of executive management team using our network to identify a key CEO, Alex Burke. Brought Alex in, who then built out, you know, the rest of his executive team. We put sales forces on the
ground in Australia and further afield. And by the time we exited that business three years later, there were, I think, about 90 % of schools in New Zealand and roughly about 50 % of schools in Australia. And we're starting to make moves into international markets as well. And we tripled the size of that business in three years. So we then exited to KKR, the protagonists and the barbarians at the gate. And yeah, it was a fantastic
outcome for the brothers. In fact, they've now gone on the journey with KKR as well. So they've continued to go. I contrast that with... maybe um totara learning which by sheer coincidence is an education technology platform as well but for corporates so e -learning um that was founded in wellington by a guy called richard wiles 5v invested in that business i think it was around 2020 2019 and richard retained 40 % of the business.
He was CEO at the time, and we agreed with him up front that through that course of our sort of investment period, we'd look to bring in new management team, allow him to step back from the business. And that's exactly what we did. We, again, built out the management team, repositioned the business. It was already quite large in Europe. It was going through third -party distributors or resellers. We ended up going direct. um into the uk ourselves with boots on the ground in
the uk and then we also put um boots in the ground in the us and from a standing start a third of the business uh was in the us when we exited three years later and again you know fantastic outcome for for richard um he obviously was able to de -risk his personal balance sheet with with our sort of original investment in the business but then stayed on the journey and enjoyed 3X growth of the business over that period. Obviously,
from an economic point of view, did well on his ultimate exit, but was able to step back from the business as well personally, which is what he was looking for. Yeah, great. Toby, I want to pick up on something that you mentioned earlier on, and it's in relation to the... asymmetry of deal experience that a founder will have when they approach the sale of their first venture especially if they're selling to private equity you know they've got some pretty sophisticated people you mentioned that degree of due diligence that will be undertaken deeper than a trade buyer.
Assembling a data room in advance of that is obviously a really smart piece of hygiene and preparation. But this kind of narrative word is one that really interests me around the stories that we're able to craft about the business and other bits and pieces. For a founder, what aspects of a narrative should they really consider mastering about their business that would put them in good stead? And to what extent would that be useful for them to do? Yeah, well, I always just come back to try and keep things simple for any client.
And it fundamentally boils down to two things, value and risk, right? So how do you think about value? Value is all about, at the sort of theoretical level, value is the present value of future cash flows, right? So what does that mean? That means how do you grow revenue? How do you contain costs and therefore grow profit? So that's profit.
That's one part of it. But discounted cash flow is all about free cash flow. So what's the working capital load? What's the capital investment plan? So free cash flow is driven by your profit and loss statement, but then you take off. your your your your capex so any investment that's required into the business and so so what that means when you're talking to to business owners is like okay what's our narrative to to build this into a high value business plan so how do you think
about um you know the growth of the business and as marie was saying earlier the resilience of your of your margins uh and and and a lot of it is about trying to understand if there have been any constraints on the business prior to the sale event that has prevented them doing the things that we're talking about in the future to grow value. And that could be about family dynamics or lack of balance sheet or lack of capability. And the number of times you've got
these personal complications in a business that have prevented change taking place. So often the transaction, the transaction can be the catalyst to unlock those value creation opportunities. Interesting. Right? To say, okay, so two brothers might be fighting amongst themselves and that's held the business back. Or they could be second generation and their father or their grandfather were big on dividends and they didn't have the
courage to say, we want to stop paying the family dividends. We want to invest in growth. So there'll be all these different factors that are... allowing you to build a story as to why the business hasn't done what it can do. But fundamentally, if it's a business in a good industry with good macro characteristics, so good growth rates, another key thing is the market structure. If it's in an industry where you might be a leader or a number two or number three, and there's a long
tail of fragmented competitors. that enables you to have strength, so that resilience of margins. This all goes to this narrative about how you build value. And then can you manage, are you in a business or a sector that has reasonably attractive working capital constraints? So for every dollar of revenue you're earning, are you having to invest 84 cents in stock or something? So your cash flow conversion is really low. So you want to be trying to work out, are there things that we can be doing to enhance those cash flows? and building a narrative around that
so that's that's the value side of things on the risk side really trying to get really focused what are the key risks to this business because people come up with all these different stories right if you're lazy you can come up with all these different stories oh that's a risk this is a risk so we need to get ahead of that how do we think about what are the real risks to this business and can we demonstrate through data points that you've got through for example the gfc or covert or or other you know new entrants coming into the market and so what we we often
spend time working with clients to actually have case studies about those events or what you've done how you navigated that why that isn't a risk and so so for me that's that's really critical when you're working with clients exiting a business to get really quite granular, quite crystal clear about what are the value drivers, how you think about building value, and what are the key risks and how you manage those risks. If you can do that, then you've got the ability to create a story to present to your bidder set. We see a
lot of businesses that have a very, very low risk appetite. And to your point, the transaction. with someone like ourselves as a catalyst for a change in that risk appetite to give them the confidence, A, that their own personal balance sheet's being due risk, but B, therefore they can take a bit more risk on the go forward. And so probably the thing I'd point to the most is M &A. Like M &A, so bolting in other businesses into your, we call it our platform, our platform
investment is an amazing way. to generate value. It could be, you know, again, new products, entering new geographies, but it supercharges the speed of growth. And if you get it right, it can generate a lot of return. And we see it time and time again where businesses haven't had the appetite to do it, mainly because there might be the... the personal needs around sort of family capital
requirements, whether it be the batch or the boat, when if it had just gone into the business and looked to take a little bit more risk, you know, it would have delivered, would continue to deliver growth. Yeah, or don't have the capability or confidence, frankly. Confidence. Confidence is a massive one. And, you know. It's rare to have an owner say, well, look, I just sort of didn't know how to do that or I lack the courage to do that. But, you know, sometimes you do get
that transparency. But a lot of it is about that. They just haven't even thought about it. You spend a lot of time talking about value and risk, you posted, and that's a really helpful lens to look at the world. I think about effective business planning and governance as well. And those are the types of conversations that an effective mechanism for. holding that space should really be responsible for delivering right you know good governance is about signing off on an effective strategic plan challenging that plan regularly supporting the ceo and the executive
team to execute upon that whilst having that eye upon risk how well are we doing that with the companies that you both see because i see that as quite a gap in new zealand i do a little bit of work in governance and i regularly see ineffective or broken governance structures inside businesses. Is that the lens that I've got on the world or is that something that you guys see regularly? If that's the case, then what should people do about it? I think, look, to generalise in private company world, it's pretty
poor, right? Like the business owner, probably the founder, probably the CEO has been doing it the same way for the last 50 years. So there is definitely a lack of strategic planning. It might be in his head or her head, but it's not a bit of paper that can take the team with them. And probably one of the biggest value adds actually we bring to the table is to clearly articulate
what that strategic plan is. What are the three or four rocks, we call them big rocks, to sort of roll over in our investment horizon and just ruthlessly execute on making that happen. happen you know of course we check in and make sure that we don't need to change the plan because you know just having a plan and going blindly after it isn't isn't sensible either but that sort of ruthless execution on an agreed strategic plan where everyone's rowing the boat the same
direction at the same speed is critically important and we you know adds a lot of value yeah and i'd say um there are a lot of private companies that don't have boards I can't remember the stats, but you have directors you're obliged to, but that doesn't mean you've got a board. So having that support around decision -making and planning, I think, is quite valuable. But where you see
private equity really excel is having a board that's aligned to their vision. So they'll come in and say, right, well, here's our plan. And typically you'll have two or three from the private equity fund on board and you'll have a couple of independents as well because it's good governance. But those independents will be selected for a particular reason. It's about how do we unlock this business plan? And you look at risk through the lens of making sure that the boat stays afloat
and hits those strategic goals. And so I'm trying to avoid the obstacles in the road as opposed to just, you know. having a compliance overlay that frankly stagnates a business. So it's all about how do we build value most effectively in the best risk -adjusted way? So investing in risk, where you think those risks could derail what your value creation plan is. Yeah, it's looking at risk from a value perspective, right?
As opposed to just risk for risk sake. Yeah, interesting. Risk management. A classic one, you know, climate risk. People go, oh, this climate stuff, it's all gobbledygook. But I tell you what, if your warehouse gets taken out by floods or earthquakes and you can't sell, it gets ugly pretty quickly. So having the right risk lens is absolutely critical. How would one, if there's a founder who's listening to this show going, oh, hell. I've really not got this risk thing effectively kind of either visible nor managed,
what would be some steps that they could take to kind of get themselves onto an effective journey, accepting, let's say, they're a mid -sized business, you know, 20 million bucks of revenue, give or take. So what are some things that they could do to start considering and factoring in risk effectively? Well, I just sort of stepped through your, you know, your P &L, right, revenue. So where does your revenue come from? Are you concentrated to one customer? Are you concentrated to one geography, one region, one sector? What's happening
in that sector? Is there some regulatory change coming that could literally stop your revenue from one day to the next? So I'd be looking at revenue. And there are a lot of components to that. So there's the industry. There are your customers. There are your competitors. and there's internally in your company. So your competitors, have you got effective competitor intelligence frameworks? So are you actually monitoring what's
going on with your competitors? And taking that seriously, it's not espionage, it's just monitoring the market within the company. Have you got some hotshot sales people? I mean, plenty of businesses have been kneecapped, if not terminated, by hotshot sales teams, people. taking the business elsewhere. So being quite deliberate about stepping through what drives your revenue and then costs. What's driving your costs? I mean, the Strait of Hormuz is a pretty good wake -up call. How exposed are you to particular supply chains? Now, some of
them you can't manage, right? But being cognizant of what are the big levers that drive value. So I mean, the small stuff's noise, but what are your biggest costs if it's labor, if it's fuel? if it's input costs of raw materials, just understanding what could derail you. And you don't have to manage every single risk, but identifying the key ones and saying, what could really hurt our business? And saying, okay, well, if that happens, what do we do? So by identifying the
risk, you can A, you can monitor it, so then you can manage it, but then you can plan for contingencies. Also try and mitigate it. Yeah. How do you do that? Well, there's some you can and there's some you can't, right? And I guess the residual risk is what you're saying is what other alternatives have you got if it happens? I think just to go back to your question, though, many founders wouldn't know where to start, right? And so I think the easy thing is there are so many frameworks around what are those questions.
And with AI now, there's plenty of frameworks out there that you can easily access and a lot of advisors that specialize in this space. massively expensive either for a business that you mentioned 20 million revenue can easily afford an advisor for a couple of days to workshop and facilitate that that sort of conversation because they'll know the right questions to ask but you know you you pick up on on probably i think the key the key point is the couple of days yeah right you don't need an advisor to help you through this you just need to think about your business
you understand your business well or You Google it, or if you're really clever, you AI it. It doesn't really matter. But the thing is, take the time. And a lot of business owners are working in the business, not on the business, right? And so it's like taking the time to say, actually, we need to stop and pause and engage our senior management teams, right? Are they empowered? You talk about how do you manage the risk. If you've got critical people to the business, do they have the right incentives? Chalemanga, show me the incentives. I'll show you the outcome.
If you don't show them the incentives, they'll be out the door working for a competitor. And it happens all the time. And it's so simple. Cut them in. Profit share, shadow equity. It does. I mean, it's one of our key tenants. And the same with any private equity. Well, most private equity funds would have the same view that alignment is critical. And alignment isn't just with your partner, your founder necessarily. It's actually with the management team as well. And so management equity plans are a very key component. component of delivering great returns.
What do you both see as the biggest misconception that founders have around the things that constitute value inside their business? They turn up for a conversation and they're thinking about selling. So where do they get it wrong? Oh, the big one is free cash flow. Education about what is value. Value is the present value of future cash flows. Okay. And on that score, You know, EBITDA is often used and thrown around. You know, EBITDA multiples equate to a value. And, you know, from
an investor point of view, you don't necessarily focus on EBITDA. You focus on free cash flow, right? And so in a capital -intensive business, you can't ignore CapEx. You can't ignore working capital because they can be big numbers. And so, yeah. The biggest thing we run into is founders thinking about EBITDA multiples when what they don't realise is there's a decent chunk of cash that goes out below EBITDA. Yeah, all being focused
on revenue without necessarily understanding how much margin you're making or where that revenue is coming from, what the vulnerability of that revenue is. Yeah, vulnerability of revenue is another one, yeah, for sure. There's a number that's been... popularised in technology of recent times and we used to talk about revenue per headcount. Now it's become gross margin per headcount. Should I be more fussy about gross or net margin? What is it that you guys care most about inside a business? Well, I think gross margin is really
important because it's the metric of how you think about your competitiveness relative to relative to your competition. And at a simple margin level, it's quite a good indicator of just, you know, your competitive advantage. And I think Murray made that point earlier. When net margin gets important, that's a determinant of your scale, because if you only sell one unit
at 90 % margin, but then you've got, you know, and you make a dollar and you've got $10 of overhead, you're still loss making. So you need to sell 100 of those things to make 90, right? And so I think it's both, but looking at it for different reasons. And so gross margin is much more important than revenue. If you're a founder, then an exit is on your horizon somewhere, either by default or by design. I'd encourage you it should be
much more the latter. Why not head to my website and do my exit audit? It'll take two minutes and it will highlight for you the things that will maximise your valuation. or indeed those that could cost you millions of dollars. joshcomrie .com, it'll be the first thing that'll pop up. Could be the best two minutes that you spend this year. But it depends where you are in the life cycle of a business as well, because there's plenty of, you know, plenty of case studies of building market share because you get network
effects. And so you might say, well, look, let's loss lead. You look at a trade met classic example. Let's loss lead. and have free selling or very cheap selling to command a leadership position in a market. And then you can start dialing up price, which then expands your gross margin. So it very much depends on where you are in the life cycle of your business as well. I think from a mid -market point of view, margins are important for sure, but it's balancing that with
growth. Growth is really critical. And we're growth investors, so it's super critical. But equally, if people are cutting costs just to get to a bottom line net EBITDA margin that is attractive, that's going to come at the cost of growth. And so it is, yeah, we do look at it from a sort of more balanced perspective. Ultimately, we're looking to grow businesses. And so what we need to reflect is an appropriate
EBITDA margin that reflects that growth. I talk about the 2020 rule, 2020 vision, so people can remember that, which is that if people can maintain 20 % growth and 20 % net margin in their business over a three plus year period, they've not just got an exciting asset, they've probably got a world -class asset and something that's well worth striving towards achieving. Over time, that's quite a difficult thing to achieve. When we had our prep call, you mentioned to me, Murray, that... one more year of growth equals one more
year of value is a misnomer. That's a misconception that people can have. So tell me when growth is not necessarily the right thing for someone to consider that they should stick around and eat this thing out just to kind of get more growth or get back to that place of growth. Yeah, we have these conversations quite often with owners, and I used to do it back in your role as well, where there was this thinking that if we go one more year, we've got this sort of... We've got a good year of growth ahead of us because we're going to nail this contract or we're going to
do this or that. But then probably the question, the more relevant question is, well, what happens after that year if you're going to keep it for that long? And often in those situations, they go X growth. And if they did hang on to the business and they did deliver that contract, yes, their EBITDA might get a... a one one time hit but then it's not so exciting in terms of looking forward and so we we do come come up against
this quite often trying to explain that you might have a bigger EBITDA number but you'll have a lower multiple because you've got lower growth into the future and so yeah because the multiple typically is is driven by by growth right so you know getting that through to founders so they they sort of understand it as always a challenge. You find that, Toby? Yeah, absolutely. And often the illusion of additional growth comes back
to the narrative point. The illusion of more growth is sometimes more powerful than actually what you deliver. So that's where building a really strong high conviction growth plan. And if you've got the right transactional dynamics and you get some competitive tension into a process where bidders will pay for that. narrative and illusion of growth, that's where you can get some great valuation outcomes. The reality is there's more higher growth buyers out there than no or low growth buyers out there. And so to
your point, less competitive tension if there's no growth. Yeah, that's right. And I've used this sort of concept of how to think about value, but multiples are just a proxy for this present value of future cash flows. So if you have... future cash flows that are low growth, well, if you pull that back to today's value, so present value of those future cash flows, and then look at that as a multiple of EBITDA, that's a lower
number than higher growth. And so if you think there's a high likelihood of being X growth in a year's time, we would always be saying sell into the growth today. And you're not going to get a different value outcome because the present value of cash flows today should be the same as the present value of cash flows in a year, but you've, you've, you've lopped off that one year of value and you've, you've, you've got that for yourself and you can pocket that with a dividend. Right. So, so actually sometimes
it is quite helpful to go through the mathematics because a lot of people don't understand the mathematics evaluation as well. And it's very easy to talk about multiples and things, but you know, and when we're working with buy side and sell side, We will actually often go into the characteristics of particular transactions. They'll say, well, Jimmy down the road got like a 10 times for his business. Well, guess what? It was bigger. It was more resilient. It had better margins. It had a better management team. It had more growth. It had more cash flow. So
therefore, someone was prepared to pay for that because they had higher belief that those cash flows would manifest versus you and your dog running around with a suitcase. No, that's not a 10 times. It's a one times if you're lucky. It's a great visual for me to have in my head, by the way. But that is a good way of framing it up. And people say, well, why should a bigger company be worth more than a smaller company? It's resilience. It's resilience of cash flows. And you've probably got multiple growth vectors. Do you grow in Australia? Do you grow in America?
Do you grow in the UK? If you're a bigger business with operations in those markets, you've got these growth vectors. comes with complexity and challenge and managing teams and all that sort of thing. But at least you've got that opportunity. Founders often conflate their identity with the business itself. And so sometimes for people to have that conversation, to hear it from you, is it like hearing that your baby is ugly? It's a phrase that we use a lot. That was an accidental, not a setup. I made some notes earlier. And sometimes,
look, you've got to do it in a respectful way, but it's like, look, this is not what you believe it might be. If you could both have a conversation with a founder who's at the start of their journey, they're early on, they're on that growth journey, they've got sub -10 people, they're probably doing $1 million to $2 million of revenue, and they're looking out to the future of what the exit event or possibility could look like. If you could say a couple of things to that person, what would be those couple of things that you would say to them at that stage of their journey?
Understand what drives value. being very, very clear about what drives value and just network, be talking to people, be talking to people that have been successful with growing businesses, exiting businesses, but also in relation to executing your own business plan. Try and get people around you that can help you ask yourself the right questions and then... taking it a step further, once you've asked yourself the right questions, go, right, what do I need to put in place? Those
big boulders that Murray was talking about, what do I need to do to get those in place? Now, I think the most effective founders, entrepreneurs are those that recognize where they have their own weaknesses. It might be a bit cliche, but it is the truth to say, shivers, I have no idea about that. How do I get someone that can help me do that? How do I get a good finance person as well and make sure that I'm not... losing money on contracts or terrible at capital allocation. So terrible at investing money in the right places.
How do I get the best bang for buck? Have I got the right business analyst? How do I think about building sales? Do I need to bring someone in and give them some skin in the game to build value faster? So it's, I would say, not being afraid of getting people around you that can help. the waka paddle a bit faster yeah mine was similar so it's all about the people getting the right people and incentivizing them in the right way so they're aligned with your outcomes or the outcomes you're seeking to to deliver probably the other one which is i think a blind
spot for a lot of founders um just get out there and and talk to who you think the ultimate buyers might be Also, I'm sure they do this, but making sure you're talking to customers and target customers, suppliers, competitors, and actually competitors is a good one. We talk a lot to competitors, not from a sort of com -com perspective, but more around just trying to understand what's going on in the market, what they're seeing. You learn stuff. And so I think, yeah, I'd say
two things would be employ the right people. And that includes governance. Align them the right way and then just, to your point, network, get out there and have the conversations because you'll learn a lot. Yeah, the competition thing is interesting, isn't it? I think too often we think that those are the enemy as opposed to people that we should potentially collaborate with, you know, the co -op petition kind of idea. And I remember university, which is many moons ago, the German pharmaceutical industry, how
there was, I think, Merck and a couple of others that essentially co -opted each other and sliced and diced markets rather than trying to turn up and cut someone's profit or develop a drug straight after the other person had done. And the value accretion for these companies is a long time ago. Value accretion of those companies outstripped many, many times over what had happened at the United States at that point in time because they were smart about how they worked a market over, so to speak, avoiding the... Commerce Commission kind of aspect, of course, as well. Yeah, I mean, back when I was an advisor, I used to call Toby a frenemy. And how about now? He's now just a
friend. Thanks, Murray. And likewise. But yeah, it is important because you never know when you might need them as well. And often, I don't know if it's a New Zealand mentality, but you do strike the zero -sum mentality a lot. And maybe it's because we're a small market. But actually it's about, okay, you know, can we be doing something to grow the industry faster? Could we be collaborating on educating the market on something that we're both doing that's quite hard to understand? You
know, so just little things like that. But yeah, a lot of, you know, I think it's understandable, but a lot of people are very secretive about what they're trying to achieve and we often encounter. in situations where clients are saying, oh, we can't disclose this to bidders. Well, guess what? I mean, the logical bidder will be, in many cases, your competitors or someone that's wanting to buy you to grow. And so by necessity, you're going to need to be transparent to a point. Now, you might not disclose everything, so you can
think about staging information release, but to get the best value outcome, you need to enable bidders to assess value and risk. So that means information. So it is hard. It is a bit of a Rubicon moment for a lot of them. I think the other piece is just having the confidence to take risk because no risk, no return. More risk, more possible returns. So obviously you've got to be calculated around it. But, yeah, I think
to get the sort of, you know, depending on what your returns are you're seeking. typically speaking, you've got to take some risk. And we probably see founders be a little bit more cautious on the whole than, again, on average. Or when founders go to take risk, they might be quite entrepreneurial. Cavalier, maybe. Yeah. Gut reaction. Because
entrepreneurialism, you know, you need to take risk and you need to move quickly and you're oftentimes just basing it on instinct or hard work. Whereas a big delta between, say, private equity and a classic privately owned business is the rigor, right? It is very, very, very thorough, extremely thorough. I would say now some are even deeper than others, but that is a massive exposure of the blind spot. of the private company
owner, I would say, is that they might say, oh, let's go and launch in Australia, and they'll just pack their bags, go to Australia, and start spending money. And before you know it, you've invested millions and have got nowhere, compared with private equity, happy to invest in advisors, commercial diligence, spending, in some cases, millions of dollars to understand a particular growth avenue before they pull the trigger. We've explored a lot of different subjects today. Gents,
is there anything that we haven't brought up today, which is something which is burning on your mind or a trend that you're seeing or some preparation that people should consider before they come and start talking to a gentleman like you? Is there any stones we haven't turned over? I think it's been pretty thorough, but what we're observing is that, and it's been a trend over the entirety of my career, that due diligence loads are getting... are getting heavier. So bidders are investing more time and more money
undertaking diligence and vendors likewise are doing the same to get the best outcome. So whether you're selling a business or buying a business. So that means the transactional burden has increased quite a lot. So we're finding that transactions are taking longer, bidders are investing more time and money on assessing opportunities. So that means as a vendor, you need to be equally prepared to navigate that. I mean, one thing we haven't talked about is warranty and indemnity insurance, which is very helpful for vendors
selling a business, which is an insurance product that insures against risks of breach of warranty. So when you sell a business, you've got warranties that, for example, that you've provided full and complete information or... you're compliant with rules and regulations and things. So there's normally a big suite of warranties that a vendor will provide. So there's an insurance product now that will support that rather than in the
old days where vendors would need to hold a portion of the proceeds back to cover any risk for a period of time between one and three years, something like that. So that's been a massive support, I think, to transactions. I think we've covered a lot. It's been very productive. Yeah, I agree. I guess probably summarising some of the, I guess repeating in a way, but private equity can be
a very successful way in transitioning a business. And going back to the earlier comment, there's nothing to be afraid of. We don't load the businesses up with debt. In fact, most of our businesses don't have any debt. That's sort of the historical view of private equity. We get behind growth. We lean in with the right strategy and the right people. We incentivize the people in the right way to get the outcomes. And so it can be a fantastic ride and a great transition for founders to think
about as an option. Of course, they've got other options, but it's one option they should explore. Yeah. I'd build on that by saying often it's incredibly invigorating for founders because a lot of them just don't know how to unlock that value, but the successful private equity funds are very, very good at that, and so it's really invigorating. We've got plenty of examples of clients that have retained a portion, de -risked by taking 60%, 70%, 80 % of the business off
the table, and the remaining 20 % has been equal to the first. 80 % because of the value creation. But very invigorating intellectually as well as just the risk. I mean, who doesn't love the adrenaline of growing something? It's fantastic. Yeah, growth is exciting. So I would agree with that, Murray. Gentlemen, very grateful for your time and coming on and sharing your experience and bits of wisdom as well. Toby King, Cameron Partners, Murray Schnuriger, 5V Capital. Thank you so much. Thank you. You're welcome. Pleasure.
Thanks so much for listening to the show. If you've gotten this far, I reckon you've probably enjoyed it. And there's more available for you in the form of my book, Two Commas. It's available on my website, joshcomery .com. I've done an audible version, which is on amazon .com. And there's a Kindle one kicking around on either of those resources as well. I've had some wonderful unsolicited feedback from early readers. They describe it as being punchy, clear, helpful, and actionable. What it's not is a guide on how
to sell your company. you can go to ChatGPT for that. It's more insightful, experiential based, and a bit of a blend of psychology, philosophy, and what it takes to build something meaningful, and what all that means afterwards. Thanks so much for listening, and I hope you grab yourself a copy.
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