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2 Commas: The $multi-million exit show with Josh Comrie

2 Commas: The $multi-million exit show with Josh Comrie artwork

3 X GM's hired but only 1 exit: How I got this wrong | Dom Sutton | 2 Commas by Josh Comrie

Sep 9, 20261 hr 11 minAudio
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Dom Sutton hired three general managers to run the business he built. Two didn't work out, and he owns most of the reasons why. Dom started Pumpt with his last paycheck, running cold calls from a tiny room next to the toilet while his two boys slept on a mattress beside his bed. He grew it into an advertising business putting 70 million items into NZ letterboxes a year. This is an unusually honest conversation about the founder-to-owner transition, the difference between delegating and abdicating, and why the lack of the right metrics let good months quietly slide into losses. He also tells the story of the toy business he bought on a lick-of-paint story that lost him a dollar a minute for two years, and how that exact disaster became StockTrim, the inventory forecasting software he now sells in 26 countries. We get into: Why two of his three GM hires failed and what he'd do differently Delegating vs abdicating, learned the hard way The $1.2 million toy business mistake and the due diligence lesson behind it How that failure became a global SaaS Why he walked away from selling Pumpt before finally exiting to his own GM Sometimes the business you build next comes straight out of the one that nearly broke you. ⁠Subscribe to the 2 Commas Journal⁠ Order the 2 Commas book⁠ Follow Josh on LinkedIn

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Transcript

From the show. Tap a time to play from there.

Dom Sutton, welcome to the show. Thanks, Josh. Thanks for having me. It's a pleasure. It's been a while in the making, actually, this conversation. Yeah, we have talked about it a few times. Once or twice. Yep. So you famously started your first business with your last paycheck. On the continuum of like a visionary entrepreneur through to desperate dad at the other end, whereabouts do you reckon you might have been? At that moment, probably. 60 % desperate dad. Desperate dad. 40 % entrepreneur.

Yeah, I'd come out of this. You know the story, but I came out of a separation. Can you share it? Yeah, I can. Separation, had two very young kids, had quite a decent bill, post -tax bill for child support and maintenance. And I was on a pretty good wicket as a sales manager for the company I was working for, but facing starting again. It just looked like I was just never going to get ahead. So I always wanted to have my own business, but it's sort of a push -pull scenario

where I just thought now's the time. Because I went to my boss and said, hey, what's the chances of a pay rise? And he's like, not right now. So I could have gone somewhere else. The company wanted me overseas in Australia. I didn't want to leave the kids, so that was the time to start my own business, take a bigger risk. And yeah, I could have earned nothing, but it turned out I... I did okay. You were up against it as well, right? I remember the kind of situation, your living situation, and there was some real kind of, you know, can you share some of those gritty

kind of details about where the kids were staying when they were with you and, you know, kind of how that was? Yeah, yeah. My now 25 -year -old, he was the younger of the two boys I had at the time, and he was still in nappies. But I didn't have enough money to pay for my own place because I was cleaned out by the separation. So I was really on my living paycheck to paycheck. And so I didn't really want to spend all my money plus the child support. I didn't want to spend all my money on paying for like a three bedroom place. So I just went and found a child friendly

flatmate. A flat share. Flat share. An apartment as it so happens. And she was pretty cool. But I just, I had the kids in my room. One slept in the bed with me and I had another one pull out a mattress I pulled out of a cupboard and put him on the ground next to me. I kept nappies in that cupboard as well. So just to relieve a bit of stress on my flatmate, I would take the kids up north each weekend when I had them to see my mum, Lee, at T -Point. Perfect. Yeah. So which do you reckon is better for motivation,

the vision or the necessity, like the desperation, the up against the wall? Vision's great, but yeah. It doesn't always provide the impetus to act. And the impetus to act, execution is where it all is at. I was talking to somebody the other day about ideas. And everyone's got ideas. Lots of us got ideas. But it's the ones that act on them, have the balls to act on them that actually sometimes come through. Not always. So you create your own luck through action. So yeah, having an up against the wall scenario creates action

because you can't not act because not acting means complete disaster. Yeah. Yeah, like failure or death, not in this instance, but death of business is kind of associated to that thing as well. Uh, it's funny you mentioned that everyone thinks they've got good ideas. Um, statistically there's three things that on average, if you ask people, if they are good at these things, they would tell you yes, out of 10 will. The first is ideas, better ideas than other people. Uh, the second is drivers. The third is lovers, like competence in the bedroom. Right. So statistically

eight out of 10 people would tell you they are better than average at doing all three of those things. Yeah. But the bell -shaped curve does not lie. No, no, I fucking believe that. Yeah. Yeah. Um. Yeah, it was interesting times for sure, but I'm glad. I've got the attitude that everything that happens that's challenging or even disastrous is a gift in some form. So looking back on that, I mean, my whole life changed from that moment. And initially it seemed pretty tough,

but it got better. Yeah, yeah. So I remember when I started my first business, Potentia, not far from here, similar timeframe actually. And I had been staying at my parents, I called them my original flatmates whenever I'd meet someone. Where do you live? Oh, with my original flatmates. And staying with them, they eventually kicked me out because they were sick of me coming, you know, leaving the house at 6am, coming back at 11pm and eating the leftovers. And they got sick of it. And so I then was moving to house sit at a friend's place. I had a beat up car back

in those days. I love cars, but you sacrifice a bunch of things when you start a company, as you well know. And I had all my clothes in the back of my car and it was parked on O 'Connell Street at about seven o 'clock in the morning. I'm walking to my office where it was and I walked past a guy that I knew out of the same industry. And Hugh. And Hugh walks up and he goes, oh, g'day, Josh. I haven't seen Hugh for a couple of years. Oh, g'day, Hugh. How are you? And he goes, you're really good. And he looks over my shoulder and there's all my clothes in the back of the car. And then he sees me like looking rumpled. And he did connect the dots up. He goes,

are you okay? He thought I was living in my car. But you talk about sacrifices and what it's involved in those really, really early days. But for you, when you started pumped, what? discipline did that instill in you as a business owner like having the last paycheck uh committed monthly outgoing support of your young now separated family what what kind of ethos disciplines did you instill in the business from day dot well i just i just couldn't bear the thought of failure

at that point right um it wasn't an option i left my i left my well -paying job um and i i hired a small room next to the toilet my friend Craig's business, who was a client at the time. And, um, I just hit the phone. I had a, I did a little business plan. I know exactly how many calls I needed to make and that the call rate that I did, and it was hard because I was a manager and I sort of got out of practice of cold calling. So I had to get back into that and get to suck up, you know, eat a bit of humble pie, I suppose.

Yeah. You got to take some beating because you get nose again. Oh yeah. Yeah. Got into a rhythm of it, though, and just became, it's sort of like going, it's like exercise, you know. At first it's hard, it's sore, you get sore, but once you get into a rhythm and you get into the habit of it, it becomes easier. And I just had, I had a call rate and an appointment rate that I knew I had to do with ratios in order to get success. And looking back on that plan, it was actually, it actually worked, you know. What

was pumped in the early days? What was the original idea? I started out with a coupon booklet called Smart Saver, and it was a composite advertising. So it was a small, it sort of had deals for pizza and video back in the day. Like the entertainment book, but a bit different. Yeah, it was free in letterboxes. So I delivered it to every household that took mailers in Auckland. At the time, about 350 ,000, 360 ,000 homes. Sounds like a lot. Yeah, it's good. Well, it was a numbers game. I was ex -DM, direct mail industry. And so I

understood all the metrics around it. And so we'd sell a page to a customer for about $3 ,500. So it was about one cent per household delivered, right? So it's a formula of people because they'd get their head around. And so you worked out success ratios, depending on what they're selling on that. And people could make their own decisions, whether it was a good ROI for them. Yeah. And yeah, it worked. Um, and so I was doing one a month and sort of, um, then I took on, um, a national one as well. So, and then, and then I started offering more extended services around

retail advertising, which included standalone mail -in drops and point of sale websites, all that sort of stuff. And media. Given, um, so advertising is the space, broadly speaking, you then, I think, diversified the offering from, uh, the mailbox delivery stuff. You went into other spaces as well. What else did you do? Well, that was our core. At one stage, I knew Letterboxd really well because I was from that industry. And so at one stage, I was doing 70 million items

into the Letterboxd a year. 70 million? Yeah. You'd have been one of the biggest polluters. I mean, deliverers. Yes. Most recyclable paper. And employing a lot of children around the country. Sweatshop days. It's a trickle -down economics, you see. Trickle -down economics. I love it. But yeah, the thing I loved about it was so good. That was when mailers were really big and they really worked for retailers. So a lot of our

retailers in QSR, so quick service retail like McDonald's or Pizza Hut and guys like that. Subway was a client of mine. So we were doing a lot of that. Then we'd go to point of sale. So in -store, what do you see in -store when you go in there? All the proof, ticketing. So, you know, wobblers and things like that. And then websites, any support material. We tended not to do a lot of above the line media, like TV ads and stuff like that. We did a bit of radio, but we sort of stayed away, left the sort of big agencies to that. So I was sort of like, someone called us a sausage factory at one stage, which is basically

a nice way of saying we just, we're a production house basically. Right. And at first, you know, you want to be fancy like the agencies, but then I realized where the money was and the money was in producing. um consulting and creative yeah cool cool if you're really good at that but we just got shit done basically yeah and so we would design print i had a design studio so we design print freight and deliver um mailers yeah turnkey okay and there was a number of revenue streams there it was a great business if you

did work it out on 70 million units a year yeah yeah so yeah it was Very highly successful business. And I'd imagine as well, if you compare to the traditional agency, the advertising agencies as an alternative, they'd be very project -based. So they'd be like a piece of work, like we're launching a new product or we're rebranding or we're going out to market with something interesting and different. And so you'd have like a big flush of cash that had come through and then you'd be back to trying to win more customers again, doing pitches. Whereas you'd be more recurring kind of regular repeat customers and revenue.

Yep. Retail promotional schedules are fascinating things. I mean, every Father's Day, Mother's Day, Easter, Christmas, Boxing Day, they'll come up with an excuse for a sale if they can't, they haven't got one. Black Friday, Singles Monday. It's gone nuts nowadays, hasn't it? Yeah, it is. They'll just go, spring sale. I mean, just come up with a season, come up with an event, back to school, all of them. Do you reckon retailers have shot themselves in the foot? As a consequence,

if I would like to purchase something, then I'll just go, I'll wait for a month. And I now have set up a reminder if there's something which might be a bit more expensive. I'll set up an agent through GPT or Claude and it'll do the searching for me and then ping me when something goes on sale. Do you reckon retailers have shot themselves in the foot? Honestly, I haven't spent much time thinking about it since I sort of got out of the business and I haven't been properly in it for a while. So, I mean, I do different forms of advertising now for my stock from my other business. Hey, it's Josh. Thanks for listening

to the show. When founders talk about the dream exit, they're really talking about freedom. Freedom to choose how to use their time and to decide what comes next. I'm a client of JB Ware in New Zealand and I know this is what sets them apart. They help entrepreneurs and leaders turn success into significance. A great exit isn't just about the commas in your bank account. It's about what those commas enable you to create. Two Commas

is proudly partnered with JB Ware, helping founders by putting their wealth to work for generations. I think, yeah, people become a little bit desensitised to things after a while. You know, the growing wolf. It's a big, massive sale, isn't it? You know, I think like that about Black Friday, not Black Friday, it's Boxing Day. It's like, I heard a stat where half the stuff is slightly more than normal sometimes, but technically that's illegal, right? But it depends on how you put the pricing in the months before, that sort of

stuff. But yeah, I saw some, there's some trickery in some of the stuff as well. Yeah. So you were essentially counter -cyclical as well, because at that time, 2003, you started the business. That was when most companies were waking up to the fact that it needed to be online. And so there was this rush of web development companies that entered the market. And I think for a short period of time, that was probably a reasonably good business to be in. But then over time, it worked out to be a pretty awful business. Back to the project problem, expectation, management,

scope creep, delivery competence, lack of resources around the market, all that sort of stuff. But did you ever think about getting into web dev? I poked my nose into it. It was probably the best way to describe it. And then realized that, looked around at some of the guys who were doing it. Only some companies were making a killing doing it. And they had big clients who wanted... Doing, creating websites for SMEs is absolute highway to a hiding. Yep. Why? SMEs, you're dealing

with the owner often. Organization, concept, you're running a project and you're not charging them for every billable hour is for the end product. And you're dealing with somebody who's distracted. Yep. It's a common problem with dealing with any SME owner. business there's distraction or focus and when you're dealing with a bigger company you have a whole executive teams the job is to get this project done um and then by the time even if you build and then they're very price sensitive so you're tempted to do cut price websites

but then you end up the cost of service just not worth it yeah the juice is not worth the squeeze as you say yeah i haven't heard that before i like it so um i stayed I stayed out of it, unless we had a client who wanted us specifically to project manage it. They really wanted us to. But we didn't go out offering a web design package or service. So with that business, you mentioned that you've been out of it for a while. What were the early motions that you did to try and extract DOM from the operations of the business

and how did that go? Well, yeah, I had around about, you were. We were friends at that time. You knew when I was sort of trying to step out of it. I sort of realized that I was possibly fatigued of the business and the industry. It was becoming not an empowering force anymore. I was becoming a slightly negative force within the business. Cynical maybe? Cynical, absolutely. I would go to meetings and I knew exactly what the customer was going to say. And it kind of

annoyed me. So I had to sort of step back. I had had that genuine enthusiasm about this whole project. Then I was like, yeah, you're shortcutting here and you're doing this and you're doing that. And some customers would like the honesty. Majority didn't. So I just thought, I just better step out of this. So let's look at getting some people in here that can do this instead of me. So I started the idea of getting a general manager, consulted with my EO forum buddies about this.

The general consensus was, you know, it's 50 -50. I was like, geez, I'd like to get some better odds on that than that. So I did observe success stories with my peers and I came to the conclusion it's better to hire someone into a role before they become general manager and just put them straight into general manager. So as in a growth role? Growth role like a sales director or something like that, yeah. So the team can get used to them without going, oh, that's the boss, the

new boss. Because even when I did do that process, still we had some resistance that found a loyalty thing. And it's like, oh, what? You're not going to be here as much or you're not as accessible. I'm not enjoying my role so much. So there is actually, you've got to be prepared for that. So I learned a few things. So I actually, Pumps had three general managers. Over time? Over time. Not at the same time? Not at the same time. So three sounds like it didn't necessarily work out the way you anticipated it to from the outset?

No. The ideal is to find a general manager who runs the business for you and grows and everything's glorious and I can go off and sail into the sunset and sit at the beach, right? Yeah. So it starts out with that intention and then as time goes on, you realize that there's things that aren't going as well. So then there's a temptation to come back in, but you don't really want to rule in that process because you're focused on your own journey outside of the business. So I started

down that road. I sort of didn't semi -retire. I just started spending more time doing fun things like traveling and I was still involved, but not on a day -to -day basis. And that seemed to go right for a while and then sort of things wavered a little bit. Do you mind me asking what? was the things that either you or they got wrong in that process and as you're reflecting upon that the probably top three things that I see are people The individual who's hiring for their

replacement, not scoping the role properly and then not stepping back properly. So they become what I call the CMO, the chief meddling officer, which is destructive as all hell because they disempower the person they've put into that role. The second is that the person that has put themselves up as a candidate or has been submitted as being the right person for the role. underestimates the difficulty of that job and they may mislead someone so they might say oh yeah I can do that

classic you know kind of lie to get the job situation and then they fail in that position the third is that the role itself has been constructed in a way that really it's not you're not setting someone up for the Ability to succeed because you've essentially tried to clone yourself as a founder. And founders, rightly or wrongly, have to do everything inside the business from being the cold caller to being the lead designer

to chief cook and bottle washer to manager of operations to all these different types of things. And then if you try and clone yourself across all those functions, it's just never going to work. So, you know, those are the three that I see probably most regularly. Yeah, I guess. Across the three that I've had, they all had different skill sets and they weren't necessarily not good. They just, yeah, like you said, they didn't have all the skill sets to necessarily grow the company. And, you know, there's a bit

of bad luck there. One of them had COVID and the second one had COVID happen on her watch. So that was a lot of change management we didn't. We couldn't really prepare for skill set wise, but obviously there's some skill sets that help cope with these things better than others. But as far as the first one goes, yeah, it was just, to be honest, it was misalignment around values and a more strategic focus on what the business was about. So some people had great focus on

immediate revenue. but then what are we actually doing with this account and where are we going with it? So that's, I was pretty good at standing, stepping away. In fact, I had the opposite problem. I would step too far away. Are you abdicated? Yeah. I was like so happy to be like. I trust you. I'm going over here. Call me if something. Well, actually, don't call me. Just fix it. I'll be somewhere hot having a beer. And that was possibly where I didn't really have enough metrics

in place to just measure and quietly measure where things were slightly going off kilter until I came in and said, what the hell's happening here on something big, which is like going from normal months would make a good profit. nothing you know right or loss so um so yeah that was metric managing kpis is probably where i sort of fell down a little bit right um yeah that's a common issue like um What is it? What Gets Measured Gets Managed. Yes. Interesting book.

And Charlie Munger, show me the incentive and I'll show you the outcome. Yeah. And you mentioned that someone focusing on short -term revenue at the expense of long -term strategic gain. That may have been an incentive problem. It might have been their individual propensity problem as well. But if you've got the right metrics in place, then that makes it a lot easier to kind of see what's actually happening, where they're going, where they're directing their efforts. Yeah. The other thing to mention is if you bring somebody in from a senior role in another company, they do bring skill sets that are new to the company, which is great because

I'm not great. I admit I'm not great at everything and it's nice to see people have got skill sets that I don't have, but they also bring a bit of baggage from the other company as well. Of course. So they bring their belief around what was good revenue. So let's say someone comes from a publishing company and they're like, we need to do more of this publishing work. And it's like, yeah, but we sell advertising. We're not really, we can be a pseudo publisher, but how we make money is on margin on advertising. And so that dynamic can change our GP, our scalable

revenue quite a bit. That's just one example. Yeah. Yeah, got it. So along the way. In that journey, when you're in a part of your step -out mode, you famously bought a toy business. Tell us about this, Folly. Oh, this is a great story. So you've got to be careful about the stories you tell yourself. Oh, yeah. What do you mean by that? You've got the inner voice in your head, right? And every day you're telling yourself

some things. And every now and then you've got to sort of have a think. Is this a real? Is this reality? It's your reality at that moment. But is it real? And we're all telling ourselves stories. Constantly. There's a narrative with which we're used to inform our view and experience in the world. Yeah. And it's a thing. It's hard to switch off. Yeah. And I was telling myself, I had a look at it. One of my clients was a toy business.

And he was a reasonably regular customer. He was a bit difficult. And he announced that he was going to sell the business. And I made the mortal mistake of inquiring about it. And so I got into his funnel and I sort of got into a process where I was basically doing DD on this business. And I was like, yeah, it could be good. But then I started telling myself the story. It's like, he's so bad at running this business. The website's not that good. The e -commerce function's not that good. He hasn't got the toys displayed correctly. All these things. And remember,

I'm not a retailer. No. Have you dealt with retailers? I've dealt with retailers all the time to the point that I maybe thought I understood how it all worked. Better than them at doing their own business. But a product business is different from a service business. And very different. Because there's inventory, which we'll get into soon. So I was telling myself the story is, this business is a bit like a house renovation. I've got properties, you know, and we all relate to this. All it needs is a bit of a lick of paint. We can do the kitchen, do the bathroom, and put

it back on the market. Straight out, instant profit. That's a good analogy. And to continue with the analogy is, I didn't realize that this renovation had, the piles were rotten. The roof was rusted. Yeah, the roof was rusted and it didn't have code compliance or something like that. And it was just, it was. It was a dog. It was a dog. Why was it a dog? It was a dog because there was a lot of slob stock. There

was a lot of obsolete stock. Some of the stock I found out later was five years old. And in toys that matters, I imagine. In toys that matters a lot. toys are very seasonal they're very what flavor of the month this sort of stuff and a lot of the stuff was coming from china it wasn't necessarily brand or brand stuff either it was it's more just like that looks cool let's let's you get that type thing right so cheap generic kind of stuff yeah and it wasn't it wasn't like um you know powder puff kids or something like that it was it was cabbage patch kids whatever whatever like yeah i thought there could be both

there's probably both yeah i had all sons so i'd have like and i was also clueless about what what young little little girls like so but i was told by my staff and that was the other problem i was telling they were telling me what what we needed and i don't really have an idea so um yeah so i had the other thing was i've been to finance i didn't have enough money to pay for all the stocks i've been to finance the stock i paid him amount for the business and then i've been to finance um a huge amount of sitting stock i think it was about a million dollars of stock and in hindsight i should have paid a fraction

of that value or not or just taking it right off the the purchase price, which he wouldn't have wanted because how was he going to get rid of it? So he is basically moving his slob stock onto me as part of the sale. And I paid the cost price for it. And anybody who knows about inventory, hearing me say that would just be wincing about now because you shouldn't really be paying for sitting stock, stuff that's not going to use in the next sales cycle. You shouldn't be paying the cost price for it. I should have paid like five cents and a dollar for it. Wow. Yeah. Because

it's the slob stock, obsolete stock that you're talking about. So I spent the next two years trying to discount the crap out of that stuff, lower than my cost, to try to generate cash flow. I then have financed the business, that stock. So I was always, and I had to buy new stock to have stuff that people wanted to buy. Yes. So I was always just, I was always at a cash flow. Thank goodness I had pumped who was doing well. Yep. I had a bunch of businesses, sorry, properties that the bank. liked my equity stake in. So they

banked and run from me, thankfully. Otherwise it would have been a patch. So over the next, once I realized I was in deep strife, I spent the next time doing sales to move that slob stock, basically asset stripping that business. Two big leases that I had to sort of have frank chats to the landlords about with personal guarantees from me, of course, when I signed up for the business. And then I had the vendor finance. I still had to pay off to the previous. To the

perhaps slightly questionable ethics prior owner. Yeah. So I sacrificed one property to get out of that and get out of that situation, which had interest on it. Yeah, it was a great, it was a very humbling experience. I was losing a dollar a minute for two years. About 70K a month if you want to work it out. It's loss. Yeah, that hurts. It's a million bucks a year, basically. Yeah. So what were the key lessons,

like top two or three lessons that you've taken away from that that have informed your view of business and life and other things that you've gotten involved in? Oh, there's a number of things, not just business ones, just about interactions. It's like if someone's harassing you to buy their business, just pause for thought. But the other ones is, yeah, do, if you don't. If you're not an expert in the area, and even if you are an expert, just get a second opinion on some of the stuff that you're looking at. The due diligence was problematic because I didn't understand inventory.

Yeah, just be careful about, I was doing very well in other areas of my life. The aid agency was going really well. I had a few other things on the go. I was doing property stuff that was going well. I was doing well. Yeah. And so I thought I could do this well. Yes. And so now if I am invited to be investing or buying something in the area, I don't know. I'm either very cautious or it's just a no. It's not my thing. There's the Dunning -Kruger effect, which is that we

don't always know as much as we think that we know. Kind of like the thing I was talking about before where you ask 10 people if they're good lovers, ideation people, et cetera. So Dun & Crew can kind of trip you up. It's tripped me up certainly on many, many occasions. But I think what you need is a young girl that I met called Dominica. And Monica, one day, she was about four years old and she had a little table outside the front of her house. Tina and I were driving past and we had to stop because she was adorable with her even younger sibling that was with her. Dad was in the background. And she had a sign

up toys for sale. And she had like Batman with one arm missing and a hobby horse and all these other things. And they had tags on them. And we didn't really pay attention to the tags, but Batman was $100. So there's $100. She goes, it's $100, but you can have him for five. What's the deal? Like, Tina and I, it was one of our greatest experiences. This girl was so adorable and so enthusiastic. Like, she gets up to get something else to try and do an upsell on something. She knocks the whole table over. The things go flying.

Dad's laughing. We're laughing, having such a good time. We ended up overpaying for these three things just because it was such a cool... Did you buy the... I bought the hobby horse. bought the Batman, gifted them both to niece and nephew, and so re -gifted, and they were super stoked with them. Immediately, niece started running around the restaurant with the hobby horse. I was intending to give it to Tina, but she didn't want to get involved in the hobby horse and community, much to my disappointment. But you needed Dominica in your life, and they sold the hell out of those things for you. Yeah, I mean, I wonder where she got the advice to start high. Uh, don't know.

Uh, so dad was in the background and we were laughing with dad about how, uh, you know, what an entrepreneurial enterprising young girl. And he's like, man, you should see, you know, this is a half of it. She sold kitchen equipment. She sold things to the kindergarten. You know, she's been out there hustling. I'm like, follow that girl. She's going to be a great hustler over time. But, um, what would you recommend starting, starting high going low or like for pricing? Yeah. Yeah. And what, in what area? You asked. Why? How did she get the idea? Yeah. Start high. Oh, yeah. You can always hustle.

It's very hard to go, oh, it was $5, but now it's $10. And people go, what? No, no, no, no, no, no, no, no. Because you set your perceptually. People have a little bit of trouble with value. Value equals benefits minus cost. Say that again. Value equals benefits minus cost. It's my little thing. Yeah. It really helps you understand a pricing model. And so there's no benefits, it's just cost. So sometimes people have trouble evaluating something straight off the bat. You're telling them what the value is because they haven't yet

seen the benefits. So the cost is the value until they see the benefits and then you get a more 360 view. So when you see some chewing gum at the counter when you're checking out, you know what chewing gum is going to do for you. So your value equals that. But if it says it's $10 chewing gum, oh, do I need chewing gum that much? I can get it. So you have an evaluation you do in your mind every time you see a product. Yeah. And there's a price imprinting that we have as well,

which is that in a category, we get a number in our head. You said $10, but you're $2. You go, that's about right, I would imagine, for a pack of gum these days. Jeremy Moon said something wonderful, and it won't leave me, which is that the value of your brand is the difference that someone will pay for your product versus a seemingly identical. Cheaper competitor. So the delta between the cheaper competitor and you is your brand value, which I absolutely love. So it's an extension of what you just said there. Yep. So you've ultimately

gone through an exit with Pumped. How did that come about? Tell us about that. So my third GM, she was an equity hire. And so the other two, we talked about equity, but never really panned out for various reasons. But she was straight off the bat, came in. I kind of needed a GM because I didn't really want to come back into the business after the second one departed. So she had a small agency doing more digital -focused advertising,

which was great. We needed that. Had expertise in that area. But she was basically a one -man band type, small operation. So I bought her business into mine. and gave her some equity in the pump business. And she took the role of GM, got a salary and stuff like that as well. So that's how we started that. And over time, she was to earn more sort of sweat equity plus buy -ins. And based on some much bit more structured rollout.

And then it sort of got to a point where I was so far removed from the business and I sort of started stocking my tech, my SaaS company. about seven years ago. That I was, yeah, time flies. That I was so far removed from the business that it sort of got to the point that if she was going to be properly incentivized, she needed a higher equity stake than the 15 % she had at the time. So we agreed that she'd take on more and eventually got to 100%. So now then just did the deal, which

concluded. about a year ago, I think it was. And now I just, because the business was, because she didn't have the funding, she just, it's just paid over a certain amount of time. To take a step back, when it was doing better pre -COVID, I did look at taking it to the market. And it's worth mentioning this because some people go through this process. A quick one while I've got you. You've probably listened to every business podcast going, this one obviously included, and

the biggest calls in your business still feel super hard and are yours to make alone. Talking to founders in exactly the spot, what I've worked out is that more content just won't fix this problem. What you need is frameworks that work in a room of people going through the same journey. That's the Comma Club. There's 50 founding places, and when they're gone, the founding rate goes up with them. Please head to joshcomrie .com to learn more. Service business, ad agency, three

and a half times EBIT. You know this one? Yeah. And I was like, hmm, okay. Our EBIT was pretty good at the time, so it was actually not a small chunk of change. But I sort of went and talked to a few people who were kind of interested, and some of them said, yeah, yeah, well, we only want these clients. We'd probably bin these. Get rid of all your staff. So basically tear the business down. And I just knew that they weren't probably going to, they weren't really respecting what the business was as it was. And it's New Zealand, Auckland, New Zealand is such

a small place that, you know, you had these comments like, oh, we could probably get those guys if we wanted to. And I was like, so you're not really respecting my moat, if you want to call it that, as far as the business I've built. So I conceded how that's going to play out in any kind of deal. So I thought, bugger it, I'm not going to do it. So I pulled back and the story I told myself. was if I can keep this business for three and a half years, earning this EBIT, it's basically everything after that's gravy, right? And I did

it. I can't say that EBIT stayed at that level thanks to COVID and a few other things, but I definitely made, in my, perceptually in my mind, I made that money. And I had the benefits of owning the business and there are some benefits, tax benefits of running a business. And so, yeah, so by the time I did exit finally, it was sort of like, perceptually in my mind, I'd made my money anyway. Right. So you might have had a discount of what the price that you could have achieved when you'd gone to market and the three

and a half times EBIT that you talked about. And so there was a bit of a discount that came to this point in time, but you'd done sufficiently well from the business that it kind of came out in the wash anyway. Yeah. And you've got to remember when you're selling to somebody who's an existing general manager in your business, running your P &L, there is no... gray areas with dd um yeah so it's an internal yeah acquire yeah yeah totally so they know the warts and all yeah types in our area so if you could go back and have a conversation with that dom now who was out in markets and

endeavoring to find a buyer and what i'm the story that i'm telling myself about what you've just told me is that um our first business is the reality is that a lot of our identity is tied up in that business We can't help ourselves. And so the notion of someone coming in and making that business different than how we've built it, like especially ripping out key staff and I can get those people up in the market if I wanted to and changing the positioning and all that sort of stuff is a bit difficult to hear sometimes. So if you could go back and have a

chat to that Dom, what would you tell him to do? Sell it or stay the path? I actually don't know. I probably would have been a bit more structured and invested a little bit more in expertise and helping me to sell it properly. I was nickel and diming a little bit as some of us entrepreneurial folk tend to do. We're taking shortcuts because we're like, oh, I don't want to pay a... somebody

to do this work for me to take it to the market. Six to 8 % or something is what a broker charges. And you feel like, oh, this is - I'm a sales guy. I can do this. Yeah, totally. And I remember you sent me the brief on it. And I'm like, it's slick. You're part advertising agency. So it was a really, really well designed. It told a good narrative. And so I remember we had the conversation at the time and I'm like, you know, it could be worth having a chat to one of these folk out there that could kind of help you out. And your story was good. You know, I know people and I know the industry and I know others that are in adjacent space. And so that decision point,

I call it one of the most expensive decisions that people don't know that they're making. Yeah. Because they're not engaging with the right level of expertise. And actually, sometimes it can. work out in your favor i think if you've gotten a certain mindset and if you've got capacity as well so you were running stock trim at that time and so you had essentially you were two lanes you were trying to you know two two businesses you're trying to run at the same time and so i had um dr michael felosi uh come on the show coming out next week and he was a dentist who

did a buy -in to a practice and then built it uh seven extra and then he's like one day i'm just done and so he did the whole thing himself end to end and he got a top quartile exit point for it but he'd gone and schooled himself up heavily on m &a like he'd read all the books listened to all the podcasts and then he just you know kind of went through that whole new role um it's a bit like that with tech business and when you're doing capital raising Let's come back to that. So Exeter pumped, you got involved

in StockTrim. And so what was the early origin stories of StockTrim? Well, the origin story is that the disaster that was the toy business. I had an inventory problem. What StockTrim is, is a tool, inventory forecasting for small businesses, small, medium -sized businesses. If I had had StockTrim and run that in my due diligence. and stock drum costs a few hundred bucks a month, I would have saved myself $1 .2 million because it would have been red blood all over the dashboards.

But I didn't. I didn't have it. And I still had no visibility in the business. So even if I'd bought the business and I was running it, as long as the data was correct, which that's another story, I would have realized what needed to be, what was the priorities about profitability, about slog. about zombie stock and all that sort of stuff and what to buy or sell versus what we needed to buy and that sort of stuff. So the story behind that is the problem that I felt viscerally was an issue that many businesses

carrying products face. A lot of people with reasonably good businesses with warehouses selling products. Most of them have an issue around inventory, whether they realize it or not. And it's affecting their P &L either through cash flow, through profitability, through just efficiencies, service levels, a bunch of areas that affect their business. And either they don't know or they do know and they don't know how to deal with it. So that's what our solution solves. And we're selling it

in 26 countries around the world now. Okay. uh direct to market what's your kind of business model and approach to market or are you um through resellers or uh it's multi multi -channel approach we have resellers working for us but um stock trim initially was as an add -on tool so we're not the system of record a lot of the resellers focus on the system of record because that's where all the money is and implementations so we're an add -on so we come in like and sort of down the down the down the pecking order a little bit but we do have resellers um We have tech partners, which are the guys we integrate

with, and they often recommend us because they want the ecosystem to grow around their product. So they have inventory management systems, ERP systems, accounting platforms, e -commerce platforms. But we do, I went straight direct to market because that was my background. And that's solid. But the cost in tech and SaaS is cost of acquisition, CAC, SME. direct -to -market, you've got to really, really watch it. You said a couple of hundred

bucks a month, 300 bucks a month is the price point for StockTrim? Yeah, it was. We've actually recently changed our pricing and we've moved slightly up a little bit more, not mid -market, but a little bit up. So our average pricing has gone up. Two to 400 US dollars we sell on USD. If you do the math of that over the course of 12 months, then that could be five to eight grand kind of thing. And one salesperson having two or three meetings with someone can immediately

kill that, can suck it completely gone. And so LTV -CAC ratio is such a critical one, as we both know. And it's one that I don't think a lot of people outside of technology necessarily think of as well. There's some dangers around that. agentic ai and all that sort of stuff a little bit and this happens with e -commerce as well it's like oh let's just remove the people out of this equation to keep our cost down and all of us had experience whether in the death spiral of an ai chat bot or something like that

and it's very frustrating when you're dealing with a solution and our solution we try to make it as easy to implement as possible some of our customers can be set up in 30 minutes but if they do need assistance you just can't abandon them and and that in that chat environment because um The temptation is to reduce your cost to serve by just automating everything. But some things just are very difficult to automate when it comes to setting the data up, getting the system of

record connected and understanding how to use a system. Yeah, we do. We try to do the heavy lifting 80 % of it, but recognize that 20 % of it has to be a bit of an area where you can push a button and go, hey, it's so -and -so from Stocksham. Yeah, got it. And along the way, you've raised some money. Yep. Tell us about that journey. Yeah, so as far as the capital raising goes, yeah, we sort of kicked off. I was the original funder. I bought the money. I had Paul, my co -founder, who built the software. I came in and threw some money, plus some sweet equity as the

sales and marketing side of it. And then we realized we had to raise some more money to keep things going. So I did a first round. That was a real interesting learning curve for me. What were the key insights for you of raising money? It's a funny old journey. And again, from the outset, you can think about it as a standard sales journey and it does have elements of that. But I'm curious on your thoughts and then I'll drop mine in. People with money, their opinions, it's good to get their reaction, but their opinions don't

always matter. Okay. I'll say that in a nice way. So I had to get used to this just because someone said, no, we don't think it's right. We don't think it's good. someone would say no it's not right for us that's cool but sometimes i just don't think it's gonna work and you know my reaction is like that sucks but then also if you yeah and um it's it's not really that's not really that's not really a response it's like okay next We just need to find the right people that believe in us. So that was a bit of a journey. Started out with angel groups,

which is great. It's a great way to get some practice in presenting stuff like that. But some of the angel groups, they just weren't really putting in a lot. Most of our monies actually come from private investors in the latter stages. But I did that dance with the angel groups and they were our initial cohort. And that was really helpful because it gave some sort of legitimacy, especially. And that's important in the New Zealand funding ecosystem. Yeah, that legitimacy is what I refer to as being the sheep notion of investors.

So people make grand claims and sound good and look good or whatever else they might be as investors. But at the end of the day, if you're able to secure a large cornerstone check from someone, especially someone that those people might know. Everyone else will pour into that deal. It's so funny. Like the first, as I say to people, if you're raising half a million dollars, the critical thing for you to do is to make sure you get one check of at least a hundred thousand, preferably maybe half of that. If you can get half of that in one check, that round is so easily done, man. And people focus on the five and the

10K investors. I'm like, no, no, win the whale, man. Get the whale across the line. Well, that critical point for us was Icehouse Ventures. Okay. So they came on first and then the rest of the few angel groups around the country came on. And then a few other people polled in privately that sort of had a connection with me that I knew through EO and a few others. And so we raised 500 and something thousand first. And then we did a little mini raise about a year later. And

then we raised about a year ago, we raised another 500 and something, 50 ,000. So we've raised about 1 .2 million in total. Okay. So not too much dilution for you and Paul, which is great. Yep. Yep. And so who was the most, what was the most difficult thing about the due diligence from any of those investors? What was the hardest thing that you had to answer or process you had to go through? Well, the angel groups had quite a rigorous process and probably the most difficult

thing was if they've had a committee, I had one angel group that, you know, they had a committee that was doing the DD and, you know, they. They were used to looking at certain types of SaaS companies, maybe a bit more mid -market or a different industry. So they're applying some of their learnings from those, as you would, to ours. And it's different. But it's hard to tell people that are doing DD on you that they're wrong. So you just had to sort of like, okay, well, that's your interesting. And, you know,

for various reasons that I don't invest because of their belief, it's quite frustrating. Especially once you go through that whole journey. Yeah, it's time consuming. That's the other thing. It's like when you're a founder and you're building a business, you know, on tools still, that's a whole new project that's raising capital. It's almost a full -time job. So you don't want to do it unless you really need it. Yeah, I would say that to people. If you're committed to doing this, it's going to take the best part of three months to get from this initial conversation

through to possibly a no or hopefully a yes for you. It'll be all consuming over that timeframe. And so you'll be distracted from the business of growing the business. And so whatever you need to do, make sure that that demand or that closing of business still happens whilst you're there doing that because typically the CEO. of early stage fundraising is also the CRO, Chief Revenue Officer, as well. It's a model perhaps that they have to wear. And so also have a contingency plan as well so that if it doesn't go the way that you hope that it does or you want it to

go, then you've got an alternate path that you can head down, whatever that might be. Yeah. And you do, it's like you have to create your own luck in this situation as well. So you might have some primary, sometimes your primary targets where you think you're going to get money from doesn't pan out for various reasons. All it takes is, oh no, we're doing this or we're not. doing it now or a bunch of things yeah um so yeah you'd have to have contingency plans for sure and it's it's a little bit of a numbers game but you know it's targeting and timing as well yeah it's a funny old space you know i've talked about this um quite quite regularly but the recapping is

you know 57 companies that I've invested in I've had seven exits out of that portfolio including New Zealand's largest ever individual angel exit in Kami 208 times my investment and so that's the you know kind of they weren't a unicorn but that that status of that kind of level and I don't think that I've gotten the um done in kruger effect uh i don't think that i have um but i have changed the way that i've invested over the years as you'd probably anticipate over 25 years and that many investments and i've made some clangor of mistakes as well like one of

them uh the team that i was involved in really competent team of assessing auror the crime analytics software they have the digital consumption of images inside retailers right and they know that if this person comes in the store they need to get security or get the police kind of thing and they're doing phenomenally well and you know we turned them down because they hadn't established product market fit and really we were investing in their product we're investing in those founders and we should have seen through that properly

That's probably my biggest claim because that's now well over $100 million of valuation and probably, you know, deserves every cent of it. But I turned down Jamie Beaton at Crimson, but I still look at their company and go, what? Yeah. Yeah. It's like it's, yeah, early stage. I mean. It's so hard. Like for both sides, you know, you're really backing the. Yeah. Not the idea, you're backing the founder and you're backing the timing of that thing that they're doing, but then you're backing the ability for them to pivot if that's

the right thing to do, but not do it too quickly. And so, you know, then you're not backing the team and you're backing the idea. Wow, you know, where do we, it becomes this vicious circle. You know, there's 10 different things you got to hold in mind simultaneously when you're evaluating this company. And also for you taking money from people, we always want smart money, you know, people that will contribute positively and proactively. not the raft, the trend that was going on in Australia when I was living there in the late 20 -teens with Ambit, was that investors would put these onerous tranche terms in. And in other

words, we'll give you a million dollar commitment, but it's half a million dollars now. And when you reach $2 million of revenue, you'll get the other half a million dollars. So that's what tranching means. Not those numbers necessarily, but that principle. And then I have seen the hockey stick work out. In 57 investments, I've seen it work out once. It's often happened, but it's taken far longer and cost more money than what anyone anticipates. So I just don't believe a hockey stick graph. So it's worked out once. So in other words, most of those companies have

fallen short of the expectations they set with investors. And so what was happening in Australia is that the investors were then going, oh, well, you don't get the second tranche. And by the way, the terms of our investment mean that we get control of the company and you're out in your ear. So then they get control of this company. And they're like, hey, Steve, Steve -o, mate, do you know what this is? No, no, mate, I don't know what this is. Bob, you know, I was just here for the ride. And I'm like, shit, what are we going to do with this bloody company kind of thing? And then they fell over. Company gets destroyed. Value gets destroyed. It's quite predatory, isn't it? It's really predatory. It's kind of

sad. I mean, I sometimes wonder if there's a better model for investing in early stage. There has to be. Have you conceived of what it might be or are you just wondering? No, no, I feel the same way. I'm relatively new on the scene as far as this goes and I'm sure that you see some iterations of different models pop up here and there. The guys at previously unavailable, Simon and Dan, have done pretty well, like the

venture studio kind of thing. You know, they've selected Martek as their space. And so ideally is their latest one. Their first one is, forgetting the name of it. They've been behind Extraordinary and another one which has gone incredibly well, which is remarkable. I've forgotten it because it's the fastest growing tech company in New Zealand's history. But anyway, they've been behind three of these incredible things and now they're working on the next one. So that's a slightly different model. So we'll give you some space, some ideas and a bit of capital. It's sort of

an incubator type thing. Yeah, it's kind of a cross between an incubator and a venture studio. So I don't know what the answer is now. I mean, you know, fundamentally speaking, we're living in this time in history where it's never been easier and cheaper to create IP and it's never been harder to get customers. Yeah, exactly. And so you kind of go the expense and the capability shift is probably interestingly, you know, for people like you and I, I have become much more of a product person over time, but I wasn't originally.

I was a solutions guy. I was about, you know, finding a market space and then working out. a model that was different to what others were doing and then hoping to win in that space and so that means you know sales and marketing kind of those sort of skills were involved in there and a bit of innovation uh and so interestingly those are now probably the most valuable skills whereas back 15 20 years ago was product skills that were more valuable because of expensive and hard to build ip yeah yeah i mean um yeah go to market is what what i what's It's a puzzle

that has to be continuously worked on. Everything now, you think you nailed it and then it just keeps moving. The rules of the game change. And in some ways, you know, the prevalence of LLMs now for replacing search, if it indeed is, it's actually helped us. How so? Well, we didn't have a lot of money to do real super fluffy websites. LLMs don't really like super fluffy websites. They like structured information. And we pretty

much had a decent description because we had to educate our market too. Our clients didn't really always understand that inventory forecasting was something that they could sign up for a subscription and be started on in 30 minutes. And a lot of them using spreadsheets. So if they plop that query into an LLM now, they'll... we're pretty well structured to pop up. So we sort of leaked the frog as far as that goes against these companies with way bigger budgets than us. Well, you got to remember we have to promote to a number of

countries, mostly English speaking countries. So it does help us and it does reduce our cost of acquisition. Still doing paid, good old PPC and paid ads and SEM and all that sort of stuff. But it's not as essential. You can turn off paid ads on our business for a while and not crash. So still on StockTrim, you went from being sole founder controlling shareholder of a business

to being essentially a business partnership with Paul. Yes. What are some things that you've learned about how to manage that situation effectively? Yeah, I mean, I used to be, consider myself a lone ranger. I didn't really like the idea of being in partnerships. In fact, you know, now. And our groups would sort of like often be in awe of the perils of partnerships and having multiple shareholders in a business. I believe

it slowed you down on decision -making and stuff like that. But in this situation, it's worked really well because Paul's got very clear domain expertise. He's a developer. He's a good developer. He built the product. He knows it inside out. And I'm not. I'm a marketer. So we've got clear domain expertise. So that works. So we sort of, we'll make suggestions in each other's patch, but we sort of, push comes to shove. You defer to the expertise. And that works. Communication's good. We're not in the same office all the time.

So we're pretty much doing our own thing, but with the same strategy in place and the same goals. regular communication, stick to your lanes in terms of what you've got expertise on. Probably now you've got some good reporting and dashboards and analytics and you know what's up, given your experience historically. So plan for stock trim. One would assume that if you've raised money, there's the traditional path, but what's your intentions with the company? Yeah, we're an add -on tool. At the moment, so we're specialist inventory forecasting. We don't do inventory

management. That's recording, right? So it's a different set of skills. Some people try to do everything, but we prefer to be agnostic and we can attach to it. We can be friends to anybody. We can attach to any system and do the inventory forecasting for you. But as a result, distribution is key for us. And one of the ways that we can grow rapidly is have a, be owned with an ecosystem of, say, a system, a number of systems that, have a lot of customers, that would sort out our whole go -to -market strategy in one fell

swoop. So what I'm trying to say is a trade sale is probably the most logical exit for us. We've been approached by buy and hold companies and the metrics are different, the valuations are different. Strategic acquisition within an ecosystem is where we're probably going to end up. Describe the difference between those two things, just for the people that are watching and unfamiliar. A buy and hold was like, hey, we like your business. It sort of fits into our portfolio. We're not going to mess with it too much. We'll give you

guys some money, but you sort of basically bought your business, and we're just going to keep running it, but run it with, say, a central office and build some efficiencies into it. Kind of like a private equity would be one of those types of deals, but also it could be an operator of a stable of different software brands as well. Yeah, Constellation Brands is a well -known one. It's a great example, yep. And, you know, we get door knocked on a regular basis for that. And the problem for that is that we're not really, I don't know if we're really a buy and hold ideal

prospect. The buy and hold is better for traditional software companies, in my opinion. So the guys, you know, a couple of dudes that had it for 30 years and they built it way from scratch and they got this great customer base, but it's not like, it's just a good solid EBITDA business. Probably legacy technology and with customers that are unlikely to change and some good stickiness of the experience as well. Yeah, and so there's some aspects of it. The buy and hold company,

the Constellation Brands, for example, that can add value in that equation. The strategic buyer is someone, let's say it's an ERP system or an inventory management and global player or someone with a good market presence. They come along and go, we don't have that technology. We could build it, but we could buy it. And what's the upside of it either? And sometimes they decide to buy. And what they do is they put it into their existing ecosystem. They add value to their

existing customers. There's a multiple play in there usually for them, for their customers. They can upsell, cross -sell their customers, something sexy and new. And we get absorbed into that ecosystem basically. Got it. But those companies are more likely to pay a higher multiple because they can see the strategic upside. Yep. Yeah, understood. That makes sense why that would be a preference for you. Yeah. So there's another

Dom Sutton that exists in another universe. He hasn't headed down the path of being the entrepreneur in a couple of quite different spaces, actually. And he's deeply satisfied with his career nonetheless. I've got some ideas as to what that career might be for you, but I'm curious as to what your thoughts are, then I'll share mine. So what is that Dom Sutton doing that's making him filled with sense of purpose? I knew you were going to ask me this question. So I thought about it. Like, I do love selling. I love hustling. But in a fully alternative

universe, I mean, knowing who I am now, I struggle. Whatever I was doing, I'd try to be finding the gap between the opportunity, the arbitrage, right? I'm always doing that. So the gap between supply and demand, I suppose you could say. There's money to be made there. But in an alternate universe, I do love minimalist functionality. So I love

it when I see something that is done so cleverly, like we could call it architecture. It could just be a thing like this. And it's built way better than everything else. And it works. And I love the simplicity of it. So, I mean, maybe a designer or some sort of architect. I do like, I'm quite visual. I like, when I see a building that's been designed and built efficiently, I think it's, well, put it this way, it pains me

when I'm driving around parts of the North Shore and see some of these new developments and they've slapped this thing on top of this quite nice section. And it's like, geez, what a wasted opportunity. But that's my answer. If you combine the two, probably a property developer or something. Right, right. But there has to be an upside and a beauty of the actual structure. Yes, not just monetary. Yeah. Yeah, I would have said own a bar. um in

brazil that has like a dive school or something attached to it so you've got this experience kind of thing like a windsurfing or you know something or a jet ski rental or something that you've got on the side of it so say it's your love for the uh the sun yeah plus running a business and plus you've got a throughput of people that um are interesting kind of um fun people to to associate with yeah i have a few caipirinhas then going for a dive might be a little bit on the um health and safety maybe dive first in caipirinhas afterwards I think you're probably going to do that anyway, aren't you? It's probably

in five years' time. I think how fun it would be just to find some spot. Yeah, somewhere in Brazil or somewhere in South America, just find a little spot by the beach and do that. But let's all be honest, that would wear off. The novelty of that would wear off pretty fast. And this interesting business that you had on the side of it, that could be fun. I wouldn't personally want to do a tourism business. You're chasing the reviews constantly and trying to appease people that are probably quite cheap through

their very virtue. Adventure, high -end tourism, that'd be interesting as a thing to do. Experiences for wealthy folk. That'd be an interesting thing to do because then you're rubbing shoulders with smart people, not backpackers. Rene De Monchi, the head of Tourism New Zealand, is a good friend of mine. And I remember him saying some years ago about their targeting campaign. He goes, there's a certain type of tourist that we have from a certain part of the world who spends $50 a day. We don't want those people. They buy crappy old vans in the market in Parnell. Those things

die. Typically, we're in the round New Zealand. They free camp everywhere. They're dreadful for New Zealand. Massive carbon footprint and not great for the brand New Zealand. Super yacht owners, they spend $10 ,000 a day on average per person. And so that's what we want more of. And people go, that's elitist, that's selective. Well, hold on. Like if you can have one person turning up to your business who's going to spend $10 ,000 versus what have you got times 200?

You've got to eat 200 of this other tourist. Yeah. Like. It's way more efficient, isn't it? It's a bit of a no -brainer, right? Yeah. I think just about that, I think there's an opportunity in the future if I was. Like I used to do those boat trips in Croatia and it was great to bring back, basically hire a boat, big boat, get a bunch of entrepreneurs through various groups who belong to together and then have a week of fun under sort of a package. And it was like getting like -minded people together. No, not

too business heavy, not too, but it was people who were sort of aligned in their thinking and aspirations. Um, to have a good time together. And I think what's happening, you know, just as we get a bit more isolated, you know, the whole, there's still that desire for community. Um, and it's getting worse because I think that's where a lot of anxiety and stuff like that comes from is we just don't have other people around us that we can bounce off. Um, you know, I think there's an opportunity, like I've just been at conferences in the US, right? Um, and I think

the conference industry is going to help to fill this, not, not the big. massive conferences but you know the more retreat and more bespoke events that brings people together out of their houses out of their work from homes um and a more curated event and not always business business it's just like but people who are aligned and i've got the ideas potentially i mean hiring you know let's just say a villa in southern spain or italy on the coast and getting groups of people who similar and under a subject matter or lifestyle

similarities together to chat, hang out, have a few drinks. A little bit of curated stuff, a little bit of freeform stuff, unconference a bit of it as well. Yeah. And see what rubs out the back end of it. Yeah, well, I've got friends all around the world as a result of these trips I've done. Yeah. And, you know, I've caught up with a guy who I met on the boat in Croatia. in Denver, hanging out, had lunch. The stuff never would have happened if we hadn't have done

those trips. Had you not curated that opportunity in the first place. Yeah. Well, either way, whichever path you end up heading down, I look forward to following the journey as always and very grateful for you to come on the show and share your experience with us today. Cool. Thanks, Josh. Nice one. Thanks so much for listening to the show. If you've gotten this far, I reckon you've probably enjoyed it. And there's more available for you in the form of my book, Two Commas. It's available on my website, joshcomrie .com. I've done an Audible version, which is on amazon .com, and

there's a Kindle one kicking around on either of those resources as well. I've had some wonderful unsolicited feedback from early readers. They describe it as being punchy, clear, helpful, and actionable. What it's not is a guide on how to sell your company. You can go to ChatGPT for that. It's more insightful, experiential -based. and a bit of a blend of psychology, philosophy, and what it takes to build something meaningful, and what all that means afterwards. Thanks so much for listening, and I hope you grab yourself

a copy.

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